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Abstract 
The thesis seeks to examine the competitiveness of the methods by which beer has been 
distributed in the UK, particularly the beer tying agreement, with the objective of setting 
out recommendations for the future. In order to fulfil this objective, the thesis aims firstly 
to engage in a scholarly exercise of clarifying the role and purpose of the beer tie; the 
application of the EU competition law provisions to the brewing industry; and the UK 
Government’s approach to regulating it. Secondly, the thesis engages in comparative 
research and will consider how other non-UK markets have dealt with the distribution of 
beer, and more specifically the issue of the beer tie.  In doing so, the thesis seeks to 
ascertain how competitive the UK market is in the context of these other geographical 
markets. The thesis will also compare the UK beer market with another UK market in 
which the use of tying agreements is prevalent in order to ascertain whether the same 
issues have been faced in this market as in the beer market. The intention of the 
comparative research in the thesis is to provide assistance to legal policy makers on the 
future regulation of beer distribution in the UK. The thesis does not however undertake to 
propose measures to achieve a state of perfect competition. Rather, it undertakes, as the 
third aim of the thesis, to propose informed recommendations that address better the on-
going anti-competitive concerns associated with the operation of the beer tie today and 
ensure a socially acceptable level of workable competition. 
 	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this 
dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree 
at the University of Glasgow or any other institution. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
The thesis seeks to examine the competitiveness of the methods by which beer has been 
distributed in the UK, particularly the beer tying agreement, with the objective of setting 
out recommendations for the future. 
1. Contextual background and motivation for the research 
The thesis examines the competitiveness of the mechanisms for the distribution of beer in 
the UK, focusing on the use of beer tying agreements. The distribution of beer by tying 
agreements has a very long tradition in the UK market becoming a feature of the UK 
brewing industry with the emergence of wholesale brewing in the 18th Century.1  However, 
as the tie has evolved, this method of distributing beer has also caused concern to 
successive UK Governments, and has also attracted the attention of the European Union 
(EU) competition authorities, due to its anticompetitive effects manifested inter alia in the 
closed nature of the trade and lack of price competition between public houses (pubs). 
Despite significant intervention by the UK Government in the late 1980s to open up the 
market to competition, the beer tie has persisted. The scrutinisation of its use has also 
continued with the rise of the non-brewing pub owning companies (pubcos) over the past 
twenty-five years.2 The on-going operation of the beer tie by these pubcos has been 
associated with the continuing and significant number of public house closures in the UK, 
causing this to become an increasingly vexed issue. Whilst the industry is continually 
changing and consolidating, recent estimates suggest that 58.7% of the UK’s pubs are 
owned and so tied to either a brewer or a pubco.3   
Whilst in broad terms the subject matter of the thesis is the competitiveness of the methods 
by which beer is distributed in the UK market, beer distribution can be broken down into 
two main channels. The first channel is the off-trade where beer is distributed to retail 
outlets for consumption off of the premises, such as supermarkets. The second channel is 
the on-trade, where beer is sold for consumption on licensed premises, namely pubs and on 
which the thesis is focused. The scope of the thesis is then narrowed further to the 
competitiveness of tying agreements within the UK on-trade.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Beer A Report on the supply of beer for retail 
sale in the United Kingdom (Cm651, 1989) at para 2.1, p6 
2 Brewing pubcos exist in the UK market but are fewer in size and number than their non-brewing 
counterparts 
3 As at 2012. R Hucker, (ed), ‘Market Report 2013, Public Houses’ (Key Note, 2013) at Table 2.4, p21 
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In 2010, at the beginning of the thesis, whilst I was working for the international brewer 
Heineken, the pressure group the Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA), as a designated 
consumer body, had made a much publicised ‘super-complaint’ to the then UK 
competition authority, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)4 concerning the UK pub industry. 
In accordance with s.11 of the Enterprise Act 2002, such a complaint is permissible where 
a designated consumer body believes any feature, or combination of features, of a market 
in the UK for goods or services is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of 
consumers. Whilst unsuccessful, with the OFT ruling that it had ‘not found evidence of any 
anticompetitive problems that are having a significant impact on consumers’, the issue of 
the use of the beer tie has persisted, as it did for decades prior to the Super Complaint.5  
Consequently since the research began, there have been numerous additions to the existing 
and vast body of Government backed reports into the issue of the beer tie. However, 
despite the question of the competitiveness of UK beer tie agreements not being an entirely 
novel one, with much research already being produced on this topic, it is apparent that 
there is a gap in the literature that the thesis looks to fill. Whilst the existing body of work 
serves to highlight the importance and significance of the subject matter, the vast majority 
of literature on the distribution of beer in the UK is not academic literature, although a 
body of such literature does exist.  Rather, the literature has been produced by interested 
parties such as Government backed Departments and Committees as well as pressure 
groups. Further, despite over a decade of declining to intervene in the operation of the beer 
tie, following its intervention in the late 1980s, on 26th March 2015 the Small Business 
Enterprise and Employment Act received Royal Assent (2015 Act). Part 4 of the 2015 Act 
introduces a statutory Pubs Code for England and Wales,6 along with an independent Pubs 
Code Adjudicator to enforce it. Thus, this is an opportune moment to examine critically the 
role of tying agreements in the distribution of beer in the UK and to evaluate whether 
statutory regulation is the correct solution to the competition problems that have arisen in 
the UK beer distribution market. Consequently, the key objective of the thesis, in contrast 
to the existing body of work on this topic, is to provide an objective, systematic and 
holistic analysis of the issue.  
In doing so, the thesis aims firstly to engage in a scholarly exercise of clarifying the role 
and purpose of the beer tie; the application of the EU competition law provisions to the 
brewing industry; and the UK Government’s approach to regulating it. Having analysed its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As of 1st April 2014 the OFT closed with its responsibilities passing to the Competition and Markets 
Authority however for simplicity it will be referred to throughout the thesis as the OFT. 
5 Office of Fair Trading, CAMRA super-complaint – OFT final decision (OFT 1279, 2010) at p6 
6 This is a devolved matter however similar intervention is being considered in Scotland. 
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role, purpose and regulation, the thesis will engage, secondly, in comparative research and 
will consider how other non-UK markets (United States, Australia and Belgium) have dealt 
with the distribution of beer, and more specifically the issue of the beer tie.  In doing so, 
the thesis seeks to ascertain how competitive the UK market is in the context of these other 
geographical markets, whilst acknowledging the limitations of such international 
comparison. The thesis will also compare the UK beer market with another UK market 
(petroleum) in which the use of tying agreements is prevalent in order to ascertain whether 
or not the same issues have been faced in this market as in the beer market.  The intention 
of the comparative research in the thesis is to provide assistance to legal policy makers on 
the future regulation of beer distribution in the UK.  Whilst the complex legal, historical 
and economic issues specific to the UK market have long proven stumbling blocks in the 
search for the perfect solution to the issues faced, the thesis does not undertake to propose 
measures to achieve a state of perfect competition. Rather, it undertakes, as the third aim of 
the thesis, the more modest task of proposing informed recommendations that better 
address the on-going anti-competitive concerns associated with the operation of the beer tie 
today and ensure a socially acceptable level of workable competition.  
2. The research questions 
The main objective of the thesis is to examine the competitiveness of the methods by 
which beer has been distributed in the United Kingdom (UK), focusing on the beer tying 
agreement, with one primary objective of setting out recommendations that better address 
the on-going anti-competitive concerns associated with the operation of the beer tie today 
and ensure a socially acceptable level of workable competition. The six main research 
questions to comply with this objective are as follows.  
1) Given the historical development of the beer market in the United Kingdom, why 
has the beer tie been such an integral part of its development up to and including 
the 21st Century?  
2) Given that the EU has a strong competition law regime to open up markets to 
competition, with tying agreements having the opposite effect, how have the EU 
competition law rules been applied to the brewing industry which relies on the use 
of such agreements?  
3) How has the United Kingdom Government regulated the beer tie? 
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4) How have other geographical markets, such as the USA, Australia and Belgium, 
dealt with beer distribution? 
5) Have other markets that rely on tying agreements, such as the petroleum market in 
the United Kingdom, had the same issues as the distribution of beer in the United 
Kingdom?   
6) What reforms are required to the distribution of beer in the United Kingdom? 
3. The methodology and sources 
As stated previously, the thesis is concerned with the competitiveness of the methods by 
which beer has been distributed in the UK, particularly the beer tying agreement, and with 
proposing recommendations for the future. Research therefore began with a consideration 
of the historical development of the beer market in the UK to determine the role of the beer 
tie. This necessitated a literature review of historical works on the UK brewing industry, 
the development of the tied house system, industrial organisation and the history of liquor 
licensing in this country. However, as was to be a recurring theme throughout this research 
process, given the on-going interest of successive Governments in the operation of the 
market, comprehensive reports produced by various Government bodies up to the year 
2000, have also been reviewed. These provide an overview of the competitive situation 
prevailing in the UK market as at the date of publication and the primary concerns and 
issues that required to be addressed. The terms of statutory instruments implemented to 
address the concerns identified in the foregoing reports over the use of the beer tie are also 
considered and the implications of such measures for the market are reviewed. In doing so, 
market reports on the operation of the beer and public house markets provided valuable 
insight into market size, competitor analysis and market forecasts at different points in 
time, thereby assisting in developing an accurate representation of the market, as did the 
relevant academic literature on the operation of beer tie agreements in the UK and the 
effects of Government intervention in the market. 
The thesis also draws on the application of the EU competition law rules, particularly 
Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to tying 
agreements. However, at the EU level, the study focuses not only on the primary Treaty 
provisions, but also considers in detail the provisions and application of successive vertical 
agreement block exemption Regulations (BER). The case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), the General Court and the European Commission dealing with 
the interpretation and application of the EU competition rules to vertical agreements, and 
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more specifically beer tying agreements, has also been reviewed. This has been instructive 
in charting the evolving approach of the EU in the application of these rules to the brewing 
industry. Numerous Commission Notices on the application of the Treaty provisions and 
the BERs, as well as Commission Guidelines and Reports on competition have been relied 
on in this regard. Several standard literature works on the EU and on the economic effects 
of vertical agreements7 have been reviewed in conjunction with academic works dealing 
specifically with the issue of the beer tie.8  
The thesis then explores how the UK Government has regulated the beer tie, noting the 
influence the EU has had on its approach since the UK’s accession in 1973. This 
necessitated that the relevant case law of the UK courts on the issue of the legality and 
application of the beer tie be reviewed. The UK legal regime and its harmonisation with 
the EU competition law provisions have also been investigated, thereby necessitating a 
review of the UK competition law regime applicable to beer tying agreements. In charting 
the concerns over the use of the beer tie since the year 2000, and the UK Government’s 
response to those concerns, again the reports produced by the UK Government and 
associated bodies have been reviewed, most notably those of the Trade and Industry 
Committee, the Department of Business Innovation and Skills and its Committee, as well 
as the OFT. The CAMRA super complaint is also reviewed in order to further understand 
the on-going concerns over the operation of the beer tie in the UK. In light of the very 
recent enactment of the 2015 Act, in order to inform a critical analysis of its provisions, 
Hansard has been consulted to ascertain Parliament’s motivations behind Part 4 of the Act. 
After considering the EU and UK positions on the use of beer tying agreements, the thesis 
then considers how other geographical markets have dealt with the distribution of beer. 
This is in order to ascertain whether any guidance can be gleaned as to appropriate future 
recommendations for the UK. Following a review of general texts9 on other geographical 
markets, three jurisdictions were selected for comparison on a case study basis. Firstly, the 
United States (US) as it is one of the largest and most established beer markets but has 
long outlawed the use of the beer tie; secondly, Australia as it is a Commonwealth country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For example J Goyder, EU Distribution Law 5th Edition (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011); A Jones and B 
Sufrin, EU Competition Law Texts, Cases and Materials 5th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); 
S Marco Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law A Comparative Study of the EU and US Regimes 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010); and V Korah and W.A. Rothnie, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC 
Competition Rules Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 2nd Edition (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1982) 
8 For example, I.M. Sinan, ‘Tied House Agreements and the EEC Competition Rules: A Brief History’  
(1985) N.L.J. 25 October 1063; and D.A Everreste, ‘British and European Community regulation of the 
British Beer Market: Tapping into the tied house system (Cheers!)’ (1990) 20 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 583 
9 For example J.F.M. Swinnen, eds, The Economics of Beer (New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2011); 
D Kirkby et al, The Australian Pub (Sydney, UNSW Press, 2010); and A Mittelman, Brewing Battles a 
History of American Beer (United States, Algora Publishing, 2008) 
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which recently implemented measures to outlaw the use of the beer tie subject to certain 
exceptions; and thirdly, Belgium which is another EU Member State which permits the use 
of the beer tie but is considered to have one of the most diversified beer markets in the 
world. The investigation of these markets required a review of historical texts on the 
evolution of each beer market in order to determine how their development has influenced 
their current day market structures and the means employed to distribute beer. The 
evolution of the competition law regime in each jurisdiction was also investigated through 
consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, and in the US the provisions of the US 
Constitution were considered. Literature on the current day market structures and 
competition law regimes in all three jurisdictions was subsequently reviewed. However, 
certain restrictions were imposed on the investigation into these markets. With regard to 
the Belgian beer market language limitations were encountered as Belgian legislation and 
cases are officially translated into Dutch and French only and literature on the historical 
development of the market and on its wholesale sector is largely in these languages. This 
limited the sources available to draw upon causing reliance to be placed on only a 
relatively limited number of sources. More generally, a further limitation on the research 
was presented by the difficulty experienced in obtaining accurate and up to date statistics 
on the brewing markets in each of these jurisdictions. The most comprehensive 
information is confined to market reports produced by independent providers of strategic 
market research, and these have not been accessible in the course of this research. Reliance 
has therefore had to be placed on alternative sources that are potentially not as detailed. 
The thesis then considers whether another market in the UK that also relies heavily on 
tying agreements, namely the petroleum market, has also faced the same issues as the 
brewing industry.  Comparing the distribution of beer and petrol required a review of the 
historical development of the petroleum market in order to understand the role of tying 
agreements within it and to ascertain the current day market structure. This necessitated 
consideration of market reports and historical reports produced by Government bodies 
such as the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). The numerous similarities 
between these two markets have also been recognised at the EU level meriting special 
treatment for exclusive purchasing agreements within these industries under the EU 
competition law provisions. Consequently, the relevant provisions of the EU BERs were 
considered. The research sources for these markets therefore also share many similarities. 
As with the UK beer market, there have been numerous and on-going Government 
investigations into the operation of the UK petroleum industry and so consideration of this 
market required that these be reviewed in order to identify any similarities with the 
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concerns associated with the distribution of beer. This also provided an insight into the 
structure of the market at various points in time, up to and including the current day, the 
competition issues raised and the Government’s response.   
Finally, the thesis makes recommendations for the reform of the distribution of beer 
drawing on the preceding chapters. 
4. The structure of the thesis  
The thesis is divided into 7 main chapters, each seeking to provide answers to the research 
questions. Chapter 1 sets out the objectives, research questions and the structure of the 
thesis.  
Chapter 2 establishes the historical links between the British brewing industry and public 
houses, helping the reader to understand why the beer tie has been and continues to be an 
integral part of the UK market. It identifies the growing concerns of successive UK 
Governments over the use of such tying agreements up to the year 2000 and analyses the 
action taken to open up the market to competition by the UK Government.  
Chapter 3 examines the application of the EU competition rules to vertical tying 
agreements with particular emphasis on the distribution agreements for beer.  This Chapter 
provides a contextual background to the EU’s evolving approach towards such vertical 
agreements, and to the EU BERs which now play a central role in the application of the EU 
competition rules to such agreements. The EU’s stance on these agreements also has its 
roots in the unique goals of EU competition law and in the seminal case law of the 
European Commission and the CJEU which is considered in the chapter.  
Chapter 4 follows with an analysis of the UK Government’s policy on the regulation of 
beer tying agreements. This provides an insight into the evolution of the UK’s approach 
towards these agreements. The chapter considers the UK’s accession to the EU and 
reviews the harmonisation of the UK’s competition law regime applicable to beer tying 
agreements with the European rules. The numerous reports resulting from on-going 
enquiries into the UK market from the year 2000 onwards are also reviewed noting any 
influence the EU’s position has had on the UK Government’s tolerance of these 
arrangements. Finally the chapter critiques the provisions of Part 4 of the 2015 Act, which 
addresses the use of beer tying agreements in the UK market.   
Chapters 5 sets out by way of comparison with the US, Australia and Belgium whether any 
guidance can be gleaned from other non-UK beer markets when making recommendations 
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for the future reform of beer distribution in the UK.  The evolution of these beer markets 
and the legal regimes regulating them will be analysed as part of this selective comparison. 
In this chapter it will be concluded whether or not these regimes provide a solution to the 
issues faced in the UK over the use of beer tying agreements.  
Chapter 6 then follows with an analysis of the petroleum industry in the UK, as this is an 
industry in which tying agreements are also widely used and which shares certain 
characteristics with the UK beer market. This Chapter will ascertain whether or not the UK 
petroleum industry has encountered the same issues as the distribution of beer in the UK 
and whether it provides any guidance regarding the future regulation of beer distribution in 
the UK.  
Finally Chapter 7 draws on the foregoing chapters and details the conclusions of the thesis 
and proposes recommendations for the reform of beer distribution in the UK. 
The cut-off date for the research is 26th March 2015. 
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Chapter 2 - The UK’s Beer Distribution Market 
This chapter maps the historical development of the beer market in the United Kingdom 
with the objective of understanding why the beer tie agreement has become such an 
integral feature of the UK market right up to and including the 21st Century. The chapter 
also considers the anticompetitive concerns of such agreements which prompted 
unprecedented Government intervention in the form of the Beer Orders in 1989.  
The chapter first provides a brief description of the history of the beer distribution market 
in the UK and, in particular, examines the links binding the British brewing industry with 
the public house market (Subsection 1). The focus of the chapter then turns to the 
anticompetitive concerns that have worried successive UK Government and competition 
authorities, resulting in an investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC), the issue of the Beer Orders, and the subsequent emergence of pub companies 
(pubcos). The position is reviewed to the point of the OFT’s decision to revoke the Beer 
Orders in 2000 (Subsection 2).  
1. A brief historical context: the links binding the British brewing industry 
to the public house market 
The British brewing industry has long been linked to the public house market with both 
sharing a great history spanning back as far as Roman Times.1 This vertical integration 
between the production and retailing of beer has therefore been a characteristic of the 
industry for a long time, with wholesale brewing developing in the eighteenth century. 
However, Government intervention, for non-economic reasons, through licensing laws and 
regulations, has also affected its structure, with the licensing of local ale houses being 
introduced in 1552.2 This invariably tightened and relaxed over the subsequent decades as 
the brewing industry evolved through periods of varying degrees of hostility. These ranged 
from the temperance movement to latter day public interest concerns. However, it was in 
the eighteenth century that the custom which came to be known as the ‘loan tie’ emerged.3 
The loan tie hugely influenced the retailing of beer by allowing the brewer to maintain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Beer A Report on the supply of beer for retail 
sale in the United Kingdom (Cm651, 1989) at para 2.1, p6 
2 Ibid at para 2.1, p6. Regulation of the trade in alcohol was considered necessary as “free use of intoxicating 
drinks produced not only incapacity and disease among all classes but also…idleness and disorderly living, 
crimes against life and property and even riot and rebellion.” S Webb and B Webb, History of Liquor 
Licensing in England Principally from 1700 to 1830 (London, Longmans Green & Company, 1903) at p2 
3 K.H. Hawkins and C.L. Pass, The Brewing Industry A Study in Organisational and Public Policy (London, 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1979) at p18.  
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control over the products sold in retail outlets in exchange for a loan to the licensee.4 
Further, the property tie, whereby licensed houses are owned by brewers and leased to 
tenants on the provision that only the Landlord’s beers are sold on the premises, was later 
to emerge towards the end of the nineteenth century.5 The property tie has been, and 
continues to be, as controversial today.  Consequently, public and Parliamentary concern 
over the relationship between the brewer and the licensee has been on-going since the 
nineteenth century.6  
Nevertheless, it should be noted at the outset that varying approaches, and degrees of 
control, were exerted by brewers in different parts of the country at different times.7 This is 
best exemplified by the Scottish market where, as will be discussed below, the licensing 
laws were very different from those in England, and so, the tied house system was largely 
unknown in Scotland as late as 1914, with free houses continuing to dominate for years 
after.8 London, however, emerged in the early eighteenth century as the centre of 
commercial brewing, and so it will primarily be used to illustrate the evolution of the beer 
tie by way of loan and property ownership.9 
1.1 The emergence of wholesale brewing  
In charting the evolution of the beer tie and the brewing industry, Vaizey states “[o]ne of 
the most consistent trends in the history of brewing in the nineteenth century was the 
decline of the small brewers and the gradual concentration of beer output on the bigger 
breweries”.10 This was due to the fact that during the eighteenth century, the brewing 
process was relatively primitive.11 It was a primarily domestic industry, dominated by 
publican brewers producing beer either for their own consumption or for sale on their 
premises.12 Donnachie notes that in Scotland, brewing remained a largely domestic activity 
until the late eighteenth century with brewing publicans not being uncommon in the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Above n.1, at para 2.1, p6 and above n.3 at p18 
5 D.M. Knox, ‘The Development of the Tied House System in London’ (1958) 10 Oxf Econ Pap 66 at p66 
6 Above, n.1 at para 2.1, p6 
7 Above, n.5 at p67 
8 T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry 1830-1980 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at p409 
9 In outlying areas commercial brewing developed in the central industrial areas and in particular Burton-on-
Trent, where Bass and Allsopp dominated the trade as the water was particularly suited to certain types of 
beer and attracted many large brewers. A Seldon, ‘The British Brewing Industry’ (1953) (October) Lloyds 
Bank Review 30 at p31 
10 J Vaizey, The Brewing Industry 1886-1951 An Economic Study (London, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, 
1960) at p3 
11 Above, n.3 at p14 
12 Ibid at p14 
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nineteenth century.13 Large commercial brewers failed to displace smaller regional brewers 
in Scotland until 1850-1914, whilst in England this process was already under way.14  
Wholesale brewers, meaning those who brewed beer at one location and distributed it to 
other retail outlets, appeared in the eighteenth century.15 Brewing was at the forefront of 
the retailing revolution which saw the majority of trade in London and larger towns being 
done on a substantial scale at designated points of sale.16  Further, at this time there were 
significant and highly important differences in regional and local tastes and the competitive 
character of the brewing industry was focused on the strength, flavour and reliability of the 
brewer’s products.17 Consequently, ‘porter’, a heavy brew preferred in London, had a 
significant impact on the organisation of the London trade.18 It could be brewed in very 
large quantities and resulted in the concentration of brewing amongst a dozen large 
brewers, who gained significant cost, as well as quality, advantages due to the scale of their 
operations.19 Further, as retailers increasingly opted to obtain the bulk of their supplies 
from a single brewer, this development enabled the brewer to judge demand for his 
product. Such a steady demand was essential in order to ensure economic production as 
beer is a perishable product.20  Consequently, Mathias suggests that from the end of the 
eighteenth century, brewers intentionally sought to gain control of the retail trade.21  
From 1790 onwards, with the re-introduction of restrictive licensing, for the brewer, the 
economic significance of the reliant publican increased and there was a drive to obtain tied 
trade. Mathias states that there is evidence from early in the eighteenth century suggesting 
that public houses were also increasingly falling into the possession of brewers through 
bankruptcy and ‘accidents of trade’.22 Consequently, he suggests that “the tied house was 
universal, and co-extensive with wholesale brewing: it may well have been coeval with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I Donnachie, A History of the Brewing Industry in Scotland (Edinburgh, John Donald Publishers Limited, 
1979) at p117 
14 Ibid at p160  
15 Above, n.1 at para 2.1, p6 
16 By 1880, the industry was increasingly concentrated amongst larger enterprises which were able to reduce 
their unit costs at a faster rate than the smaller brewers. (Above, n.10 at p4 and p6) Vaizey notes that as the 
brewing process became more exact as the industry became more scientific, the optimum size of breweries  
increased and the available market area also grew due to advances in transportation. (See above, n.10 at p6)   
17 Above, n.3 at p19 
18 Ibid at p19 
19 Ibid at p19. At later dates, the same concentration occurred in Bristol, Burton-on-Trent, Norwich and 
Dublin as wealthy individuals maximised the economies of scale made possible by the technical 
advancements. Above n.10 at p3  
20 Above, n.5 at 67 
21 P Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England 1700-1830 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959) 
at p119 
22 Ibid at p119 
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it.”23 However, despite this evidence, tied houses did not absorb large amounts of capital 
and the brewer was rarely the freeholder of the houses under his control, often making a 
loss, not a profit, in his capacity as landlord.24 Consequently, from the outset it was 
apparent that this investment was not made with a view to profiting in the real estate 
market, but rather to further the brewer’s interests as a brewer.25  
1.2 The impact of restrictive licensing 
However, despite the weight afforded by Mathias to wholesale brewing as a reason for the 
development of the tied house system, the structure of the brewing industry has also long 
been affected by state intervention on public interest grounds. This has principally been by 
way of licensing as a reaction by the UK Parliament to drunkenness and with the control of 
the licensing process being conferred on the Justices of the Peace due to its association 
with the prevention of crime.26 Consequently, Knox supports the view of S and B Webb 
that the foundations of the close relationship between the brewing industry and retail 
outlets were strengthened as restrictive licensing highlighted the logic of vertical 
integration.27 Brewers sought greater control of retail outlets in 1790 when restrictive 
licensing was enforced, following on from a period of leniency which had been largely 
unrestricted until 1787.28 This came to an end as concern grew over the ever rising number 
of beer and ale houses as well as the “unruly and rowdy” behaviour of the clientele.29  
Legislation was subsequently introduced which afforded Justices of the Peace great power 
in reducing the number of licences available, whilst also permitting them to exercise tighter 
control of the remaining licences.30 This included refusal of new licences, the withdrawal 
of licences where the public house was not properly conducted, and in some cases, the 
introduction of local veto regarding the opening of new public houses and the closing of 
existing ones without any compensation.31 Consequently, S and B Webb explain the need 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid at p120 
24 Often the brewer had to make payments to the freeholder which almost rivalled the rent received, and was 
responsible for the upkeep of the property. (Ibid at p120) 
25 Ibid p120 
26 Although beer was once “regarded as a necessity of life”, enjoyed with every meal and preferred by the 
majority of the population, S and B Webb state that due to the crime and nuisance associated with excessive 
drinking, successive governments have been forced to tackle the cause, and so have brought the trade in 
alcohol under legislative regulation. S Webb and B Webb, History of Liquor Licensing in England 
Principally from 1700 to 1830 (London, Longmans Green & Company,1903) at p 2-4 
27 Above, n.5 at 66. This is also supported by Hawkins and Pass. Above, n.3 at p3 
28 Above, n.3 at p17. As S and B Webb note, during this period, licences to keep ale houses could be issued 
by two Justices of the Peace, regardless of whether they had any knowledge of the applicant and effectively 
were granted to anyone and not withdrawn. Above, n.26 at p15  
29 Above, n.3 at p17 
30 Above, n.3 at p17. The Monopolies Commission, Beer – A Report on the Supply of beer (HC 1969, 216) at 
p153-158  
31 Above, n.26 at p49-50  
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for and intensification of ownership and control of retail outlets at such an early stage 
within the licensed trade on the basis of restrictive licensing. They noted discontent over 
tying between 1816 and 1830 but considered that greater stringency in the licensing 
process encouraged the practice.32 
“When Justices made it a practice, before granting a licence, to require that the 
applicant should show that he occupied premises suitable for the business, they 
insensibly passed into virtually licensing the houses, as well as the particular occupiers. 
It then became inevitable that the brewers, commanding large capitals, should advance 
money to enable the necessary alterations to be made, and thus obtain control of a 
large proportion of the premises on which drink was sold, either by simple purchase of 
the property, or by the publican’s indebtedness. It was reiterated on all side, that 
limitation of the number of public-houses, their alteration and enlargement to suit the 
requirements of the Justices, the insistence on substantial sureties for good behaviour, 
and the general increase of pecuniary responsibility involved in stricter regulation, all 
fostered the tied house system.”33   
Consequently, it is clear that restrictive licensing had a significant role to play in the initial 
development of the loan tie. This practice of loan tying was established throughout 
England by 1817, when the Select Committee reporting on the conditions in the trade, 
noted that approximately one half of London public houses were tied and that the practice 
was also prevalent in country areas.34 By contrast, Donnachie states that evidence of tied 
trade in Scotland before 1850 is very limited with none of the existing brewery archives 
providing any evidence of this.35  
1.3 The loan tie and its advantages 
For the reasons stated above, the loan tie was extensively utilised by the London brewers. 
The restrictions on the number of licences available gave rise to what was known as a 
“monopoly value” and thereby encouraged the development of this practice of loan tying.36 
Due to the significant level of investment required to acquire such a property, which was 
greater than that commonly available to those wishing to enter the retail trade, potential 
publicans were forced to obtain loans in order to finance such entry.37 Knox comments that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid at p88 
33 Ibid at p88-89  
34 This was the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Public Breweries,1817. Above, n.3 at p26-27 
35 Above, n.13 at p128  
36 Above, n.5 at p67 
37 Ibid at p67 
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brewers were virtually the sole source of such funding.38 This was due to the precarious 
nature of such lending, on account of the insecurity of the licence obtained, which could be 
removed at any time by the Licensing Justices on the grounds of misconduct.39 This 
consequently precluded the possibility of obtaining funds from any sources other than 
brewers who obtained a trading advantage from the arrangement.40 The brewers were also 
eager to secure a degree of control over the licensee in order to avoid the potential loss of 
their investment.41 Consequently, as Girouard notes the system operated on the basis that a 
publican wishing to acquire a public house would borrow a significant proportion of the 
money required to do so from the brewer, on which he would pay interest and agree to buy 
the brewer’s beer.42  The agreement was not binding and in the event the publican bought 
beer from another brewer, the loan would be called in.43 Consequently, although this was a 
risky strategy as the value of the public house depended on a licence being in place, 
brewers were prepared to take the risk.44 This was due to the interest paid and the 
assurance of a guaranteed outlet for their beer.45  
Subsequently, brewers’ considered the advantages of the tie to outweigh the disadvantages. 
They held the entire trade of each tied publican, thereby creating a constant demand for 
their product. This enabled the brewer to estimate sales of his products more accurately 
than was possible in a free market, at a time when he was under an obligation to take back 
any beer that went unsold.46  This was also useful as beer’s perishable nature precluded 
stock piling, and so, the tie assisted with planning, production and storage.47 Such constant 
demand was also of importance in ensuring economic production as brewing has always 
been a scale economy. Brewers had to utilise their full capacity in order to keep costs at an 
acceptable level, thereby further driving the brewer’s desire to control as many public 
houses as possible, often within sufficient proximity to the brewery to minimise 
transportation costs.48 However, brewers were also keen to gain control of the retail side of 
the market, as facilitated by the beer tie, given that increasing importance was attached to 
reputation and branding. Vaizey states that “[b]eer was perishable and had to be handled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid at p67 
39 Ibid at p67 
40 Ibid at p67 
41 Ibid at p67 
42 M Girouard, Victorian Pubs (London, Yale University Press, 1984) at p89 
43 Ibid at p89 
44 Ibid at p89 
45 Ibid at p89 
46 Above, n.21 at p123-124 
47 Above, n.5 at p67 and above, n.21 at p123-124 
48 Above, n.10 at p140 
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carefully because bad handling could ruin the reputation of the product”.49 Consequently, 
numerous advantages were presented to the brewer by tying the retail trade, although 
concern was subsequently expressed over its foreclosure effects on the market.  
1.4 Early concerns regarding the competitive impact of the tie 
The 1817 Select Committee expressed concerns that this practice of tying public houses to 
such exclusive dealing arrangements made trade too closed.50 However, a more relaxed 
approach to licensing was advocated by the Committee with this being acted on by the 
Justices of the Peace.51 The Select Committee considered that the ‘most objectionable 
feature’ of the monopoly held by the English brewers by virtue of the tie was “the 
restricted power which the public at large possess of employing their capital in the trade of 
victualing houses”.52 Further, Members of Parliament from 1816 to 1830 were also 
concerned with the anticompetitive impact of the practice, with it being noted that the main 
brewers of the time gathered and ‘fixed the price of porter’.53 They also highlighted that 
the grant of a licence caused the value of the property to rise exponentially as well as the 
price of beer sold from it.54 Consequently, measures were ultimately introduced to create 
‘free-trade’ in beer55 and from 1830 to 1869 there was a relaxation in the licensing laws 
through the enactment of the Beer Act 1830.56 Beer licences were issued on payment of 
only a small duty to the Excise Offices, a move which has been credited with fuelling the 
beer boom of the 1830-1869 period.57 The intention had been to create a new form of 
drinking establishment, free from the control of both Justices of the Peace and commercial 
brewers.  Naturally this resulted in the rise of the new ‘beerhouse’ as well as public 
houses,58 although Vaizey states there is no evidence to suggest that this resulted in a 
decrease in the number of tied houses.59 This was due to the fact that, in contrast to the 
restricted licences prior to 1830, little value was placed on these licences which were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Above, n.3 at p26 citing J Vaizey, The Brewing Industry 1886-1951 An Economic Study (London, Sir Isaac 
Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1960), at (sic) p400 
50 Above, n.3 at p17-18 
51 Ibid at p17-18 
52 Above, n.26 at p91. Committee on the state of the Police of the Metropolis, First Report from the 
Committee on the State of the Police of the Metropolis: with Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee 
(HC 1817, 233) at p10 
53 Above, n.26 at p92 citing Hansard 1st May 1818  
54 Above, n.26 at p92-93 
55 The Chancellor of the Exchequer took the decision in 1830 to end the tax on beer and cider and to take 
measures to fully open trade. (Above, n.26 at p113). Two measures were introduced. The first was the 
abolition of tax on beer and the second was the Beer Act 1830 which enabled tax payers to sell beer from 
their premises without the necessity of obtaining a Justices’ license. (Above, n.3 at p18) 
56 Above, n.10 at p6 
57 Above, n.10 at p6 
58 Above, n.3 at p18 
59 Above, n.10 at p6 
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frequently abandoned.60 The publicans’ dependence on commercial brewers however 
persisted as the higher prices of public houses caused by the licence premium continued to 
force publicans to seek financial assistance from brewers. Consequently, according to 
Vaizey, this perpetuated the exclusive dealing arrangements that already existed during the 
restrictive licensing era.61  
1.5 The return to restrictive licensing and declining market conditions 
The rise of the temperance movement saw various parliamentary committees investigate 
the beer trade and confirm the problems of uncontrolled drinking.  However, in light of the 
problems previously caused by restrictive licensing and the subsequent drive to tie houses, 
the re-introduction of licensing did not occur until 1869, in the form of the Beer and Wine 
Act.62 This again forced brewers to be even more concerned with the retail trade than they 
had been previously.63 By limiting the number of licensed houses, this again created a 
scarcity value. This ultimately forced brewers to acquire public houses in order to 
guarantee outlets to supply and thereby encouraged the spread of the tied house system.64 
Brewers’ feared exclusion from the market as their competitors sought to tie remaining 
public houses, and thereby caused an almost instantaneous increase in property values and 
forced publicans to continue to seek financial assistance from brewers.65 However, in the 
years following 1870, there was increasing hostility towards the drinks trade as the 
temperance movement gathered greater momentum and beer consumption declined and 
remained at a lower level throughout the 1880s.66 Consequently, Hawkins and Pass state 
that the role of restrictive licensing in driving the growth of the tied trade should not be 
over-stated and the primary push to tie trade was ultimately the reduced market demand 
and a subsequent increase in competitive pressures.67 Nevertheless, both the declining 
demand and the re-introduction of restrictive licensing, were influential in the growth of 
the tied house system at this time.   
Moreover, over this period, brewers were lending increasing sums of money to publicans 
due to inflated property values and to declining sales of beer due to reduced market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid at p6 
61 Ibid at p6-7 
62 Ibid at p7 and p118 
63 Ibid at p7. S and B Webb note that there had been early moves in this direction under the second Beer Act 
of 1834 and the third Beer Act of 1840, although they ultimately failed to provide any form of effective 
regulation. Above, n.26 at p129 
64 Above, n.3 at p27 
65 Above, n.10 at p6-7 
66 Above, n.3 at p27 
67 Ibid at p27 
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demand.68 Further strains were placed on the brewer-publican relationship when the 
London brewers sought to call in loans and refused the custom of publicans convicted of 
‘diluting’, a practice of watering down beer in a bid to increase profit margins.69 The 
situation subsequently prompted publicans to look for new sources of finance, which they 
found in the Licensed Victuallers Mortgage Association, which was formed in 1887 and 
lent money to publicans without ties.70 Similarly, the Burton Breweries became a source of 
funding.71 Therefore, between 1880 and 1900 there were significant changes on the 
retailing side of the brewing industry.72 Prior to this, the country brewers were more 
heavily dependent on owning retail outlets for their own beer, while the larger Burton and 
London brewers opted out of direct involvement in retailing to any significant extent.73 
They held firm the belief that they were brewers not property owners.74 However, after 
1880 this position changed drastically with a significant push by brewers for further 
integration with the result that by 1900 the tied house system prevailed in the retail 
market.75 
1.6 Move towards property ownership 
Over this period there was a distinctive shift away from the partial loan tie towards 
brewery ownership of freeholds.  This was largely prompted as problems arose due to the 
size of the loans which spiralled out of control due to rising London property prices.76  
Issues were also arising due to the incomplete nature of the loan tie as well as the 
unworkable discounts being offered by Burton and country brewers to the free trade.77  
Consequently, at the point when loans exceeded one million pounds during the 1880s, 
brewers’ attention turned to owning the leaseholds and so forging a closer tie with 
publicans, especially given the ease with which capital could now be raised.78 Changes in 
the laws on limited liability, most notably marked by the Guinness six million pounds 
issue, enabled brewers after 1884 to take advantage of changes in the law. This was 
achieved through incorporation which enabled the brewery companies, through share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Above, n.42 at p89 
69 Above, n.5 at 69 and above, n.3 at p33 
70 Above, n.42 at p90 
71 Ibid at p90 
72 Above, n.3 at p25 
73 Ibid at p25 
74 Ibid at p25 
75 Ibid at p25 
76 Above, n.8 at p268-269 
77 Ibid at p268-269 
78 Ibid at p269 
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issues, to raise the capital required to acquire further public houses or to make larger loans 
on mortgage to secure existing trade.79  
However, the position differed north and south of the border. Donnachie states that in 
Scotland, although there is evidence of the larger brewers acquiring public houses, there is 
little to no evidence of a tied trade in Scotland, much before the middle of the nineteenth 
century.80 Donnachie cites HH Drummond’s evidence in 1830 to a parliamentary 
committee that there had been no complaint of a monopoly in the Scottish brewing trade 
with few public houses being owned by brewers as confirmation that “the trade is perfectly 
free”.81 The tied house system based on brewery ownership took some time to become 
established in Scotland. Brewers preferred to develop the retail trade by lending money to 
publicans to create a partial tie whilst the debt was outstanding.82 Consequently, the 
property tie did not prevail although it was more common.83 The primary reason for the 
diverging approaches north and south of the border during this period was ultimately 
licensing.84 Similarly to England with the reintroduction of restrictive licensing, retail 
licences were issued to individuals, not to public houses or other outlets, although in 
England no restriction was placed on the number of licences one brewer could acquire.85 In 
contrast to the position in England, in Scotland licences could not be traded, with the 
Scottish magistrates abiding by the principle of ‘one man, one licence’ and thereby 
effectively preventing the development of the tied house system based on brewery 
ownership.86 Therefore, as restrictions were placed on the number of licences available, 
their value and that of the retail outlets, increased significantly.87 Whilst this caused 
brewers in England to compete for tied outlets, due to the differences in licensing in 
Scotland, Scottish brewers instead opted to extend credit to licensees in return for the 
exclusive sale of their product.88 In addition a practical matter also inhibited the 
development of the system namely the limited capital available to Scottish brewers by 
comparison to their English counterparts.89 This caused the Scottish brewers to seek out an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Above, n.5 at 74 
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English market and develop their export trade to England and abroad.90 Gourvish and 
Wilson state that some brewers acquired houses in the North East of England, although the 
loan tie was more heavily relied upon.91  
However, the turn of the century marked the end of the ‘Stock Exchange boom’92 during 
which there had been a significant number of amalgamations. By the early twentieth 
century the fierce competition amongst brewers to secure licensed premises was over with 
most public houses now belonging to brewers.93 However, the tied house system was still 
largely unknown in Scotland in 1914 with the Temperance (Scotland) Act 1913 further 
discouraging brewers from investing in licensed property by making licences subject to 
periodic local elections.94  
1.7 The trend towards greater concentration in the industry  
Nevertheless, in the post-First World War era, the trend towards consolidation continued 
with further amalgamations as companies were cash rich95 and acquired other breweries in 
order to expand their retail base.96  Such acquisitions were for the most part linked to the 
proximity of the tied houses close to the acquiring brewery97 as technical advancements 
also added to the need to ensure that a high level of output was maintained in the larger 
breweries.  Consequently, the chairman of one brewery stated in April 1924 “what we 
really want is more trade to enable us to run our brewery (which was a new one) more 
nearly to its real output capacity. This probably can only be achieved by absorption of 
some other brewery undertakings, as individual houses are becoming extremely difficult to 
acquire at a reasonable price.”98  
However, throughout the 1920s support for the temperance movement remained strong and 
at that time the Royal Commission on Licensing was also critical of the tied house 
system.99 Nevertheless, the UK Government did not act on the Committee’s 
recommendations although the impetus for acquisitions changed significantly after 1920 
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given the climate of reduced demand.100 The emphasis was placed strongly on the 
rationalisation of productive capacity.101  
Subsequently, by the end of the 1930s, the industry was even more concentrated.102  The 
larger national brewers had strengthen their distribution networks and had sought to take 
advantage of the increasing popularity of bottled beer.103 Bottled beer offered higher 
margins and lower transport costs. The smaller breweries on the other hand had grown in 
regional importance chiefly by way of amalgamation and by seeking to tie further outlets 
to sell their own brands of bottled beer.104 Consequently, there was a division between 
national brewers with significant tied estates who also sold branded beer on the national 
market, and the regional brewers whose markets were more localised and whose trade 
focused on draught and bottled beer sold through their own tied houses. A number of 
smaller firms also operated in the UK.105  
However, in Scotland, concentration was slower to occur. The industry was dominated by 
family owned firms which, prior to 1939, relied heavily on their extensive export trade. 
This trade was reduced in the post-war era as former colonial customers developed their 
own brewing industries, forcing the Scottish brewers to compete in the sluggish Scottish 
market.106 Brewery acquisitions of public houses therefore increased after 1939 but the 
majority of public houses remained free of tie. Rationalisation was also slow to occur in 
Scotland during the 1950s despite the low level of tied trade in the Scottish market.107 The 
main obstacle was the reticence of family owners to lose the identity of their own beers and 
breweries, although some opted to integrate vertically through the acquisition of licensed 
houses and the loan tie.108 
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Nevertheless, in the period 1945-1948, brewers had to operate in a very different climate 
with allegations of excessive profits circulating in 1948 and a highly restrictive Licensing 
Bill being proposed.109 Moreover, threats to the tied house system had been presented by a 
larger potential free trade in national bottled beer and the rise in popularity of clubs.110 The 
competitive threat presented by clubs, as well as the emergence of club breweries, had 
grown out of the dissatisfaction with the increasing prices and beer shortages of the First 
World War.111 Vaizey states that their success and their backward integration into brewing, 
provides evidence of consumers’ turning away from the tied house system.112 However, he 
acknowledges that their exemption from the most rigid elements of the licensing system 
made them a significant exception to the tied house system for reasons beyond 
cheapness.113  
Nevertheless, Vaizey has estimated that by 1950, almost all public houses were tied with 
approximately 95 per cent of public houses in England and Wales and 80 per cent of those 
in Scotland being tied to a brewery, at least for beer.114 However, Gourvish and Wilson 
suggest that these estimates may be a little high and refer to the results of a Brewers’ 
Society Questionnaire as an authoritative statement on the matter.115 This Questionnaire 
suggests that in 1948, 75 per cent of full on-licences in England and Wales, as compared 
with only 28 per cent of such licences in Scotland, were owned by brewers.116 
Consequently, this demonstrates that brewers in England had come to place significant 
reliance on the tie as a means of selling their beer, with the practice increasing in 
importance in Scotland.117 
1.8 Oligopolistic equilibrium and increased competition 
These traditional retailing methods described above endured.  Although the industry itself 
was to change dramatically in the coming twenty-five years with a tide of mergers, the tied 
house was to remain the dominant type of on-licensed property.  
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Nevertheless, the concentration of the market had been contracting but it was not 
significantly concentrated which was largely due to the protected market position enjoyed 
by most firms.118 Vaizey refers to the oligopolistic situation that existed at the time and 
ensured ‘secure profits’ were made.119 He concludes that formal trade agreements were not 
as important as in other industries, where there were greater threats of market entry.120 He 
consequently notes that national agreements to consciously restrict competition with a 
view to raising prices or restricting output were not known to exist and local agreements 
were more concerned with preventing price cuts.121 Nevertheless, such local co-operation 
was not complete with firms wishing to increase competition doing so by simply avoiding 
local meetings and thereafter acting in ignorance of any agreements reached.122 However, 
the lack of national agreements was largely attributable to the fact that trade was protected 
from outside competition with a natural oligopolistic equilibrium existing.123 This also 
prohibited any ‘wars to the death’ as the national brewers were too equal in size for this to 
be successful.124  Moreover, the free market was too tied to allow any significant victories. 
This state of equilibrium was dependent on the existence of the tied houses system.125 
However, by the early 1950s the tied house was faced with increased competition from 
various other sources including national bottled beer brands, the rising popularity of 
alternative leisure activities, as well as pressure to improve the standard of public 
houses.126 Consequently, brewers began to diversify their commercial interests further than 
brewing and ownership of public houses with the industry increasingly being regarded as 
part of the highly competitive leisure market.127 However, this need to compete within the 
leisure market resulted in changes in the competitive strategies within the industry as 
brewers sought additional resources in order to compete successfully.128 Concerns were 
increasingly raised that the concentration of brewing and public house ownership amongst 
fewer and fewer undertakings was not in the public interest.129 Seldon estimates that 
brewers owned 85 per cent of on-licensed premises in England and Wales by 1953.130 
Consequently, scrutiny of the tied house system continued. This was mainly due to its 
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monopolistic characteristics that saw brewers enjoy significant profits at the expense of the 
publican and their customers whilst also restricting the number of brands of beers available 
to the public.131  
1.9 The growth of the national market and further mergers 
Throughout this period the national market in beer continued to develop. Although there 
had been such a market since the introduction of the railway in the nineteenth century, the 
tied house system effectively limited this market to a small number of brewery companies 
whose products already largely enjoyed ‘national status’.132 These brewers had 
successfully surmounted the significant transport costs relative to the selling price 
associated with delivering to distant markets by focusing on the sale of one or two brands 
and, thereby, achieving economies of scale.133 Consequently, this elusive market was 
dominated by a limited number of recognised brands of bottled stout and pale ale, which 
were retailed by local brewers through their own tied houses.134 The situation was 
intensified by the growth in bottled beer in the inter-war period and beyond which 
encouraged the companies involved to increase their geographical coverage by acquiring 
shares in their trading partners equity and reciprocal trading agreements.135    
This trend developed during the 1960s-1970s and is described by Gourvish and Wilson as 
a time of “merger ‘mania’” in all industries in the United Kingdom.136 Most of these 
mergers were horizontal in nature and resulted in substantial increases in concentration in 
many industries including brewing.137 However, the merger wave in the brewing industry 
was slightly ahead of this trend. Decisive changes in the industry occurred during the 
1950s-1960s.138 As a result during the 1960s six major brewery groups emerged, each of 
which owned a chain of tied houses.139 
However, Scotland again deviated slightly from this trend. Although in 1960 Scottish 
Brewers merged with Newcastle Breweries forming Scottish & Newcastle Breweries, 
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which continued to expand and develop its market position through further mergers in 
Scotland, this was a far more expensive process for Scottish brewers than their English 
counterparts.140 This level of expense had a limiting effect. Far higher prices had to be paid 
for public houses in Scotland compared to England. This was due to the fact public houses 
were sold as independent businesses in their own right, thereby necessitating significant 
payments for the goodwill.141 Consequently by 1967 less than 30 per cent of Scottish 
public houses and licensed hotels were owned by brewers.142 
Nevertheless, as the market continued to contract, Hawkins and Pass estimates that by 
1968 the seven largest companies controlled 73 per cent of beer production in the UK.143 
These companies continued to increase their market share by acquiring smaller companies 
and by greater infiltration of the free trade.144 The motivation behind these mergers was the 
acquisition of retail outlets not productive capacity, and so although horizontal in nature, 
Gourvish and Wilson remark on this vertical characteristic.145 Further, in light of the 
increasing competition for consumers in the leisure market throughout the 1970s,146 a 
number of these were conglomerate mergers and subsequently linked brewing with other 
products and leisure interests.147  Consequently as this process continued, in comparison to 
the position in 1955 when the top five breweries owned eleven per cent of Britain’s 
licensed retail outlets, by 1974 they owned 38 per cent.148 However, there were also 
rationalisations and synergies in production of beer following on from these mergers which 
resulted in the closure of over half of the production plants involved.149 Thus there was a 
substantial contraction in the industry which resulted in the ‘Big Six’ breweries, along with 
Guinness, dominating British brewing for the next thirty years.150  
Various reasons have been suggested for this increase in merger activity, some of which 
were general economic influences: a buoyant stock market which enabled mergers to take 
place by way of exchange of shares, not just cash; the continued drive to achieve 
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economies of scale; and the desire to maintain market power.151 However, others were 
specific to the brewing industry. Hawkins and Pass suggest that the rapid increase in 
concentration in the industry in 1959-1961 was partly fuelled by the realisation in the City 
of London that licensed property, being the industry’s main asset, was undervalued.152 This 
was clearly revealed by the attempted take-over of Cheltenham and Hereford Breweries 
Ltd in 1955.153 This divergence in values and the depressed share value of breweries 
gained the attention of influential ‘entrepreneurs’ such as Charles Clore154 whose 
unsuccessful bid for Watney Mann in 1959 prompted the brewery to undertake a 
programme of defensive mergers on a national scale.155 Further, although the most obvious 
reason was the continued decline in the demand for beer, which had been the prevailing 
trend for the previous fifty years, increased demand for bottled beer caused national 
brewers to seek to expand their retail trade, causing an increase in the absorption of smaller 
brewers.156  
However, despite the merger mania that had prevailed, it should be noted that a number of 
smaller regional brewers managed to retain their independence.157 This was partly due to 
their rural locations which were not appealing to potential purchasers and to their low level 
trade.158 However, Seldon also notes they enjoyed an entrenched position as they had 
successfully exploited local tastes and benefitted from advantages in distribution costs, 
whilst also being able to supervise closely their public houses with greater ease than a 
distant owner.159 Consequently, by the end of the merger era, the UK brewing industry was 
largely polarised with huge national brewers and a myriad of smaller regional and local 
enterprises.  
2. Growing concern over the anticompetitive implications of beer tie 
agreements in the UK market 
Notwithstanding the survival of many small groups throughout the merger era, concerns 
were expressed by both the Government and other public bodies over the conduct of many 
of the larger brewers, with several critical reports being circulated by the National Board 
for Prices and Incomes (in 1966 and 1969), the MMC (also in 1969) and the Price 
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Commission (in 1977).160 One of the universal concerns expressed, regarded the practice of 
brewers passing on post-merger costs to consumers by way of higher prices for beer, 
wines, spirits and soft drinks.161 However, such behaviour was a largely inevitable 
consequence of vertical integration as one of the general concerns associated with such a 
degree of integration is the resulting reduction in competition. This arises from 
undertakings by-passing one or more levels in the market by engaging not only in 
manufacturing, but also retailing, and so placing the product directly in the hands of 
consumers.162 Consequently, the higher the degree of vertical integration in the brewing 
industry, the greater the scope for abuse of market power. 
2.1  The National Board for Prices and Incomes, the MMC and the Price 
Commission’s concerns over the tied house system 
2.1.1 The National Board for Prices and Incomes (1966) 
As the brewing industry underwent considerable concentration in the 1960s-1970s, its 
adjustments were not well received, especially by the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes (National Board).163 Under an arrangement for “early warning” of price increases, 
the Government received notification from several brewers of their intention to increase 
the wholesale price of certain beers.164 Before these were approved, the National Board 
reviewed the structure of costs and prices within the industry, and took into consideration 
the level of profits already enjoyed.165 They suggested that the estimated cost increases 
within the industry had already been largely covered by previous price increases.166 They 
found that the tied house system had diminished competition and that the “brewing 
industry is too closed an industry to give the consumer the reductions in costs that are 
associated with innovation.”167 They therefore recommended there be no increase in 
wholesale or retail prices.168 Further, due to the industry’s closed nature as set by the 
licensing laws, the Government was to consider instituting an enquiry into the control of 
the sale of alcohol without impeding the entry of new competitors into the industry.169 
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2.1.2 The MMC (1969) 
The foregoing report prompted a reference to the MMC170 in 1966 regarding the supply of 
beer for retail sale on licensed premises. They reported in April 1969,171 and focused 
almost entirely on the level of vertical, rather than horizontal, integration in the industry 
and found that, amongst others, such level of integration restricted the entry of new 
products and producers.172 While numerous factors can conspire to hinder such entry in all 
markets, including established companies with large market shares and advanced 
production and distribution facilities, restrictive licensing and the tied house system have 
long been pin-pointed as the main hindrances in the brewing industry.173 The MMC 
concluded that restrictive licensing reduced competition by imposing limitations on the 
establishment of new competitors in the licensed trade, and the tied house system operated 
under these conditions of restrictive licensing had certain negative effects.174 Included 
amongst these were the hindered removal of redundant brewing capacity; detriment to the 
creation by brewers of rational and efficient systems of distribution; the weakening or 
prevention of the growth of independent wholesalers of wines and spirits; and the 
hindrance of the entry of new products and producers, thereby weakening competition in 
the retail trade.175 Nevertheless, Hawkins and Pass state that the weight afforded to the tied 
house system in this respect should not be exaggerated as it does not prevent the entry of 
new products irrespective of consumer demand.176 This position is supported by the growth 
of domestic lager production.177 Lager grew in popularity throughout the 1960s and, 
initially, almost all lager was imported to satisfy this demand. However by 1976 less than 
10 per cent was imported and so the tied house system failed to prevent the entry of a new 
product.178 Nevertheless, as Hawkins and Pass also acknowledge, this was largely possible 
due to the national brewers’ extensive distribution systems which ideally placed them to 
develop such products.179  
The MMC however also noted that competition between brewers was principally to 
acquire “captive outlets” and to improve their amenity, noting that in the on-trade, price 
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competition was almost entirely absent with licensees generally being content to avoid 
active competition.180  It observed that: 
“Price competition between tied houses would mean price competition between 
brewers. The brewers in general would have to stand the adverse effects of retail price 
competition on the level of their prices and profits, without compensating benefits. We 
do not think that brewers, especially having regard to their investments in tied houses 
for the sake of security of market, wish to compete with each other in this way, which 
would be largely self-defeating from each brewer’s point of view.”181 
Consequently, as noted by Hawkins, the MMC argued that under the tied house system, 
oligopolistic reticence to engage in price competition had been transmitted from the supply 
side to the retail trade in the market.182 It was therefore unsurprising that as brewers owned 
48% of all licensed outlets in the UK, including 78% of full on-licensed premises, this was 
not conducive to the public interest.183 The MMC found that the ‘restrictions on 
competition resulting from the tied house system as operated by brewer suppliers are 
detrimental to efficiency not only in brewing, but in wholesaling and retailing, and to the 
interests of independent suppliers and to the interests of consumers.’184 Hawkins and Pass 
however remark that the Report was produced at a time when the merger era was just 
ending and the process of post-merger rationalisation had not gotten under way, and 
therefore efficiency gains had not yet been realised.185 Consequently, accurate 
representation of the established post-merger market may not have been provided. 
Nevertheless, although the MMC would not recommend the separation of brewing from 
the ownership or control of retail outlets due to the serious consequential problems that 
would create, they stated, “we are of the view that, but for the difficulties of change and 
transition, a state of affairs in which brewers did not own or control licensed outlets would 
be preferable to the tied house system.”186 Similarly to the National Board it was 
considered that whilst potentially straying outside the scope of their remit, there were 
grounds for suggesting that the licensing laws could be amended to assist in addressing the 
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‘defects’ of the tied house system as currently operated under those laws.187 While no 
direct action was taken, it was recommended that the licensing laws be relaxed.188 
2.1.3 The National Board for Prices and Incomes (1969) 
Following on from the MMC’s report, in light of the aforementioned arrangement for the 
early warning of price increases,189 the industry was once again considered by the National 
Board in 1969. In reviewing the conditions within the industry, it noted that it faced 
increased competition from outside itself with, amongst others, restaurants and residential 
premises obtaining licences to sell alcohol.190 While competition between on-licensed 
premises was increasing the National Board shared the MMC’s view that due to the effects 
of restrictive licensing and the tied house system, “price competition is at present far from 
being a fully effective force”.191 It was however conceded that if competition increased 
following the MMC’s report discussed above, the industry should be afforded freedom in 
retail pricing.192  
2.1.4 Continuing concerns - Price Commission (1977) 
Concerns over the tied house system therefore did not dissipate. The Price Commission’s 
1977 report contrasted with the foregoing reports which focused on vertical integration, as 
the degree of horizontal integration was also criticised. It was noted that: 
“…the most striking point is the degree of both horizontal, and vertical integration in 
the industry. Horizontally, the industry is dominated by six concerns who over the years 
have pursued an aggressive policy of amalgamation and acquisition. Vertically, it is 
highly integrated from the brewery to the public house… 
Not only is brewing a highly concentrated industry, but there are significant barriers to 
entry and virtually no competition from imports. These are the classic conditions for a 
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monopoly which is likely to operate to the detriment of consumers….the way this trade 
is organised and run has a profound effect on prices and profits.”193 
It addition to establishing that the classic conditions for a monopoly existed within the 
market, the report echoed the concerns surrounding the tied house system raised in 
previous reports as these largely remained.194 It concluded that “[t]he combined effect of 
high concentration and vertical integration has enabled the brewers to exert a high degree 
of price leadership and to augment the barrier to entering the industry imposed by 
restrictive licensing laws….The effect of price leadership by managed houses has been to 
lead prices up. Aggressive price cutting by a publican is almost unknown.” 195   
During the 1960s and 1970s, the primary concerns over the UK beer market were therefore 
the increasingly closed nature of trade and the rapidly diminishing level of price 
competition largely attributable to the extensive use of the beer tie in conjunction with 
restrictive licensing. Concerns regarding the industry and the tied house system continued 
to intensify causing it to be the subject of extensive Government scrutiny which 
culminated in the 1989 MMC Report. 
2.2 The MMC’s 1989 Report and the Beer Orders 
In 1989 the MMC published its report ‘The Supply of Beer’196 (1989 Report) following a 
reference from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). Due to the aforementioned concerns over 
the operation of the market, in 1986 it was reviewed by the OFT. The OFT’s resulting 
Paper on the possibility of a reference to the MMC highlighted, amongst others, that 
brewers’ extensive tied estates potentially restricted competition, and that profits, margins 
and prices were high within the industry.197 As a result, it recommended that a reference be 
made to the MMC for them to further investigate the market.198 The MMC’s 1989 Report 
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196 Above, n.1 
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followed and saw it take a far more aggressive approach than that adopted in 1969. 199 
Whish describes the Report as “one of the most remarkable and controversial reports to 
have been published”.200 
2.2.1 The UK market at the time of review by the MMC 
Just prior to the 1989 Report the UK market was only ‘moderately concentrated’ and less 
so than in most European and North American countries.  It consisted of six national 
breweries,201 which together accounted for 75% of UK beer production and 74% of brewer 
owned retail estate; and fifty-two regional and local brewers that controlled 17% of UK 
beer production.202 The remainder of the market consisted of brewers who had no tied 
estate who accounted for approximately 8% of beer production, as well as over 160 micro-
breweries operating on a much smaller scale.203 However, the MMC estimated that 
approximately 75% of all public houses in Great Britain were owned by brewers and fell 
into two categories.204 Around 30% were managed public houses in which the publican and 
the staff were employees of the brewer who set the house’s retail prices and received all 
the profits.205 The remainder were tenanted and the publicans, who were not employees of 
the brewer who owned the public house, bought beer from the brewer at the wholesale 
price and set their own retail prices.206 The publicans paid the brewer rent and earned their 
living from the retail profit of the public house.207 These tenanted houses tended to be 
smaller in size than their managed counterparts. However, in both instances the brewer 
determined what beer could be sold from the premises and from where they had to be 
bought, which was almost always the brewer himself.208  
The MMC also noted that brewers influenced the free-trade via the loan tie to free houses. 
This allowed brewers to secure exclusivity for their products in the public house owned by 
the operator or a ‘minimum throughput’ in exchange for a loan at a generous interest 
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rate.209 Consequently, it was estimated that half of the 25% of public houses not owned by 
brewers were tied to them by way of loan, as well as half of members’ clubs.210 It was also 
estimated that approximately two thirds of all beer sold by brewers, including that for 
home consumption, was sold through premises they either owned or loan tied.211  
Subsequently, only a very small proportion of the market was entirely free of brewery 
influence.212 It was however acknowledged that the position differed in Scotland. In 
Scotland there was a far smaller number of premises owned by brewers, although loan 
tying was far more prevalent.213 The market was also greatly more concentrated with 
Scottish & Newcastle and Bass sharing 80% of the beer market.214 The Report also noted 
that in Ireland neither the property or loan tie prevailed although Guinness and Bass 
supplied 90% of the market.215 
2.2.2 A complex monopoly finding 
In light of the foregoing, despite arguments by The Brewer’s Society that the market for 
beer in the UK was highly competitive the 1989 Report concluded that a complex 
monopoly216 existed in favour of brewers with tied estates or loan ties with free houses and 
restricted competition at all levels.217 
2.2.3 Exploitation of the monopoly situation contrary to the public interest  
The MMC identified numerous practices which it considered amounted to the exploitation 
of this monopoly situation and were against the public interest.218 These included the fact 
that the price of a pint of beer had risen too quickly in recent years.219 This was deemed to 
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be the result of the complex monopoly.220 As so many pubs were tied to the owning 
brewer, thereby closing them to competing suppliers, wholesale competition was “severely 
limited”.221 The MMC found that even with regard to free public houses and clubs, brewers 
opted to compete through subsidised loans with their associated exclusive purchasing 
obligations, rather than through prices.222 Due to this lack of competition in the market and 
as brewers’ charged their tenants wholesale prices that were sufficiently high to cover any 
rent subsidies given to tenants, wholesale prices were higher than they would have been in 
a competitive market.223 These high wholesale prices ultimately resulted in tenants and free 
houses charging higher retail prices.224 This was so regardless of whether the house 
enjoyed a local monopoly or was surrounded by competitors.225 As a result the MMC 
found that tenants and free houses failed to offer effective competition to the brewers’ 
managed houses at the retail level.226 The retail prices charged in managed houses were 
therefore maintained at a higher level than would have been permissible in a competitive 
market.227  
The MMC also found that the retail price of lager was substantially higher than ale even 
although some brewers could produce it at a similar or lower price than some of their 
ales.228 These higher prices were deemed to exemplify the brewers’ ability to set and 
maintain prices in the wholesale and retail markets.229 The higher price of lager was 
therefore due to brewers’ pricing practices rather than the cost of production.230 The MMC 
also identified regional price differences for beer in on-licensed premises. While it was 
acknowledged that retail price differences could be influenced by variations in operating 
costs, the MMC had evidence of differences in wholesale prices which were not influenced 
by property and retailing costs.231 These were considered to be the result of the brewers’ 
policy to set different wholesale prices in different regions.232 It was noted that the regional 
price differential in off-licence prices was significantly less than in the on-trade even 
although they were considered to face similar trends to brewers in retailing costs.233 In the 
off-trade, however, purchasers had competitive power and had access to alternative sources 
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of supply including brewers in continental Europe.234 In the on-trade, brewers’ pricing 
strategies had inhibited the growth of an independent wholesaling sector, which by posing 
competition on a significant scale could have challenged whether these differences were 
justified. 235 Consequently the regional price differences were attributed to the existence of 
the monopoly situation. 
Tied and managed houses were also noted to lack the ability to freely choose what drinks 
they stocked in order to meet consumer demands.236 Free houses and clubs who had 
accepted a loan tie were similarly restricted.237 Therefore consumers in some pubs may not 
have been able to buy the product of their choice, but would be offered an alternative of 
‘similar character’.238 Nevertheless, as consumers considered there were differences 
between brands, consumer choice was affected by the tied house system.239 While it was 
acknowledged that it was not practical for pubs to stock all brands of all drinks, brewers 
decided what products were supplied, not consumers.240 Tying agreements were therefore 
found to restrict the ability of the pub’s proprietor to respond fully to consumer demands, 
with this being particularly serious where there was a concentration of pubs owned by an 
individual or small group of companies in a particular area.241 
The MMC also addressed the position of tenants of public houses. They highlighted their 
lack of security of tenure and the lack of a legally binding Code of Practice for brewers. 
Brewers were therefore considered to be able to significantly restrict the independence of 
their tenants and thereby strengthen their own ability to exploit and maintain their 
monopoly.242  
The MMC turned to consider the impact of the complex monopoly on the position of 
wholesalers in the market. In doing so it noted that the role of the independent wholesaler 
was to facilitate supplies to smaller retailers whose requirements were not sufficient to 
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justify direct deliveries from manufacturers.243 They were considered central in enabling 
smaller brewers to achieve national distribution.244 Despite the increasing range of drinks 
offered in the UK market wholesalers’ activities were found to be very limited and so 
provided little competition to the brewers’ wholesaling operations.245 The MMC attributed 
this lack of competition to brewer policies246 and noted that their hostility was largely 
influenced by their fear that the development of such competition would threaten their own 
wholesaling and retailing activities.247 The MMC’s expectation was that in ‘proper’ market 
conditions, independent wholesalers would offer customers, on cost effective terms, a 
range of brewers beers and products thereby presenting licensees with a genuine choice as 
they could opt to accept brewers products from a brewer owned wholesaler or an 
independent wholesaler.248  
Brewer reliance on the loan tie to secure trade was also found to reduce the opportunity for 
other brewers to compete for business as well as restricting consumer choice.249 It was 
therefore also found to restrict or distort the entry of new suppliers and to inhibit smaller 
brewers from increasing their free-trade sales against the public interest.250 
These numerous concerns subsequently prompted a legislative strike on the traditional tied 
house structure in the UK which had far reaching implications for the Big Six national 
brewers and the industry generally.251 Some of these were potentially unforeseen and are 
still affecting the industry today. 
2.3 The Beer Orders  
Due to the findings of the 1989 Report and its recommendation that measures be taken 
with a view to “increase competition in brewing, wholesaling and retailing, encourage 
new entry, reduce prices and widen consumer choice”,252 the Secretary of State 
subsequently made two Orders. These were the Supply of Beer  (Tied Estate) Order 
1989253 and the Supply of Beer (Loan Ties, Licensed Premises and Wholesale Prices) 
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Order 1989,254 together known as the ‘Beer Orders’.  However, due to intensive lobbying 
following the publication of the MMC’s Report, these were a diluted version of the 
original recommendations proposed.255 Nevertheless, the Orders were intended to loosen 
the tie between brewing and pub retailing, thereby easing market entry and encouraging 
competition.256 They ultimately severed the tie between brewing and retailing for the 
largest brewers and greatly shook the industry.  The most controversial requirement, which 
departed from the MMC’s position in 1969 when it actively chose not to divest brewers of 
their public houses due to the potential implications, was detailed in The Tied Estate Order. 
This constituted an extreme intervention in the market. It targeted those brewers and ‘large 
brewery groups’ with interests in excess of two thousand ‘licensed premises’ and capped 
the number of ‘licensed premises’257 that could be owned by such vertically integrated 
brewers.258 These were effectively only the Big Six at that time. It was therefore key in the 
restructuring of the industry. Brewers were required to have reduced their tied estates to no 
more than 2,000 licensed premises or to have released the ties on half of the premises 
above that number by November 1992.259 They therefore essentially had to decide whether 
to cease brewing and focus on retailing or whether they should retain their brewing 
interests and sell or lease their pubs free of tie.260 Moreover, brewers with more than 2,000 
tied premises had to allow them to serve at least one cask-conditioned ale261 from a 
supplier other than the landlord, known as a Guest Beer.262 The brewers were also 
prohibited from tying non-alcoholic beer or other drinks.263 The primary aim of this Guest 
Beer Provision (GBP) was to afford greater choice to the tenants who wanted to offer a 
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257 This was widely defined by Article 1(2) of the Tied Estate Order to cover all on-licensed premises and 
clubs in England and Wales. In Scotland it covered premises with a public house licence, a hotel licence or a 
refreshment licence. 
258 Article 2, Tied Estate Order 
259 Article 2, Tied Estate Order  
260 V Edwards and L Bunting, ‘Licensed Premises: Part 1 the Changing Strategies of National Brewers’, 
(1992) 10(4) Property Management 319 at p325  
261 ‘Cask-conditioned beer’ is defined in Article 7(3) of the Tied Estate Order as “beer which undergoes 
fermentation in the container from which it is served for consumption”. 
262 Article 7, Tied Estate Order  
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wider range of products to their customers.264 Further, the Loan Tie Order effectively 
required that brewers supply the wholesale trade unless they had a sound commercial 
reason for refusing to do so.265 They also required the introduction of a three-month notice 
period on termination of which the borrower should be released from any loan held with 
the brewer.266  The use of restrictive covenants when selling premises was prohibited and 
the brewer was required to publish the list prices for the wholesale supply of beer.267  
Consequently, although the Beer Orders were weaker than the MMC’s recommendations 
they were very prescriptive and constituted an extreme intervention in the market. They 
were also stricter in their terms than the EU competition rules in force at that time.268 
2.3.1 Impact of the Beer Orders on the UK beer market  
The Beer Orders caused a substantial shake-up within the brewing industry and saw 
changes occur throughout the 1990s that have shaped it today. Each of the Big Six 
operated up to 7,000 public houses at the time of the Orders and were therefore required to 
divest most of their tied estates. Brewer ownership of on-licenses subsequently declined by 
14,000, which exceeded the 11,000 required by the Beer Orders.269 Managed houses 
tended to be larger, and so more profitable, and therefore most of the pubs that were sold 
were tenanted.270 Of the tenanted pubs remaining, the majority were converted from three 
year to long leases, thereby making the tenant of these leased houses responsible for a 
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to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements ((1983) OJ L173/5). This is dicussed in Chapter 3. The EU 
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greater proportion of capital improvements to them.271 However, contrary to the intentions 
of the MMC, independent purchasers were slow to enter the market due to the recession 
and the subsequent property slump in the period following the Beer Orders.272 
Furthermore, a complex series of events subsequently took place within the industry. These 
included several mergers and some companies engaging in a “pub for breweries swap”,273 
which ultimately caused even greater consolidation which was indeed contrary to the aims 
of the MMC Report. Consequently, by the compliance date in 1992, the brewing industry 
was as concentrated as it had ever been, and there was now an even tighter and more 
complex oligopoly in existence. The largest brewers enjoyed 60 per cent of beer sales in 
March 1992, compared to only 46 per cent of beer sales in 1989.274 This was accompanied 
by a corresponding increase in beer prices which exceeded inflation over the same period, 
thereby having the opposite effect from that intended by the reforms.275  
Further, as part of the major changes that continued to occur throughout the 1990s, the Big 
Six took actions which resulted in all but one of them exiting brewing by the year 2000.276 
In 1991 Grand Metropolitan was the first to leave brewing, selling its breweries to Foster’s 
Brewing Group, the Australian based owner of Courage and another of the Big Six.277 In 
1993 Allied Breweries merged with the UK brewery owned by Carlsberg to form 
Carlsberg Tetley. This was a joint venture company that eventually withdrew from 
brewing and instead focused on wines and spirits when Carlsberg took full control of the 
joint venture in 1997.278 Bass was the largest of the Big Six brewers at the time the Beer 
Orders were adopted. They opted to stay in brewing but in 2000 Bass Brewers was 
eventually sold to Interbrew, as was Whitbread’s brewing division in the same year.279 
Furthermore, Scottish & Newcastle which was the smallest of the Big Six at the time the 
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272 Above, n.200 at p479-480 
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Beer Orders were implemented grew to be the UK’s largest brewer on acquiring Courage 
from Fosters in 1995.280 They also became involved in the international brewing industry 
when in 2000 they acquired Kronenbourg, the largest French brewer.281  
Thus, by 2000 all but one of the Big Six had left brewing and so another consequence of 
the Beer Orders was that they created the perfect opportunity for powerful foreign 
multinationals to enter and to dominate the UK beer market. This was exemplified by 
Grand Metropolitan’s sale of its brewing division to the Australian company, Foster’s 
Brewing Group; the acquisition of Bass and Whitbread’s brewing divisions by Interbrew, a 
multinational brewer based in Belgium which was forced in 2001 to sell the Bass brands to 
Adolph Coors of the US as a result of a Competition Commission Inquiry;282 and the 
acquisition of Allied Breweries by the Danish company Carlsberg, with the result that by 
2001, half of British brewing was in foreign hands.283 By contrast to the national brewers, 
the sole focus of these foreign companies is brewing, but on an international scale.284 They 
place upmost importance on the maintenance of a powerful portfolio of brands as a means 
of securing a loyal customer base and providing protection against price competition.285 
Nevertheless, a strong regional brewing base was also maintained thereby preserving the 
polarised nature of the UK beer market. 
Even although all but one of the Big Six had disposed of their brewing interests during the 
1990s, the majority remained committed to their pub divisions throughout this period. 
However, by the end of the decade, a new breed of company with no formal associations 
with any breweries emerged which came to be known as pubcos and owned the largest pub 
estates.286 These developed as brewers divested their pubs in accordance with the terms of 
the Beer Orders. Whilst some were bought by individuals, thereby creating free houses as 
anticipated, large blocks of public houses were bought by non-brewing companies, many 
of which already had interests in the hotel, food and entertainment businesses.287 These 
companies, which focus purely on retailing operations, subsequently entered into long-term 
purchasing agreements with the largest brewers for the supply of beer to their newly 
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acquired tied estates. Many of these agreements with brewers imposed exclusive dealing 
clauses on the pubcos.288 Consequently, although the Beer Orders removed the rental 
payments the national brewers received from many of their tied houses, the beer tie 
essentially remained.289 
One of the first pubcos was created in the early 1990s when, following the sale of their 
breweries, Grand Metropolitan and Courage placed their tenanted and leased pub estates in 
a joint venture named Inntrepreneur and formed the UK’s largest grouping of public 
houses.290 By 2001 Inntrepreneur had a tied estate of 5,500 pubs which were subsequently 
sold to other pubcos in 2002.291 Furthermore, having retained their pub estate for most of 
the 1990s, Allied Domecq sold their estate to Punch Taverns, another new pubco.292  In the 
meantime Bass and Whitbread having already disposed of, or significantly reduced their 
brewing capacity, also opted to sell their tied estates to Enterprise Inns, another pubco.293 
Thus, only Scottish & Newcastle was left with an interest in both brewing and public house 
ownership. However the conclusion of this ten year process of dismantling the traditional 
‘vertically integrated brewer-landlord business model’ favoured by the national brewers 
came with Scottish & Newcastle’s decision to sell its retailing division in May 2003.294  
Prior to Scottish & Newcastle’s disposal, the Beer Orders resulted in the Big Six disposing 
of more than 14,000 public houses. This exceeded the 11,000 that had been estimated, with 
the vast majority of them falling into the hands of various pub companies. This was a 
development that was unforeseen by the MMC when it reported in 1989.  
2.3.2 The emergence of the pubco 
The pubco essentially performs traditional pub-related activities. These include ownership 
and maintenance of public houses and the supply of beer. These were once the exclusive 
preserve of brewers who had required large tied estates in order to achieve the economies 
of scale that made the tie work efficiently.295 In fact, the pubcos have perpetuated the tied 
house system by owning estates to rival those of the Big Six whilst also sourcing supplies 
from a single brewer. The single brewer is often the largest brewer with the strongest 
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brands that is also able to offer the largest discounts.296 Consequently this arrangement 
prevents each outlet acting as a free house that sources its own supplies.297 Whilst some 
pubco owned public houses are directly managed by the pubcos themselves, where the 
public house is tenanted the relationship between the pubco and its tenant is committed to a 
lease.298 Pubcos generally secure their income from public houses via three separate 
revenue streams. Firstly, they benefit from the wholesale profit also referred to as the ‘wet’ 
rent, which is essentially the price differential between the price paid to suppliers for tied 
products and the wholesale price at which it is sold to their tenants.299 Secondly, they 
collect the property or ‘dry’ rent which is subject to review at regular intervals.300 Thirdly, 
they derive income from any amusement machines within the public house.301 Essentially, 
the combination of these three revenue streams, together with any benefits afforded by the 
pubco to the tenant, are meant to equal the ‘rent’ that would be paid by a free from tie 
tenant.302  However, regardless of the style of lease relied upon the central condition is that 
the tenants, who were previously tied to a national brewer, are now required to source their 
supplies from the pubco. The pubco determines the prices charged (this is not left to the 
open market) and flow-monitoring equipment is used to ensure tenants do not purchase 
beer outside of the tie.303 Additionally, and in contrast to the position of brewers following 
the Beer Orders, pubcos are able to tie tenants in respect of non-beer products such as 
spirits and cider.304  
As already mentioned above, Inntrepreneur was one of the first pubcos to emerge and 
subsequently provided the business model for pubcos over the next ten years.305 As it was 
essentially a property-holding company it had to demand the highest rents possible from its 
lessees. This caused rents to be far higher than they were under previous tenancies and 
forced lessees to raise the price of beer sold on their premises in order to cover their 
costs.306 Many pubco chains evolved during the 1990s and early 2000s with Punch Taverns 
and Enterprise Inns acquiring 16,000 pubs, which had largely been released from the 
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estates of the Big Six.307 Pubcos effectively removed the brewers and the publicans from 
property ownership. However, due to the need to achieve economies of scale similarly to 
the brewers before them, consolidation in the pubco market was inevitable. Punch Taverns 
and Enterprise Inns were the two main players, with estates large enough to rival the size 
of those of the Big Six.308  
2.4 Revocation of the Beer Orders  
The rise of the pubco subsequently resulted in the Beer Orders replacing one group of 
powerful players with another. The OFT’s 2000 Report ‘The Supply of Beer’309 (2000 
Report) considered whether the Beer Orders were still required under the new market 
conditions. The relevant markets affected by the Beer Orders were defined by the OFT in 
order to establish a framework for the analysis of what the future of the Beer Orders should 
be. At the brewing level this was the market for the supply of all beers in the UK. At the 
retail level the on and off trade were deemed to be in separate markets.310  
2.4.1 Observations about the UK beer market 
In the course of its review, the OFT made several observations about the UK beer market. 
It was noted that since 1989 over one third of the UK’s pubs had been transferred into the 
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ownership of retail pub chains which had subsequently developed a degree of 
countervailing buyer power in relation to the national brewers.311 Furthermore, the 
declining demand for beer and the new countervailing buyer power presented by pub 
companies caused further consolidation in UK brewing.312 It was considered that only two 
or possibly three national brewers were likely to remain in the UK market.313 The 2000 
Report also noted that with the exception of microbrewers, entry into the UK brewing 
market was limited with substantial barriers to entry and expansion remaining.314 
Economies of scale had an even more significant role in production, and expenditure on 
lager brands and more recently ale brands had increased thereby contributing to those 
barriers.315 These factors favoured the national brewers and limited entry into the UK 
brewing market, which again was contrary to the aims of the MMC.316 
Small brewers also still faced difficulties in accessing wholesale and distribution markets 
in the on-trade due to the substantial discounts offered by national brewers to the 
pubcos.317  The 2000 Report noted that small brewers and independent wholesalers could 
not match these levels of discounts as they lacked the necessary economies of scale in 
production as well as the economies of scope in distribution.318 Tied loans also had the 
potential to foreclose the wholesale on-trade market to them.319 The 1989 Report had stated 
that the ultimate test for the Beer Orders was whether an independent wholesale and 
distribution sector had emerged. This was due to its importance in reducing the barriers to 
entry faced by smaller and new brewers thereby increasing competition on the market 
overall.320 Clearly such an independent wholesale and distribution sector had not 
developed, with the vast majority of beer sold to the on-trade being distributed by the 
national brewers.321 Nevertheless, in examining the concerns raised by the MMC in 1989, 
the OFT concluded that, subject to the retention of certain provisions, the Beer Orders were 
no longer required. 
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2.4.2 Pricing issues no longer a concern in the UK beer market 
One of the MMC’s major concerns had been real increases in beer prices. The OFT noted 
that with the new increased buyer power at the retail level, the pubco had brought about a 
reduction in the average net wholesale price of beer, although this had failed to filter 
through to the average retail price of beer in the on-trade.322 This was not however 
considered to indicate a failure in competition at the retail level.323 This was excused on the 
basis that retail competition was manifest in the greater level of amenity offered by pubs, 
with consumers also benefitting from greater choice of amenity and price combinations 
with the emergence of the lower-priced pubco outlets.324 The distinction between pubs and 
other on-trade outlets was considered to have been clouded with the OFT establishing that 
pubs were increasingly competing with clubs, bars, and to some extent restaurants.325 On-
going changes in the licensing regime were deemed to be easing the entry process at the 
retail level.326 Although on-trade beer prices had risen by over 25% in the last ten years by 
comparison to far smaller increases in off-trade prices, which had largely increased in line 
with the all items Retail Prince Index (RPI), the OFT suggested that in light of the service 
element involved in the sale of beer in the on-trade, service sector RPI may be a more 
appropriate comparator.327 When reliance was placed on this, it was suggested that over the 
last 10-year period, the real increase in beer prices was only 4%.328 Proceeding on this 
basis, the increases in beer prices at the retail level are small and it was suggested that beer 
prices are not as significant a factor in the on-trade as they once were.329 The ‘offer’ to 
consumers via on-trade premises was ‘arguably’ improved and there was thought to be a 
trade-off between this and higher beer prices.330 In emphasising the reduced importance of 
price, the range of prices amongst pubs even within a small area, was considered to 
confirm this increased emphasis on amenity in the UK as a whole.331 This was viewed as 
an indication that the adverse effects identified by the MMC had been sufficiently reduced 
to make structural control of the market unnecessary.332 This was so even although it was 
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instead opted to take a broad view of the relevant market as including all fully on-licensed premises.  
326 Above, n.256 at para 2.15, p4 
327 Ibid at para 4.3, p8 
328 Ibid at para 4.3, p8  
329 Ibid at para 4.4, p8 
330 Ibid at para 4.5, p8 
331 Ibid at para 4.5, p8 
332 Ibid at para 4.5, p8 
 	  45	  
noted that between 1992 and 2000 wholesale prices had fallen by 15% due to the discounts 
afforded to pubcos by brewers and this had clearly not filtered through to the retail price.333  
Nevertheless, the price differential between beer and lager was found to have remained 
despite the costs of production being broadly similar. The OFT however dismissed this as 
an indication of anti-competitive behaviour as the national brewers suggested their 
profitability in the sales of lager and beer were similar and given the decline in brewery 
ownership of public houses, the ale to lager differential was no longer driven by the actions 
of brewers.334 The OFT did not however address any possible role played by the pubcos in 
maintaining this differential. The OFT also turned to consider differences in regional 
wholesale prices highlighted by the MMC in 1989. These were deemed to have been 
lessened due to the need for brewers to work from national wholesale price lists following 
the growth of pubcos which sought to negotiate individual prices for each brand of beer.335 
Consequently such differences were considered to be sufficiently reduced for this to no 
longer be a competition concern. 
2.4.3 Concerns over independence of tied tenants and consumer choice 
In addressing the MMC’s concerns over the limited independence of pub tenants, reference 
was made to the European Commission’s approval in 1999 of the beer tie agreements of 
the UK’s largest brewers.336 It was highlighted that whilst Article 101(1) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) was applicable to these agreements, they 
benefitted from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, and these provisions had not been 
found to be infringed by the current lease agreements of the major pubcos.337 It was 
therefore concluded that none of the agreements underwriting tied tenancies in the UK 
were anti-competitive and so this was considered sufficient, despite the on-going litigation 
in the UK between tied tenants and their brewer and pubco landlords, for the OFT to 
conclude that the competition concerns raised by the MMC over the position of tied tenants 
no longer remained.338  
Turning to the MMC’s concerns regarding the restriction on consumer choice resulting 
from reliance on beer tie agreements the OFT was unable to state that there had been a 
significant improvement in this following the Beer Orders. Rather it was noted that “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Ibid at para 4.6, p9 
334 Ibid at para 4.8, p9 
335 Ibid at para 4.9, p9 
336 See Chapter 3  
337 Above, n.256 at para 4.12, p10 
338 Ibid at para 4.12, p10  
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choice of beer available to consumers has been at least maintained by brewers”339 with the 
choice of on-trade outlet appearing to have increased in importance at the expense of the 
choice of beers.340 The OFT attributed the maintenance of this level of choice to demands 
imposed by pubcos enjoying a degree of market power, and responding to consumer 
preferences. This necessitated brewers supply beers they did not brew including those of 
smaller brewers. 341 However, given the limited ability of smaller brewers to compete with 
the incentives offered to pubcos by the largest brewers to supply their brands discussed 
above it was acknowledged that smaller brewers still struggled to penetrate the market at 
the retail level.342   
2.4.4 Brewers’ reliance on the loan tie, the cap on ownership of public 
houses and the GBP 
As mentioned above, brewers’ extensive use of the loan tie had contributed to the MMC’s 
complex monopoly finding.  In reviewing this, the OFT established that due to competition 
from the commercial banking sector, this was no longer as popular a commercial practice 
and there was little evidence that it hindered competition.343 In considering the cap 
imposed on the number of public houses that could be owned by national brewers under 
the Tied Estate Order, discussed above, it was acknowledged that its removal could result 
in brewers re-acquiring large numbers of public houses. This risk was however deemed to 
be minimal due to the costs involved and because outlets could already be secured by 
virtue of supply agreements.344 The OFT also suggested that the maintenance of the cap 
potentially restricted the growth of larger regional brewers.345 Given the significant drop in 
the number of brewer-owned public houses since the imposition of the cap,346 it was 
deemed unreasonable to impose significant structural remedies aimed at tackling beer 
prices, when the majority of pubs were now owned by pubcos and small and independent 
free traders.347 It was similarly suggested that the GBP discussed above be revoked as they 
had “faded into insignificance”.348 Consequently, the OFT suggested that due to the value 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Ibid at para 4.15, p10 
340 Ibid at para 4.15, p10 
341 Ibid at para 4.15, p10  
342 Ibid at para 4.16, p10 
343 Ibid at para 4.19-4.20, p11  
344 Ibid at para 4.36, p14 
345 Ibid at para 4.37, p14 
346 As at January 2000, brewers owned 9,770 pubs, by comparison to 34,059 pubs in 1989. Above, n.256 at 
para 4.38, p14 
347 Ibid at para 4.38-4.39, p14-15 
348 At that time, they only applied to Whitbread’s tenants and those loan tied to Whitbread, Bass and Scottish 
and Newcastle. Above, n.256 at para 4.40, p15 
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now placed by consumers on venue over choice and price, the provisions made little 
contribution to competition.349 
2.4.5 Retention of some provisions of the Beer Orders 
In light of the foregoing, despite the lack of any significant improvement in the 
competitive conditions in the UK beer market and the failure of an independent wholesale 
sector to emerge, as was deemed central to the success of the Beer Orders, it was 
concluded that “the brewing industry and the market for the supply of beer is very different 
now at all levels of distribution from the 1980s…the changes in the structure and 
behaviour in the industry appear to have led to an improvement in competition”.350 This 
was so even although the primary change was the emergence of the pubco. Although there 
had been no reduction in retail prices and consumer choice had not improved greatly the 
OFT stated that “the concerns which Sir Gordon Borrie had in 1986 about high prices and 
lack of consumer choice of beer appear to have been diminished.”351 It was therefore 
recommended that the Beer Orders be revoked, subject to certain provisions regarding loan 
ties and publication of wholesale prices being retained in an attempt to reduce foreclosure 
to competing brewers and to maintain the position of independent wholesalers and free 
houses.352 Despite the many claimed improvements, the OFT was forced to concede that 
competition in the industry could be better, especially through improved access for 
competitors, at all levels of distribution, which the Beer Orders alone were unable to 
achieve.353 No proposals were however suggested to tackle the remaining anticompetitive 
issues faced in the market at that time. The Director General simply gave a personal 
undertaking to ‘be vigilant in his pursuit of anti-competitive practices in the industry and in 
his consideration of structural changes through mergers’.354 The Government subsequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Ibid at para 4.41, p15 
350 Ibid at para 5.4, p16 
351 Ibid at para 5.4, p16. Gordon Borrie was Director General of Fair Trading when the decision was made to 
refer the market to the MMC. 
352 Provisions of the Loan Tie Order were retained to reduce foreclosure of the market to competing brewers 
and to maintain the position of independent wholesalers and free trade pubs, namely Article 2 regarding loan 
tie agreements; Article 4, concerning the publication of wholesale prices; and Article 5, which except in 
certain circumstances, made the refusal to supply beer for resale unlawful (above, n.256 at para 5.3, p16). 
While it was acknowledged that wholesale price lists did not reflect the level of discounting that occurred 
within the industry, the requirement to publish these under Article 4 was thought to impose some restraint on 
the price discrimination brewers could achieve (ibid at para 4.28, p13). Article 5 was considered to have set 
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353 Above, n.256 at para 5.4, p16 
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repealed the Beer Orders in their entirety in 2003 as none of the national brewers to whom 
they applied remained in tact and so they were no longer relevant.355 
3. Conclusion  
Having reviewed above the historical development of the British brewing industry, it is 
apparent that there are numerous links binding the brewing industry and the public house 
market, with the beer tie being an integral part of the UK’s brewing business. Numerous 
reasons have been identified to explain the UK market, including the need to ensure a 
constant demand for perishable products and to reduce transportation costs in the early 
years. However, it is also apparent that the beer tie has been a source of concern 
throughout the ages as recognised early on by the 1817 Select Committee and latterly, and 
more controversially, by the MMC. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the 
resulting Beer Orders were not the most appropriate response to the complex monopoly 
that existed amongst the Big Six national brewers in the 1980s. The Beer Orders gave rise 
to numerous unforeseen consequences, including even greater concentration in the industry 
and the emergence of a tighter and more complex oligopoly than had previously existed. 
Moreover, foreign multinationals have come to dominate, and with their greater emphasis 
on powerful branding, have further raised the barriers to entry. However, the most 
significant consequence was the emergence of the pubco which replaced the brewers in the 
ownership of substantial tied estates.  Thus the Beer Orders were therefore only successful 
in replacing one set of powerful players with another. The aim of increasing competition in 
the industry failed to materialise and concerns have continued to be raised over pubcos and 
their reliance on the beer tie. 
The Beer Orders therefore serve as an important warning of the unintended consequences 
that can arise from interfering in the use of the beer tie which as demonstrated above is 
largely intertwined into the structure of the UK market and has played an integral role in 
shaping it. Thus, in order to make recommendations for the reform of regulation of the 
market, in later chapters some other national markets will be analysed by way of 
comparison, however, before undertaking such a task it is instructive to consider the 
application of the EU’s competition rules, particularly Article 101 TFEU, to tying 
agreements.   
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Chapter 3 - EU Competition Law and the Brewing 
Industry  
The preceding chapter mapped the historical development of the beer market in the UK 
and explained why the beer tie remains an integral feature of this market. It also identified 
why the use of beer tying agreements has attracted considerable and on-going attention 
from the UK Government and competition authorities. This chapter now examines the 
application of the competition provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) to vertical tying agreements with particular emphasis on those for the 
distribution of beer. 
The chapter provides first an introduction to the EU competition law provisions, with a 
specific focus on Article 101 TFEU. It touches on the perceived ‘double nature’ of vertical 
agreements and the impact this has had on the application of the EU competition law 
provisions to such agreements (Subsection 1). The chapter then focuses on the EU’s 
evolving approach towards beer supply agreements, briefly noting that the distribution of 
petrol is the only other sector to be treated by the EU in a similar manner. The emphasis is 
placed on the provisions of successive block exemption regulations (BERs) the terms of 
which have been of central importance in the EU’s approach to distribution agreements in 
the beer market. The decisional practice of the European Commission and Courts is also 
considered (Subsection 2). Finally, the need for the EU to adopt a more economics-based 
approach to the handling of vertical agreements is discussed (Subsection 3). 
1. Introduction to the EU competition law provisions 
EU competition law came into existence on 1 January 1958 and the rules were set out in 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. These are now renumbered Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.1 The focus of this chapter is Article 101 TFEU, which is concerned with the 
economic impact of bilateral or multilateral practices as opposed to their legal form.2  
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits “as incompatible with the internal market”: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hereafter referred to as Article 101 and 102 TFEU. For simplicity, the current Treaty numbering is used 
throughout the thesis in place of preceding Treaty provisions.  
2 In (Case 56/65) Société La Technique Miniere (STM) v. Maschinebau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 234; [1966] 
1 CMLR 357 at p374 the CJEU held that “[t]o be forbidden as incompatible with the Common Market under 
Article [101 (1)TFEU], an agreement between undertakings must fulfill certain conditions depending not so 
much on its legal nature as on its relations, on the one hand, with 'trade between the [M]ember-States' and, 
on the other, with 'the play of competition'.” Also J Goyder, EU Distribution Law 5th Edition (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2011) at p22-25. 
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“all agreements between undertakings3 decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market…”4 
Article 101(2) TFEU declares such agreements to be automatically void, however Article 
101(3) TFEU offers the possibility to save such agreements on satisfaction of its 
requirements, which generally rely on efficiency grounds as a basis for exception from the 
prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU.5  
By referring to ‘all agreements, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices’ Article 101(1) TFEU is wide enough to apply to almost all multilateral conduct, 
thereby recognising undertakings’ resourcefulness in structuring and describing their 
arrangements.6 It was also expressly confirmed in the seminal case, Consten & Grundig7 
that the prohibition extends to vertical agreements. Whish describes vertical agreements as 
‘agreements concluded between operators at different stages of the production and 
marketing chains’ of a product or service.8 As such, beer supply agreements are a form of 
vertical agreement.  
The European Commission at the outset of their application of Article 101(1) TFEU 
traditionally adopted a formalistic approach to the assessment of agreements between 
undertakings.9 As discussed below, at this time market integration was at the forefront of 
the Commission’s agenda with it generally assuming that all agreements that were 
potentially restrictive of competition came within the terms of Article 101(1) TFEU. This 
approach precluded any economic analysis of the agreement in question until determining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The CJEU stated in (Case C-41/90) Hofnör and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979; [1993] 4 
CMLR 306 at para 21, p333 that “…the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an 
economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed...” See also R 
Whish, Competition Law 6th Edition (London, Oxford University Press, 2009) at p83 
4 Article 101(1) TFEU follows with a non-exhausted illustrative list of prohibited practices. 
5 In order to be offered exception under Article 101(3) TFEU all four of the following requirements must be 
satisfied by the agreement, decision or concerted practice in question. 
“contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of 
the products in question.” 
6 M Furse, Competition law of the EC and UK 6th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) at p167 
and see (Case 56/56) Société La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] 1 CMLR 357 at 374 
7 (Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64) Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs- GmbH v. EEC 
Commission [1966] ECR 299; [1966] CMLR 418. This is discussed further below.  
8 R Whish, Competition Law 3rd Edition (London, Butterworths, 1993) at p45 and S Marco Colino, Vertical 
Agreements and Competition Law A comparative study of the EU and US Regimes (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2010) at p1 
9 F.M. Carlin, ‘Vertical Restraints: Time for change?’ (1996) 17(5) E.C.L.Rev 283 at 283 
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whether the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU were satisfied thereby rendering Article 
101(1) TFEU inapplicable. Given the widespread reliance on vertical agreements in the 
production and distribution of goods throughout the EU, their handling under Article 101 
TFEU has been influential in the development and interpretation of the EU competition 
law provisions. 
1.1 Vertical agreements – ‘double nature’ and the development of the EU 
competition law provisions 
As stated above, vertical agreements involve firms operating ‘at different stages of the 
production and marketing chains of one product’.10 As such they involve two undertakings 
that are not competitors and that are not operating on the same relevant market.11 Such 
vertical agreements are widespread in the distribution and sale of goods and tend to be 
relied on in the absence of vertical integration.12 Vertical integration describes the situation 
where the manufacturer of a product is able to distribute that product through its own 
distribution chain. In the absence of such integration, and so, where products are 
distributed by independent undertakings, rather than the manufacturer, vertical agreements 
replicating the effects of vertical integration are an essential feature of commercial life.13 
As such, these agreements are widespread in the beer industry, as they are in the petrol 
industry. As these agreements detail the rights and obligations of the parties, they include 
‘restraints’ on the manner in which they can buy, sell or resell goods. Some of these 
restraints come within Article 101(1) TFEU and are known as vertical restraints.14 
Exclusive purchasing obligations are an example of such a restraint and are widespread 
within the beer industry as well as the petroleum industry. These restraints generally oblige 
resellers to acquire the majority of their supplies from a single supplier and not to handle 
any competing manufacturers’ products. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 S Marco Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law A Comparative Study of the EU and US 
Regimes (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) at p1. Also R Whish, Competition Law 3rd Edition (London, 
Butterworths, 1993) at p45. 
11 S Marco Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law A Comparative Study of the EU and US 
Regimes (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) at p1 
12 R Whish, Competition Law 3rd Edition (London, Butterworths, 1993) at p538 
13 Above, n.11 at p1. The decision whether or not to vertically integrate in influenced by numerous factors 
including capital requirements and efficiency gains resulting from using an independent undertaking to 
distribute goods. Above, n.12 at 537-538. Williamson highlights three categories of motivation for vertical 
integration as “incentives, controls and what may be referred to as “inherent structural advantages”.” He 
suggests that the most “distinctive” advantage is the wider variety of control instruments available for 
enforcing intra-firm activities by comparison with inter-firm activities. Williamson O.E, ‘The Vertical 
Integration of Production; Market Failure Considerations’ (1971) 61(2) Am Ec Rev 112 at p 113. 
14 Article 1(b) Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices ((2010) OJ L102/1) 
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The competitive effects of such restraints largely depend on the market power of the 
parties to the agreement as well as the prevailing competitive conditions in the relevant 
market. The competitiveness of a market can be gauged through consideration of the levels 
of intra-brand competition;15 and inter-brand competition16 it supports.17 The use of 
vertical restraints can affect inter- and intra-brand competition in the relevant market. 
Where a manufacturer imposes obligations on the reseller regarding the promotion or sale 
of his products those obligations will affect the way in which his products are dealt with, 
thereby only affecting intra-brand competition.18 Such restrictions tend to be looked on 
more favorably by the competition authorities than inter-brand restrictions given the 
manufacturer’s genuine interest in the handling of his own products.19 However, vertical 
restraints, such as exclusive purchasing obligations which are widespread in the beer 
market, may affect inter-brand competition by requiring the reseller does not handle the 
manufacturer’s competitors’ products.20 The anticompetitive effects of any vertical 
restraint tends to be reduced where the market is competitive and open as evidenced by the 
level of inter-brand competition it supports. However, the anticompetitive effects are 
heightened where there are barriers to entry and the market is foreclosed.21 Given the 
importance of the prevailing market conditions, there are numerous theories highlighting 
the competitive and anticompetitive effects of vertical agreements.  
Wesseling highlights the ambiguous effects of such agreements.22 Exclusive distribution 
agreements, for example, are a form of vertical agreement that can assist producers in 
penetrating new markets via incentivised distributors who are protected from the problem 
of ‘free-riding’ by other distributors.23 However, while they can increase both efficiency 
and inter-brand competition, by offering territorial protection to distributors they can 
potentially seal off particular geographical markets from others.24 Whilst the beneficial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Competition from retailers of products obtained from the same supplier. 
16 Competition from retailers of products made by a rival producer. V Korah and W.A. Rothnie, Exclusive 
Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 2nd Edition (London, Sweet 
and Maxwell ,1982) at para 1.8, p8.  
17 As Whish notes, competition law is more concerned with restrictions of inter-brand competition than 
restrictions of intra-brand competition. Restrictions of intra-brand competition only cause concern where 
inter-brand competition is weak. R Whish, Competition Law 6th Edition (London, Oxford University Press, 
2009) at p614 
18 Above, n.12 at p45 
19 Ibid at p45 
20 Ibid at p45 
21 Above, n.16 para 1.9, p9 and para 1.11, p11 
22 R Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) at p78 
23 Ibid at p78. ‘Free riding’ occurs where a distributor undertakes the necessary advertising and promotion to 
penetrate a new market and the manufacturer subsequently supplies its goods to other distributors in the same 
sales territory who have not incurred the same expenses however benefit by ‘free-riding’ on the expenditure 
of the original distributor. See above, n.11 at p20 
24 Above, n.12 at p547 
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effects of such arrangements on inter-brand competition are now recognised, as will be 
discussed when considering market integration as a goal of EU competition law and the 
seminal case Consten & Grundig, the EU initially veraciously pursued such market 
partitioning agreements in its application of Article 101 TFEU. By contrast, exclusive 
purchasing obligations can increase efficiency by allowing manufacturers to have 
guaranteed outlets for their products thereby enabling them to rationalise production.25 
Further, manufacturers may offer financial or other assistance to the resellers subject to 
such restraints as this will potentially assist in increasing the production of the 
manufacturer’s own goods, not its competitors.26 However, where networks of exclusive 
purchasing obligations exist, as is the case in the UK brewing industry, this can lead to 
market partitioning and foreclosure to competing and potential suppliers.27 The exclusive 
purchasing obligations beer supply agreements impose on resellers essentially deny the 
supplier’s competitors access to those resellers’ outlets.28 In the brewing industry, this 
situation is exacerbated by restrictive licensing which limits the number of available retail 
outlets in the UK market.29 This has implications for integration and in-store inter-band 
competition, whilst also potentially facilitating collusion between suppliers in the case of 
cumulative use.  Further, as exclusive purchasing obligations potentially prevent the 
reseller from acquiring the same goods elsewhere at a cheaper price, they can ultimately 
result in the end consumer paying a higher price for the goods in question.30 Consequently 
Carlin correctly highlights that exclusive purchasing agreements must be clearly defined in 
scope and limited in duration to avoid this consequence. 31 
In light of the foregoing unpredictable effects and resulting ‘double nature’ of vertical 
restraints, Wesseling notes that they have become central to the development of the 
concept of ‘restriction of competition’ under Article 101(1) TFEU.32 As discussed above, 
the European Commission’s initially formalistic approach to the application of Article 
101(1) TFEU extended to its treatment of vertical agreements with their implications for 
the competitive and integration processes also driving this approach.33 Nevertheless, this 
would soon attract much criticism, most notably from Hawk.34 Hawk highlights the 
criticisms over the Commission’s practice of over-emphasising the importance of intra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid at p542-543 
26 Ibid at p543 
27 Above, n.22 at p78 
28 Above, n.12 at p545 
29 Ibid at p545 
30 Ibid at p52 
31 Above, n.9 at p284 and above, n.16 at para 1.9, p9 and para 1.11, p11 
32 Above, n.22 at p79 
33 Ibid at p79 
34 B.E. Hawk, ‘The American (anti-trust) revolution: lessons for the EEC?’ (1988) 19(1) E.C.L.Rev 53  
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brand competition through the strict treatment of export bans, in the pursuit of market 
integration.35 This largely ignored the distribution efficiencies and increased inter-brand 
competition that could result from the use of vertical restraints.36 Hawk therefore 
highlights that resolution of the tensions between the efficiencies resulting from the use of 
vertical agreements and inter-brand competition; and market integration and distribution 
concerns has been one of the most significant issues in EU antitrust law.37 Whilst the 
Commission’s approach to vertical agreements is now somewhat more sophisticated, with 
their benefits being largely accepted, Colino notes that the Commission is still wary of 
their potential effects,38 with their approach being influenced by the goals of EU 
competition law, some of which are unparalleled in other antitrust jurisdictions. 
1.2 The unique goals of EU competition law  
The goals of EU competition law and so the reasoning that informs what competition law 
should protect is, as Colino notes, influenced by historical and political, as well as social 
thinking, not to mention economic schools of thought.39 Consequently, certain goals of EU 
competition law have had greater influence, or find no analogue in other jurisdictions, such 
as the EU’s overarching goal of integration. These goals have impacted on EU policy 
regarding vertical restraints, which over the past several decades has been criticised and 
subsequently reformed. 
1.2.1 Integration  
Although there has been some movement in the order of priority afforded to the goals of 
EU competition law, with economic efficiency40 at the top, due to the historical 
development of the EU, non-economic goals have also been influential on EU competition 
policy. These non-economic goals can be understood within a process of integration geared 
towards the establishment of a single market.41 As EU competition law has to take into 
account the constitutional framework provided by the Treaties, a principle objective of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid at p74-75 
36 Ibid at p74-75. Whish also notes the European Commission and Courts’ long-held concerns over market 
partitioning, even where the restrictions in question concern intra-brand competition as opposed to inter-
brand competition. Above, n.17 at p614.  
37 Above, n.34 at p75 
38 Above, n.11 at p15 
39 Ibid at p25 and p28 
40 Motta notes social welfare is also taken into consideration in EU competition policy. He highlights that 
social and political considerations influence the way in which competition policy is implemented. 
Competition may therefore be “sacrificed” where the social costs of it are considered to be too high, for 
example where significant job losses would result. M Motta, Competition Policy Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) at p15. 
41 Above, n.11 at p25 and p27 
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competition law was, and to a more limited extent today is, integration through the 
eradication of discrimination based on national grounds.42 Consequently, the competition 
regime under the TFEU has a strong emphasis on opening up markets to competition. As a 
result, the Commission was initially keen to condemn firms’ attempts to segment national 
markets, for example by conferring absolute territorial protection on resellers.43 This 
subsequently impacted on the treatment of vertical restraints which vary significantly in 
scope. As Whish highlights, such restraints raise many ‘complex theoretical and analytical 
problems’44 with their mixed effects requiring individual attention to determine their 
competitive impact.45 Nevertheless, due to their ‘double nature’ stated above, and the risk 
they pose to market integration, vertical agreements have been subject to a high degree of 
regulatory intervention under EU competition law.46 
1.2.2 Economic Freedom  
As stated above, economic efficiency may have greater primacy today as a goal of EU 
competition law however this was not always the case. When EU competition law rules 
were adopted, the thinking of German Ordoliberal scholars, known as the ‘Freiburg 
School’, which advocated ‘the economic freedom of action of all actors,’ significantly 
influenced the development of European competition law.47  They sought to keep 
government power in check in order to protect individual freedoms whilst also recognising 
the need for the State to be strong enough to resist the misuse of private power.48 The 
notion of economic freedom subsequently came to be a goal of EU competition law. Given 
the desire to facilitate open markets and ensure economic freedom,49 vertical restraints 
were subject to a high level of interference by the EU competition authorities.50 As Colino 
notes, the Commission attached itself to the concept of ‘economic freedom’ and considered 
the concept of ‘restriction of competition’ as the negative effects deriving from a 
restriction on the economic freedom of the operators in the market. 51 As a result, almost all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Above, n.40 at p14 
43 Ibid at p14 
44 Above, n.12 at p536 
45 Above, n.11 at p26 
46 Above, n.22 at p78-79 and above, n. 34 at p73 
47 D.J. Gerber, Ordoliberalism: A New Intellectual Framework for Competition Law, (Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2010) at p232 and A Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond – the first 50 years of 
European Competition Law’ (2008) 29(2) E.C.L.Rev 81 at 82 
48 D.J. Gerber, Ordoliberalism: A New Intellectual Framework for Competition Law (Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2010) at p240. G Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) at p39-
41  
49 D J. Gerber, Ordoliberalism: A New Intellectual Framework for Competition Law (Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2010) at p249 
50 Above, n.40 at p24 
51 Above, n.11 at p61 
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agreements were prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU.52 This was due to the fact that a 
party’s freedom to act is almost always limited on entering a contractual arrangement, as 
exemplified by beer supply agreements which contain exclusive purchasing obligations.53  
However, this approach would ultimately distinguish the EU from other antitrust 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, where in the 1980s, the Chicago School was 
influential. By contrast to the Freiburg School, the Chicago School advocated economic 
efficiency as the only goal of antitrust and pointed to the efficiency enhancing qualities of 
vertical restraints, including their ability to enhance inter-brand competition.54 
Consequently, as already stated above, the initial lack of economic analysis in the 
Commission’s decisions and its attachment to the notion of economic freedom caused its 
policies on vertical restraints to be one of the most criticised aspects of EU competition 
policy.55  
1.2.3 Protection of small and medium sized enterprises  
Another goal of EU competition law, once shared by the United States,56 is the protection 
of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).57 As Colino notes, this has its basis in the 
neoclassical economic belief that the greater the number of competitors in the market, the 
more intense competition will be.58 However, Motta highlights that while resources should 
not be expended on monitoring the agreements of small firms, their over-protection 
through attempts to address the issues faced by SMEs may cause distortions in the 
competitive sphere.59 Nevertheless, the goal of protecting SMEs is evident in the EU’s de 
minimis doctrine, developed in Völk v Vervaecke.60 This doctrine clarifies what is not 
considered to be an appreciable restriction of competition for the purpose of the application 
of Article 101(1) TFEU. This has been supplemented by a series of Notices issued by the 
European Commission over the past several decades.61 As will be discussed below, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid at p61 
53 Above, n.22 at p78-79 
54 Above, n.34 at p57 and above, n.11 at p20 
55 B Hawk, ‘System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law’ (1995) 32(4) C.M.L.Rev 973 at 
977-978 and above, n.11 at p60-61 
56 US antitrust law came into being following complaints from small enterprises against large trusts in the 
19th Century. Above, n.40 at p22 
57 Hereinafter referred to as SMEs 
58 Above, n.11 at p32 
59 Above, n.40 at p22. Motta highlights that assisting small firms to survive when they are unable to operate 
at an efficient scale of production would cause the inefficient allocation of resources and would ultimately 
contribute to higher prices in the economy (ibid at p22). 
60 Case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295 
61 The first notice was European Commission, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance  ((1970) OJ 
C64/1). (No English translation available) The current notice is European Commission, Notice on agreements 
of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (de minimis) ((2001) OJ C368/13) 
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applying the de minimis doctrine to the UK beer market, the European Commission came 
to distinguish the beer tie agreements of national brewers from those entered into by small 
regional brewers. It considered that the former foreclosed the market thereby requiring 
individual examination, whilst the latter, on account of the size of the breweries concerned 
were out with the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, except where their cumulative effect was 
foreclosure or hindered market access.62 
2. The EU’s evolving approach towards beer supply agreements 
For the reasons stated above, the terms of Article 101 TFEU, the perceived ‘double nature’ 
of vertical agreements and the goals of EU competition law, have all impacted on the EU’s 
policy decisions affecting vertical agreements, including the vast number in the beer 
industry. Another industry which has been affected by these policy decisions is the petrol 
industry, which is significantly similar to the beer industry in that it shares a distinct 
prevalence for such agreements. This is explained by Whish who highlights the natural 
tendency towards vertical integration within these markets.63 As stated above, vertical 
restraints can be used to replicate the effects of vertical integration. This is possible as they 
align the objectives of the parties to the agreement, with this being preferred when large 
sums have been invested in public houses and service stations, as is commonly the case in 
these industries.64 Nevertheless, in charting the EU’s evolving approach towards beer 
supply agreements and the vertical restraints contained within them, the focus will be 
placed on the provisions of the various Block Exemption Regulations (BERs) that have 
been adopted over the decades. This is due to the fact that historically, most agreements 
within this market were drafted to come within the terms of a BER due to the 
Commission’s overly-broad and formalistic application of Article 101(1) TFEU discussed 
above. However, regard will also be had to the relevant decisions of the European 
Commission and of the European courts, including those which provided guidance on the 
assessment of vertical agreements prior to the adoption of the first BER in 1967 which are 
still of importance today.  
2.1 Pre-Block Exemption Regulations  
Prior to the adoption of the first BER in 1967, guidance on assessing the legality of 
agreements was to be gleaned from the decisional practice of the European Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 D.A. Cowan and J.S. Nazerali, ‘Beer Supply Agreements – a Step Forward of Last Orders?’ (1998) 19(5) 
E.C.L.Rev 289 at 290 
63 Above, n.12 at p538 
64 Above, n.40 at p303-304 and R.J. Van den Bergh and P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective 2nd Edition (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at p207  
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and Courts, with quite clear instruction being provided in the 1966 case Société Technique 
Miniére.65 There the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified that the 
words ‘object or effect’ in Article 101(1) TFEU were to be read disjunctively.66 It stated 
that “[t]he fact that these are not cumulative but alternative conditions, indicated by the 
conjunction ‘or’, suggests first the need to consider the very object of the agreement…”67 
In applying this, it firstly has to be determined whether the agreement has the object in its 
economic context to restrict, distort or prevent competition; and secondly, if this 
consideration of the object of the agreement fails to show a “sufficient degree of 
harmfulness with regard to competition”, it has to be determined whether it has an 
appreciable effect on competition through an examination of the relevant facts.68 It 
therefore highlighted at an early stage the importance of the economic context in 
determining the purpose of an agreement. The European Commission, however, was slow 
to follow this approach.69  This was significant as the European Commission, by virtue of 
Article 9 of Regulation 17/62,70 enjoyed the exclusive right to declare Article 101(1) TFEU 
inapplicable to an agreement on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU. It therefore effectively 
enjoyed a monopoly in applying Article 101 TFEU, to the exclusion of the national courts 
and competition authorities.71 The only means of ensuring exemption of an agreement was 
to notify the European Commission, causing it to be inundated with agreements but also 
presenting an opportunity for it to further the goal of integration through its decisional 
practices.72  
2.1.1 Influence of Consten & Grundig  
At a time when integration was at the forefront of the European Commission’s priorities, it 
was empowered by its virtual monopoly under Regulation 17/62 in the application of 
Article 101 TFEU, to control those restraints that threatened to divide the common 
market.73  Due to the wide scope afforded to the notion of restriction of competition, and 
its reluctance to recognise that certain restraints could divide the market, whilst also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 (Case 56/65) Société Technique Miniére (STM) v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 234; [1966] 1 CMLR 
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66 (Case 56/65) Société Technique Miniére (STM) v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] C.M.L.R. 357 at 375 
67 Ibid at 375 
68 Ibid at 375. D Weston and J Pheasant, ‘Vertical Restraints, Foreclosure and Article 85 Developing an 
analytical framework’ (1997) 18(5) E.C.L.Rev 323 at 324  
69 Above, n.11 at p65  
70 Regulation No 17 First Regulation implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty ((1962) OJ 13/204) 
71 A Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond – the first 50 years of European Competition Law’ 
(2008) 29(2) E.C.L.Rev 81 at 82. Above, n.11 at p62. Colino notes that this monopoly allowed the 
Commission to ensure uniformity in the application of the competition law provisions.  
72 Above, n.11 at p62 
73 Ibid at p62 
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enhancing competition, most agreements were found to infringe Article 101 TFEU.74 In the 
seminal 1960s case of Consten & Grundig75 the Commission, as endorsed by the CJEU, 
clarified the application of Article 101 TFEU to vertical agreements.76  The general 
concern was that such agreements could isolate markets by re-establishing barriers to trade 
along national lines, thereby frustrating the basic objects of the EU. The CJEU stated that 
the preamble and text of the Treaty is aimed at “suppressing the barriers between States 
and…could not allow undertakings to restore such barriers.”77 It reaffirmed that Article 
101 TFEU was intended to prohibit this even where the agreement concerned undertakings 
“placed at different levels of the economic process”, as in vertical arrangements.78 
Consequently, an exclusive distribution agreement between the parties, which made 
provision for absolute territorial protection for Consten supported by the grant of an 
exclusive licence of the Grundig trademark throughout the territory of France, was 
contrary to the internal market philosophy and was prohibited.79 As Wesseling notes, by 
holding that an agreement which aims to separate artificially national markets for certain 
goods, thereby hindering the free movement of goods is a restriction of competition, the 
CJEU linked the concept of competition under EU competition rules to the process of 
market integration.80 Further, in keeping with its earlier decision in Societe Technique 
Miniere,81 discussed above, as the agreement appeared to have the object of restricting, 
preventing or distorting competition, it was prohibited without the need to assess the actual 
effects of the agreement.82 Consequently, Consten & Grundig clarified the application of 
Article 101 TFEU, to vertical agreements, and reinforced the principles driving its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid at p61 
75 Joined Cases, 56/64 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission 
[1966] ECR 299, [1966] CMLR 418 
76 As noted by Weitbrecht the CJEU at this time, assumed a supporting role for the Commission’s integration 
agenda. A Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago and beyond – the first 50 years of European Competition 
Law’ (2008) 29(2) E.C.L.Rev 81 at 83 
77 Joined Cases, 56/64 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission 
[1966] C.M.L.R. 418 at p471 
78 Ibid at p471 
79 The CJEU, however, in-keeping with its earlier decision in Société Technique Miniére, did not accept that 
exclusivity clauses alone would automatically cause an agreement to breach Article 101(1) TFEU. The 
clauses considered incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU were those concerning absolute territorial 
protection and the agreement concerning the Grundig trademark (above, n.77 at 474-475.) 
80 Above, n.22 at p85   
81 Above, n.66. STM had been granted exclusive rights to sell machines in France and some overseas 
territories. When Maschinenbau did not receive payment, it sued STM which in turn claimed that some of the 
clauses under the agreement were void under Article 101(1) TFEU. The CJEU however took the view that 
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p375) 
82 Above, n.77 at p471 and p473 
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application most notably market integration.  The decision in Consten & Grundig was 
closely followed by the Commission in the drafting of Regulation 67/67.83 
2.2 The Block Exemption Regulations  
BERs are ‘self-regulatory mechanisms’, in that, should their terms be fully complied with, 
the parties to an agreement, can be satisfied that the agreement complies with EU 
competition law.84 However, the Commission’s early BERs were subject to much criticism 
for adopting a highly formalistic approach.85  
2.2.1 Regulation 67/67 – the starting point 
The first BER was adopted in 1967 to stem the flow of agreements besieging the European 
Commission seeking an individual exemption under Article 101(3) following the adoption 
of Regulation 17/6286 and the Consten & Grundig judgment.87 The new BER reflected the 
desire to filter out those agreements which although prima facie contrary to Article 101(1) 
TFEU had overall pro-competitive effects.88 In doing so, Regulation 67/67 acknowledged 
the benefits of exclusive dealing arrangements, including their ability to bring about 
improvements in the distribution of goods.89 Article 1 of Regulation 67/67 detailed the 
exemption. This applied to exclusive distribution and purchasing agreements90 between 
two undertakings, where these were concerned with goods for resale, but not services.91 
Although there were no express rules governing beer supply agreements, by including 
exclusive purchasing agreements, they were implicitly included within the terms of 
Regulation 67/67. However, Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67 provided that agreements 
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Exemption Regulations (London, Chancery Law Publishing, 1994) at p50  
84 Above, n.17 at p164 
85 Above, n.11 at p64  
86 Above, n.70 
87 Above, n.77 
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89 Recital 6 of Regulation 67/67. It was also during this period when the Commission was seeking to reduce 
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  61	  
where the undertakings were from one Member State and concerned the resale of goods 
within that State, were excluded as they rarely affected trade between member states. This 
effectively rendered the BER inapplicable to UK national beer agreements as both parties 
were from the same Member State.92  
However, in the same year as Regulation 67/67 was adopted, the CJEU provided guidance 
on beer agreements in Brasserie de Haecht.93 In a preliminary ruling concerning the 
compatibility of a beer supply agreement with Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court confirmed 
that such agreements could be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU however, it was unlikely 
that a beer agreement incorporating an exclusive purchasing obligation would restrict 
competition by object.94 The CJEU clarified that where an agreement does not have the 
object of restricting competition, it is necessary to perform an extensive analysis of its 
effects in order to determine whether it restricts competition.95 It stated that “[t]o judge 
whether it is hit by Article [101](1), a contract can thus not be isolated from that context, 
i.e., from the factual or legal circumstances resulting in it having the effect of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition. With regard to that objective, the existence of similar 
contracts can be taken into account in so far as all the contracts of that type as a whole are 
such as to restrict the freedom of trade.”96 The guidance provided by the CJEU was 
therefore that the effect of the beer supply agreement in question had to be considered in its 
complete legal and economic context, highlighting the importance of assessing the 
restraint, not in the abstract, but within the context in which it operates, in order to 
determine its effects. 
Whilst the judgment of the CJEU in Brasserie de Haecht suggested it was adopting a more 
economics based approach to the assessment of vertical agreements under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, this was not reflected in the terms of Regulation 67/67. In keeping with the desire 
for legal certainty, Article 2 of Regulation 67/67 detailed a ‘White’ list of permissible 
restrictions which could be placed on the exclusive dealer if exemption was to be secured. 
The Regulation also provided in Article 3 a ‘Black’ list of clauses which would deny the 
agreement an automatic exemption from the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
Consequently, the Regulation was largely formalistic with all agreements having to be 
drafted to include the permitted ‘White’ clauses, whilst excluding those outlawed by the 
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‘Black’ list. In line with the internal market philosophy, the ‘Black’ list respected the 
‘cardinal rule’ of no absolute territorial protection and sought to ensure intra-brand 
competition was preserved.97  While this approach satisfied the need for legal certainty, it 
denied undertakings the freedom to draft agreements on the basis of commercial 
considerations and overlooked the economic effects of the agreements in question. 
Nevertheless, the format set by Regulation 67/67 was followed by its successors,98 which 
were later criticised for their ‘straitjacket effect’ on agreements and for their lack of 
economic analysis.99 
2.2.1.1 Extension of Regulation 67/67 
Whilst agreement was being reached on the terms of Regulation 67/67’s successor, the 
BER had to be amended to accommodate the CJEU judgment in Fonderies Roubaix – 
Wattrelos v. Fonderies Roux.100 The judgment confirmed that Regulation 67/67 did in fact 
cover agreements which satisfied its requirements even where the parties were based in the 
same Member State,101 with this being reaffirmed in Concordia.102 These judgments 
therefore opened up the possibility of exemption to beer and service station agreements 
involving parties in one Member State.103 However, at this time between the extension of 
Regulation 67/67 and the adoption of its successors, the Commission had been notified of 
far more agreements concerning the supply of beer than petrol, but had avoided taking a 
formal decision on a brewery contract. Instead, it opted to pursue enquiries into the 
industry under Article 12 of Regulation 17/62, and Sinan notes that during these 
evaluations, brewery contracts benefitted from a “relatively liberal application of the EEC 
competition rules”.104 This was despite the fact that in the UK, concern was being 
expressed about the increasing width of the beer tie which now included, amongst others, 
wines, sprits, soft drinks and amusement machines.105 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Above, n.9 at 248 
98 Above, n.91 at p50  
99 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the application of the Community 
competition rules to vertical restraints (Follow-up to the green paper on vertical restraints) ((1998) OJ 
C365/3) at para 4, 23 
100 Case 63/75, Fonderies Roubaix – Wattrelos v. Fonderies Roux [1976] ECR 111 at 118  
101 Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67. See above, n.91 at p51 
102 (Case 47/76), De Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia [1977] ECR 65. This concerned a loan by the 
Concordia brewery in exchange for the recipients and their successors undertaking that their café would 
purchase only Concordia products 
103 Ibid. See also I.M. Sinan, ‘Tied House Agreements and the EEC Competition Rules: A Brief History’ 
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  63	  
2.2.2 The need for more than one regulation 
The European Commission opted to replace Regulation 67/67 with two BERs, which 
would operate alongside the 1977 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance (1977 
Notice).106 The decision to adopt two BERs was partly attributed to the CJEU’s 
aforementioned judgment in Concordia. This judgment did not just reaffirm that 
Regulation 67/67 was applicable to agreements that satisfied its requirements even where 
the parties were based in the same Member State, but clarified other aspects of its 
application. Whilst Article 1 of Regulation 67/67 did not impose a requirement for an 
exclusive purchasing agreement to specify an exclusive territory to gain exemption107 as 
Korah and Rothnie note, the Commission appears to have considered one of these 
requirements to be the counterparty of the other.108 From a literal reading of the provision 
it is unclear why the Commission would have done so. However, Korah and Rothnie seek 
to justify this on the basis of the Commission being more concerned than the Court that 
exclusive purchasing obligations may have the effect of foreclosing too much inter-brand 
competition.109 This explanation is in line with the Commission’s practices discussed 
above. The Commission subsequently highlighted this judgment and the lack of any 
provisions in Regulation 67/67 dealing with the specific issues arising from exclusive 
purchasing agreements as justification for the need to adopt two separate BERs.110 
These ultimately came in the form of Regulations 1983/83 on exclusive distribution 
agreements, and Regulation 1984/83 dealing with exclusive purchasing agreements.111 The 
Commission stated that the adoption of two BERs was preferred due to the “differences in 
the nature of such agreements and in their implications for competition in the common 
market”.112 The Commission noted that exclusive distribution agreements and the 
allocation of exclusive sales territories to resellers may result in market partitioning and a 
substantial lessening in intra-brand competition.113 By contrast, the Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 It provided a qualitative test of turnover, and a market share test requiring that the products subject to the 
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importance which do not fall within Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community ((1977) OJ C313/3). Also above, n.90 at p242.  
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highlighted that exclusive purchasing agreements presented the problem of market 
foreclosure to competing manufacturers and suppliers thereby limiting inter-brand 
competition in the EU.114 This was considered to be particularly likely where there is a 
network of similar contracts affecting the largest or majority of retail outlets.115 The 
Commission sought to define specific rules for beer supply agreements in light of the 
ability of a network of such agreements to “immobilize competitive structures within the 
national markets affected and to partition off these markets, because they make it much 
more difficult for suppliers from other Member States to distribute their products through 
the established public houses, cafes and so on.”116 These concerns prompted the 
Commission to express its intention not to deny such agreements exemption but to use the 
new provision to ‘loosen’ the exclusive purchasing obligations that could qualify for 
exemption from the EU competition law provisions.117 Therefore given the significance of 
the new provisions of Regulation 1984/83 in order to gain exemption for beer supply 
agreements, this chapter will focus on its terms, not those of the exclusive distribution 
BER. 
2.2.3 Regulation 1984/83 
In adopting the new BERs, the Commission intended to “bring the rules applicable to 
these types of agreements into line with developments both in the economic reality of the 
common market and in Community competition law”.118  In adopting Regulation 1984/83 
on exclusive purchasing agreements, the Commission states that its underlying rational was 
“agreements of this kind covering the purchase of goods for resale display similar features 
in almost all sectors of the economy, so that they can be brought under a common set of 
rules”.119 However, the Regulation was also the first time that the Commission had drafted 
provisions specifically dealing with exclusive purchasing agreements within the brewing 
industry. The only other sector selected for similarly special handling under the Regulation 
was the petrol industry. It stated that “[b]rewery and filling station agreements, however, 
show clear differences from other exclusive purchasing agreements so that special rules 
were necessary for those sectors”.120 Whilst this may have been so, it has also been 
suggested that the vast number of beer and service station agreements in force across the 
EU at that time was influential. The Commission was made aware of the substantial 
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119 Ibid at para 29, p37 
120 Ibid at para 29, p37 
 	  65	  
opposition that would arise from brewery interests in several Member States should they 
be prohibited from relying on their existing long-term exclusive purchasing obligations.121 
Consequently, the preamble to Regulation 1984/83 stated that following the Commission’s 
experience three categories of agreement and concerted practices were regarded as 
satisfying the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. These are noted in the BER as exclusive 
purchasing agreements of short and medium duration in all sectors of the economy; long-
term exclusive purchasing agreements entered into for the resale of beer in premises used 
for sale and consumption, being beer supply agreements; and of petroleum products in 
service stations, being service station agreements.122 Consequently, the Regulation was 
divided into three Titles, one for each category of agreement. Titles I and II will be 
discussed here while Title III is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6.  
2.2.3.1 Title I of Regulation 1984/83 – exclusive purchasing agreements in 
all sectors of the economy 
Title I was concerned with exclusive purchasing agreements in all sectors, and followed 
the same mechanistic format of Regulation 67/67 by detailing the exemption and providing 
‘white’ and ‘black’ lists of restraints. Consequently, Article 1 stated that exemption was 
only open to bilateral agreements for the purchase of certain goods specified in the 
agreement for resale, not services. However, in light of the CJEU rulings discussed earlier 
in Foundaries Roubaix and Concordia, no mention was made of the undertakings being 
required to be in the same Member State or for a geographical area to be specified in the 
agreement.123 Article 2 detailed the ‘white’ list. This stated that the only permissible 
restriction that could be imposed on the supplier was the obligation not to distribute the 
contract goods or competing goods in the reseller’s principal sales area, namely the area 
covered by their “normal business activity”,124 and at the reseller’s level of distribution. 
Article 2(2) added to this that the only permissible restriction on the reseller was an 
obligation not to manufacture or distribute goods, which compete with the contract goods, 
although Article 2(3) provided certain exceptions to this through the provision of an 
exhaustive list of restrictions which could be imposed on the reseller. Article 2(3) 
permitted an obligation on resellers to purchase complete ranges of goods, and differed 
from Regulation 67/67 by permitting an obligation to purchase a minimum quantity of the 
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122 Recital 2 of Regulation 1984/83  
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  Recital 3 and Article 1 of Regulation 1984/83	  
124 European Commission, Notice concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No 1984/83 and (EEC) No 
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goods subject to the exclusive purchasing obligation.125 These white list obligations were 
considered to compel resellers to focus their sales efforts and were deemed necessary to 
improve the distribution of goods subject to the exclusive purchasing obligation.126 They 
were, however, limited to the duration of the agreement and no further restrictions could be 
imposed.127 Article 3 followed with the ‘black’ list. This prohibited exclusive purchasing 
agreements between competing manufacturers;128 precluded exclusive purchasing 
obligations for unconnected goods, thereby attempting to limit the obligation to take 
complete ranges under Article 2(3)(a).129 It further prohibited agreements for an indefinite 
duration or more than five years. Consequently Article 3 reflected the principle of the 
Regulation that market foreclosure is directly connected with the duration and scope of the 
exclusive purchasing obligation.130 Article 14 also made provision for the withdrawal of 
the benefit of the BER from agreements under any Title where, among others, the contract 
goods were not subject to effective competition from identical or equivalent goods “in a 
substantial part of the common market”.131 However, the most significant departure from 
Regulation 67/67 was the inclusion of specific rules regarding beer and petrol supply 
agreements in Titles II and III of the Regulation.  
2.2.3.2 Beer supply agreements under Regulation 1984/83 
During the consultation period informing Regulation 1984/83, the European Commission 
was convinced that purchasing agreements within the beer and petrol sectors were distinct 
on account of the way the products within these were sold and distributed. This was due to 
the fact that unlike any other sector, on account of the large capital outlays often involved, 
breweries and oil companies would frequently buy and lease premises to resellers or 
almost always finance the acquisition of sites.132 However, this investment also benefitted 
suppliers due to the importance afforded to brand preference within these sectors with such 
expenditure on retail outlets encouraging brand loyalty.133 Consequently, the Regulation 
emphasised that beer and service station agreements merited distinct rules to take into 
account the ‘peculiarities of the markets in question’ with provision being made to 
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preclude the combination of the different Titles under the Regulation.134 Nevertheless, 
Korah and Rothnie highlight that the new sector-specific rules were too interventionist and 
failed to consider fully economic considerations, with very similar provisions being 
enacted to deal with both industries.135 The rigidity of the rules is plainly evident from a 
simple reading of Regulation 1984/83. 
2.2.3.3 Title II– Special Provision for Beer  
Recital 13 sought to justify the decision to implement distinct rules for agreements in the 
beer and petrol markets. This further emphasised the fact that in contrast to other exclusive 
purchasing agreements, in these sectors the supplier often confers on the reseller ‘special 
commercial or financial advantage’. The Commission shed some light on what was 
required in order to confer such an advantage on a reseller stating that this goes “beyond 
what the reseller could normally expect under an agreement”.136  Recital 13 of the BER 
provided examples of this, again, referring to ‘the granting of loans on favourable terms, 
and the provision of business premises’. The BER also highlighted that, as with other 
exclusive distribution agreements, such agreements in these sectors result in an appreciable 
improvement in distribution, with consumers enjoying a fair share of the resulting 
benefit.137  
In light of the foregoing justifications, beer agreements were exempted under Article 6(1) 
of Regulation 1984/83. The Regulation offered exemption where the agreement concerned 
two undertakings and the reseller agreed with the supplier, in consideration for according 
of special commercial or financial advantages, to purchase only from the supplier, certain 
beers or certain beers and certain other drinks, specified in the agreement for resale in the 
premises, used for the sale and consumption of drinks and designated in the agreement.138  
The crux of Article 6 was therefore that for exemption to be granted, the exclusivity must 
be in consideration of special commercial or financial advantage granted by the supplier.139 
The Commission considered that this made it significantly easier for resellers to establish, 
operate and maintain their premises, whilst the ban on dealing in competing goods 
provided the necessary motivation to concentrate on the sale of the contract goods.140 This 
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136 Whether or not the benefits in question amount to special commercial or financial advantage depends on 
the nature and extent of the obligations and their duration. Above, n.124 at para 43, p7 
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was considered to promote a ‘dual co-operation’ between the parties, whilst, permitting 
long-term planning of sales and cost-effective production and distribution.141 However, the 
actual reality of being party to such a beer tie agreement may have been somewhat 
different with tenants long claiming of loses, not quantitative advantages, arising from their 
beer agreements.142  
Article 6 of Regulation 1984/83, permitted publicans to enter into an exclusive purchasing 
obligation with a brewery in respect of beer, and a drinks wholesaler in respect of a 
different type of beer and, or, other types of drinks.143 However, in an attempt to limit the 
extent of the tie, which had come under criticism, especially in the UK, beer and drinks 
had to be specified by brand or denomination in the agreement.144 Further, they had to be 
for resale in the premises used for the sale and consumption of drinks designated in the 
agreement, thereby limiting the tie to those premises.  However, Article 6(2), stated that 
the Article 6(1) exemption would still apply where the exclusive purchasing obligations 
were imposed on the reseller in favour of the supplier by another undertaking which itself 
was not a supplier. Green notes this could cover several situations including where a 
wholesaler contracts with a dealer on the main supplier’s behalf.145 Nevertheless, Korah 
and Rothnie rightly state that this is difficult to reconcile with the terms of the Guidelines 
and Recitals, which justified the tie on the basis of the advantages conferred by the 
supplier, itself, on the reseller.146 The terms of Article 6(2) had no equivalent in Title III 
regarding petrol supply agreements. 
2.2.3.4 The ‘white’ list for beer supply agreements 
As stated above, in keeping with the prescriptive format established by Regulation 67/67, 
Title II of Regulation 1984/83 detailed exhaustive white lists of the permissible restrictions 
suppliers could impose on resellers. Article 7 detailed those in respect of beer supply 
agreements. However, Article 9 imported the terms of Articles 2(1) and 2(3) from Title I 
into Title II thereby permitting additional obligations to be imposed under beer supply 
agreements, such as requiring the reseller to purchase complete ranges of goods and 
minimum quantities of the contract goods. Article 7(1)(a) detailed the first ‘white’ 
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obligation the supplier could impose on the reseller. This provided that the reseller could 
be obliged  ‘not to sell beers and other drinks supplied by other undertakings which are of 
the same type as the beers or other drinks supplied under the agreement, in the designated 
premises.’ The Commission clarified that the obligation only applied where the supplier 
could meet the reseller’s demands.147 Article 7(1)(b) then dealt with the situation where the 
reseller sold beers supplied by other undertakings which were a different type from those 
supplied under the agreement, and allowed the supplier to require that they only be sold in 
the designated premises in bottles or other small packages, unless their sale in draught 
form had been tolerated previously or was necessary to satisfy a sufficient demand from 
consumers. Consequently specialty beers could be sold but only in a form which did not 
directly compete with the principal supplier’s beer.148  Under the terms of Article 7(1)(c) 
the supplier was permitted to impose restrictions on advertising competing products,149 
often causing them to be relegated to the back counter.150 
2.2.3.5 The ‘black’ list for beer supply agreement 
As stated above, in keeping with Regulation 67/67’s approach Title II contained a ‘black’ 
list of restraints, the inclusion of which would deny an agreement the benefit of exemption. 
These limitations sought to restrict the extent and duration of the exclusive purchasing 
obligations imposed on resellers. Article 8(1)(a) stated that the reseller could not be 
expected to undertake an exclusive purchasing obligation in respect of goods or services 
not directly connected with the supply of drinks. Article 8(1)(b) prohibited any restriction 
on the reseller regarding the choice of supplier for goods or services which were not 
subject to an exclusive purchasing obligation or a ban on dealing in competing products. 
This blacklist clause affected the practice of UK brewers issuing tenants with a shortlist of 
suppliers of amusement machines who would give a share of their takings to the 
landlord.151 However, the Commission clarified that the installation of amusement 
machines in tenanted public houses could require the owner’s permission, which may be 
refused where it would impair the character of the premises; or the tenant could be 
restricted in the type of machine installed.152 Subsequently, in re the Tenancy Agreement of 
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Bass153 the Commission stated that it considered that the Bass policy at that time was 
compatible with the provisions of Regulation 1984/83.154 Bass had to consent to the 
installation of amusement machines in its public houses and required a share of the takings 
of those machines. It had established a list of objective qualitative criteria to be met by the 
suppliers of the machines, and would consider whether suppliers suggested by the tenant 
qualified.155 
The Title II ‘black’ list was also concerned with the duration of the beer supply 
agreements. Articles 8(1)(c) and (d) reflected the Commission’s concerns regarding 
foreclosure, and detailed the permitted periods for agreements. Whilst the permitted 
duration was affected by the extent of the tie it imposed on the reseller, this could not be 
indefinite in any case. Where the agreement concerned beer alone the maximum permitted 
duration of the agreement was ten years; and where drinks other than beer were also 
included, this was reduced to five years.156 The Commission has indicated that the 
extended ten-year limit on beer supply agreements, with the same time frame applying to 
petrol station agreements, was due to the fact that resellers would generally be unable to 
repay the loans made to them by the other party to the agreement within five years.157 
Consequently the Commission maintained that the extended duration was influenced by 
practical considerations.158 Article 8(1)(e) also denied exemption where the reseller was 
required to impose the exclusive purchasing obligation on his successors in title for a 
longer period than he himself would have been tied to the supplier, thereby preventing 
outlets being foreclosed for longer than the permitted duration.  
However, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 8(1), Article 8(2)(a) provided that 
where premises are let to the reseller by the supplier, as under a tied tenancy, then the 
exclusive purchasing obligation could be imposed for the duration of the lease, even if this 
exceeded ten years, and could be renewed. The Commission sought to justify this as beer 
and petrol supply agreements require a substantial financial commitment by the supplier 
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justifying a lengthier obligation than in other sectors.159 This was despite the fact that the 
Commission had acknowledged that networks of such agreements between drinks suppliers 
and resellers could potentially ‘immobilise competitive structures within national markets’ 
whilst also sealing them, with this being more likely where agreements are of longer 
duration and covered a range of products.160 Consequently, this approach was contrary to 
that adopted in all other sectors, except petrol. However, in a bid to open up the market for 
other drinks,161 Article 8(2)(b) required the inclusion of a clause in the agreement, referred 
to as an ‘English Clause’. Where the public house was provided by the supplier, this clause 
permitted the reseller to acquire supplies of drinks, other than beer, from another source if 
they could be obtained more cheaply than from the supplier.162  However, the supplier had 
the opportunity to match the new offer. Article 8(2)(b)’s requirement to include an English 
Clause in the agreement was difficult to reconcile with Article 9 which incorporated 
Article 2(3) into Title II.163 As Korah and Rothnie highlight, given the possibility for the 
supplier to require the reseller purchase minimum quantities of the contract goods, the 
reseller may struggle to afford to purchase much from outsiders, even if a substantial 
discount was offered.164 This provision also controversially required the tenant inform the 
landlord of discounts offered by his competitors, with the Commission requiring that he do 
so ‘without delay’ so that the landlord has an opportunity to match such an offer.165 In 
Bass, discussed above, the Commission accepted one week’s notice to allow the landlord 
to match any better offer made to the tenant.166 This reduced the likelihood of the tenant 
obtaining supplies elsewhere on more favourable terms.167 This was despite the fact, 
highlighted by Korah and Rothnie, that the anti-competitive implications of such clauses 
had been acknowledged in other sectors, as in BP Kemi.168 There the Commission noted 
that such clauses could be used as a mechanism for the exchange of information regarding 
prices and conditions between competitors.169  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Above, n.112 at para 30, p37 
160 Above, n.158 at answer 2(a) and (b), p2 
161 See Recital 18 Regulation 1984/83 
162 Article 8(2)(b). Above, n.91 at p56.  
163 Above, n.16 at para 8.21, p229 
164 Ibid at para 8.21, p229-230 
165 Above, n.124 at para 55, p9 
166 Above, n.153 at para 9, p6 
167 Above, n.16 at para 8.21, p230 
168 Commission Decision of 5 September 1979 in Case IV/29.021 BP Kemi- DDSF  ([1979] OJ L286/32) 
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2.2.4 UK reaction to the new rules  
However, Title II received a mixed response from brewers and publicans. As Green 
highlights by limiting the exemption to purchasing agreements for the supply of beer alone, 
breweries claimed that the loss of revenue caused by cutting the tie on wines and spirits 
would necessitate an increase in beer prices and rents to compensate them.170 Brewers also 
argued that loss of control over the drinks sold in their pubs would damage their reputation 
and the resulting shift in the balance between tenancy and management would cause more 
pubs to be changed to company managed rather than tenanted outlets on the expiration of 
existing leases.171 However, as Green notes, there was no evidence that these consequences 
were economically necessary.172  By contrast, some publicans welcomed the reforms as 
having the potential to loosen the Brewers’ economic hold over them and introducing the 
possibility of purchasing wines and spirits from other sources at competitive prices.173  
There was, however, skepticism over this. Sinan rightly regards the Regulation as “a 
victory for the Brewers’ lobby” as they would face little difficulty drafting their agreements 
to fulfill the Regulation’s requirements. It was also unlikely that in the event of a brewer’s 
agreement failing to comply strictly with the terms of Regulation 1984/83 that individual 
notifications would have a meaningful impact on the relationship between the publicans 
and their brewers. This was due to the fact there would always be the option to modify the 
notified agreements, thereby ensuring compliance.174 
2.2.5 The European Commission’s on-going approval of tying agreements  
Following the adoption of Regulation 1984/83, the Commission approved beer supply 
agreements under the Regulation, as well as on an individual exception basis. This practice 
was exemplified in Carlsberg175 in 1984. There, Metropolitan was granted exclusive rights 
to produce, market and sell Carlsberg beer in the UK in return for royalty payments. The 
agreement was granted an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU on satisfaction of its 
efficiency enhancing criteria, discussed above. The Commission referenced the 
peculiarities of the British beer market with most outlets being foreclosed, making it 
unlikely that Carlsberg could penetrate this as efficiently and so enhance competition in the 
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market, without the agreement granting access to Metropolitan’s tied houses.176 
Consequently, the agreement which was to be operated for eleven years was exempted on 
the basis of the peculiar structure of the UK beer market which made it necessary for 
foreign brewers wishing to enter the market to obtain the assistance of a national brewer.177 
This contrasted with the Commission’s decision in Re Soda ash178 where the parties were 
involved in the chemical industry, and their five-year agreement incorporating an exclusive 
purchasing obligation had to be reduced to a two-year non-exclusive agreement.179 
However, in 1989, the Commission announced its intention to approve another agreement 
similar to that in Carlsberg, involving Moosehead Breweries of Canada and Whitbread.180 
The agreement was for an indefinite duration and granted Whitbread the exclusive right to 
produce, market and sell Moosehead in return for a royalty payment.181 Again, in doing so, 
the Commission highlighted the distinguishing features of the British beer market182 with 
this being a determining factor in its decision, as foreign brewers’ required the assistance 
of a large national brewery to access the UK market.183 
At this time the Commission also began to approve the terms of standard form tenancy 
agreements submitted by brewers, such as Bass.184 In considering Bass’s notified 
agreement, the Commission noted the concentrated nature of the UK market and that a 
larger proportion of on-licensed premises in the UK were owned and operated by brewers 
than in any other Member State.185 The notified standard tenancy agreement incorporated a 
standard tying clause and was considered to comply with Regulation 1984/83.186 However, 
possibly influenced by the prevailing competitive conditions in the UK market at that time, 
the Commission stated that the exemption was only granted for a period of five years.187 
Nevertheless, as Everreste notes, this tolerance of beer agreements contrasted with the 
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approach adopted to similar agreements in other sectors, with very few such exemptions 
being granted.188 This was exemplified by the Commission’s decision in Spices.189 The 
Commission found an exclusive purchasing agreement between spice producer Liebig, 
which accounted for 39% of the Belgian market, and the three largest supermarket chains, 
did not qualify for exemption under Regulation 67/67 then in force, or for individual 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.190 The agreement was largely identical in its 
essential aspects to a brewery tying agreement, requiring the supermarkets to sell only 
Liebig spices and their own brand spices. However, in considering the agreement, the 
Commission held that whilst it was beneficial to the parties to the agreement, consumers 
did not share in the benefits as their choices were restricted and prices increased.191 
Consequently it violated the terms of Article 101(1) TFEU. However, given the significant 
similarities between the essential terms of the agreement in the Spices decision and those 
of a beer tying agreement, Everreste correctly suggests that the Spices Decision highlights 
the European Commission’s ‘special deference’ towards breweries.192 Everreste also 
suggests that this policy on brewery agreements was influenced by the “entrenched and 
long-established” tied house system across most of the EU.193 This was supported by the 
Commission’s estimate that there was approximately a quarter of a million tied house 
agreements in existence in the EU in 1983.194 Agreements of this type were therefore of 
significant economic importance and so most likely influenced the Commission’s decision 
making at that time. As already discussed in Chapter 2, the strength of the lobbying in the 
brewers’ corner was also evident in the UK’s failure to implement the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission’s (MMC) original proposals in its 1989 report, instead implementing 
weaker versions of these through the Beer Orders in 1989.195  
2.2.6 The EU’s 1990 Beer Review  
Although the Beer Orders as ultimately implemented in the UK in 1989 were a weakened 
version of the MMC’s original proposals, the terms of the MMC’s 1989 Report196 were 
sufficiently controversial to prompt the Vice President of the European Commission, in 
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March 1989, to commission a review of the EU beer market.197 The announcement of the 
review was simultaneous with the publication of the MMC’s Report. However, the 
‘official’ justification provided for the review was to determine whether there were any 
significant competitive obstacles obstructing the opening of national markets in the lead up 
to the creation of the single market in 1992, and whether additional measures were 
required to achieve this.198 Given the Commission and the Court’s decisional practices in 
the years immediately preceding this review, noted above, an adverse outcome was not 
expected, and was not delivered.199 It was found that countries that operated tied-house 
systems, including the UK, enjoyed a “proliferation of small and medium-sized breweries” 
and offered their consumers the greatest choice of brands.200 This contrasted with countries 
with “open” systems, such as the USA and Australia,201 where one or two large breweries 
tended to dominate and benefitted from significant economies of scale.202  Within Europe, 
the Commission found that the tied house system only existed in the “developed and static 
North European markets” with this being most prevalent in the UK.203 Consequently, one 
of the Commission’ primary conclusions following its review was that no general changes 
were required to EU rules governing beer agreements. However, the Commission would 
consider whether further measures were required in the UK once the Beer Orders had taken 
effect.204 It highlighted that 62% of beer sales passed through the UK’s tied houses, with 
the situation being worsened by the restrictive licensing system in operation, which 
restricted the number of new retailers entering the UK market.205 Given the lack of 
proposals at that time to amend the restrictive licensing regime in the UK, Maitland-
Walker correctly asserts that the Commission was simply waiting to establish the impact 
the Beer Orders have on the UK market.206 As Maitland-Walker also asserts, this approach 
suggested an implicit approval of the Beer Orders thereby making it unlikely that the 
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Commission would seek to challenge these on the grounds of incompatibility with EU 
law.207     
However, in addition to the consideration of the tied house system and the peculiarities of 
the UK beer market, the review considered the matter of exclusive purchasing agreements 
concluded by small breweries and the application of the de minimis rule to these.208 In 
contrast to the agreements of large breweries, the Commission concluded that the exclusive 
purchasing agreements of small regional brewers should be governed by national law not 
the EU competition law provisions.209 The Commission’s consideration of these 
arrangements was prompted by confusion at that time amongst small brewers as to whether 
the EU competition law provisions were applicable to their tying agreements. This 
confusion had resulted in litigation between such small brewers and their resellers over the 
legality of their exclusive purchasing agreements.210 The decision that these should be 
governed by national law was reached on the assumption that the risk of market 
foreclosure was effectively managed by confining the restrictions imposed on tying 
agreements to the largest brewers who accounted for the greatest proportion of beer 
sales.211 Such agreements of small brewers would not normally restrict competition or 
affect trade to an appreciable extent as required by Article 101(1) TFEU. However, the 
Commission stated that it believed this to be the correct position even where other parallel 
agreements concluded by other brewers existed.212  This conclusion was noted to be 
without prejudice to the CJEU’s judgment in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu,213 although as 
will be discussed below, there is difficulty in reconciling the two positions.214   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Ibid at 133 
208 As noted at para 1.2.3 above, this principle has its roots in the EU goal of protecting SMEs. 
209 Above, n.200 at p1 
210 Ibid at p3 
211 Ibid at p3 
212 Ibid at p3 
213 At the time of the review, the EU was determining at what level the de minimis principle should apply to 
brewery contracts with a notice later being produced on this. The review also considered the licensing 
agreements between major brewers, such as Carlsberg and Metropolitan, discussed above. It concluded that 
these agreements should be examined to determine whether they were being used to divide the market or 
control imports.  Above, n.200 at p1 and p3. 
214 Above, n.206 at 134 where the author also makes this argument 
 	  77	  
2.2.7 The CJEU’s approach in Delimitis 
The CJEU was required for the first time in Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu,215 to interpret the 
application of Regulation 1984/83 to beer supply agreements. In doing so it demonstrated a 
less mechanistic approach to the application of the competition provisions than had long 
been demonstrated by the Commission, as noted above.216 The CJEU took the opportunity 
to clarify the status of those agreements whilst also ruling on several important matters, 
thereby refining its decision in De Haecht.217  It laid down two cumulative conditions 
which had to be satisfied before a beer supply agreement would be found to come within 
Article 101(1) TFEU, with foreclosure effect being a determining factor.218  
By way of a preliminary reference, the CJEU was required to answer several questions 
regarding the interpretation of certain provisions in Regulation 1984/83. Specific 
requirements of Regulation 1984/83 appeared not to be satisfied by the terms of 
Delimitis’s beer supply agreement. The primary problem was that the drinks affected by 
the purchasing obligation were not specified in the contract but in the brewer’s price list, 
which would be amended ‘from time to time’; and the agreement did not include an 
‘English clause’ regarding drinks other than beer.219 The CJEU clarified that Regulation 
1984/83 required that the agreement itself contain a list of the drinks affected, it not being 
sufficient to refer to the brewer’s price list; and the necessary ‘English clause’ had to be 
included for exemption to be possible. 220  As the beer supply agreement did not qualify 
from exemption under Regulation 1984/83, the CJEU had to consider whether the 
agreement came within Article 101 TFEU. In doing so, focus was placed on the 
foreclosure effects of such beer supply agreements.  
Building on its decision in de Haecht, the CJEU held that the object of beer supply 
agreements was not to restrict competition, referring instead to the benefits flowing from 
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such agreements.221 However, even although beer supply agreements did not have the 
object of restricting competition, the CJEU stated that it was necessary to ascertain whether 
the agreement had that effect.222 In doing so, the Court referenced its judgment in de 
Haecht and emphasised the need to examine the effects of such an agreement on the 
market in the specific context in which they occurred,223 and where they may combine with 
other such agreements to have a cumulative effect on competition.224 The relevant product 
and geographical market therefore had to be determined. The CJEU stated: 
“[b]eer is sold through both retail channels and premises for the sale and consumption 
of drinks. From the customer’s point of view, the latter sector, comprising in particular 
public houses and restaurants, may be distinguished from the retail sector on the 
grounds that the sale of beer in public houses does not solely consist of the purchase of 
a product but is also linked to the provision of services… The specific nature of the 
public house trade is borne out by the fact that breweries organise specific distribution 
systems for this sector which require special installations, and that the prices charged 
in that sector are generally higher than retail prices. 
It follows that in the present case the reference market is that for the distribution of beer 
in premises for the sale and consumption of drinks.”225 
The CJEU also noted that most supply agreements were entered into at the national level 
and so account was to be taken of the UK market for beer distribution in premises for the 
sale and consumption of drinks.226 Having determined the relevant market, the CJEU 
established two cumulative conditions that had to be satisfied in order for a beer supply 
agreement to be prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU. In doing so, it further refined its de 
Haecht decision.227 The first condition laid down by the Court was that having regard to 
the ‘economic and legal context of the agreement it must be difficult for new entrants to 
increase their market share to gain access to the domestic market for the distribution of 
beer in premises for the sale and consumption of drinks’.228 Consequently, the agreement 
must be one of a number of similar agreements on the market that have a cumulative 
foreclosing effect on competition. However that in itself was only one factor in 
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determining whether access to the market is difficult.229 Secondly, the CJEU required that 
‘the agreement in dispute must make a significant contribution to the cumulative effect 
produced by all those agreements in their legal and economic context’.230 It highlighted 
that beer supply agreements entered into by brewers who only make an insignificant 
contribution to the cumulative effect of such agreements, are outwith the Article 101(1) 
TFEU prohibition.231 Consequently the CJEU’s position appears to conflict with the 
Commission’s in the 1990 Beer Review, noted above, that agreements of small brewers 
would not normally restrict competition or affect trade to an appreciable extent even where 
other parallel agreements concluded by other brewers existed.232 The CJEU’s ruling 
clarified that such agreements can be caught by as Article 101(1) TFEU where the 
agreement is one of several similar agreements which have the combined effect of 
distorting competition in the marketplace.233 
Wheeler and Shaw also suggest that the CJEU’s assertion that beer supply agreements 
entered into by brewers who only make an insignificant contribution to the cumulative 
effect of such agreements, are out with the Article 101(1) TFEU prohibition was an 
indication that the Court was hinting at a role for the de minimis doctrine.234 However, in 
determining the contribution made by an individual agreement, the CJEU highlighted not 
only the importance of the contracting parties market position in the relevant market but 
also the duration of the agreement.235 Long-term contracts were more likely to restrict 
competition than short-term ones, even where the brewer had a small market share.236 This 
position was potentially at odds with Wheeler and Shaw’s assertion. The CJEU clarified 
that even a brewer with a relatively small market share, which ties its sales outlets for 
several years, contributes significantly to the sealing off of the market in the same way as a 
brewer with a significant market position which regularly releases those outlets at shorter 
intervals.237 Consequently all beer supply agreements, including those of small brewers, 
had to be assessed according to the two cumulative conditions established by the CJEU.238 
Further, in adopting this two-stage approach, the CJEU’s judgment could potentially be 
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applied to exclusive purchasing obligations in other sectors of the economy.239 Korah 
considers the judgment to be “an important milestone along the road to a more realistic 
attitude being taken towards assessing the effects of all kinds of agreements on 
competition.”240 
2.2.8 Post Delimitis  
In 1992, shortly after the CJEU’s decision in Delimitis, the Commission undertook to 
clarify the application of the de-minimis principle to agreements of small brewers.241 It had 
touched upon this in its EU Beer Review discussed above but provided little guidance. It 
issued Notes of Guidance242 amending the existing notice on Regulation 1983/83 and 
1984/83.243 Guideline 40 clarified that beer agreements were generally excluded from 
Article 101(1) TFEU where the brewery had a national market share of less than 1% and 
did not produce more than 200,000 hectolitres of beer per annum.244 However, reflecting 
the CJEU’s foreclosure concerns in Delimitis, the de minimis provision was only 
applicable where the agreement was for no more than 7.5 years where it covered beer and 
other drinks; and no more than 15 years, where it covered only beer.245 As Weston and 
Pheasant note, the 1% threshold for brewers was significantly lower than the 5% for 
undertakings in other sectors, thereby potentially recognising the foreclosure risk within 
this market due to the extensive use of exclusive purchasing agreements.246 However, the 
Commission did also indicate that even where the de minimis conditions outlined in the 
notice are not satisfied, there was still a possibility Article 101(1) TFEU would not be 
applicable. This was where the number of outlets tied to the undertakings party to the 
agreement was limited compared to the number of outlets existing in the market, as such an 
agreement may still have a negligible effect on trade between Member States or 
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competition.247 It was further clarified that these changes were without prejudice to the 
application of national law to the agreements covered by it. The Notice was therefore 
without prejudice to the application of the Beer Orders in the UK, discussed in Chapter 2.  
The Commission’s newly clarified position on the application of the de minimis principle 
to beer supply agreements came into play when Mr and Mrs Roberts, the tenants of Greene 
King, a small UK regional brewer and pubco, alleged that the beer purchasing obligation in 
their beer supply agreement infringed Article 101(1) TFEU.248 They claimed the tying 
provision in their lease was incompatible with the treaty provision. In considering their 
application, the Commission established that as the hectoliter and duration thresholds of 
the beer de minimis Notice were not satisfied, Greene King could not benefit from it.249 It 
applied the CJEU’s judgment in Delimitis to the agreement. Greene King was not 
considered to have sufficient market power to contribute significantly to the market 
foreclosure. Its total tied network only accounted for 1.3% of volume beer through put in 
the UK on-trade market by comparison to the 5%, or more, market shares held by the 
largest brewers at that time.250 Also, the agreement’s nine-year duration was significantly 
less than the twenty-year or longer duration of other operators.251 The Commission 
subsequently concluded that the agreement did not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. Mr and Mrs Roberts appealed the Commission’s decision however it was upheld by 
the General Court.252  
The Court held that the definition of the relevant market was as stated by the CJEU in 
Delimitis, being ‘establishments selling alcoholic beverages for consumption on the 
premises and not public houses alone’.253 The Commission was considered to have 
correctly assessed the effects of Green King’s network of agreements noting that their 
market share was very small and the duration of their agreements was not “manifestly 
excessive”.254 The Commission was also correct to reject the argument that Greene King’s 
network of ‘downstream’ agreements could be attributed to the supplying breweries, which 
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had concluded beer supply agreements with Greene King.255 Reliance was placed on the 
Commission’s earlier decision in Inntrepreneur and Spring.256 For the supply agreements 
between the wholesaling brewery, such as Greene King, and the supplying breweries, 
namely the national brewers, (‘upstream agreements’) to form part of the supplying 
breweries’ network of agreements, they had to contain a purchasing obligation.257 For these 
upstream agreements and those agreements concluded between the wholesaling brewers 
and their tied establishments (‘downstream agreements’) to be attributed to the supplying 
breweries’ network of agreements, it was deemed necessary that the agreements between 
the supplying breweries and the wholesaling brewery be sufficiently restrictive that access 
to the wholesaling brewer’s network of downstream agreements is very difficult or no 
longer possible for other brewers.258 If the restrictive effect of the upstream agreement is 
limited, then other brewers are free to enter supply agreements with the wholesaling 
brewer and so enter their network of downstream agreements, enabling them to have 
access to all premises within that network without having to conclude individual 
agreements with each outlet.259 This was considered to promote penetration of the market 
by other breweries.260 Consequently the assessment of downstream agreements had to be 
distinguished from the assessment of the upstream agreements.261   
Greene King’s supply agreements with the national breweries were not very restrictive 
with the most restrictive agreements having only a minimum purchasing obligation of less 
than 20% of the beer it sells wholesale, so at least 80% of that beer may come from other 
brewers.262 As a result those agreements were deemed to be so little restrictive “that access 
to Greene King’s network of “downstream” agreements was not seriously compromised 
for other breweries, even taking the cumulative effect of those agreements into account.”263 
Greene King was not precluded from sourcing from a number of brewers and the 
agreements failed to contribute significantly to the foreclosure of the market as required by 
Delimitis. In rejecting the appeal, the Court held that the Commission had correctly 
established that the agreement was out with the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.264 
Consequently, in light of the foregoing, the Commission, as upheld by the General Court, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Ibid at para 114, p852 
256 Commission Decision of 29 June 2000 in Cases IV/36.456/F3 Inntrepreneur and IV/36.492/F3 Spring 
[2000] OJ L195/49 
257 Above, n.253 at para 106, p850 
258 Ibid at para 107, p850 
259 Ibid at para 108, p850 
260 Ibid at para 108, p850-851 
261 Ibid at para 109, p851 
262 Ibid at para 113, p851 
263 Ibid at para 113, p851 
264 Ibid at H10, p831. Also P Bridgeland, ‘New case law on market foreclosure. Court of First Instance 
upholds three Commission decisions relating to beer ties’ (2002) (2) ECCPN 45 
 	  83	  
appeared to follow the CJEU’s approach in Delimitis by adopting a less mechanistic style 
in its handling of vertical restraints generally. The decision was also considered to be of 
importance in allowing the Commission to focus on the restrictive agreements of national 
brewers, rather than being tied up in the handling of agreements of small brewers.265  
The Commission in its decision in Inntrepreneur and Spring, which was followed in 
Roberts with regard to distinguishing the assessment of upstream and downstream 
agreements, considered the notified leases of pubcos Inntrepreneur and Spring.266 The 
pubcos had extensive tied estates and imposed a comprehensive tying obligation on tenants 
which specified seventeen different types of beers, the brands and denominations of which 
were detailed in the company’s price list to which the company could ‘add, substitute or 
delete brands or denominations’ as often as it wished.267 The Commission noted that in 
contrast to Delimitis, which was concerned with a brewer’s agreements, here the notifying 
party was a pubco which was not vertically integrated with any brewer.268 It established 
that the relationship between pubcos and their tenants and its relationship with brewers was 
economically different from a brewer selling beer through its own network of 
agreements.269  The Commission highlighted the pubcos’ practice of ‘multi-sourcing’ and 
‘periodic tendering,’ and considered their portfolios to be diversified and included products 
of regional and national brewers.270 The duration of the contracts with supplying brewers 
was structured so that a proportion of business could be re-tendered frequently and the 
notifying pubcos did not have a volume commitment with any of the 18 brewers whose 
brands were listed on their price list.271 It subsequently took a very favourable view of this 
arrangement and commented that this made the notifying parties ‘gateways’ for a large 
number of brewers and potentially for all notional and foreign brewers.272 It concluded that 
the tied leases of a non-tied pubco were more likely to enhance the competitive structure of 
the market than contribute to foreclosure.273 This was despite the fact, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, small brewers still struggled to penetrate the market at the retail level due to the 
practices of such pubcos. The focus on the effect of the pubcos’ upstream agreements 
continued as the Commission relied on the perceived foregoing benefits to dismiss the 
importance of considering the situation at the retail level where significant concerns were 
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being expressed with regard to the UK beer market.274 In light of the pubcos’ sourcing 
arrangements it stated that the “importance of a pub company’s tied estate (in terms of 
number of outlets tied and beer throughput of those outlets) is not currently relevant to an 
assessment of the contribution to market foreclosure.”275 The pubcos were therefore 
deemed not to operate a network of ‘restrictive’ agreements that significantly contributed 
to the foreclosure of the UK on-trade beer market and their standard leases were also 
deemed not to form part of the supplying brewer’s tied network.276 Given its focus on the 
upstream market, the Commission concluded that the exclusive purchasing agreements and 
non-compete obligations in the notified leases did not come within Article 101(1) 
TFEU.277 
2.2.9 The Commission’s continued approval of beer supply agreements 
The Commission’s deference towards beer supply agreements, discussed above, continued. 
In 1994 it published a Notice of its intention to grant retroactive individual exemption from 
Article 101(1) TFEU to the standard form ‘Inntrepreneur’ lease of Inntrepreneur Estates 
Limited (IEL), one of the UK’s largest pubcos.278 The parties had sought either negative 
clearance or exemption under Regulation 1984/83.279 The Commission, without explaining 
the clauses that precluded exemption under Regulation 1984/83, rejected the parties’ 
request in favour of the granting of individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. It 
has been suggested that exemption was precluded as the tying provision of the lease 
referred to twelve generic types of beer, not brands, as required, and effectively included 
all beers sold in the UK.280 The Commission’s Notice also failed to make clear the 
advantages bestowed on the tenant under the terms of the lease, it only being stated that 
Inntrepreneur expected the rent to be lower than that paid by free-of-tie tenants, but ‘the 
terms were otherwise comparable in all respects’.281 The publication of the Notice caused 
the Commission to receive numerous complaints from Inntrepreneur’s tenants.282 This 
prompted the Commission in February 1995 to request the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to 
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launch an inquiry into brewers’ wholesale pricing policies.283 In doing so, the OFT 
referenced the Commission’s concerns over Inntrepreneur tenants being forced to purchase 
beer from Courage at significantly inflated prices by comparison to free-of-tie customers, 
and that other large brewers pursued a similar strategy thereby placing lessees in a position 
where they were unable to compete.284 The terms of the report were not made public, 
however the OFT ultimately declared that tenants were charged fair wholesale prices and 
that pubcos had increased retail competition in the UK market.285 The Director General of 
Fair Trading, stated that “[w]hile the exact trade-off between the value of discounts on the 
price of beer and other benefits cannot be a subject for precision, I do not believe that 
price differentials have…operated to the detriment of the tied trade.”286 It therefore 
followed the European position that the countervailing benefits of the tie justify it as a 
legitimate business model, despite the numerous concerns being raised over the operation 
of the UK beer tie at that time. 
The Commission subsequently continued undeterred and granted retroactive exemption to 
the notified standard leases of the UK’s three largest breweries Whitbread, Bass and 
Scottish & Newcastle.287 Two factors had prompted these brewers to notify their leases to 
the Commission. Firstly, the Commission did not consider that the beer tie as commonly 
specified in UK agreements satisfied the requirements of Regulation 1984/83 by referring 
to brands not types of beer.288  Secondly, extensive litigation was initiated in the UK due to 
the price differential between beer sold in free houses and tied houses as reflected in the 
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Commission’s foregoing request to the OFT to investigate the matter.289 Consequently, 
although the Commission considered that access to the relevant market for new and foreign 
brewers was considerably hindered and that the agreements of the brewers in question 
significantly contributed to that foreclosure, the notified leases were exempted under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. While tied lessees of all three paid more for beer than their free-of-
tie competitors,290 the Commission concluded that the price differential is “more than 
offset by quantifiable countervailing benefits.”291 The ‘average’ tied lessees, on an overall 
assessment of their business relationship with the tying brewer was able to “compete on a 
‘level playing field’ with his free-trade counterpart.”292 Amongst others, the Scottish & 
Newcastle tenants paid a lower rent which was considered to more than compensate for the 
price differential;293 the Bass tenants were similarly compensated by a rent subsidy and 
bulk buying and procurement services; and Whitbread’s tenants were considered to be 
compensated by lower rent and apparently valuable business advice. In dealing with the 
UK practice of specifying beer by type rather than brand in the tying provision, contrary to 
Article 6(1) of Regulation 1984/83 noted above, the Commission stated its acceptance of 
this practice. As already noted in the CJEU’s decision in Delimitis one of the purposes of 
limiting the purchasing obligation to beers specified within the tying agreement was to 
avoid brewers widening the tie, with implications for consumer choice and market 
foreclosure. By specifying beers by type, brewers are able to unilaterally extend, delete or 
substitute the brands of beer supplied by amending their price lists. Contrary to the terms 
of Article 6 of Regulation 1984/83 and the CJEU’s judgment in Delimitis, the 
Commission, considered this to be a practical approach and made it easier for foreign beers 
to be introduced to national brewers’ price lists.294 Tenants had long been opposed to tying 
by type as it distorted the commercial balance of the agreement, while brewers naturally 
preferred this.295 Further, the Commission considered that a relatively long-term exemption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 N Von Hinten-Reed, ‘UK Beer Cases’ (1999) ECCPN (3) 38 at 38  
290 For example, Bass [1999] OJ L186/1 at para 179, 24; Scottish and Newcastle [1999] OJ L186/28 at para 
148, 49; Whitbread  [1999] OJ L88/26 at para 161, 53 
291 Bass [1999] OJ L186/1 at para 186, 25; Scottish and Newcastle [1999] OJ L186/28 at para 155, 50; 
Whitbread [1999] OJ L88/26 at para 168, 54. Following its initial assessment of the price differential and 
countervailing benefits under the notified leases, the Commission published Notices in respect of each lease. 
See Whitbread [1997] OJ C294/2. This attracted 135 observations, 92 of which were to be treated as formal 
complaints. Bass [1998] OJ C36/5.  This prompted 26 observations that were also to be treated as complaints. 
Scottish and Newcastle [1998] OJ C8/4 which received 16 observations that were also to be treated as 
complaints. Above, n.289 at p38. 
292 Bass [1999] OJ L186/1 at para 186, 25; Scottish and Newcastle [1999] OJ L186/28 at para 155, 50; 
Whitbread [1999] OJ L88/26 at para 168, 54 
293 Scottish and Newcastle [1999] OJ L186/28 at para 155, 50 
294 Bass [1999] OJ L186/1 at para 171, 23; Scottish and Newcastle [1999] OJ L186/28 at para 140, 48; 
Whitbread [1999] OJ L88/26 at para 153, 52 
295 Above, n.62 at 290 
 	  87	  
period for the notified leases was justified in order to provide the brewers with legal 
certainty and to make commercial decisions. 
Whilst aspects of the Commission’s reasoning is difficult to reconcile with Delimitis and 
the terms of Regulation 1984/83, in 2001 in cases Shaw296 and Joynson,297 the General 
Court upheld the Commission’s decisions to retroactively exempt the Whitbread and Bass 
leases. At the outset of its decisions, the Commission had started from the position that, in 
line with Regulation 1984/83, exclusive beer supply agreements generally resulted in 
improvements in distribution, but also acknowledged that such improvements would not 
materialise where the lessee was subject to unjustified price discrimination.298 On 
challenging the Commission’s decision the applicants sought annulment of its decision to 
grant Whitbread and Bass individual exception under Article 101(3) TFEU. In Shaw the 
applicants opposed the Commission’s finding that whilst Whitbread’s tenants suffered 
price discrimination, this was compensated by countervailing benefits enjoyed by tied 
tenants.299 They contested that the price differential was greater than that established by the 
Commission and the countervailing benefits enjoyed by tenants were less extensive than 
the Commission had found in its judgment.300 It was also asserted that from 1990-1994, the 
Whitbread lease failed to provide sufficient countervailing benefits to fully compensate 
tenants for the price differential.301 Nevertheless, the General Court upheld the 
Commission’s decision and so approved of the Commission’s assessment of the 
countervailing benefits enjoyed by Whitbread’s tenants, noting the Commission’s 
“painstaking investigation” into the issue of the price differential.302 Whilst tenants had not 
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been fully compensated for the price differential in the first three years of the majority of 
the leases entered into, the Court upheld the Commission’s exemption of Whitbread’s 
leases for their entire duration.303 In doing so, it approved of the Commission’s conclusion 
that a brewer’s price discrimination would only have a significant negative impact on 
competitiveness of a tied lessee if it was both significant and long-lasting.304 This was not 
deemed to be so under the Whitbread lease, with the Court highlighting the Commission’s 
finding that in the first three years of the lease the price differential was only £3-£6 per 
barrel of the beer price and tied lessees also shared in ‘unquantifiable’ countervailing 
benefits resulting from being tied to Whitbread as opposed to being a free house.305 
Similarly in Joynson, on challenging the Commission’s decision regarding the Bass lease, 
the applicants asserted that the Commission in excepting the lease under Article 101(3) 
TFEU made “manifest errors” in its assessment by failing to take sufficient account of the 
profitability of Bass’s tied houses and in its assessment of the price differential, rent 
subsidy and the countervailing benefits for tied lessees.306 However, as in Shaw, the Court 
again rejected all of these arguments.  It approved of the Commission’s assessment of all 
of the points highlighted by the applicants, finding that it had correctly focused not on the 
issue of the profitability of Bass’s tied pubs by comparison to its competitors, but on the 
issue of whether tied lessees faced significant and long-term price discrimination.307 
Consequently, the Commission’s handling of beer tie agreements whilst producing 
reasonably controversial results for the reasons discussed above, was met with the approval 
of the General Court.   
3. Reform – the need for a more economic approach to the treatment of 
vertical agreements 
While the Commission and the Courts proceeded with their decisional practices discussed 
above, on-going discontent over Regulation 1984/83 prompted calls for a more economic 
approach to the treatment of all categories of vertical agreements. As noted above Korah 
and Rothnie were critical of Regulation 1984/83’s sector-specific rules from the outset as 
they were ignorant of economic considerations and too interventionist.308 The Commission 
had also received numerous complaints regarding the interpretation and application of the 
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sector specific rules of Regulation 1984/83.309 Maitland-Walker states that issues regarding 
the interpretation of the provisions were to be expected given the reliance placed on 
subjective terms such as ‘more favourable conditions’.310 Such subjectivity causes legal 
uncertainty which in turn undermines the usefulness of the Regulation. It prompted 
complaints to the Commission and subsequently defeated one of the primary reasons for 
the adoption of the Regulation, namely to reduce the Commission’s individual examination 
of agreements.311   
In addition to these specific problems with Regulation 1984/83, EU law on vertical 
agreements generally had been subject to significantly more criticism than any other aspect 
of EU competition law.312 The list of widely held complaints included that the law was not 
only too formalistic, but was overly ‘clause-based’ and lacked a suitably economic 
approach in determining whether or not competition is restricted.313 Hawk, in his scathing 
attack on the EU’s approach towards vertical agreements and its over-broad application of 
Article 101(1) TFEU to them, highlighted the inadequate economic analysis under Article 
101(1) TFEU; an unconvincing rationale for the overbroad application of Article 101(1) 
TFEU, noting in particular the notion of economic freedom; and the Commission’s 
ongoing resistance of Court judgments adopting a more economics-based approach.’314 
Given the mounting pressure of such criticism on the Commission and the looming expiry 
of the BERs315 in December 1997, it eventually acknowledged the failings of the system 
and undertook its reform.316 Early in 1997 the Commission published its Green Paper on 
vertical restraints.317 Many shortcomings of EU competition policy concerning vertical 
restraints were acknowledged, with a Communication being published by the Commission 
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in 1998 summarising the responses to the Green Paper.318 This created a framework for 
policy reform, and formed the basis for Regulation 2790/99.319 The Commission intended 
its new policy on vertical agreements to create a more efficient system for the protection of 
competition, to remove the ‘strait-jacket’ effect of the current system and to reduce the 
enforcement costs on industry.320 In order to achieve this, the Commission identified four 
pillars on which its new policy was to be based. These included one broad umbrella BER 
applicable to both goods and services including a market share cap and a ‘black’ list 
approach; Guidelines on the Commission’s policy where the BER thresholds are exceeded 
and withdrawal of the exemption; reduced notification requirements through the 
amendment of Regulation 17 removing the Commission’s monopoly in applying Article 
101(3) TFEU; and an increased role for National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
courts.321 Whilst these proposals outlined an encouraging move towards an improved 
system for the handling of vertical agreements in the EU, there were concerns amongst 
industry that the proposals were too complex and that the use of market share thresholds 
would reduce the legal certainty of the proposed regime.322 
3.1 Regulation 2790/99 
On 1 June 2000, Regulation 2790/99 on vertical agreements and concerted practices323 
came into force thereby replacing Regulation 1984/83 and Regulation 1983/83 BERs with 
a single umbrella Regulation. This brought about three principal changes this brought 
about. These were a broader scope of application of the BER; a more economics-based 
approach, considering the market power of the undertakings concerned; and the per se 
prohibition of certain restrictions, through the maintenance of the black list approach.324  In 
its Communication, discussed above, the Commission had made clear its intention to move 
from its ‘form-based requirements’ with ‘sector-specific rules’ towards a system based on 
economic effects, focusing on almost all sectors of distribution, through the adoption of a 
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single Regulation.325 This also signalled the end of the sector specific rules of Regulation 
1984/83. The Commission noted that in order to ensure ‘coherence and unity of policy’, 
those rules dealing specifically with beer supply agreements under Title II of Regulation 
1984/83 had to be withdrawn.326 There was no longer a legal or economic justification for 
their continuation and to the extent that sector-specific treatment was justified, the 
Guidelines would cover this.327 Regulation 2790/99 was applicable to all vertical restraints 
concerned with intermediate and final goods, as well as services, with the exception of 
only a few hardcore restraints. Shortly after its implementation, in October 2000, the 
Commission published Guidelines on the application of the new BER. 
3.1.1 The extended exemption 
In light of the aforementioned considerations, Regulation 2790/99 consolidated the 
provisions dealing with all vertical agreements and so was a significant development for 
EU competition law. Through the definition of vertical agreements and vertical restraints 
in Article 2(1) of Regulation 2790/99 its scope was extended beyond that of its 
predecessors. It stated that: 
“Article [101](1) TFEU] shall not apply to agreements or concerted practices entered 
into between two or more undertakings each of which operates for the purposes of the 
agreement, at a different level of the production or distribution chain, and relating to 
the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or 
services (‘vertical agreements’). 
This exemption shall apply to the extent that such agreements contain restrictions of 
competition falling within the scope of Article [101](1) TFEU] (‘vertical restraints’)”. 
This definition consisted of three main elements. Firstly, the agreement or concerted 
practice could be between two or more undertakings, in comparison to previous 
Regulations, which restricted exemption to bilateral agreements between undertakings.328  
Secondly, the undertakings have to be operating, for the purpose of the agreement, at 
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different levels of the production or distribution chain.329 Thirdly, the agreement has to 
concern the conditions under which the parties ‘may purchase, sell or resell certain goods 
or services’, thereby reflecting the Regulation’s purpose, namely to include both 
purchasing and distribution agreements.330 Exemption was no longer limited to the supply 
of goods for resale. All final and intermediate goods and services were covered. 
Consequently, subject to the other provisions of the Regulation, it was capable of 
application to all types of vertical agreements, including those in the beer and petrol 
industries. However, Article 2(4) clarified that as before the exemption provided for in 
Article 2(1) was not applicable to ‘vertical agreements entered into between competing 
undertakings’ thereby limiting restrictions of inter-brand competition. Article 2(5) also 
provided that the exemption did not apply where the vertical agreement fell within the 
scope of another BER. 
3.1.2 Economics-based approach  
In keeping with the Commission’s intention to adopt a more economics-based approach, 
the preamble to Regulation 2790/99 stated that the likelihood of the efficiency enhancing 
effects of vertical restraints outweighing any anticompetitive effects, depends on the 
degree of market power of the undertakings and so the level of competition they face from 
competing suppliers.331 Recital 8 stated that, where the market share of the supplier does 
not exceed 30%, it can be presumed that vertical agreements which do not contain any of 
the ‘black’ listed provisions, generally lead to an improvement in production or 
distribution and allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Article 3 of 
Regulation 2790/99 therefore introduced a market share cap for the first time. This 
provided that the Article 2 exemption would only apply where the market share held by the 
supplier did not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or 
services. The intention was that this would prevent other suppliers being foreclosed from 
accessing customers.332 However, Article 2(3) provides that where a vertical agreement 
contains an exclusive supply obligation,333 the buyer, not the supplier’s, market share must 
not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it purchases the contract goods or 
services. This was intended to prevent competing buyers being foreclosed from suppliers. 
However, Article 3 also marked an attempt to address criticisms regarding the over-
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application of Article 101(1) TFEU and so responded to the argument that vertical 
agreements are only harmful where the parties possess market power.334 It also dispensed 
with the sector-specific rules of Regulation 1984/83 which had been critcised for their 
formalism and lack of economic considerations.335 The new market share cap would 
therefore impact on those large breweries and pubcos which had previously complied with, 
and so enjoyed exemption under Regulation 1984/83 despite their significant market 
shares.  
Despite its more economic focused approach, the market share test of Regulation 2790/99 
was contrary to the prevailing wishes of industry.336 Nevertheless, the Commission 
considered it was the only reliable gauge of market power, noting that “[n]obody has been 
able to suggest a better single indicator than market share for use in a block exemption 
regulation.”337 The implementation of the market share approach prompted concerns to be 
raised. There were concerns over adequacy of the 30% threshold. Whish and Bailey 
remark on it being generous and providing a safe harbour for hundreds if not thousands of 
agreements.338 Industry however was in favour of a 40% threshold.339 Many concerns also 
focused on the reliably of calculating market shares due to the difficulty in defining the 
relevant market for the products in question, an analysis which Bortolotti rightly highlights 
is largely subjective and so can cause uncertainty.340 However, Whish notes that the 
uncertainty generated by the market share threshold would not cause the Commission to be 
inundated with notified agreements due to procedural changes removing notification as a 
requirement for individual exemption.341 Bishop and Ridyard also support its introduction 
stating that the rationale behind it is “sound and is intended to eliminate the regulatory 
burden on firms that, to put it starkly, could not behave in anti-competitively even if they 
tried.”342 However, they acknowledge the use of the market share cap in the BER imposes 
an “undue weight” on the definition of the relevant market.343 This position is supported by 
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Waelbroeck who highlights that although the market share criterion was a significant 
improvement on the formalistic approach of the past, such criterion are necessarily 
arbitrary and provide only ‘imperfect guidance’ regarding the actual problems that 
agreements cause in reality.344 He correctly highlights the problem that some agreements 
may require to be scrutinised even below the 30% threshold, however, benefit from 
exemption.345 Likewise, agreements above the threshold may be deprived the certainty of 
exemption, despite being inoffensive.346 Consequently, Waelbroeck questions the need for 
market share thresholds at all, stating that as long as there was sufficient inter-brand 
competition in the relevant market, it was unlikely that the restraint would have a 
significant impact on competition.347 However, Bishop and Ridyard arguably propose a 
better solution to the problem of such flawed decisions. They highlight that these could be 
limited by placing reduced emphasis on market definition and market share calculations by 
performing a more detailed assessment of the actual competitive effects of the vertical 
restraint in its particular context.348 Nevertheless, it is submitted that whilst excessive 
reliance may be placed on market share thresholds in Regulation 2790/99, their 
introduction marked a significant progression in the EU’s move towards an effects-based 
approach to competition law with Bishop and Ridyard supporting this position.349 
The Commission’s Guidelines on vertical restraints, published shortly after Regulation 
2790/99, also clarified the Commission’s approach where the 30% market share threshold 
was exceeded. Under those circumstances there was no presumption of illegality but 
individual exception may be necessary.350 The Guidelines were intended to assist 
companies in determining whether their agreements benefitted from exemption under 
Regulation 2790/99 or whether their agreement satisfied the requirements of Article 101(3) 
TFEU without notifying the Commission. In determining the latter, they provided a 
framework of analysis and divided vertical agreements into four categories in order to 
analyse their possible negative effects.351 Beer supply agreements, like and service station 
agreements, were classified as single branding agreements as their main element was the 
buyer being required to concentrate his orders for a certain type of product with the one 
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supplier.352 The Guidelines noted four principle negative effects on competition resulting 
from such agreements. These included the risk of foreclosure of the market to other 
suppliers; increased rigidity in market shares thereby aiding collusion when applied by 
several suppliers; lack of in-store inter-brand competition; and the buyer having to pay a 
higher price for tied products.353 The Guidelines also highlighted the reduction in inter-
brand competition due to such agreements may be alleviated by the initially strong 
competition between suppliers to obtain the contract, however, the longer the duration of 
such agreements, the less it is likely that this initially strong competition will be enough to 
compensate for the reduction in inter-brand competition.354 The Guidelines also 
acknowledged the many positive effects of vertical restraints generally.355 These factors to 
be considered in determining whether the agreement in question infringed Article 101(1) 
TFEU are noted to include amongst others the market position of the supplier and their 
competitors; entry barriers; maturity of the market; and the level of trade.356 Subsequently 
the Guidelines appeared to represent a more economic approach to the assessment of 
vertical agreements by the Commission.  
In light of the foregoing, the notification requirements were greatly reduced under the new 
regime. However inevitably there were still occasions where the market share cap was 
breached and individual exception sought. This was exemplified by Interbrew, Belgium’s 
largest brewer, notifying its supply agreement with on-trade establishments in Belgium to 
the Commission.357 Their agreement had to be amended before being approved by the 
Commission. This would not have been necessary under Regulation 1984/83 due to the 
safe harbour it provided for brewers’ agreements irrespective of their market share.358 
Nevertheless in doing so, the Commission still ultimately accepted significant non-
compete obligations despite Anheuser Busch InBev’s market share of 53%. 
Under the new regime, the Commission’s decisional practice therefore appeared to 
continue largely as before through the continued approval of beer supply agreements. This 
is not to say that the outcome is wrong, it simply serves to highlight the Commission’s 
perseverance in ensuring the approval of agreements within this sector. However, given the 
significant market position of Interbrew and the concerns expressed over their non-
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compete obligations, it may have been prudent for the Commission to undertake to review 
the operation of its revised agreements after a period of years. This would have enabled it 
to assess whether or not the commitments offered were having the desired effect in 
opening up the relevant markets to increased competition. Nevertheless, it is accepted that 
Article 3 of Regulation 2790/99 marked a significant step towards a more economic-based 
approach by recognising the link between market power and the effect of restraints, 
thereby requiring amendments to agreements that would not have been necessary under 
Regulation 1984/83.  
3.1.3 De-minimis 
While as noted above the industry expressed concerns over the introduction of the market 
share cap in Regulation 2790/99, this was not the only market share threshold to be taken 
into consideration when assessing vertical agreements, including those in the brewing 
industry. Shortly after the adoption of Regulation 2790/99, the Commission published a 
new de minimis Notice.359 This was considered necessary to ensure ‘coherence’ between 
the new Regulation 2790/99 and the de minimis notice.360 Through this the Commission 
used market share thresholds as a means to quantify what is not an appreciable restriction 
on competition for the purposes of Article 101(1) TFEU. The de minimis Notice showed a 
slight relaxation towards vertical agreements. Part II of the Notice stated that they did not 
appreciably restrict competition for the purpose of Article 101(1) TFEU where the 
agreement was between undertakings which are not actual or potential competitors on the 
markets affected and the market share held by each party to the agreement did not exceed 
15% of any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement.361 This was an increase on 
the 5% threshold under the Commission’s 1986 de minimis Notice.362 It also dispensed 
with the turnover test. Under the 1986 Notice the Commission had established an ECU 300 
million turnover threshold below which undertakings were able to benefit from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 European Commission, Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (de minimis) (2001) OJ 
C368/13 
360 L Peeperkorn, ‘New Notice on agreements of minor importance (de minimis notice)’ (2002) (1) ECCPN 
45 at 45 
361 Above, n.359 at para 7(b), p13. The market share threshold for parties to a horizontal agreement were set 
at 10% as these were considered to have a greater restrictive effect on competition (ibid at para 7(b), 13). 
Also S Rating, ‘Commission proposes new de minimis notice’ (Europa, 1st April 1997) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_017_en.html> accessed 18th February 2015 
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under Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community  (1986) OJ C231/2 as later 
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Notice.363 By dispensing with this threshold, the Commission denied SMEs preferential 
treatment over larger undertakings as it was no longer turnover but the market position of 
the contracting parties that governed whether there was an appreciable restriction on 
competition.364 The new 15% threshold therefore opened up the de minimis safe harbour to 
more beer supply agreements. However, in line with CJEU’s judgment in Delimitis, 
discussed above, the Notice made provision for the ‘cumulative foreclosure effect of 
parallel networks of agreements having a similar effect on the market’. This was a 
heightened risk in the beer, as well as the petroleum, market due to the widespread reliance 
on exclusive purchasing agreements within these discussed above. Such a cumulative 
foreclosure effect was considered unlikely where less than 30% of the relevant market was 
covered by parallel agreements having similar effects; and individual suppliers or 
distributors were not considered to contribute significantly to the foreclosure effect where 
their market share did not exceed 5%.365 Therefore where competition in the relevant 
market was restricted due to the cumulative effect of such agreements, the market share 
thresholds under paragraph 7 of the Notice were reduced to 5% for both horizontal and 
vertical agreements.366 Consequently, despite the difficulties in calculating market shares, 
discussed above, they were central to the regime applicable to vertical agreements. 
However, the Notice also clearly listed the hardcore restrictions the inclusion of which 
deny vertical agreements exemption even where the market share thresholds are met.367 
These reflected those contained in Regulation 2790/99. 
3.1.4 The ‘black’ list  
In keeping with the regime under Regulation 1984/83, Article 4 of Regulation 2790/99 
detailed the ‘black’ list of restrictions. However, these were referred to as ‘hardcore’ 
restrictions, the inclusion of which denied the agreement exemption.368  These were illegal, 
regardless of the market shares of the parties, and due to their per se illegality, no 
economic analysis was required to determine their validity.369 They differed from the five 
‘black’ clauses listed in Regulation 1984/83 discussed above. Firstly, Article 4(a) was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 European Commission, Notice of 3 September 1986 on agreements of minor importance which do not fall 
under Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community OJ (1986) C231/2 as 
amended at para 7, p2-3 
364 S Rating, ‘Commission proposes new de minimis notice’ (Europa, 1st April 1997) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_017_en.html> accessed 18th February 2015 
365 Above, n.359 at para 8, p14 
366 Ibid at para 8, p14 
367 Ibid at para 11, p14 
368 The Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints made it clear that there was no option of severability 
for the prohibited clauses. The whole of the vertical agreement would be outwith the BER. It also stated that 
individual exception of agreements containing such hardcore restrictions was unlikely. Above, n.328 at para 
46, p11 
369 Above, n.11 at p104 
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concerned with resale price maintenance,370 due to its market partitioning potential through 
the division of national markets, and prohibited the seller from determining the minimum 
sales price.371 Article 4(b), similarly to Article 2(c) of Regulation 1984/83, focused on 
restrictions on territory and customers and prohibited absolute territorial protection, with 
some exceptions.372 This prohibition related back to the Commission’s long held 
integration objectives.373 Thirdly, Article 4(c) sought to ensure parallel trade, where 
selective distribution systems were utilised;374 with the fourth and fifth restrictions also 
focused on these.375  
However, Article 5 of Regulation 2790/99 introduced a new ‘grey’ list, namely clauses 
which were denied coverage by the BER but were severable from the remainder of the 
agreement.376 The first such ‘grey’ clause was detailed in Article 5(a) and addressed non-
compete obligations as are common in beer supply agreements.377 Exemption was denied 
to such obligations of indefinite duration or in excess of 5 years. Where the obligation was 
tacitly renewable beyond the initial five-year period it was deemed to have been concluded 
for an indefinite duration. This reflected the Commission’s long held concern over the 
duration of such obligations and their foreclosure effects. However, in keeping with the 
deference of the past, the Commission was careful to ensure that the beer supply 
agreements under which the goods were sold from premises and land owned or leased by 
the supplier continued to benefit from exemption. This potentially avoided the wrath of the 
powerful lobbyists who had largely influenced past policy. All that was prohibited was for 
the non-compete obligation to exceed the period of occupancy of the premises and land by 
the buyer.378 The CJEU however clarified that Regulation 2790/99 clearly required that the 
supplier owned both the land and the premises from which the contractual goods were sold 
by the reseller before exemption could be granted, thereby tightening up on the provisions 
under Regulation 1984/83.379 
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The CJEU noted that the Commission had changed the condition for exemption in order to 
prevent the maximum duration for exclusivity clauses fixed by the Regulation being 
circumvented.380 However, in its Guidelines, the Commission sought to justify the 
continuation of the exemption of such arrangements simply on the basis that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a supplier to allow competing products to be sold from the premises 
owned or let by him, without his permission.381 Consequently, even in the absence of the 
sector-specific rules of Regulation 1984/83 the beer supply and ultimately service station 
agreements continued to benefit from exemption, albeit as more narrowly construed by the 
CJEU. This was notwithstanding the concerns surrounding exclusive purchasing 
obligations of long duration which prompted the Commission to limit the duration of such 
obligation to five-years in most other sectors of the economy where the special conditions 
of Article 5(a) regarding supplier owned or let premises and land were unlikely to be 
met.382  
3.1.5 Withdrawal of the Regulation  
Article 6 of Regulation 2790/99 also made provision to address the situation where inter-
brand competition on a relevant market was weak or restricted by allowing the 
Commission, in certain circumstances, to withdraw the benefits of the BER. This presented 
potential implications for the beer industry which is prone to parallel networks of 
agreements and their cumulative effects, as this was a ground for such withdrawal.383 
Recital 13 made clear that withdrawal could occur ‘where parallel networks of vertical 
agreements have similar effects which significantly restricted access to a relevant market 
or competition therein’.384 It noted that this was likely to occur in the case of non-compete 
obligations, as in Langnese, 385 the only case to date where the benefit of the BER has been 
withdrawn. Further, Article 6 stated that the Commission could withdraw the Regulation 
where it found ‘in any particular case’, rather than a ‘particular market’, that an agreement 
has effects that are incompatible with Article 101(3) TFEU. Article 7, which was un-
paralleled in Regulation 1984/83 also enabled NCAs to withdraw the benefit of the 
exemption where in any particular case, vertical agreements to which the Regulation 
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applied, had effects incompatible with Article 101(3) TFEU, ‘in a Member State, or in part 
thereof, which has all of the characteristics of a distinct geographical market’. However, 
Article 8 was similarly novel and provided for the disapplication of the BER by 
Commission Regulation where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints covered more 
than 50% of the relevant market, thereby restoring the full application of Articles 101(1) 
TFEU and 101(3) TFEU.386 Consequently, Regulation 2790/99 widened the scope for the 
possible withdrawal of the benefits of the BER, however, as noted above, this has only 
been successful in Langnese. 
3.1.6 Reaction to the new rules  
Regulation 2790/99 marked a significant progression in the Commission’s treatment of 
vertical agreements and so was generally welcomed. By moving away from the ‘white’ list 
approach, which was originally driven by the desire for legal certainty, it appeared to 
introduce some much need flexibility, leaving behind the ‘strait-jacket’ effect of 
Regulation 1984/83. Further, the adoption of the market share criterion was a move away 
from the formalistic approach of the previous regime, although as discussed above its 
implementation and 30% threshold were greatly criticised. Nevertheless, the introduction 
of market share thresholds was recognition of the link between the effects of the restraint 
in question and the market power of the undertakings concerned, and so agreements of 
major brewers, pubcos and oil companies no longer benefitted from block-exemption 
where the market share cap was exceeded. Whilst this represented a significant 
advancement in the treatment of vertical agreements, as discussed above, by virtue of 
Article 5(a), the time-limits imposed on non-compete obligations did not apply where the 
contract goods or services were sold by the buyer from premises and land owned or leased 
by the supplier. Therefore the new regime maintained the Commission’s deference towards 
beer supply agreements, despite the continued concerns over these in member states, such 
as the UK. 
3.2 Regulation 330/2010 
Notwithstanding the concerns discussed above, Regulation 2790/99 was still regarded as a 
‘revolution’ in the treatment of vertical restraints.387 It was however set to expire on 31 
May 2010. This prompted the Commission in July 2009 to issue a new draft Regulation 
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and Guidelines on supply and distribution agreements for public consultation.388 This acted 
as a review of the current system. The Commission noted that it considered the current 
regime to have worked well overall and did not propose to fundamentally alter it. It did 
however propose amendments to take into account recent market developments, especially 
the increased buyer power of big retailers and the growth of on-line sales.389 The 
Commission adopted Regulation 330/2010 on Vertical Agreements and Concerted 
Practices on 20th April 2010390 with this entering into force on 1 June 2010.391 
Accompanying Guidelines were published by the Commission in May 2010.392 Whish and 
Bailey correctly note that the BER and Guidelines adopted by the Commission only 
represented a ‘mild evolution’ of the law, largely following the provisions of Regulation 
2790/99, and accompanying Guidelines.393 Consequently, only the new provisions in 
Regulation 330/2010 regarding market share shall be considered here.394  
3.2.1 New market share criterion 
In light of the Commission’s perception that the regime under Regulation 2790/99 had 
worked well with it only being necessary to address the issue of progressively powerful 
retailers, Regulation 330/2010 extends the market share criterion first introduced by 
Regulation 2790/99 for determining whether or not an agreement should benefit from 
exemption. Whilst the inclusion of market share thresholds is now largely accepted, there 
was significant debate over the Commission’s decision to include such thresholds for both 
the buyer and the supplier.395 Article 3 states that for exemption to be granted, the market 
share held by the supplier does not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it sells the 
contract goods or services and the market share of the buyer does not exceed 30% of the 
relevant market on which it purchases the contract goods or services. As discussed above, 
under Article 3 of Regulation 2790/99 the buyer’s market share was irrelevant except in 
the case of exclusive supply obligations. Recital 8 of Regulation 330/2010 states that 
where the market share thresholds are complied with by both undertakings, and the 
agreement does not include any hardcore restrictions detailed in Article 4 of the BER, it 
will usually lead to an improvement in production and distribution and allow consumers a 
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fair share of the resulting benefits. However Recital 9 provides that where the market share 
thresholds are breached there is no such presumption.396 Equally, it provides where the 
market share thresholds are breached, there is no presumption of illegality under Article 
101 TFEU.  Further, Article 3(2) deals with multiparty agreements. It states that where an 
undertaking buys the contract goods or services from one undertaking party to the 
agreement and sells them to another undertaking party to the agreement, the market share 
of the first undertaking must respect the market share threshold of Article 3(1) as both a 
buyer and a supplier. Therefore should there by three parties to an agreement, all operating 
at a different level of trade, each party’s market share must be below the 30% threshold in 
order for exemption to be possible.397 
Through the implementation of these new market share thresholds the Commission has 
confirmed it remains wedded to this approach, notwithstanding the concerns discussed 
above regarding the adequacy of the 30% threshold.  As noted by Colino, this extension in 
their use to both the buyer and the supplier had the potential to further ‘aggravate’ those 
concerns.398   
3.2.2 Reaction to new market share criterion 
The beer industry was not welcoming of the Commission’s decision to impose the need to 
consider the buyer and the supplier’s market share under Article 3 of the new BER. The 
British Beer and Pub Association (BBPA)399 highlighted the variety of agreements relied 
on in the UK pub sector and also emphasised the difficulty that would be experienced in 
assessing the market share of those undertakings operating in downstream markets.400  
Similarly, the Brewers of Europe401 expressed their concerns over the new market share 
requirements. Due to the significant differences in existing agreements, they stated that 
depending on the country and the size of the producer, this may have an important effect 
on the delivery contracts in place and cause significant uncertainty for producers, noting 
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that it may be impossible for them to assess the market share of others with certainty.402  
Consequently there were common concerns that the new market share thresholds would 
narrow the scope of the BER and cause legal uncertainty.  
3.2.3 Maintenance of the status quo for beer supply agreements 
While Article 3 of Regulation 330/2010 implemented the Commission’s desire for both the 
buyer’s and supplier’s market share to be subject to a cap, contrary to the wishes of some 
interested parties, this was largely the only departure from the regime under Regulation 
2790/99. Therefore in keeping with the old regime, Article 5(1) of Regulation 330/2010 
denied exemption to any direct or indirect non-compete obligation the duration of which 
was indefinite of exceeded 5 years. However, Article 5(2) echoed the terms of Regulation 
2790/99. It stated that the five-year time limitation on non-compete obligations under 
Article 5(1) shall not apply where the contract goods or services are sold by the buyer from 
premises and land owned by the supplier or leased by the supplier from unconnected third 
parties and the duration of the non-compete obligation does not exceed the period of 
occupancy of the premises or land. Regulation 330/2010 has therefore again retained the 
deference of the past towards beer supply agreements where the premises are provided to 
the reseller.  
In light of the maintenance of the foregoing concession, notwithstanding their concerns 
over the extended market share criterion, the BBPA, generally welcomed the new 
Regulation and Guidelines. However, the Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA)403 and the 
Fair Pint campaign404 greatly opposed the renewal of the exemption for beer supply 
agreements. They objected to the Commission’s assertion that due to the generally positive 
experience under Regulation 2790/99 it was appropriate to adopt a new BER.405 They 
expressed the view that the application of the BER in the UK market had not been positive. 
They highlighted that exemption of exclusive purchasing agreements and non-compete 
obligations had caused “inflated prices, reduced competition and reduced amenity”.406  
The Fair Pint Campaign submitted that exempted beer supply agreements, which at that 
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time tied more than 54% of the UK’s public house market, had a significant effect on 
restricting competition. Amongst others, they foreclosed the UK market to competitors, 
increased prices and reduced consumer choice.407 This was deemed to be possible as no 
single company operating on the UK market had a market share in excess of 30% of the 
relevant market.408 The majority of UK pub companies had market shares of less than 
5%.409 In order to address this situation, the Fair Pint Campaign had proposed that the 
Commission reduce the 30% market share threshold for exemption under the BER and that 
the de minimis threshold should also be reduced below a market share of 5% of the 
relevant market.410 Despite these submissions, as noted above, the Commission opted to 
extended the 30% market share threshold until 31 May 2022.  
4. Conclusion 
Having charted above the evolution of the EU’s approach to vertical agreements generally, 
it is apparent that they were initially treated defensibly by the Commission, on account of 
their ‘double nature’. This approach was also bolstered by the goals of EU competition 
law, and most notably the integration objective. However, it has been shown that over the 
decades there have been swings in the treatment of vertical agreements in line with 
changing schools of thought and social and political environments. This gradual tolerance 
has resulted in most vertical agreements benefitting from exemption under the prevailing 
BER or obtaining individual exception under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
With specific reference to beer supply agreements, as first distinguished in Regulation 
1984/83, it has become apparent from this consideration of the evolution of the EU’s 
approach toward such agreements that the Commission’s practices have highlighted what 
Everreste has describes as a ‘special deference’411 towards these. This has been despite the 
potential for such exclusive purchasing obligations to partition and foreclose markets, 
contrary to the goals of EU competition law. These widely recognised concerns have 
prompted the terms of successive BERs including the formalistic provisions of Regulation 
1984/83 and the current economics-based Regulation 330/2010, to seek to limit the 
potentially harmful effects of such vertical restraints by restricting their scope and 
duration. Nevertheless, this general approach has long been caveated. The time-limits 
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imposed on all vertical agreements are inapplicable to beer supply agreements where the 
contract goods or services are sold by the buyer from premises and land owned by the 
supplier or leased by them from third parties. This leniency afforded by the various BERs 
towards such beer supply agreements has been supplemented, in particular, by the 
decisional practices of the European Commission, which often resisted attempts by the 
CJEU to adopt a more reasoned and economics-based stance towards such agreements. 
This was especially evident prior to the adoption of Regulation 2790/99, when Regulation 
17/62 effectively ensured the Commission’s monopoly in the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. However, as has been shown above, this was not confined to this period. The 
Commission appears to have developed a ‘special deference’ towards beer agreements 
from a relatively early stage, with this being evident through the decades, up to, and 
including, the current day Regulation 330/2010.  
Through the implementation of Regulation 330/2010 the Commission has opted to largely 
maintain the status quo regarding the EU’s acceptance of beer supply agreements. This is 
despite the concerns raised during the consultation process over the competitive 
implications of exempting tying agreements in the UK beer market. It is therefore 
instructive to consider in the next chapter the UK Government’s policy on the regulation of 
the beer industry. 
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Chapter 4 - The United Kingdom Government’s 
Policy on the Regulation of the Brewing Industry 
The preceding chapter examined the application of the EU competition rules to vertical 
agreements with particular emphasis placed on those for the distribution of beer. In doing 
so it provided a contextual background to the EU’s evolving approach towards beer tying 
agreements, which are now fully accepted by the EU as being a legitimate business model. 
This chapter now considers the UK’s policy on the regulation of beer tying agreements 
following the decision in 2000 to revoke the Beer Orders and in doing so provides an 
overview of the development of the UK’s approach towards these agreements and the 
influence the EU has had on the UK’s tolerance of such arrangements. 
The chapter first considers briefly the UK’s accession to the EU and the challenges this 
presented to the UK courts in applying the EU competition law provisions in the context of 
beer tying agreements. The UK’s refusal to award damages to tied tenants for breaches of 
Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is also considered  
(Subsection 1).  The chapter then reviews the harmonisation of the UK and EU legal 
regimes applicable to vertical agreements such as beer tying agreements (Subsection 2). 
The on-going concerns and inquiries into the operation of the tied business model 
following the OFT’s 2000 decision to revoke the Beer Orders are then addressed noting, 
amongst others, the Trade and Industry Committee and the Business Innovation and Skills 
Committee’s heightened concerns over the operation of the UK market and the Office of 
Fair Trading’s reluctance to intervene (Subsection 3). The Chapter then focuses on the 
Government’s continued inaction on the matter of the beer tie (Subsection 4). The 
Government’s policy change in light of past regulatory failings is then reviewed 
(Subsection 5). Finally the chapter considers the relevant provisions of the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and the impact this will likely have on the UK beer 
market (Subsection 6). 
1. EU Membership and its challenges for the UK courts 
1.1 Implications of accession to the EU  
The treatment of beer tie agreements in the UK has been influenced by the UK’s accession 
to the EU in 1972. The relationship between national and EU law became subject to 
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various governing constitutional principles, most notably the supremacy of EU law.1 This 
is applicable to the EU competition law provisions discussed in Chapter 3 and so came to 
impact on the handling of beer tie agreements in the UK. Following accession Regulation 
67/67 granted all qualifying exclusive purchasing agreements, including beer tie 
agreements, an exemption from the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU.2 This was due to 
their perceived benefits including improved distribution, which was of importance to the 
EU’s unique integration agenda at that time.3 This offer of exemption remained under 
Regulation 1984/834 and continues today under Regulation 330/2010.5  
 At the time of the UK’s accession, it was significant that the EU was satisfied that the beer 
tie merited the possibility of block exemption given that the European Commission 
enjoyed sole authority to grant exemptions from Article 101(1) TFEU.6 However, the 
requirement for the national courts to apply Article 101(1) in conjunction with the 
Commission proved problematic for the UK courts as illustrated in Holleran and Evans v. 
Thwaites plc.7 There the exclusive supply obligation in the tenant’s beer supply agreement 
made reference to broad categories of beer, not brands, which as discussed in Chapter 3 
was a requirement of Article 6 of Regulation 1984/83.8 The English High Court accepted 
that this did not satisfy the requirements of the Regulation,9 however the European 
Commission had been involved in the case at a preliminary stage following a written 
complaint concerning the agreement.10 It subsequently notified Thwaites that certain 
clauses were out with the terms of the Regulation and negotiated with them to reach a 
conclusion on this without issuing a formal decision.11 When reference was made to the 
Commission’s refusal to make an interim decision, the High Court considered this to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Where a conflict between national and European law arises, EU law takes precedence. See Case 6/24 Costa 
v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. See also R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law 7th Edition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at p75. In Case14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, it was 
confirmed that the principle of supremacy would be used to resolve any conflict between community and 
domestic law. In the UK the principle of supremacy was given effect by s.2(1) and s.3(1) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 on accession to the EU. Today the matter has been clarified by Article 3 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003) OJ L1/1) which addresses the relationship between Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU and national law. 
2 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 67/67 of 22 March 1976 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements ([1967] OJ (spec ed) 10). See Chapter 3 for discussion. 
3 Ibid at Recital 6 
4 Commission Regulation (EEC) 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of exclusive purchasing agreements ((1983) OJ L173/5) 
5 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
((2010) OJ L102/1) Chapter 3, p100 
6 Chapter 3, p58 
7 Holleran and Evans v. Thwaites plc [1989] 2 CMLR 917 
8 Ibid at 917 and Chapter 3, p68 
9 Above, n.7 at 918 
10 Ibid at para 16, p921 
11 Ibid at para 20, p922 
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“…no more than a factor to be taken into account…given that Article [101] has direct 
effect and so can be relied on in the national courts”.12 As MacCulloch rightly highlights 
the national court’s dismissal of the Commission’s opinion, demonstrated the difficulties at 
that time between the national courts and the Commission’s procedures for enforcement of 
the EU competition law provisions.13  
In order to encourage an efficient system for enforcing the EU competition law rules 
before national courts, the Commission drafted a Co-operation Notice setting out the 
policy on their application by the national courts.14 The Notice came into effect in 1993, 
the year after the compliance date for the Beer Orders. By that time, the effects of the Beer 
Orders on the UK market were becoming clear. Amidst the litigation in the UK regarding 
the price differential of beer sold to tied and free-of-tie tenants and concerns that the UK 
beer tie was incompatible with EU law discussed in Chapter 3, several cases disputing the 
legality under Article 101(1) TFEU of the tying provision of the pubco Inntrepreneur 
Estates Limited’s (IEL) lease were brought before the English courts.15 IEL had however 
notified their lease to the Commission with a view to obtaining negative clearance or 
individual exemption under Regulation 1984/83.16 In the cases before the UK courts, slow 
use was made of the 1993 Notice, as exemplified by Inntrepreneur v. Mason.17 The 
Commission had issued comfort letters in respect of IEL’s lease,18 stating that the 
conditions for individual retroactive exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU appeared to 
have been met and that retroactive exemption was proposed.19 The High Court however 
had difficulty following and applying the EU competition law provisions despite the 
guidance offered by the 1993 Notice.20 The Court highlighted its discomfort in estimating 
the likelihood of exemption being granted, as required under its terms, despite the 
Commission twice making clear its intention do so through the aforementioned letters. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid at para 66, p931 
13 A MacCulloch, ‘Case Comment Inntrepreneur Estates: Co-operative application of the EC competition 
rules in the United Kingdom?’ (1995) 16(6) E.C.L.Rev 380 at 381 
14 European Commission, Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty ((1993) OJ C39/6) (the 1993 Notice). Also, ibid at 380 
15 Forr example Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd v. Mason [1993] 2 CMLR 293; Inntrepreneur Estates (GL) Ltd v. 
Boyes [1995] E.C.C. 16;  Inntrepreneur Estates (CPC) Ltd v Bayliss [1998] Eu LR 483. These cases involved 
challenges before the English Courts to the tying provisions in IEL’s lease which tenants alleged were 
contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. Also above, n.13 at 381. 
16 Chapter 3, p84  
17 Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd v. Mason [1993] 2 CMLR 293 
18 Prior to the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission often granted exemptions through comfort 
letters rather than formal decisions. D.G. Goyder EC Competition Law 3rd Edition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at p128. See also Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd v. Mason [1993] 2 CMLR 293 at para 
38-39, p303-304. When the Masons, assignees of a lease of a tied public house, fell into arrears and IEL 
sought to forfeit the lease and claim relief, the Masons subsequently claimed the lease was void as it failed to 
come within the terms of Regulation 1984/84. 
19 Above, n.17 at para 38-39, p303-304 
20 Above, n.13 at 382 
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High Court’s difficulty stemmed from the fact that although the letters indicated the 
Commission’s intention to exempt the lease, they were not deemed to be ‘comfort letters’ 
within the meaning of the 1993 Notice.21 However, as MacCulloch notes, the High Court 
did not seek any guidance from the Commission or stay proceedings in order to give the 
Commission the opportunity to commence the exemption procedure.22 This approach was 
nevertheless approved by the UK Court of Appeal in Boyes,23 although greater co-
operation was apparent in Bayliss.24 There the High Court was prepared to hold off 
enforcing the tying provision under an IEL lease until the Commission had decided 
whether to grant individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.25 There was therefore 
some acceptance by the national court that the conclusion of the Commission’s procedure 
was central to the decision at the national level.26 
1.2 The UK’s refusal to award damages to tied tenants for breaches of 
Article 101 TFEU 
Challenges to beer supply agreements also came before the UK courts in light of 
developments in EU case law in the 1990s, which established that in certain circumstances 
national courts should award damages to private litigants who suffer as a result of a 
Member States’ breaches of EU obligations.27 However, it remained to be clarified whether 
it was possible to claim for a breach of the EU competition provisions where financial loss 
resulted from such a breach by a third party, rather than by a Member State.28 The UK 
courts however refused to depart from the national legal principle of in pari delicto. This 
prevented the parties to an illegal contract relying on that illegality as a basis for a claim 
for damages from a co-contractor, regardless of whether they benefitted from bargaining 
power or were forced into acceptance of an arduous contract.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Above, n.17 at p294 and para 43-44, p305 
22 Above, n.13 at 382 and 1993 Notice at para 30, p9 
23 Inntrepreneur Estates (GL) Ltd v. Boyes [1995] ECC 16. This concerned an action for the recovery of 
possession of a tied house. The main question of law was whether the tying provision under the IEL lease 
was contrary to Article 101 TFEU. With regard to the Mason case, the Court stated “[t]his judgment has 
provided welcome assistance on the hearing of this appeal.” (at para 7, p18) 
24 Inntrepreneur Estates (CPC) Ltd v Bayliss [1998] Eu LR 483 
25 The Court refused to determine whether or not an injunction to enforce the terms of the tying agreement 
should be granted until the Commission had ruled on the matter, noting that it would be inappropriate for the 
national court to do so as the matter came within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction. (Ibid at p483-484) 
26 Above, n.13 at 383 
27 For example C-6 and 9/90 Francovich v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5357 and Case 46-93 Brasserie du Pêcheur 
SA v. Germany [1996] ECR I-1029. D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 4th Edition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at p466 and R Whish, Competition Law 6th Edition (London, Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at p232 
28 D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 4th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) at p466-467  
29 Ibid at p467 
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The application of this principle was demonstrated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Gibbs Mew v. Gemmell.30 The tenant Gemmell was in rent arrears and was sued by his 
landlord, Gibbs Mew, a small brewer. The tying provisions of the lease referred to beers by 
type not brand.31 Gemmell subsequently claimed that Regulation 1984/83 was 
inapplicable, and counterclaimed for damages in restitution of the sums he had paid for 
beer under the contract. While the agreement was de minimis, the Court of Appeal still 
considered the matter.32 Whilst it was considered that the agreement did not breach Article 
101(1) TFEU, however the Court considered the remedies available to the tenant for such a 
breach including their right to claim damages for an infringement of the Treaty provision.33 
It stated that whilst Article 101 TFEU was directly effective, it was intended to protect 
third party competitors not the parties to a beer tie agreement that offends Article 101 
TFEU.34  It was accepted that the parties to the offending agreement were the cause rather 
than the victims of the distortion, restriction or prevention of competition.35 Applying 
national law, and so the principle of in pari delicto, the English Court refused to allow 
tenants to claim for damages on the basis that their lease, incorporating the beer tie, 
infringed Article 101 TFEU with this judgment being followed later that year in Crehan.36  
Crehan was a tenant under a long lease with Inntrepreneur.37 When an action was brought 
for arrears for beer supplied, Crehan defended this and counterclaimed that the beer tie 
breached Article 101(1) TFEU as it prevented him from purchasing beer on the open 
market from the cheapest sources, and also foreclosed the outlets available to competing 
suppliers’ beers.38 Following the Court of Appeal in Gemmell, the counterclaim was 
dismissed on the basis of the principle of in pari delicto.39 This case however went on to 
have a long passage through the European and UK Courts and further illustrated the 
difficulties the UK courts experienced in applying the EU competition law provisions in 
tandem with the Commission. Under a preliminary reference from the Court of Appeal, in 
addressing the question of whether a party to a prohibited tied house agreement could rely 
on Article 101TFEU in order to seek relief from the other party, the Court of Justice of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gibbs Mew v. Gemmell [1998] Eu LR 588 
31 Ibid at 601. This case was heard by the English Court of Appeal just prior to the European Commission’s 
notice of its acceptance of the UK formulation of the beer tie based on tying by type rather than brand, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
32 Above, n.30. Also J.M. Walker, ‘Have English Courts gone too far in challenging the effectiveness of EC 
Competition Law?’ (1999) 20(1) ECL Rev 1 at p2-3 
33 Above, n.30 at p603-604 
34 Ibid at p604-605 
35 Ibid at p604 
36 Courage Limited v. Crehan (No.1) [1999] Eu LR 409 
37 Ibid at 409 
38 Ibid at 410 
39 Ibid at 410 
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European Union (CJEU) established that the party could do so, thereby countering the 
English rule of in pari delicto.40 The CJEU however stated that regard had to be had to the 
EU recognised principle that it should not be possible for a litigant to profit from his own 
unlawful conduct, with EU law allowing national rules to prohibit this where that party 
bore significant responsibility for the distortion of competition.41 In determining the party’s 
degree of responsibility, the national court was to have regard to the parties’ respective 
bargaining power and conduct.42 Consequently, as noted by Cumming the CJEU sought to 
protect the practical effect of Article 101 TFEU and to ensure effective protection for 
rights under the Treaty.43 By allowing a contracting party to an agreement that infringes 
Article 101 TFEU to claim damages, the CJEU contributed to the use of national courts in 
the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. 44   
Following the preliminary reference however, in 2003 the High Court heard Crehan’s 
claim.45 While it was accepted that Crehan would have been entitled to damages had his 
lease infringed Article 101(1) TFEU, the first Delimitis condition of foreclosure was not 
deemed to be satisfied by the UK beer market.46  Nevertheless, this was later reconsidered 
by the English Court of Appeal and damages were awarded.47 It was noted that the 
European Commission had investigated the relevant market on numerous occasions and, 
when considering the Inntrepreneur leases had found Article 101(1) TFEU was applicable 
to these during the relevant period.48 The Court had erred by concluding that the 
Commission was wrong in doing so with this creating inconsistency in the application of 
the EU competition law provisions.49 Nevertheless, Inntrepreneur ultimately successfully 
appealed the decision to the UK Supreme Court.50 There it was opined that it was for the 
English court to determine whether or not Article 101(1) TFEU was applicable and it had 
properly reached its own conclusion in assessing the evidence before it.51 The Supreme 
Court clarified that where a judge concludes that a decision of the Commission is incorrect 
it would be inconsistent with their judicial oath to nevertheless follow that decision.52 
Crehan therefore failed to recover any damages in respect of his beer tie agreement with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v. Crehan [2002] QB 507 at 507-508 
41 Ibid at 507-508 
42 Ibid at 508 
43 G.A. Cumming, ‘Case Comment Courage Ltd v Crehan’ (2002) 23(4) ECL Rev 199 at 199 
44 Ibid at 201 
45 Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC), Brewman Group Limited [2004] E.C.C. 8 at H7 p79-80 
46 Above, n.40 at H11, p80-81  
47 Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co CPC, [2004] EWCA Civ 637 
48 Ibid at para 1, p 804 and see Chapter 3 for discussion on the Inntrepreneur leases. 
49 Above, n.47 at para 1, p 804  
50 Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) and another (Office of Fair Trading and other intervening) [2007] 
1 AC 333 
51 Ibid at p334 
52 Ibid at para 69, p356-357 
 	  112	  
this setting-back the private enforcement of the EU competition provisions for UK tied 
tenants. 
The position of the tied tenant in the UK was however further complicated following the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Passmore v. Morland.53 There it stated that as Article 101 
TFEU is essentially an effects based prohibition applying to agreements and concerted 
practices which have an offensive economic objective or effect, it becomes inapplicable 
when the circumstances change.54 Therefore when a tenancy agreement was assigned from 
Inntrepreneur, one of the largest pubcos in operation, to Morland, a small brewery,55 the 
Court of Appeal held that even if the agreement with Inntrepreneur breached Article 101 
TFEU, on assignation, the prohibition no longer applied. The effects of the agreement 
changed due to the far smaller degree of market power enjoyed by Morland.56 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal took the view that not only is the prohibition imposed 
by Article 101(1) TFEU ‘temporaneous or transient’ in effect but so too is the sanction of 
nullity under Article 101(2) TFEU.57 Whilst this was a positive outcome in the sense of 
potentially preserving the legality of commercial agreements between parties, it also 
increased doubt over the availability in the UK of a remedy for disgruntled tied tenants.  
2. Harmonisation of the UK and EU legal regimes applicable to beer tying 
agreements  
In light of the foregoing, for several years after accession to the EU the UK courts and 
businesses appeared to grapple with the application of the European competition law 
provisions and the availability of remedies for their breach. At one point an estimated 800 
beer supply agreements awaited decision in the English courts largely due to the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the application of the competition law rules to them.58 Whilst the 
jurisdiction of the EU competition law provisions was limited by the requirement that the 
conduct in question have an ‘effect on trade between Member States’ and although this had 
been broadly interpreted, there were many circumstances in which domestic competition 
law applied to the beer tie agreement in issue. Consequently, during the 1990s, as Europe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 David John Passmore v Morland and Others [1999] 3 All ER 1005; [1999] 1 CMLR 1129; I Eur LR 501 
54 David John Passmore v Morland and Others [1999] 1 CMLR 1129 at para 25 and 26, p1139-1140. See 
also D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 4th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) at p468  
55 David John Passmore v Morland and Others [1999] 1 CMLR 1129 at para 11, p1134 
56 Ibid at para 25-27, p1139-1141. D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 4th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003) at p468 
57 Above, n.55 at para 55, p1150 
58 D Cowan and J Nazerali, ‘Beer Supply Agreements – a Step Forward of Last Orders?’ (1998) 19(5) 
E.C.L.Rev 289 at p294 
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was actively considering vertical restraints reform,59 the UK broke away from its past, 
enacting the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002.60 It was however made 
clear “… that the purpose…is to ensure as far as possible a consistency with E[U] 
approach and thereby ease burdens for business.”61  
2.1 Chapter I Prohibition  
The Competition Act 1998 (1998 Act) is now the principal statute in UK competition law 
and policy with the main provisions coming into force on 1 March 2000. This introduced 
new rules known as the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions. The Chapter I prohibition is 
contained in s.2 of the 1998 Act and is modelled very closely on Article 101(1) TFEU. As 
such, it states 
“(1) Subject to section 3,62 agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings or concerted practices which-                                 
(a) may affect trade within the United Kingdom, and               
(b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the United Kingdom,                 
are prohibited unless they are exempt in accordance with the provisions of this Part.” 
Section 18 of the 1998 Act contains the Chapter II prohibition which is closely modelled 
on Article 102 TFEU and as such forbids the abuse of a dominant position.63 In line with 
the intention to harmonise national and EU law, s.60 of the 1998 Act states the principles 
to be applied in determining questions in relation to competition within the UK, and 
requires where possible, that there should be consistency with the treatment of 
corresponding questions arising under EU law.64 It therefore requires close conformity 
between the 1998 Act and the EU competition law regime, to the extent that is relevant in a 
national context. Conformity is also ensured by s.10 of the 1998 Act which provides for 
parallel exemptions, stating that an agreement is exempt from the Chapter I prohibition if it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Chapter 3, p88 
60 This essentially implemented other changes to UK competition law, including, a new system of market 
investigations and merger control. This will not be discussed further. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1976 and the Fair Trading Act 1976 were repealed. 
61 Lord Haskel, HL Deb 17th November 1997, col 417 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo971117/text/71117-18.htm> accessed 1st 
May 2015. As Furse highlights this approach was adopted when there was no obligation on Member States to 
align their laws with those of the EU. (M Furse, Competition law of the EC and UK 6th Edition (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at p55) The focus here shall be the Competition Act 1998 and the Chapter I 
prohibition. 
62 Section 2(3) of the 1998 Act states that section 2(1) is only applicable “if the agreement, decision or 
practice is, or is intended to be, implemented in the United Kingdom”. 
63 This will not be discussed further 
64 Section 60(1) 1998 Act 
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is exempt from the Community prohibition by virtue of, amongst others, a Regulation. 
Section 10(2) of the 1998 Act states that this is so even where the agreement does not have 
the necessary effect on trade between Member States, as required for the application of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, but falls within a category of agreements which is exempt under a 
Regulation. Section 10 therefore wholly imports all EU block exemptions into UK national 
law. 
2.2 Vertical agreements and the Chapter I Prohibition 
The s.60 requirements are however open to limitation in that, for example, judgments of 
the European Courts that are motivated by single market considerations may not be 
followed by the UK courts.65 Further, the application of the Chapter I prohibition to 
vertical agreements, such as beer supply agreements, was extensively debated.66 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the European Court had established that Article 101(1) TFEU was 
applicable to vertical agreements, however the UK authorities decided that as EU policy 
was largely influenced by single market considerations and in particular their unique goal 
of market integration, it should adopt its own distinctive approach to vertical restraints.67 
This decision was also influenced by the desire to reduce the number of precautionary 
notifications to the UK competition authorities of agreements which were not 
anticompetitive.68 As a result, by virtue of s.50 of the 1998 Act, the Secretary of State 
excluded vertical agreements from the Chapter I prohibition.69 However, this would later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Section 60(1) of the 1998 Act states that the requirement applies “in so far as is possible (having regard to 
any relevant differences between the provisions concerned)”. For example, s.2(1)(a) of the 1998 Act provides 
that the Chapter I Prohibition only applies where “trade is affected within the United Kingdom” and so 
departs from the EU test of an effect on interstate trade which is linked to the market integration goal. K 
Middleton, ‘Harmonisation with community law: the Euro clause’ in B Rodger and A MacCulloch, eds, The 
UK Competition Act, A new era for UK competition law (Oxford, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) at p26 and 
p28, and R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law 7th Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) at p59  
66 R Whish, ‘The Competition Act 1998 and the prior debate on reform’ in B Rodger and A MacCulloch, eds, 
The UK Competition Act, A new era for UK competition law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) at p13-14 
67 B Rodger and A MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK 3rd Edition (London, 
Cavendish Publishing, 2004) at p199-200 
68 Department of Trade and Industry, Competition Act 1998 Exclusion of Vertical Agreements Consultation 
on a draft Order (4th February 1999) at para 6 
69 Section 50 of the 1998 Act entitled the Secretary of State to make an order to provide for exclusions or 
exemptions or otherwise for prescribed provisions not to apply in relation to vertical or land agreements. As a 
result, The Competition Act 1998 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000 SI 2000/310 was 
enacted and Article 3 excluded all vertical agreements from the Chapter I Prohibition with the exception of 
those imposing minimum or fixed resale prices (Article 4 SI 2000/310). Article 2 of the Order also excluded 
agreements to the extent that they constituted a ‘land agreement’. Beer tie agreements could therefore 
potentially benefit from both the Article 2 and the Article 3 exclusions with different parts of the agreement 
benefitting from different exclusions. This was effective from March 2000 until 30th April 2005. B Rodger 
and A MacCulloch, ‘The Chapter I Prohibition: Prohibiting cartels or permitting verticals? Or both?’ in B 
Rodger and A MacCulloch, eds, The UK Competition Act, A new era for UK competition law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2000) at p189-190 
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change with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003.70 Following its implementation the 
European Commission now shares competence in applying Articles 101 TFEU in its 
entirety, with National Competition Authorities and Courts making it preferable for the UK 
to align its domestic law on vertical agreements with that of the EU.71 A review of the 
UK’s vertical restraint policy subsequently culminated in the adoption of an Order to 
repeal the exclusion of vertical agreements from the Chapter I prohibition.72 In keeping 
with the Government’s earlier expressed intention to rely on parallel exemptions stemming 
from Regulation 2790/99 then in force,73 it subsequently extended the application of the 
Regulation to all vertical agreements, either directly or indirectly, where there was no 
effect on inter-state trade only in the UK. In doing so it completed the radical 
Europeanisation of UK law on vertical agreements, including beer supply agreements.  
3. Continued concerns and inquiries in the UK market following the OFT’s 
decision to revoke the Beer Orders 
Consequently, in 2000, two significant events occurred. The 1998 Act came into force and 
as discussed in Chapter 2, the OFT deemed the UK market sufficiently competitive for the 
Beer Orders to be revoked. Nevertheless concerns over the level and impact of the 
concentration of public house ownership in the UK and the extensive use of beer tying 
agreements did not dissipate.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Beer Orders had not been the most appropriate response to 
the issues faced in the UK beer market and as a result the aim of increasing competition 
within the brewing industry through their implementation failed to be achieved. They had 
several consequences that were largely unforeseen at the time of their implementation. As 
several brewers concluded that it would be desirable to specialise in either brewing or 
retailing, whilst others simply exited the brewing business, the market became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003) OJ L1/1. This replaced Regulation No 17 
and the centralised scheme it established. This was deemed to hamper the application of the EU competition 
law provisions by national competition authorities and courts, whilst the system of notification prevented the 
Commission from focusing on the most serious infringements of the competition law provisions. (Recital 3 
Regulation 1/2003) It therefore sought to establish a directly applicable exception system under which the 
national courts and authorities have the power to apply Article 101 TFEU in its entirety (Recital 4, 
Regulation 1/2003). 
71 Department of Trade and Industry, Government response to the consultations on giving effect to 
Regulation 1/2003 and aligning the Competition Act 1998 including exclusions and exemptions (16th January 
2004)  
72 The Competition Act 1998 (Land Agreements Exclusion and Revocation) Order 2004 SI 2004/1260 
73 Department of Trade and Industry, Productivity and Enterprise: A world class competition regime (Cm 
5233, 2001) at para 8.14-8.16. Above, n.67 at p200 
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exceptionally concentrated.74 The divestiture of public houses in accordance with the terms 
of the Beer Orders also resulted in the growth of pubcos that, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
have perpetuated the tied house system and its associated competition concerns.  
However, despite the ongoing interest that would subsequently be shown in the UK market 
following the revocation of the Beer Orders, prompting a significant level of reporting, no 
real change in the regulation of the UK market would be implemented over the coming 
decade. This was so even although the terms of many of these reports were damming for 
the industry and clearly indicated numerous on-going anticompetitive issues surrounding 
the operation of the beer tie. The unforeseen consequences of the Beer Orders discussed in 
Chapter 2 appeared to have a chilling effect with regard to further intervention in the 
market, with several of the reports produced noting the sponsoring organisation’s 
reluctance to suggest far reaching or ‘eye catching’ recommendations.75 Over this period 
the OFT also exhibited an on-going reticence to interfere in the market often citing the 
EU’s acceptance of the beer tie in support of its position, with the Government tending to 
follow its lead with regard to proposed interventions. Nevertheless other bodies, most 
notable the Business Innovation and Skills Committee (BISC) and the pressure group the 
Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) were more persistent and activist in this regard. Further, 
not long after the OFT’s decision to revoke the Beer Orders, in 2002 Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB) requested the OFT investigate the market for the resale of beer through 
public houses.76 This would be the precursor to numerous and on-going investigations into 
the UK market despite the fact the OFT declined to pursue the FSB’s request. It defaulted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 M.E. Slade, ‘Beer and the Tie: Did divestiture of Brewer Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer 
Prices?’(1998) 108 The Economic Journal 565 at 573-574  
75 Business and Enterprise Committee, Pub Companies (HC 2008-2009, 26-1) at p4 and para 11, p8 
76 Their concerns were focused on how much tied tenants had to pay for beer; their level of rent; the 
inadequate support provided by pubcos; and that beer ties caused a restriction of choice which was anti-
competitive. They asked the OFT whether the Chapter I or Chapter II prohibition of the 1998 Act had been 
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to the position that the beer tie did not infringe the EU competition provisions.77 The OFT 
believed competition was working well and was not being prevented, restricted or distorted 
by pubcos, and so, refused to refer the matter to the Competition Commission.78   
However, despite the OFT’s reluctance to investigate the market and due to the FSB’s 
growing concerns over the concentration of public houses in the hands of large pubcos and 
their operation of the tied model, in 2004 the Trade and Industry Committee (TIC) 
investigated the matter.79 
3.1 The Trade and Industry Committee’s Investigation 
The Trade and Industry Committee (TIC) noted that on numerous occasions the European 
Commission and Courts have considered arrangements between national brewers and 
pubcos, and their respective tied tenants under Article 101 TFEU.80  While, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 the old leases of the national brewers had been found to come within Article 101 
TFEU, the TIC highlighted that the current leases underwriting pubco arrangements had 
not been found to infringe Article 101 TFEU.81 The TIC however addressed the definition 
of the final market for the consumption of beer noting that this was one of the principle 
areas of contention between tenants and competition authorities.82  
3.1.1 Market definition  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the CJEU in Delimits considered the reference market to be that 
“for the distribution of beer in premises for the sale and consumption of drinks”.83 
However, the TIC noted that since the Beer Orders, the OFT have come to apply a stricter 
market definition ‘in tandum’ with that of the European Commission, defining it “both in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Trade and Industry Committee, Pub Companies (HC 2004-2005, 128-I) at para 30, p15. The OFT clarified 
that it had to take into account the application of EU law to similar questions raised under it. It was noted that 
the European Commission and Courts have held that Article 101 TFEU is inapplicable to agreements 
between pubcos and their tenants where the pubcos acquire their drinks from a number of sources or are too 
small to contribute to the foreclosure of retail outlets to competitors. (See Roberts and Roberts, Chapter 3, 
p81 and Trade and Industry Committee, Pub Companies Volume II, (HC 2004-2005, 128-II) at Appendix 22, 
para 21, Ev234.) They also found no ground for withdrawing the benefit of the exclusion from the Chapter I 
Prohibition as the agreements between pubcos and their tenants came within the terms of the Competition 
Act (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000, then in force, as they involved the transfer of 
land rights, namely the public house. ((HC 2004-2005, 128-I) at para 30, p15). The refusal to do so was also 
deemed to be supported by the competitiveness of the on-trade sector and the danger that the OFT would take 
action that was inconsistent with the European Commission and Courts’ approach. ((HC 2004-2005, 128-II at 
para 22, Ev234) 
78 Trade and Industry Committee, Pub Companies (HC 2004-2005, 128-I) at para 31, p15-16. In its 2000 
Report The Supply of Beer, the OFT found that pubs were increasingly competing with other on-trade outlets 
including clubs, bars and increasingly restaurants. See Chapter 2.  
79 Trade and Industry Committee, Pub Companies (HC 2004-2005, 128-I) at p3 
80 Ibid at para 25, p13 
81 Ibid at para 28, p13  
82 Above, n.79 at para 32, p17 
83 Chapter 3, p78 
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terms of full on-licences and in terms of all on-licences”.84 The FSB claimed that the pub 
sector constituted a distinct market in itself, although the OFT refused to accept this noting 
that although they had not been required to conduct in depth analysis of market definition, 
there were “significant doubts about whether pubs are in a discrete market”.85 While the 
TIC acknowledged that there was an overlap between public houses and other outlets 
whose main purpose is selling alcohol for consumption on the premises, they questioned 
the OFT’s market definition as they considered that from the standpoint of the consumer, 
there is a distinction between going to a public house for a drink and going for a meal in 
premises where alcohol may be consumed.86 Therefore, if the public house market was not 
a discreet market, all on-licensed premises did not constitute a ‘coherent market either’.87 
The TIC therefore correctly stated that the OFT should reconsider this in order to more 
accurately define the market and establish mechanisms for monitoring it.88   
However, under any of the possible market definitions considered, no pubco, brewer or 
retail pub chain was considered to hold a dominant position in the total market for beer.89 
At that time, Enterprise was the largest pubco in operation and owned 15% of all public 
houses, which were all tenanted and to whom it acted as wholesaler and had no brewing 
operations.90 The TIC also stated their agreement with the OFT’s position that there are 
sufficient different types of public houses, namely managed, tenanted and free houses, for 
there to “be a reasonable amount of competition between on-trade outlets”.91 It did 
however acknowledge that there may be higher concentrations of public house ownership 
in certain regions or areas.92  
3.1.2 Wholesale supply, small brewers and distribution problems 
The TIC considered wholesale supply of beer noting the MMC’s concerns in 1989 that this 
was largely controlled by the national brewers resulting in higher beer prices.93 Today 
pubcos either have their own distribution networks or are supplied directly by brewers.94 
While the TIC established that no pubco had a dominant position in the wholesale market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Above, n.79 at para 36, p18 and Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Beer A Report on 
the supply of beer for retail sale in the United Kingdom (Cm 651, 1989) at para 2.128, p45 
85 Above, n.79 at para 36, p18 
86 Ibid at para 37, p18 
87 Ibid at para 37, p18 
88 Ibid at para 38, p18 
89 Ibid at para 18, p11 
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91 Ibid at para 19, p11 
92 Ibid at para 19, p11 
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for beer,95 they received evidence that tenants and consumers’ access to locally brewed 
beers remained a concern as the beer tie along with pubcos’ centralised distribution 
systems prohibited small brewers from supplying public houses in their area.96 Small 
brewers experienced significant logistical issues in supplying pubcos. As pubcos often 
outsourced their distribution to international brewers’ distribution arms, small brewers 
found it both impractical and prohibitively expensive to deliver their goods to brewer’s 
regional warehouses which were significant distances from their breweries.97 Although the 
Society of Independent Brewers’ Association’s (SIBA) Direct Delivery Scheme (DDS) 
assisted some small brewers in this regard,98 their position was considered to have been 
worsened by the recent sale of one of the few independent wholesalers to the brewer 
Scottish Courage.99 The big four international brewers dominated the market through their 
distribution systems and discounts, with SIBA submitting that this was encouraged by 
pubcos operating practices.100 Various respondents suggested that the difficulties 
experienced by small brewers in accessing the market could be alleviated by reintroducing 
the Guest Beer provisions (GBP) of the Beer Orders,101 however, the TIC accepted that the 
reintroduction of a statutory GBP would run counter to EU competition law and cause the 
UK Government to be legally challenged.102  In contrast to the OFT’s finding in 2000,103 
discussed in Chapter 2, the TIC however recognised the need for there to be greater 
consumer choice and recommended pubcos offer their tenants increased flexibility 
regarding the products they sell, thereby affording small brewers greater opportunity to 
participate in the market.104 They also highlighted that the largest international brewers 
enjoyed a “stranglehold on the distribution of beer” on account of their distribution, rather 
than their supply contracts with pubcos105 and concluded that there was a “strong 
possibility of anti-competitive consequences” in the distribution market for beer, prompting 
them to request the OFT keep it under close scrutiny.106  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ibid at para 46, p20 
96 Ibid at para 47, p20 
97 Ibid at para 62, p23-24 
98 The DDS acted as a ‘middle person’ between the brewers and the pubcos with pubco orders being sent to 
the brewers who delivered directly to the public houses where they were required. Above, n.79 at para 64, 
p23  
99 Above, n.79 at para 66, p23  
100 Ibid at para 48, p20  
101 Ibid at para 55, p22 
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103 Office of Fair Trading, The Supply of Beer (OFT 317, 2000) 
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  120	  
3.1.3 The cost of the tie to tenants 
The TIC also received evidence from many tenants who complained of excessive 
wholesale prices for tied products, which made them uncompetitive in their local 
markets.107 The TIC established that whilst the wholesale selling price quoted to tied 
tenants was largely similar to the standard wholesale selling price at which free houses 
purchased beer, the actual wholesale price paid by pubco tenants was higher due to the 
discounts subsequently offered to free houses.108 The TIC accepted that the terms of 
commercial contracts should remain confidential however they proposed that pubcos be 
more transparent regarding the discounts available to tied tenants compared to free house 
operators.109 As the TIC’s inquiry was initiated following complaints regarding inequality 
in the contractual relationship between pubcos and their tenants, the TIC attempted to 
balance the costs and benefits of the tie to tenants.110 In doing so it concluded that whilst 
the ‘quantifiable costs of the tie were usually balanced by the benefits available to the 
tenants’,111 their analysis was an approximate guide “backed by many assumptions, some of 
which we believe are unrealistic.”112 They noted that the costs and benefits are not equal in 
all cases, with some tenants finding themselves in financial hardship, suggesting that more 
could be done by pubcos to redress the imbalance.113  
3.1.4 Ending the beer tie  
In light of the foregoing concerns it was suggested that many of the issues faced by tenants 
could be resolved by removing the beer tie thereby freeing tenants to purchase beer on the 
open market.114 The TIC however concluded that it was not certain that doing so would 
improve the position of tenants. Pubcos being property companies would offset their loss 
of income from the wholesale price differential they charge by imposing higher rents on 
tenants as they would no longer have an interest in expanding the tenant’s business.115 The 
TIC was also concerned that doing so would allow the national brewers to have a ‘virtual 
monopoly’ on the wholesaling of beer, as they did prior to the Beer Orders. As they 
already controlled the national distribution of beer through their ownership of the 
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distribution companies that deliver to the majority of tenanted houses for the pubcos, 
removing the tie would be enable them to supply the free-of-tie tenants directly.116  
3.1.5 Statutory code for pubcos  
In light of the foregoing concerns numerous recommendations were made during the 
course of the inquiry to improve the relationship between the pubcos and their tenants, 
including a strengthened voluntary code of conduct. Given the fairly recent and significant 
interventions in the market via the Beer Orders, this was a relatively safe recommendation 
for the TIC to make. While the TIC refrained from requiring a legally binding code, it was 
clarified that if the industry failed to show signs of accepting and complying with an 
adequate voluntary code117 then “the Government should not hesitate to impose a statutory 
code on it”.118 The TIC therefore passed the responsibility for implementing more 
significant reform to the Government however given its response to the report this was 
highly unlikely to happen. 
Despite the strong terms of the TIC’s report, dismissive responses to it were received from 
the OFT and the Government.119 The Government stated that it would have difficulty 
imposing a statutory code of practice which would prescribe the terms and conditions of 
commercial agreements.120 It also stated that the competition concerns raised were for the 
competition authorities to deal with. The OFT was similarly dismissive of the report stating 
that it keeps the market definition for the beer sector under review; that it lacked any 
evidence of anti-competitive behaviours amongst distributors; and as no company holds a 
dominant position in the supply of beer the problems faced by tenants and small brewers 
were not a basis on which it could exercise its competition enforcement powers.121 The 
primary recommendation of an updated voluntary code of conduct was however followed 
through by the British Beer & Pub Association (BBPA),122 which published its revised 
Framework Code of conduct in 2005, with members including the major pubcos reviewing 
their codes in line with it.123 
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3.2 OFT – continued decline to investigate the market 
Notwithstanding the publication of the revised Framework Code, given its voluntary nature 
and the Government’s apparent lack of interest in intervening in the market, it was of little 
surprise that the competition concerns over the supply of beer in the UK market did not 
dissipate. In March 2005, the Competition Commission considered the merger of Serviced 
Dispense Equipment Limited (SDEL) and Coors’ technical services function.124 Having 
concluded that the merger would result in a substantial lessening of competition in the 
technical services market, the Competition Commission believed that as the price for the 
supply of technical services and equipment were almost always bundled with the price of a 
barrel of beer, it recommended the OFT once again consider whether a market 
investigation into the pricing or supply of beer was appropriate.125 In keeping with its on-
going resistance to further investigate the market, the OFT later in 2005 declined to 
conduct a new inquiry into the distribution of beer to public houses. 
3.3 BISC’s heightened concerns  
Despite the OFT’s increasingly unfaltering support for the beer tie which was in line with 
the EU’s acceptance of it as a legitimate business model, the relative inaction in dealing 
with the foregoing concerns raised in regard to the UK market caused the investigation and 
reporting on it to continue in earnest.  
The Business and Enterprise Committee, now the Business Innovation and Skills 
Committee (BISC), re-visited this in 2009. They reviewed the relationship between pubcos 
and their tenants in light of the TIC’s 2004 findings, resulting in a scathing report.126 
Contrasting with the 2004 conclusion already mentioned that the ‘quantifiable costs of the 
tie were usually balanced by the benefits available to the tenants’, it clearly stated it had 
“no confidence that the advantages of the tie outweigh its drawbacks.”127 They considered 
the best way to test this was by requiring that on renewal of their lease, lessees be offered 
the choice of being tied or free of tie.128 The BISC stated that a voluntary arrangement 
implementing this would be preferable to a statutory solution however they considered it 
unlikely that pubcos would support it. It was therefore suggested that the department of 
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Business Innovation and Skills consider how best to bring this about and to conduct an 
urgent consultation on the phasing of this proposal.129 While it was considered to be highly 
likely that the tie pushed up beer prices for lessees and customers, given the unforeseen 
consequences of the Beer Orders discussed in Chapter 2, they expressed a reticence in 
suggesting ‘eye-catching recommendations’, such as the abolition of the tie.130 These had 
the potential to produce problems worse than those they sought to solve.131 It was also 
noted that the TIC’s main recommendation, namely the introduction of a new updated 
framework code of conduct, had been implemented with all pubcos who responded to the 
BISC claiming to have complied with this, although some of its recommendations had been 
completely rejected.132 Nevertheless given the level of acrimony in the market, which was 
evident in the terms of the foregoing reports, the BISC found that lessees were far less 
positive than pubcos regarding progress made since 2004 noting that “much of their 
evidence is completely at odds.”133  
3.3.1 Competition issues pre-Beer Orders still evident in the UK market 
In contrast to the OFT’s 2000 report,134 the BISC reported that many of the concerns raised 
in the MMC’s 1989 Report discussed above “can be found in the market today.”135 They 
referred to evidence from the Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) that the on-trade price of 
a pint of beer in 2008 could be estimated to be approximately 3.3 to 3.5 times more than 
the off-trade price.136 Whilst it was acknowledged that the evidence relating to the tie’s 
impact on pricing was not altogether simple, given the large market share enjoyed by 
pubcos, it was suggested their prices set the norm which was followed by the market, with 
the exception of some occasional discounts.137 The BISC also found the MMC’s concerns 
regarding consumer choice remained as pubcos restrict the list of approved products, 
impacting on lessees’ ability to respond to the market and to stock smaller brewers 
products.138 Tenants’ bargaining position was also considered not to have improved since 
1989 given their limited bargaining position compared to pubcos.139 They were therefore 
unable to negotiate discounts, guest ale provisions or lower rents which would ultimately 
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benefit consumers through lower prices and increased choice.140 Further, one of the 
principle concerns expressed by the MMC in 1989 was the lack of an independent 
wholesale and distribution sector in the UK market. The BISC subsequently received 
evidence in support of CAMRA’s claim that the pub market is ‘substantially foreclosed’ to 
small brewers due to their difficulties in meeting pubco demands and the logistical issues 
in supplying their tied estates, with only three pubcos supporting SIBA’s DDS discussed 
above.141 
3.3.2 The OFT’s position  
While this report was produced five years after the TIC reported in 2004 with significant 
competitive issues still being apparent in the UK beer market, when invited to comment on 
the foregoing the OFT declined to alter its position as submitted to the TIC in 2004 that 
“there is no significant competition problem in relation to the beer and pub market.”142 
The BISC noted its disagreement with this in light of the evidence it had received in the 
course of this enquiry which demonstrated that there was a case for the OFT to 
investigate.143 It noted that since 2004 brewery discounts had increased significantly 
however very little of these have been passed on through the supply chain to the benefit of 
lessees or customers.144 While the OFT in 2004 submitted that pubcos were driving down 
wholesale prices,145 the BISC had established that pubcos did little to resist increases in list 
prices, on which the customer retail price is based.146 This was due to the fact that pubco 
discounts increased pro rata with brewery list price increases.147 The resulting divergence 
in on and off-trade beer prices had caused pub closures and increased supermarket beer 
sales.148 The BISC was also critical of the OFT’s refusal to recognise the public house 
market as a separate market from other on-trade premises.149 The BISC considered pubs to 
form a distinct segment of the on-licensed market. While they there may be difficulties in 
distinguishing food-led pubs and restaurants, they generally considered there was a 
distinction between pubs and other on-trade outlets with this being well recognised by the 
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143 Above, n.126 at para 169, p65  
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consumer.150 Reference was also made to the OFT’s omission in 2004 to have regard to the 
geographical market.151 They suggested that in relation to public houses this was likely to 
be narrowly defined, with the market for substitutable pubs being within a radius of 10-15 
miles, as this was the maximum distance within which a consumer was likely to travel to 
visit a pub for a drink.152 The OFT however only considered data on a local licensing 
authority basis.153 In light of the foregoing the BISC was rightly ‘surprised and 
disappointed’ by the OFT’s reluctance to investigate whether the pub market was working 
well for consumers.154 This was especially given the pubcos’ failure to pass on discounts to 
lessees which in turn prevented consumers from benefitting from lower prices. This was 
deemed to have contributed to the disparity between on and off-trade prices and so 
contributed to the on-going closure of pubs in the UK as consumers turned to cheaper off-
trade sales.155 It was subsequently deemed to be “to the overall detriment of the consumer 
if pubs are forced to close due to uncompetitive practices in the market.”156 
3.3.3 Underestimation of the costs of the tie  
The BISC reiterated that the beer tie generally benefits from the EU Block Exemption 
Regulation on the basis that it offers low cost entry to the business for lessees accepting the 
tie, and in the UK is excluded from the Chapter I prohibition of the 1998 Act.157 
Nevertheless, the BISC considered that the benefit of low cost entry offered by the pubco 
lease model should not be overstated with there being no evidence of tied lessees enjoying 
benefits that are not available to free-of-tie tenants or freeholders.158 The high failure rate 
of tied public houses was considered to be attributable to the speed with which wholesale 
prices offered to tied lessees have increased thereby placing them at a significant 
competitive disadvantage compared to free-of-tie tenants.159 The BISC therefore 
considered that the beer tie operated by pubcos may be anti-competitive and in light of the 
OFT’s unwillingness to seriously investigate the matter, the Secretary of State, rather than 
the OFT, was urged to refer the beer tie to the Competition Commission to conduct a 
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market investigation.160 The BISC’s provisional view was that steps be taken to 
significantly restrict the tie in order to restore competition to the retail market, although 
similarly cautious to the TIC, it reiterated that severing the tie could simply result in one 
set of powerful players being replaced with another, as well as having a detrimental effect 
on small brewers.161 Consequently, it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
consequences of the Beer Orders had potentially had a chilling effect with regard to 
suggesting any further significant interventions in the UK beer market. 
3.4 CAMRA Super-Complaint  
Despite the strong terms of the 2009 report, the Government’s response was not as prompt 
as expected, with this being attributed to the significant developments following its 
publication, namely CAMRA’s intention to launch a super-complaint.162 This was 
submitted to the OFT in 2009 on the basis that the UK pub industry, and the beer tie in 
particular, were anti-competitive.163 The complaint primarily concerned exclusive 
purchasing obligations under the beer tie focusing on pubcos which tie over five hundred 
pubs in the UK in relation to beer.164  
CAMRA claimed there was a number of serious market failures stemming from the fact 
that there are 57,000 public houses in the UK of which 54% are leased or tenanted by a 
brewing or non-brewing pub owning company and in almost all cases were subject to a 
beer tie.165 They considered that the cumulative effect of this was to foreclose a substantial 
part of the UK market to brewers; to foreclose access to suppliers of technical services and 
equipment to a substantial part of the UK pub market; to hinder access of suppliers of other 
goods and services subject to exclusive purchasing obligations, to the UK pub market; and 
to hinder the access of wholesalers to the UK pub market.166 Access to these tied outlets 
via the tying company was not considered to be a substitute for independent access, which 
allowed companies to negotiate on an individual basis with each tied pub.167 The operation 
of the beer tie and associated exclusive purchasing obligations was therefore deemed to 
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prevent, restrict and distort competition by establishing a substantial barrier to market entry 
and so infringed Article 101(1) TFEU.168  
In light of the foregoing, CAMRA submitted that whilst the benefits of the operation of the 
beer tie were clear from the perspective of the tying company, consumers did not receive a 
“fair share of the resulting benefit”.169 They therefore claimed that pubcos should be 
precluded from relying on Article 101(3) TFEU to except their agreements from Article 
101(1) TFEU.  
In turning to the issue of market definition, similarly to the BISC, CAMRA urged the OFT 
to regard the public house market as a separate market from other on-trade premises and 
made reference to numerous factors in support of this.170 With regard to geographical 
scope, they asserted that competition occurred at a local level with consumers only being 
prepared to travel short distances when deciding where to drink.171 Consequently while it 
was recognised that no company controlled more than 15% of the UK’s pubs, the ‘local 
nature’ of the pub market meant that the situation still resulted in substantial consumer 
detriment.172 Further, various market failures including the barriers to market entry faced 
by small brewers; and the role of the beer tie in enabling pubcos to increase retail prices 
above market levels and so prompting pub closures all contributed to this consumer 
detriment.173 CAMRA submitted that pubcos were protected from competition in the 
supply of ‘tied’ products to their estates as competitors are denied access to these captive 
outlets. This resulted in higher prices for consumers as tied pubs are precluded from 
sourcing their supplies on the free market.174 There was deemed to be a lack of price 
competition in the UK pub market as a whole as these tied pubs were prohibited from 
competing with free and managed pubs on the basis of price, which also meant free and 
managed pubs were able to charge higher prices than would be possible if there was real 
competition.175 CMARA also pointed to the difficulty experienced by small brewers in 
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accessing the market as causing there to be a lack of consumer choice, with restrictive 
covenants on the sale of properties causing further loss of amenity.176  
In light of the foregoing, CAMRA’s optimum super complaint outcome was for the OFT to 
conduct a market study into the beer tie; public house rental calculations; and the use of 
restrictive covenants to restrict the availability of free-of-tie pubs.177 They therefore 
focused on the need for the tie to be reformed in order to prevent its exploitation. 
3.4.1 The OFT’s Initial Response to the super-complaint 
The OFT issued its initial response to CAMRA’s super complaint in October 2009.178 
Despite the arguments presented by CAMRA and the BISC’s 2009 conclusion noted above 
that it had “no confidence that the advantages of the tie outweigh its drawbacks,” in 
keeping with its past reluctance to reconsider the beer tie, the OFT concluded that it “has 
not found evidence of competition problems that are having a significant impact on 
consumers.”179 As they had done previously they referred to the large number of 
competing pub outlets owned by different operators at the national, regional and local level 
with consumers benefitting from competition and choice between different pubs.180 The 
commercial interests of pubcos were aligned with their lessees, as any competitive strategy 
that compromised the competitive position of lessees would cause them both sales and 
margin losses.181 They also failed to consider that tied lease agreements prevented pubcos 
from offering consumers a wide choice as pubcos generally sourced from a number of 
suppliers.182 The OFT therefore concluded that overall no further investigation of the 
competition problems in the UK beer and pub market was warranted.183 As they had done 
before, they refused to undertake a market study or investigation under the 1998 Act or to 
make a reference to the Competition Commission.184 They therefore rejected the complaint 
in October 2009 prompting CAMRA to appeal to the Competition Appeals Tribunal 
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(CAT),185 whilst the OFT undertook a public consultation with a view to further 
considering the alleged anticompetitive behaviour of pubcos.186 
3.5 The BISC’s Follow-Up 
In the meantime, the BISC again contrasted with the OFT’s position on the market by 
restating in 2010 its commitment to the recommendations in its 2009 report on pubcos.187 
It also added that a reference to the Competition Commission may be necessary as it had 
“grave doubts about the industry’s willingness to do enough voluntarily to prevent 
statutory or regulatory intervention.”188 Given that since the decision to revoke the Beer 
Orders in 2000, notwithstanding the numerous investigations into the market, the only 
meaningful action taken to address these on-going concerns was the introduction of the 
BBPA’s revised voluntary Code of Practice, the BISC unsurprisingly found the industry 
had only made ‘modest’ progress in the year since its last report.  It therefore suggested 
that the Code had to be treated by major pubcos as an ‘absolute de-minimis requirement’, 
with its successful ‘policing’ being critical to the success of the reforms.189 Again whilst 
they acknowledged that many advocated the removal of the beer tie, it remained committed 
to its 2009 view that the only way to properly judge the fairness of the tie was to offer 
lessees the possibility of being tied or free of tie.190 June 2011 was set as the deadline for 
real reform, thereby giving the industry a further two years to address these on-going 
issues even although it had already shown itself incapable, after which it would 
recommend legislation as a basis for statutory regulation.191 In acknowledgement of the 
numerous occasions on which the industry had been ‘found wanting’, this was the last 
opportunity for pubcos to instigate effective self-regulation to remove anticompetitive 
concerns.192 The BISC did however strongly encourage the Government to monitor the 
success of the initiative for reform and to remain open to a reference to the Competition 
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Commission, while also encouraging the OFT to reconsider and carefully review the issues 
raised by CAMRA in their super-complaint.193         
3.5.1 Government’s apparent support for reform  
In a departure from its long held stance that intervention in the market was not required, 
the Government’s response to the foregoing report was that as part it’s broader strategy on 
pubs, it “wholeheartedly endorsed” the recommendations made.194 The BISC considered 
this to amount to “effective adoption” of all of its recommendations, including the June 
2011 deadline.195 The Government clarified that it accepted the proposals for the effective 
operation of the BBPA code of conduct and also stated that it should incorporate the option 
for tenants to be tied or free of tie, and the industry should offer a voluntary guest beer 
outside the tie as part of the code.196  
3.6 Super Complaint - the OFT’s final decision  
While this was a remarkably positive response from the Government, it was followed 
shortly after in October 2010 by the OFT’s final decision on CAMRA’s Super-
Complaint.197 The OFT stated that in reaching its decision it had reviewed all of the 
responses received to its consultation mentioned above.198 In-keeping with its long held 
position that it has already reviewed the beer tie, as have the Competition Commission199 
and the European Commission, the OFT predictably re-iterated its initial finding that no 
further evidence had been presented to justify initiating any additional investigations.  
3.6.1 The OFT’s assessment  
The OFT responded to each aspect of the super-complaint, dismissing each in turn.200 
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3.6.1.1 Competitive market, alignment of the interests of pubcos and 
tenants and rising retail prices explained 
At the outset the OFT stated that its focus was whether there was effective competition 
benefitting consumers within the beer and pub market.201 For the purpose of its competitive 
assessment the OFT considered the level of competition between pubs.202 They did not 
however take as narrow an approach to the relevant geographical market as that suggested 
by CAMRA. Consideration was had to the level of competition between pubs owned by 
different operators on the basis of both Local Authority licensing areas and an analysis of 
the number of competing premises within clear distances around pubs in the UK.203 The 
OFT noted that “[a]t a national, regional and local level, the evidence indicates that there 
is a large number of competing pub outlets owned by different operators and that there is 
competition and choice between different pubs.204 No individual pubco was found to hold a 
significant concentration of public houses.205 The resulting fragmented nature of the 
market was deemed not to facilitate co-ordinated behaviour, and so pubcos could not 
sustainably inflate prices above a competitive level as had been suggested by CAMRA.206 
They also established that it would not be sustainable for pubcos to set prices and rents at a 
level that would risk the competitive position of the pubs within their estate as this would 
result in a loss of custom to other pubs in their locality.207 Consequently they concluded 
that the commercial interests of pubcos and their lessees were aligned. 
The OFT was satisfied that increased retail prices were attributable to increased costs at the 
retail level of the supply chain due to inflation rates and were not due to a lack of effective 
competition between pubs, as had been submitted by CAMRA.208 While it was accepted 
that on average tied pubs charged more for beer than free and managed houses, this could 
be explained by the ‘package of features’ offered by a pub to customers, and it was also 
considered that average prices disguised the variations in prices charged by different 
pubs.209  Additionally, in addressing tenants’ concerns over the prices and rent levels paid 
to their landlords, noting the large number of submissions received to that effect, the OFT 
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relied on its own conclusion that there was significant competition and choice between 
pubs so it was unlikely that issues relating to the negotiation process would result in 
consumer detriment.210  Consequently this was not an issue relating to competition and was 
ultimately for pubcos and their lessees to address.211 
3.6.1.2 Barriers to entry to brewers and wholesalers 
The OFT also turned to the considerable and well documented concerns over market 
foreclosure and the resulting exclusion of small brewers and wholesalers from the market. 
They did not consider that large pubcos’ reliance on beer tie agreements prevented pubs 
from offering consumers a wide choice of beers due to their practice of multi-sourcing 
from a range of suppliers.212 Despite the concerns expressed by the TIC, BISC and 
CAMRA noted above regarding small brewers’ access to pubcos tied estates, the OFT 
stated that “[t]here appear to be considerable opportunities for access to pubs and other 
on-trade outlets by brewers”.213 Whilst this statement was most accurate for larger 
brewers, it was arguably not so for smaller producers. However, the OFT stated that the 
logistical issues faced by these small brewers in dealing with retail chains with large-scale 
distribution networks did not in themselves indicate a problem of competition.214 This was 
notwithstanding the considerable lack of independent wholesalers in the UK market as well 
as the domination of the distribution sector by the largest international brewers which had 
been a source of concern in previous enquiries.215 The OFT stated that whilst small 
brewers may have difficulty accessing the pubcos centralised distribution systems, these 
resulted in efficiencies and enabled some brewers to achieve large-scale distribution which 
in turn facilitated market entry or expansion.216 These benefits had clearly been enjoyed by 
the largest international brewers who supplied the pubcos estates. Further, SIBA’s DDS 
was highlighted as a ‘successful market led solution to the issues faced by small brewers’ 
notwithstanding pubcos very limited participation in this scheme mentioned above.217 
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3.6.1.3 No further investigation 
In light of its foregoing conclusions, the OFT stated that it did not have to address the 
availability of an appropriate remedy in response to CAMRA’s complaint.218 It also noted 
that under Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003,219 it is not possible for national law to 
prohibit agreements which may affect trade between Member States but do restrict 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, fulfil the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU or benefit from a block exemption Regulation.220 The OFT again deferred to 
the fact that the European Commission and Courts have found that Article 101(1) TFEU 
does not apply to tied leases where the pubco sources from a number of sources, or the 
agreements are de minimis.221  Dismissing the extensive concerns raised by CAMRA, the 
OFT did not consider that further investigation of the beer and pub market was warranted 
concluding that it “has not found evidence of competition problems that are having a 
significant impact on consumers.” 222 No specific recommendations were therefore made to 
the Government or the industry as a result of its consideration of the issues raised by 
CAMRA.223  
3.7 BISC’s Persistence 
While the OFT continued to decline to interfere in or recommend further investigation of 
the market, with the support of the new coalition Government, the BISC honoured its 
undertaking to monitor progress. In September 2011 it published its fourth report on 
pubcos in seven years, and assessed whether the industry had delivered on its promise of 
‘meaningful reform’.224 The significantly contradictory evidence received by the BISC was 
deemed an indication of how little the industry had moved on.225 Whilst there had been 
some improvements, a genuine commitment to reform was clearly lacking and so the test 
set by its predecessor Committee had not been met.  
3.7.1 Lack of meaningful reform and demands for a statutory code 
As noted above, the BISC had previously advocated that the on-going dispute regarding 
the beer tie could be ended by offering lessees the option of being tied or free of tie, 
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thereby enabling both sides to prove their respective claims. The Government also 
‘wholeheartedly’ endorsed this proposal. The BBPA submitted that whilst there was no 
explicit free-of-tie option under the existing voluntary Framework Code, companies were 
not precluded from offering this.226 Numerous pubcos provided evidence of offering free-
of-tie arrangements to lessees, however, evidence was also provided that only 16% of new 
lessees and 9% of existing lessees had been offered a free-of-tie option.227 
This inaction was deemed by the BISC to highlight the industry’s inability, or more likely, 
unwillingness, to deliver meaningful reform.228 Its inability to do so despite clear 
instruction demonstrated “the deep-seated problems which lie at the heart of the 
industry”.229 Although the new Codes of Practice implemented since its last report were 
deemed to be an improvement, they only addressed a limited number of issues.230 As noted 
above, the BISC’s 2010 report had been lauded as the final opportunity for the industry to 
reform and it had failed to do so.231  The BISC deemed there to be no alternative but for the 
Government to put the industry’s Code on a statutory footing and for it to be accompanied 
by a statutory Code Adjudicator.232  
4. Government’s inaction 
Despite the apparent zest for change expressed in its response to the BISC’s 2010 report 
discussed above, the Government reneged on this when statutory intervention was deemed 
immediately necessary. Consequently the Government could be seen to be reverting to its 
long held reticence to engage in actual reform of the market.  This inaction subsequently 
prompted a further flurry of investigations and reporting on the market, the terms of which 
initially broadly echoed those discussed above although they would soon recognise the 
need for genuine reform.233 
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4.1 Self-regulation over statutory regulation 
In determining ‘the most appropriate course of action’ in response to the BISC’s 2011 
report, the Government defaulted to the OFT’s position that there was no evidence of 
competition problems having an adverse impact on consumers.234 Further out of line with 
its response to the BISC’s 2010 report, the Government stated that “legally binging self-
regulation can be introduced far more quickly than a statutory solution and can, if devised 
correctly, be equally effective”.235  Whilst this statement was generally correct, it was 
inaccurate in the circumstances of this market, as it had clearly failed to change 
significantly following years of voluntary regulatory attempts. 
The Government nevertheless placed reliance on the EU’s acceptance of the beer tie under 
the EU Block Exemption Regulation, which had been recently renewed.236 Apparently 
disregarding the preceding dearth of reports published on the matter it stated that it should 
“not intervene in setting the terms of commercial, contractual relationships, where these 
are fully justified by law and have been found by the OFT to be raising no competition 
issues that significantly affect consumers.”237 In finding a solution to the issues presented, 
it contrasted starkly with its response to the BISC’s 2010 report, stating that it “considers 
the debate over ‘tied’ or ‘free-of-tie’ to be largely a distraction. There is nothing in itself 
that causes the tie to be fundamentally wrong”.238 The new coalition Government therefore 
appeared to shun the BISC’s proposal for statutory regulation as endorsed by its 
predecessors. Despite acknowledging the industry’s history of failed attempts at self–
regulation, it was proposed that a legally binding self-regulatory code be adopted, with it 
naively stating that “the industry will lose no time in fulfilling the commitments it has 
publicly made.”239 This policy change notwithstanding the past gross inaction of the 
industry prompted suggestions that, in addition to OFT and EU policy, the BBPA had been 
significantly influential. 
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4.2 Self-regulation: the response 
Suspicions over the BBPA’s involvement were raised in December 2011, when the BISC 
followed up on the Government’s response to its 2010 report.240 This detailed the 
mechanics implementing the legally binding code which would no longer be on a statutory 
basis.241 The All-Party Parliamentary Save the Pub Group242 stated it was “extremely 
unhappy” with the Government’s response to the BISC’s report which reneged on its 
undertaking to introduce a statutory code as well as a free-of-tie option and a guest beer 
right for tied tenants.243 Their concerns included the fact that the code was the product of 
closed negotiations with the BBPA.244 A genuine free-of-tie option and guest beer 
provision were deemed necessary to reduce the over-inflated price of tied products with 
their omission rendering the proposed reforms “weak and ineffectual.”245 Concerns were 
also raised over the failure to establish mechanisms to review the BBPA’s commitment to 
deliver reform in light of its past failings.246 These concerns were echoed amongst 
numerous interested parties, including the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers 
(ALMR).247 Consequently, the general consensus rightly appeared to be that these reforms 
were entirely unsuitable to address the on-going problems of the beer tie and the industry 
generally. 
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4.3 Demands for an independent inquiry into reform  
A backbencher business debate in January 2012 forced the Government to re-visit the issue 
of the beer tie as pub closures continued to increase around the UK.248 MPs called for an 
industry wide statutory code of conduct including a genuine free-of-tie option and an open 
market rent review, overseen by an independent body.249 The outcome was unanimous 
support for the Government to instruct an independent review of self-regulation within the 
pub industry, reporting in Autumn 2012.250  
5. Government’s policy change 
The aforementioned report failed to materialise and in January 2013 the Business Secretary 
undertook to consult on the establishment of a statutory Code and an Adjudicator to 
oversee the relationship between pubcos and licensees, as recommended by the BISC in 
2010.251 However at the outset of its consultation document the Government sought to 
clarify that this was not a competition issue, again deferring to the OFT’s 2010 finding 
noted above that “[a]t a national, regional and local level, the evidence indicates that 
there is a large number of competing pub outlets owned by different operators and that 
there is competition and choice between different pubs.”252 It was however stated that 
whilst the tie is a good business model when it is operated responsibly, its abuse could 
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result in “serious hardship”.253  The aim of the consultation was stated to be ensuring 
fairness to tenants whilst also safeguarding the long-term sustainability of the industry by 
placing reliance on ‘proportionate and targeted’ interventions.254 The Government’s 
proposals appeared to be in line with the BISC’s aforementioned aim to ensure that tied 
tenants are no worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts with it seeking to ensure this 
through the implementation of a statutory code together with an Adjudicator.255 
5.1 A statutory code and Adjudicator 
The existing industry Framework Code was to form the starting point for the statutory 
Code, subject to strengthening to address the principle aims of fairness and ensuring that 
tied tenants are no worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts.256 The Code would only be 
applicable to those pubcos which have 500 or more pubs, with the aim being to target those 
with market power and to exclude those smaller companies who are generally considered 
to act responsibly towards their tenants in light of the very few complaints received 
regarding them.257 The terms of the Code would be applicable to non-managed pubs only 
given that managed houses are run by employees of the pub company.258  The Government 
intended that the Code would be immediately binding and in the case of a conflict would 
supersede the terms of any lease or tenancy agreement.259 It was also proposed that the new 
Adjudicator should be based on the Groceries Code Adjudicator and have an arbitration 
and an investigative function.260   
5.1.1 Content of the Code - The free-of-tie option  
The terms of the Code were to ensure that risk and reward are shared at an appropriate 
level between the parties and so make sure that tied tenants are no worse off than their 
free-of-tie counterparts.261 A free-of-tie option with an open market rent review had 
previously been suggested as a means of achieving these core principles.262 The 
Government clarified that this is “an option in which the tenant is subject to no purchasing 
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obligations of any form and therefore the only sum paid to the pub company is the dry 
rent”.263 It was however suggested that within the free-of-tie option one possibility would 
be for pubcos with their own brewing operations, to be allowed to require their pubs to sell 
only their beers, or that a certain proportion of the beers sold had to be the brewer’s own 
but could be purchased from any source the tenant wished.264  
5.1.2 Differing views over a mandatory free-of-tie option 
In the course of its consultation the Government sought views on the inclusion of a 
mandatory free-of-tie option. This had the potential to be highly interventionist with the 
Government highlighting its concerns over such an approach.265 The Government noted 
uncertainty over the impact such an obligation could have on the market highlighting that 
the last significant Government intervention, namely the Beer Orders discussed in Chapter 
2, had the unexpected effect of promoting the growth of pubcos and contributing to the 
current concerns within the industry.266 This was deemed to emphasise the need for 
proportionate measures to be adopted. The Government also highlighted the long history of 
beer tie agreements within the UK market and their importance in promoting the growth of 
small and medium sized brewers by guaranteeing them a market for their products, and 
assisting them in building their brands.267  It was thought that this could be undermined by 
the uncertainty associated with a mandatory free-of-tie option which could potentially 
accelerate pub closures.268 They also pointed to the buoyant craft and micro-brewing 
industry in the UK as an indication that the current industry structure is highly beneficial to 
brewers. Over one thousand British brewers were in operation, which is the highest 
number since the 1930s.269  
Opposing views were expressed by tenant groups which, similarly to the BISC, highlighted 
that a free-of-tie option was the simplest avenue for reform as it would ultimately allow the 
market to decide which option is best.270 They also conflicted with the Government by 
claiming that a free-of-tie option would promote the growth of microbrewers as the 
majority of their sales are to free-of-tie pubs, and so an increase in their number would 
increase their potential market.271 Greater consumer choice within each public house was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Ibid at para 5.25, p29. As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘dry’ rent is the property rent. 
264 Above, n.252 at para 5.26, p29 
265 Ibid at para 5.28, p29 
266 Ibid at para 5.32, p31 
267 Ibid at para 5.33, p31. This is also discussed in Chapter 2. 
268 Above, n.252 at para 5.33, p31  
269 Ibid at para 5.34, p31 
270 Ibid at para 5.36, p31 
271 Ibid at para 5.36, p31 
 	  140	  
also projected as they would be free to choose the beers sold, although this was dependent 
on tenants choosing a wide range to sell in their public houses.272 
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, brewers and pub companies were naturally keen 
to highlight a relatively long list of negatives associated with a free-of-tie option. These 
included the potential loss of economies of scale which would prevent pubcos from 
negotiating discounts from brewers and would reduce the efficiency of national 
distribution networks.273 Structural implications resulting from the absence of pubco 
buying power were thought to include domination of the UK market by the large 
international brewers who would be free to offer discounts to publicans in return for 
exclusivity, thereby potentially contributing to the foreclosure of the market.274 An erosion 
of the tie would also damage the partnership between the pubco and the tenant, as in the 
absence of being able to guarantee the right to tie a public house the incentives to promote 
the business of the tied publican would be lacking.275 It was thought that it could also cause 
the exit of major pubcos given the significant reliance they place on the tie as part of their 
business model, with the closure or sale of thousands of public houses resulting, with this 
uncertainty also being likely to discourage investment.276 Similar concerns were expressed 
with regard to brewing pubcos in light of their dependence on sales through their tied 
estates although the likelihood of this would be reduced by permitting them to require the 
sale of their beers through their houses, where the tenant was allowed to purchase these 
from any source as discussed above.277 
5.2 Exclusion of mandatory free-of-tie option 
The BISC in its response to the Government’s consultation welcomed the proposals for a 
statutory Code and Adjudicator. While they again reiterated that they did not support the 
abolition of the beer tie, they were supportive of a free-of-tie option. This was due to the 
fact that should the tie be seen to present significant benefits to the lessee, the option would 
not be relied upon and the tie would continue to prevail.278 Further, from responses 
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received to the Government’s consultation,279 67% supported a mandatory free-of-tie 
option and 92% supported an open market rent assessment.280  
The Government’s response to the consultation reiterated its commitment to the 
introduction of a statutory Code in order to ensure fairness and transparency in the 
industry, with all tenants being permitted to request an open market rent review should 
they not have had one for five years, as well as the right to take disputes before an 
independent Adjudicator.281 These proposals were to be incorporated into a ‘Core Code’ 
applicable to all tied tenants.282  The Government also proposed to introduce an ‘Enhanced 
Code’ applicable to all tenants of pubcos tying 500 or more public houses.283 This would 
incorporate provisions requiring pubcos to offer parallel tied and free-of-tie rent 
assessments where requested by new and existing tenants either when deciding whether to 
take on a pub tenancy or at the time of their tied rent review.284  The Government 
considered that this provision would achieve its core principle of allowing tied tenants to 
test whether or not they would be worse off than free-of-tie tenants.285 This was so even 
although the tenant would only be able to request such a review when the parties were 
unable to agree on the tied rent and the tenant would also be required to pay a £200 fee to 
the Adjudicator on doing so.286 This was the Government’s favoured option despite the fact 
that only 30% of respondents were supportive of a parallel rent assessment.287   
The Government commissioned independent analysis from London Economics on the 
impact of the two options namely the free-of tie option and its favoured parallel rent 
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(Motion S4M-12348: Paul Martin, Glasgow Provan, Scottish Labour, Lodged 19th February (Scottish 
Parliament, February 2015) 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28877.aspx?SearchType=Advance&ReferenceNu
mbers=S4M-12348&ResultsPerPage=10> accessed 5th May 2015) This will not be considered further. 
284 Above, n.281 at p5 
285 Ibid at p5 
286 Ibid at p6 
287 Ibid at p67 
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assessment.288 While it accepted that a mandatory free-of-tie option was the quickest and 
simplest option for ensuring that tied tenants are no worse off than their free-of-tie 
counterparts, it focused on the concerns noted above over the uncertainty that would be 
caused by such an option and its impact on the broader pub sector.289 The parallel rent 
assessment avoided the risk of unintended consequences associated with the free-of-tie 
option and the perceived uncertainty of whether pubs would or would not remain tied, 
despite concerns that such an approach was too simplistic to capture all of the variables in 
this complex business model.290 For similar reasons, the Government also vetoed the 
inclusion of a guest beer option as this would potentially undermine the tied model should 
tenants rely on it to purchase their best selling beer out-with the tie.291  
5.3 Intervention by members of the UK Parliament 
Although the Government deemed the foregoing proposal to be a “proportionate and 
targeted response” it was ultimately lack luster.292 The proposals failed to strike the right 
balance between avoiding unintended consequences, undermining the beer tie as a 
legitimate business model and addressing the need for change. The fact the Government 
had clearly misread the mood for real change and succumbed to the pressure of larger 
companies was evident when in June 2014 the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Bill (2014 Bill) was introduced to Parliament.293 Part 4 made provisions for 
the statutory Code and the Adjudicator in line with the foregoing proposals however this 
was subject to amendment during a House of Commons vote in November 2014 with the 
surprise insertion of a new clause 2 into the Bill.294 Contrary to the Government’s desire to 
maintain the tied house system largely unchanged, Members of Parliament (MPs) rebelled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Ibid at p71. Also London Economics, Modelling the impact of proposed policies on pubs and the pub 
sector A report  to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Project reference : 008/ 1314 
(December 2013). This report was greatly criticised and was considered to be very one sided, failing to take 
into account the views of tenants or their representative bodies.  HC Deb 14th October 2014, col 60 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141014/pm/141014s01.htm> 
accessed 7th June 2015; HC Deb 28th October 2014, col 331 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/pm/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015; HL Deb 9th March 2015, col 458 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150309-0001.htm - 1503098000524> 
accessed 7th June 2015  
289 Above, n.281 at p73-74 
290 Ibid at p74-75 
291 Ibid at p6 
292 Ibid at p7. Also HC Deb 11th June 2014, col 591 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140611/debtext/140611-0002.htm - 
14061151000324> accessed 10th May 2015 
293 HL Deb 28th January 2015, GC 116 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150128-gc0001.htm - 15012858000257> 
accessed 7th June 2015  
294 HC Deb 18th November 2014, col 195-196 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141118/debtext/141118-0002.htm> 
accessed 11th May 2015 
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and voted in favour of the insertion of a ‘Market Rent Only option’, or mandatory free-of-
tie obligation, for large pub-owning businesses.295 While the 2014 Bill was subject to 
further amendment following its passage through Parliament, these initial revisals set the 
tone for the 2014 Bill which received Royal Assent on 26th March 2015.296 The Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (the 2015 Act) is therefore a significant 
departure from the Government’s original proposals and its long held position on the beer 
tie, not to mention the EU’s acceptance of it as a legitimate business model, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
6. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (the 2015 
Act) 
6.1 The Pubs Code 
The 2015 Act makes provision for ‘the creation of a Pubs Code and Adjudicator for the 
regulation of dealings by pub-owning businesses with their tied pub tenants.’ Provision is 
made in Part 4297 of the Act for a statutory Pubs Code and Adjudicator in England and 
Wales.298 A large amount of detail regarding the new regulatory regime will be contained 
in the Pubs Code, despite the industry’s past failure to comply with such codes, as 
discussed above. However notwithstanding these concerns, as the Pubs Code is confined to 
secondary legislation, this affords greater flexibility in altering its terms in accordance with 
changing market conditions.299 The 2015 Act reiterates that the Pubs Code is to be 
consistent with the Government’s two main aims, namely ensuring fair and lawful dealing 
by pub owning businesses in relation to their tied pub tenants; and the principle that tied 
tenants should be no worse off than they would be if they were not subject to a product or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ibid 
296 HL Deb 26th March 2015, col 1590 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150326-0002.htm#15032625000607 > 
accessed 14th July 2015 
297 Only Part 4 of the 2015 Act will be considered in this chapter given its relevance to the regulation of the 
distribution of beer in the UK. 
298 As already noted above, at n.283, this a devolved matter. The application of Part 4 of the 2015 Act to 
Scotland was discussed in the House of Lords and it was acknowledged that the Scottish Parliament is 
considering similar intervention in Scotland.  (HL Deb 28th January 2015, Col GC 163 -166 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150128-gc0001.htm - 15012858000257> 
accessed 7th June 2015) CAMRA has also launched a campaign to ensure that pubco reform is brought about 
in Scotland. (CAMRA, ‘CAMRA launches a campaign to promote pubco reform in Scotland’ (CAMRA)  
<http://www.camra.org.uk/news/-/asset_publisher/1dUgQCmQMoVC/content/camra-launches-a-campaign-
to-promote-pubco-reform-in-scotla-1> accessed 9th June 2015) This will not be considered any further here 
as the provisions of the 2015 Act will most likely form the basis for any subsequent reform in Scotland. 
299 HC Deb 28th October 2014, col 305-307  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/am/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 7th June 2015 
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service tie.300 It is therefore intended to support the provisions of Part 4 of 2015 Act, some 
of which came into force two months after the Act received Royal Assent in March and 
largely detail the provisions to be included in the Pubs Code.301 The Code will be effective 
from May 2016.302 
Whilst the 2015 Act makes provision for a Market Rent Only option, on which focus will 
be placed here, s.42(5) of the 2015 Act states that the Pubs Code may require pub-owning 
businesses to provide parallel rent assessments in relation to their tied tenants in specified 
circumstances.303 This is so even although it received very little backing in the 
Government’s consultation and has been criticised as being a time consuming and complex 
procedure which fails to substantially alter the balance of risk and reward between the 
parties contrary to the intended aims of the reforms.304 The parallel rent assessment is 
proposed to increase transparency in negotiations, however there are numerous difficulties 
associated with its implementation including calculating the value of the special 
commercial or financial advantage (SCORFA) afforded to tenants, thereby undermining its 
usefulness.305   
However, notwithstanding concerns over the retention of the parallel rent assessment 
procedure and the inability of the industry to comply with codes of practice, there are thirty 
two sections of the 2015 Act implementing reforms to the regulation of the UK market. 
Focus here shall be placed on those provisions dealing with the ‘Market Rent Only option’ 
(MRO option) given that it is the most significant challenge to the tied house system in the 
UK since the Beer Orders and the focus of the thesis is the distribution of beer and in 
particular beer tying agreements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Section 42(3) of the 2015 Act.  Product tie is defined to include beer tying obligations. It refers to a 
contractual obligation of a tied pub tenant that a product to be sold at the tied pub must be supplied by the 
landlord or a group undertaking in relation to the landlord or a nominee of either, with a service tie being the 
equivalent in relation to a service supplied to the tied tenant. ‘Stocking requirements’, which are discussed 
later, are specifically excluded from the product tie definition. (Section 72(1) 2015 Act) 
301 Section 164(3)(d) of the 2015 Act provides that s.42-44 (Pubs Code) and s.68-73 (Part 4: supplementary) 
come into force at the end of the period of 2 months beginning on the day on which the Act is passed.   
302 Section 42(1) of the 2015 Act provides the Secretary of State with an additional period of one year from 
the date the section comes into force to draft the Pubs Code and so the relevant date is May 2016. A final 
draft of the Code is therefore awaited. Consequently consideration here shall be limited to the provisions of 
the 2015 Act not the current draft of the Code. 
303 Section 42(5) 2015 Act  
304 HC Deb 16th July 2014, col 928-929, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140716/debtext/140716-0002.htm - 
14071659000001> accessed 7th June 2015. The Secretary of State has the power to define ‘parallel rent 
assessment’ in regulations to ensure there is flexibility in how the Pubs Code addresses this for different 
types of tied pub agreements. See s.72(1) 2015 Act.  
305 HC Deb 28th October 2014, col 341- 343 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/pm/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
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6.2 Scope of application of Part 4 of the 2015 Act and the MRO option 
6.2.1 ‘Pub-owning business’, ‘tied pub’ and ‘tied pub tenant’  
The scope of application of the 2015 Act and so the MRO option is largely set by the 
definition of three key terms, namely ‘Pub-owning business’, ‘tied pub’ and ‘tied pub 
tenant’. 
6.2.1.1 ‘Pub-owning business’ 
‘Pub-owning business’ is defined in s.69(1) of the 2015 Act. This is ‘a person that in the 
period beginning with the day on which the Pubs Code comes into force and ending on the 
last day of that financial year306 was the landlord of 500 or more tied pubs; and is a pub 
owning business in any subsequent financial year, if for a period of at least 6 months in the 
previous financial year the person was the landlord of 500 or more tied pubs’. The 
application of the provisions of Part 4 of the 2015 Act is therefore restricted to those 
pubcos with 500 or more tied pubs. Some flexibility is however introduced into the s.69(1) 
threshold by s.69(8). This permits the Secretary of State to amend the threshold through the 
substitution of a different number of tied pubs, or a different period, from those specified 
thereby enabling the legislation to respond to changing market conditions. However in 
addition to increasing flexibility, this potentially serves to increase the uncertainty for the 
market with regard to the application of Part 4 of the Act, which may in turn undermine 
investment in the industry.307 
6.2.1.1.1 Threshold for application  
The inclusion of a threshold based on quantity is also a questionable choice given that it 
potentially creates a two-tier system of regulation for pubcos falling above and below this 
threshold. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tied Estate Order similarly imposed a threshold 
of ‘more than 2,000 licensed premises’ as the basis for its application, thereby restricting it 
to the six largest brewers at that time.308 By focusing on those with over 2,000 licensed 
premises and using 2,000 as the cap on the number of such premises brewers could own, it 
had many unintended consequences some of which, namely the growth of the pubco, the 
2015 Act is seeking to address. Further, while large pubcos have been the source of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 ‘Financial year’ is defined in s.72(1) as a period of 12 months beginning on 1 April and ending on 31 
March. 
307 In light of these concerns it was proposed that any change in the threshold should be confined to primary 
legislation. HL Deb 28th January 2015, col GC151 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/150128-gc0001.htm - 15012858000257> 
accessed 7th June 2015 
308 See Chapter 2, p36  
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concerns discussed in the various reports produced over the last decade, the overarching 
aim of the proposals was to ensure that tied tenants are no worse off than their free-of-tie 
counterparts, without it being suggested that the benefits of this be limited to tied tenants of 
the largest pubcos. While CAMRA consider that this threshold is appropriate as the leases 
of the larger pubcos present a greater risk to tenants,309 it is questionable whether or not 
this strikes the right balance between avoiding imposing a disproportionate burden on 
small brewers without undermining the intention of the reforms.310   
6.2.1.1.2 Danger of pub-owning companies evading the provisions 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the aftermath of the Beer Orders highlighted the 
skill with which the UK market has been able to remodel itself in order get around 
restrictions imposed on it by Parliament. Consequently, a further concern associated with 
the adoption of the threshold requirement in s.69(1) is the ability of pub owning businesses 
to restructure in order to exempt their pubs and so evade the application of the provisions. 
These concerns are accentuated by the fact that the threshold criteria specifically refers to 
500 tied pubs.311 Whilst the intention behind this was to remove small regional and family 
brewers from the scope of the provisions, during debate in the House of Lords it was 
correctly suggested that this threshold should cover all relationships between pubcos and 
their tenants, not just those based on the tied model.312 Limiting it in this way opens up the 
possibility of some pub-owning companies simply having to dispose of a single tied pub to 
fall below the threshold.313 Further, it was considered that within the leasehold model of 
ownership there is generally movement between tied and non-tied pubs creating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 HC Deb 16th October 2014, col 80-81, Q172 and col 87, Q188-189 concerning CAMRA’s 2013 survey of 
tenants’ views of larger pubcos and family brewers 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141014/pm/141014s01.htm> 
accessed 7th June 2015. The survey revealed that 71% of tenants of pubcos with 500 pubs compared to 49% 
of licensees tied to family brewers had a negative view of the beer tie agreement. While the proportion of 
those tied to family brewers with a negative outlook is significantly smaller than those tied to a large pubco, a 
significant proportion, almost half of them, have a negative view of tying arrangements as a result. This is so 
even although large pubcos tie a significantly higher number of pubs than family brewers causing doubt to be 
placed on the value of this finding 
310 Abuse of publicans by independent, small brewers was discussed in the House of Commons. HC Deb 14th 
October 2014, col 59 at Q129 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141014/pm/141014s01.htm> 
accessed 7th June 2015. ALMR also support regulation for all. See HC Deb16th October 2014, col 89-90, 
Q194  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141014/pm/141014s01.htm> 
accessed 7th June 2015. Concerns over the practices of family brewers was also highlighted. HC Deb 30th 
October 2014, col 372 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141030/am/141030s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015. It was also noted in the responses received to the Government’s consultation. 
Above, n.281 at p25 
311 Section 69(1) 2015 Act 
312 Above, n.293 at GC 116 
313 Ibid at GC 116 
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possibility for exploitation of market power.314 This highlights the importance of linking 
the two so that the 500 threshold would be applicable in such circumstances and not simply 
limited to tied pubs.315 Therefore although the concerns in the reports discussed above have 
primarily focused on tied pubs, the threshold for determining who Part 4 of the 2015 Act 
applies to should be based on the size of the company as a whole, thereby requiring that all 
types of tenancies be taken into consideration in determining this.316  The desire to do so is 
linked to the issue of market share and the possibility for anticompetitive behaviour arising 
out of the ownership of a substantial number of pubs.317 Implementing generally applicable 
provisions would therefore potentially have been simpler and would also have avoided the 
possible creation of a two-tier system of regulation that is open to manipulation.318 
6.2.1.1.3 Calculating the number of pubs owned 
However, notwithstanding the foregoing concerns over pub owning businesses attempting 
to evade the application of the Pubs Code, in calculating the number of tied pubs of which 
a person is the landlord, s.69(2) provides that any tied pub the landlord of which is a group 
undertaking in relation to that person is treated as a tied pub of which that person is a 
landlord.319 Considering the collective number of pubs within a group structure in this way 
should limit the possibility of companies restructuring in order to avoid the application of 
the Pubs Code.320  However whilst the intention is to avoid pubcos devising structures that 
allow them to evade the provisions, it is highly unlikely that the Act could cover all 
possibilities as it remains to be seen how pubcos will react to the 2015 Act and so whether 
there are unintended consequences of the legislation. Provision is therefore made in s.69(8) 
to increase its flexibility.321 The Secretary of State may by regulations specify the 
circumstances in which a person who is a group undertaking in relation to a pub owning 
business is to be treated as a pub owning business, as well as or instead of another person 
for the purposes of Part 4 of the 2015 Act. Whilst this undoubtedly increases the flexibility 
of the Act, there remains the possibility that such a power increases the uncertainty of the 
application of the provisions for pub owning businesses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Ibid at GC 119  
315 Ibid at GC 119  
316 Ibid at GC 116  
317 HC Deb 28th October 2014, col 352 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/pm/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
318 Concerns over this were expressed during the Government’s consultation. Above, n.281 at p24 
319 Section 69(2) 2015 Act  
320 See above, n.293 at GC 132 
321 Section 69(8) 2015 Act  
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Nevertheless, a person is also considered to be a ‘pub-owning business’ where they do not 
satisfy the requirements of s.69(1), and so the threshold of 500 tied pubs, but are the 
landlord of a tied pub occupied by a tied tenant who has ‘extended protection’ in relation to 
that tied pub.322 This covers those tenants who occupied a tied pub under a tenancy or 
licence at a time when the landlord came within the definition contained in s.69(1) and 
before the end of their tenancy or licence the landlord is no longer such a person due to a 
transfer of title or for some other reason.323 Consequently, the protections of the Pubs Code 
rightly continue for tenants when their Landlord no longer satisfies the 500 tied pub 
threshold. However, s.69(7) precludes the application of the MRO provisions324 and those 
relating to investigations by the adjudicator325 to pub-owning companies in these 
circumstances. 
6.2.1.1.4 Loopholes in the 2015 Act - managed pubs excluded  
Despite the foregoing measures to prevent pubcos restructuring and selling pubs to avoid 
being subject to the Code, loopholes are creates in the regulatory regime by limiting the 
application of Part 4 of the 2015 Act to tied pubs. One notable exception from the 
provisions of Part 4 of the 2015 Act is managed pubs.326 As a result, pub-owning 
businesses of a significant size that would be expected to come within the Pubs Code do 
not.327 This therefore opens up the possibility of other companies taking measures such as 
switching from tied to managed estates of pubs in order to exempt themselves from the 
provisions, thereby undermining the intention of the Act.328 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Section 69(3) 2015 Act. However the MRO provisions contained in sections 43-45 are inapplicable to 
such ‘pub-owning businesses’ (s.69(7) 2015 Act). 
323 Section 69(4) 2015 Act. This extended protection ends under the circumstances prescribed in s.69(5) 
namely on the earlier of the end of the tenancy or licence concerned and the conclusion of the first rent 
assessment of money payable in lieu of rent to be provided after the person is no longer a pub-owning 
business by virtue of s.69(1). 
324 Section 43-45 2015 Act. As will be discussed below, this was influenced by concerns that selling pubs 
subject to the MRO provisions could ultimately stifle the market for the sale of such pubs. 
325 Sections 53-59 2015 Act. This is due to the fact these are concerned with uncovering systemic breaches of 
the Code. HC Deb 24th March 2015, col 1341 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150324/debtext/150324-0002.htm - 
15032473000004> accessed 7th June 2015 
326 Arguments were made in Parliament that managed pubs should be excluded as they are run by employees 
of the company who are salaried and as such are effectively running a ‘branch office’ thereby distinguishing 
them from tied publicans who are essentially ‘self employed small business men’ (Above, n.293 at GC 98).  
327 Pubcos Mitchells & Butler and Wetherspoons are large, managed pub chains and as such do not have any 
tied pubs. Further, Spirit Pub Company, which at the time the 2014 Bill was passing through Parliament 
owned 1,200 pubs of which only 430 were on a leased model, are also precluded from its scope. See above 
n.317. 
328 Above, n.281 at p72. Interest groups consider that the likelihood of this occurring is overstated by pubcos. 
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6.2.1.2 ‘Tied pub’  
The 2015 Act however lays down a number of conditions to be met in order for premises 
to come within the definition of a ‘tied pub.’329 The conditions are contained in s.68 and 
include the requirement that the premises must be licensed for the retail sale of alcohol for 
consumption on the premises, with the sale of alcohol to the public for consumption on the 
premises being the, or one of the main activities carried on at the premises.330 The premises 
in question must also be occupied under a tenancy or license and be subject to a contractual 
obligation that some or all of the alcohol sold at the premises is supplied by the landlord, a 
person who is a group undertaking in relation to the landlord, or a nominee of either.331 
While these conditions will be satisfied by many pubs, the drafting of this provision is not 
sufficiently tight to exclude other on-trade establishments, such as restaurants, coming 
within the definition of a ‘tied pub’ and so being inappropriately covered by the Pubs 
Code.332 The difficulty of definition has however been increased due to the growing focus 
on the provision of food in many pubs with it being deemed necessary for the Secretary of 
State to have the authority to grant exemptions from the Pubs Code in order to ensure its 
proper application.333 However, whilst it important to ensure the proper application of the 
Pubs Code, the power to grant exemptions under s.71 also potentially opens up the 
possibility of pubcos abusing this provision by seeking to comply with its terms, for 
example through the adoption of the franchise model, in order to have their premises 
exempted from the Pubs Code.334 The s.71 power therefore has to be used with caution in 
order to prevent the Pubs Code being undermined through the creation of exceptions and 
so loopholes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Section 68 2015 Act  
330 Section 68 (2)-(3) 2015 Act  
331 Section 68 (4)-(5) 2015 Act 
332 The British Franchise Association raised concerns over this during the course of early debates. HC Deb 
30th October 2014, col 367 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141030/am/141030s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
333 HC Deb18th November 2014, col 147 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141118/debtext/141118-0001.htm - 
14111843000002> accessed 11th June 2015. This power is granted under s.71 2015 Act.  
334 This danger was also recognised in the House of Lords (see above, n. 293 at GC 152-153). The issue of 
whether or not franchises would be included in Part 4 was frequently raised during the course of the 2014 
Bill’s passage through Parliament. Pub franchise agreements based on a share of turnover rather than a tied 
tenant were considered to better align the interests of the parties. The decision was later taken to exempt 
‘genuine’ franchise agreements from the Pubs Code under the powers granted by s.71 2015 Act. The 
definition of a ‘genuine franchise’ is to be consulted on later.  This was despite the fact franchises share 
many of the characteristics of a traditional tied pub and so aspects of the relationship have the potential to 
lead to unfairness. This creates an additional loophole in the 2015 Act which could potentially be exploited 
by pubcos. Above, n.293 at GC 160 and HC Deb 24th March 2015, col 1344. 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150324/debtext/150324-0002.htm - 
15032473000004> accessed 7th June 2015  
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6.2.1.2.1 Exclusion of ‘stocking requirements’ from definition 
Section 68(5) of the 2015 Act also removes from the definition of ‘tied pub’, premises that 
are subject to a contractual obligation amounting to a ‘stocking requirement’.335 Section 
68(7) provides that a contractual obligation is a stocking requirement if, firstly, it concerns 
only beer and or cider produced by the landlord or by a person who is a group undertaking 
in relation to the landlord.336 Secondly, the tied pub tenant is not required to source the 
beer or cider from any particular supplier,337 and thirdly, the tied pub tenant is not 
precluded from selling on the premises beer or cider produced by another supplier.338 The 
intention of this provision is to exclude from Part 4 pubs owned by brewing pubcos.  
During parliamentary debates, it was deemed logical for such pubcos to be allowed to 
require their tenants stock their own brands of beer and cider with it being suggested that 
precluding this would cut off approximately 30% of their market.339 These provisions were 
therefore considered to be necessary to safeguard their existence. As s.68 does not require 
the tenant to source beer or cider from a particular supplier, on the face of it, it appears to 
strike a balance between the brewer having to compete for the tenant’s business and ensure 
they offer the best price for the product, whilst allowing the brewer to benefit from the 
protection of requiring their products are sold in their own pubs.340 CAMRA have declared 
their support for this exclusion of stocking requirements from the provisions of the Act as 
they are a means of ensuring that brewing pubcos are able to continue to distribute their 
brands.341 However, whilst it is undoubtedly important that steps are taken to protect 
smaller and regional brewers whose survival is dependent on selling their brands through 
their own pubs, it is suggested that brewers could also take steps to ensure that they are the 
only source from which their beers can be purchased, thereby circumventing the intention 
of these provisions and undermining the protection it affords to tenants. It will therefore 
remain to be seen whether or not such actions would be effectively addressed by the 
Adjudicator.342  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Section 68(6) 2015 Act  
336 Section 68(7)(a) 2015 Act 
337 Section 68(7)(b) 2015 Act 
338 Section 68(7)(c) 2015 Act 
339 Above, n.293 at GC 101-102  
340 Ibid at GC 102  
341 Ibid at GC 123 
342 HC Deb 24th March 2015, col 1343 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150324/debtext/150324-0002.htm - 
15032473000004> accessed 7th June 2015 
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6.2.1.3 ‘Tied pub tenant’ 
‘Tied pub tenant’ is defined in s.70(1)(a) as a person ‘who is the tenant or licensee of a tied 
pub’, or under s.70(1)(b) ‘who is a party to negotiations relating to a prospective tenancy 
of or licence to occupy premises which are, or on completion of the negotiations are 
expected to be, a tied pub.’  Concerns were expressed in Parliament that this provision was 
too widely drafted and so had the potential to extend the benefit of the Pubs Code to those 
who were in the very early stages of negotiations with pub owning companies.343 However, 
affording protection from an early stage and so before negotiations are concluded between 
the parties, was correctly deemed to be required in order to help redress the imbalance 
between the parties. This ensures that potential tenants have access to the necessary and 
correct information in order to make an informed decision and so reduces the possibility of 
them entering into a disadvantageous contract.344 
6.3 The MRO option  
Section 43 of the 2015 Act is intended to achieve the Government’s aim of ensuring that 
tied tenants are no worse off than those who are free of a product or service tie. It is an 
extensive provision and provides for the MRO option in the Pubs Code. Section 43(1) 
states that the ‘Pub Code must require pub-owning businesses to offer their tied pub 
tenants, falling within s.70(1)(a), namely existing tenants of the business, a MRO option in 
specified circumstances.’ Prospective tenants are therefore precluded from the MRO 
option. The intention of Parliament was that they could request a parallel rent assessment 
under the Pubs Code. This is so, despite the numerous concerns and criticisms levied at 
this discussed above, which cast doubt on its ability to afford a significant degree of 
transparency to prospective tenants prior to entering into a tenancy agreement.345 This 
subsequently reduces the scope for this provision to achieve the Government’s much 
discussed aims of ensuring fair and lawful dealing and ensuring that tied tenants are no 
worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 HC Deb 28th October 2014, col 358-359 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/pm/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
344 HC Deb 30th October 2014, col 378 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141030/am/141030s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
345 Above, n.293 at GC 134 and HC Deb 24th March 2015, col 1342 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150324/debtext/150324-0002.htm - 
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6.3.1 Definition of MRO option  
Section 43(2) defines ‘market rent only option’ to mean the option for the tied pub tenant 
to occupy the tied pub under a tenancy or licence which is MRO compliant and to pay in 
respect of that occupation ‘such rent as may be agreed between the pub-owning business 
and the tied pub tenant in accordance with the MRO procedure,346 or failing such 
agreement, the market rent’.347 Consequently, in the event the tenant opts to accept the 
MRO offer, their occupation of the premises must be on a basis which is MRO compliant. 
A tenancy or licence is MRO compliant if, ‘taken together with any other contractual 
agreement between the tied pub tenant and the pub owning business in respect of that 
tenancy or licence it contains the terms and conditions as may be required by virtue of 
s.43(5)(a) and so those specified by the Pubs Code as being required to be contained in a 
tenancy or licence for it to be MRO compliant,348 does not contain any product or service 
tie except in respect of insurance for the tied pub, does not contain any unreasonable terms 
or conditions, and is not a tenancy at will.’349 Consequently, s.43 frees the tenant or 
licensee of any ties to the pubco and obliges the tenant to pay to the landlord only the 
market rent. Section 43 therefore eradicates the obligation on the tied tenant to pay ‘wet 
rent’ as was customary under a traditional tied tenancy, discussed in Chapter 2. It ensures 
tied tenants are no worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts by offering them the option 
to accept being ‘market rent only’. However, the counter effect of this is that the tenant is 
no longer entitled to any of the SCORFA350 from which they should have benefitted under 
the terms of their tied agreement. The process to be followed by the pub owning company 
in calculating this however requires to be clarified under the Pubs Code in order to avoid 
its abuse.351  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 This will be discussed when considering s.44 of the 2015 Act  
347 Market rent is defined as ‘the estimated rent which it would be reasonable to pay in respect of that 
occupation on the assumption that the tenancy or licence is entered into on the date on which the 
determination of the estimated rent is made, in an arm’s length transaction, after proper marketing, and 
between parties who acted knowledgeably, prudently and willingly, and Condition B in s.68 continues to be 
met, and so the main, or one of the main activities carried on at the premises is the retail sale of alcohol to 
members of the public for consumption on the premises.’ (Section 43(10) 2015 Act)  
348 Section 43(5) 2015 Act  
349 Section 43(4)(a) and (b) 2015 Act. ‘Tenancy’ is widely defined in Part 4 of the 2015 Act. Section 70(2) 
defines this as ‘a tenancy created either immediately or derivatively out of the freehold, whether by lease or 
sublease, by an agreement for a lease of sublease, by a tenancy agreement or a tenancy sub-lease agreement 
or in pursuance of a provision of, or made under an Act, and includes a tenancy at will.’ Tenancies at will 
arise when there is a sudden requirement for a short-term tenancy, such as an emergency. Their inclusion in 
the 2015 Act was to avoid permitting rolling shorter-tenancies to undermine the Code and so create a 
loophole. HC Deb 30th October 2014, col 379 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141030/am/141030s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
350 See Chapter 3 
351 Above, n.293 at GC 128  
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6.3.2 Circumstances under which MRO option is to be offered  
As noted above, s.43(1) requires the offer of the MRO option in ‘certain circumstances’ 
which will be further specified in the Pubs Code, however s.43(6) requires the Pubs Code 
to include provision for this in connection with certain events. These are the renewal352 of 
any of the pub arrangements;353 or a rent assessment or assessment of money payable by 
the tenant in lieu of rent.354 They also include a significant increase in the price at which 
any product or service which is subject to a product or service tie is supplied to the pub 
tenant where the increase was not ‘reasonably foreseeable’ when the tenancy was granted 
or when a rent assessment or assessment of money payable in lieu of rent was last 
concluded,355 or after a ‘trigger event’.356  
S.43 therefore details numerous points at which the pub-owning company must offer to the 
tenant the MRO option.  However some of the terms relied on are subjective and so are 
lacking in certainty. This makes them potential sources of contention between the pubco 
and their tenants or lessees and may in turn prompt referrals to the Adjudicator, stalling the 
MRO option. ‘Significant increase’ for example is a very general term357 which is open to 
interpretation, and fails to provide the tenant with a clear basis on which they can expect 
their pubco to offer them the MRO option. Clarity is essential if the Pubs Code is to ensure 
fairness between the parties and so additional detail should be provided in the Code.358 
‘Reasonably foreseeable’ is a similarly subjective term that prompts the same concerns.359 
Further, as the offer of MRO is to be made at the aforementioned points, in addition to the 
tenant lacking certainty as to whether or not the conditions of s.43 are satisfied, by linking 
the MRO offer to renewal of the pub arrangements or rent assessments they may have to 
wait several years until this offer will be made. This therefore fails to provide an 
immediate solution for tied tenants.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Section 43(7) clarifies that the Pubs Code will specify what renewal means with regard to a tenancy or a 
licence.  
353 This is defined in s.43(8) as ‘the tenancy or licence under which the tied pub is occupied, and any other 
contractual agreement which contains an obligation by virtue of which Condition D of s.68 is met in relation 
to the premises, namely the tying obligation in respect of alcohol sold and the premises. 
354 Section 43(6)(a) 2015 Act. This is intended to cover the situation where the tenant’s payments are linked 
to the pub’s turnover as opposed to a fixed rent, in which case there may be an assessment of any money 
payable in lieu of rent, for example under some franchise agreements. See Explanatory Notes, Small 
Business, Employment and Enterprise Act 2015 at para 285, p47.  
355 Section 43(6)(c) 2015 Act  
356 Section 43(6)(d) 2015 Act  
357 Above, n.293 at GC 103  
358 Ibid at GC 131  
359 Ibid at GC 124  
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Section 43(6) also requires the Pubs Code make provision for the offer of the MRO option 
‘after a trigger event has occurred’. ‘Trigger events’ in relation to tied pub tenants is 
defined in s.43(9) of the 2015 Act as ‘an event which is beyond the control of the tied pub 
tenant, was not reasonably foreseeable,360 has a significant impact on the level of trade that 
could reasonably be expected to be achieved at the tied pub, or is of a description specified 
in the Pubs Code’. The intention is therefore to capture unfair price increases and so 
addresses the imbalance in the relationship between the parties. However the drafting of 
this provision is also subjective through the inclusion of general terms such as ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ and ‘significant’ and will require clarification in the Code.  It is also notable 
that the sale of the premises does not prompt the offer of the MRO option. This was the 
subject of Parliament debate.361 Whilst there was concern to afford continuing protection to 
the tenant in the event of the sale of the premises to a party who was not subject to the 
Code, it was considered that making the transfer of title a trigger point for the MRO option 
would stifle the pub sales market.362 Whilst this may be the case, its exclusion also presents 
the danger that the sale of the premises may be used as a means get around the 
legislation.363 
6.4 MRO option: Procedure 
 Section 44 of the 2015 Act outlines the procedure to be followed when the MRO option is 
exercised, and will be detailed in the Pubs Code which will also confer functions on the 
Adjudicator in this regard.364  This procedure essentially consists of two-stages. Firstly the 
tied pub tenant will give the pub owning business notice that they consider that they are 
required to offer the tenant a MRO option and that they wish to receive such an offer.365 
The Code will specify a reasonable period, ‘the negotiation period’, during which the pub 
owning business and the tied tenant will seek to agree the rent to be payable in respect of 
the tied pub tenant’s occupation of the premises.366 At the end of the negotiation period, 
should the parties not have reached agreement, provision may be made for the appointment 
of an ‘independent assessor’ to determine the market rent of the premises concerned.367 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 As mentioned under s.43(6)(c) above  
361 Above, n.293 at GC 128-129  
362 Ibid at GC 125  
363 Similar concerns were raised in connection with the administration of the pub-owning business. Above, 
n.293 at GC 119. Also HC Deb 24th March 2015, col 1350  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150324/debtext/150324-0002.htm - 
15032473000004> accessed 7th June 2015 
364 Section 44(1) 2015 Act  
365 Section 44(2)(a) 2015 Act  
366 Section 44(2)(b) 2015 Act  
367 Section 44(2)(c) 2015 Act  
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The Code may require the appointment of the independent assessor to be made by the 
parties acting jointly or should they fail to reach agreement, by the Adjudicator.368  
Whilst the procedure outlined appears to be reasonable, it will be essential to the success of 
the MRO option that the independent assessor is truly independent in order to ensure that 
fairness and balance between the parties is reflected in the outcome. The Pubs Code may 
set the criteria to be met by the person appointed as an independent assessor and require 
that they determine the market rent within a specified reasonable period and in accordance 
with the provision of documents specified in the Pubs Code.369 ‘Reasonable period’ will 
have to be elaborated on in the Pubs Code in order to avoid the process becoming 
unnecessarily protracted. The Code may however require that the tenancy, licence under 
which the tied pub is occupied, or any other arrangement in connection with the tenancy or 
licence, continue to have effect until the MRO procedure is completed,370 regardless of 
whether or not the agreement would or could cease to have effect before that time.371  
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the MRO option will be dependent on the procedure 
working efficiently and only time will tell if the one outlined in the 2015 Act will be 
sufficient to achieve this. 
6.5 MRO option: Disputes  
Section 45 of the 2015 Act enables the Secretary of State by Regulations to confer 
functions on the Adjudicator to resolve disputes relating to the offer of the MRO option.372 
It is submitted that these will need to be comprehensive and effective if the Code is not to 
be undermined by the actions of pubcos, given their past disdain for complying with the 
terms of such Codes of practice. Section 45(2) provides that the Regulation may make 
provision covering disputes regarding whether the circumstances are such that the pub-
owning business is required to offer a tied pub tenant a market rent only option; whether a 
proposed tenancy is MRO compliant; whether a determination of the market rent of a 
tenancy or licence made by an independent assessor has been made in accordance with the 
Pubs Code; or whether any other requirement of the MRO procedure has been complied 
with.373 A further safeguard is provided by s.47 which states that the terms of an agreement 
between a pub-owning business and a tied pub tenant are void to the extent that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Section 44(2)(d) 2015 Act  
369 Section 44(2)(e)-(h) 2015 Act 
370 Section 44(4) 2015 Act states that the Pubs Code may specify the circumstances under which the MRO 
procedure is treated as having come to an end.  
371 Section 44(3) 2015 Act 
372 Section 45(1) 2015 Act 
373 Section 45(2) 2015 Act  
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purport to prevent the tenant from referring a dispute to the Adjudicator for arbitration in 
accordance with s.45 or s.48 of the 2015 Act or penalises the tenant for making such a 
referral.374 This is so regardless of whether those agreements were entered into before the 
provisions of the 2015 Act came into effect.375 However, similarly to the MRO procedure 
discussed earlier, it will be essential for the Pubs Code to ensure that the dispute resolution 
procedure works efficiently and effectively in order to prevent the process being protracted 
and the intentions of the Act undermined. 
6.6 The UK beer market following the 2015 Act 
The foregoing reforms have been introduced after a decade of Business Select Committees 
and pressure groups investigating and reporting on the UK market, as well as the most 
recent Government consultation discussed above. Despite the fact there has not been a sea 
change in the market concerns addressed by this reporting, substantive reform of the 
regulation of the UK market is only now being implemented. This suggests that reform 
should have occurred sooner and also should not have been left to rebel MPs to bring about 
in a hurried fashion.  
While the reforms contained in the 2015 Act again place a significant amount of reliance 
on a Pubs Code, despite the industry’s past failings in complying with such codes, these 
reforms are the most radical since the Beer Orders due to the inclusion of the MRO option. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the beer tie is interwoven into the structure of the UK beer 
market and has played an integral role in shaping it. The MRO option however attempts to 
significantly weaken its operation in the UK although it falls short of severing the tie in all 
circumstances. The MRO offer is limited to those tied tenants of pub owning companies 
meeting the threshold requirements of the Act, leaving the rest of the market free to rely on 
the tie.  
While the 2015 Act is assumed to affect only six companies, two of which are brewing 
pubcos, it cannot be predicted with absolute accuracy how the market will react to the 
MRO option.376 Although it is clearly more effective than the parallel rent assessment 
option in achieving the Government’s fundamental principle that a tied tenant should be no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Section 47(4) 2015 Act. Section 48 is concerned with the referral for arbitration by tied pub tenants. While 
the arbitration provisions of the 2015 Act are of importance they will not be considered further here. 
375 Section 47(6) 2015 Act 
376 Above, n.293 at GC 97-98  
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worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts377 as it is open to the market to determine what 
option is best, past interventions have proven that their potential implications may serve to 
worsen the problems they seek to address.378 Similarly to the Beer Orders, the MRO 
provisions of Part 4 of the 2015 Act are a significant intervention in the market and as they 
are only available to tied tenants of pub owning businesses satisfying the threshold 
requirements of the 2015 Act are likely to produce a two-tier system of regulation of the 
UK market. Further, many of the provisions of the 2015 Act are potentially open to 
manipulation by pubcos and create loopholes in the regulatory regime thereby increasing 
the likelihood of unintended consequences.   
During Parliamentary debates on the 2015 Act some of the concerns raised by the 
Government over the potential consequences of offering a MRO option during its 
consultation discussed above were justifiably reiterated. These included concerns that 
pubcos are motivated to increase beer volumes sold through their pubs and invest capital to 
support this. In the event the tie is prohibited, pubcos will likely focus almost entirely on 
the property aspect of their businesses and so remove any support provided to tenants 
whilst increasing property rents, thereby prompting the closure and sale of many pubs.379 It 
was also acknowledged that the MRO option could have knock-on effects for others in the 
market,380 including potential implications for family brewers who supply their products 
through the pubcos’ retail chains and distribution networks.  
However, the reporting on the market over the last decade has shown that the beer tie as 
currently operated in the UK requires to be restricted in order to address the many on-
going anticompetitive issues surrounding its operation. Whilst subject to criticism and 
concerns, it was stated in Parliament that the introduction of the MRO option is intended to 
promote ‘free and fair’ competition in the market.381 By loosening the pubco’s grip on the 
UK market it has the potential to increase competition by permitting certain tied publicans 
to source supplies on the open market and to be placed on a more level playing field with 
their free-of-tie counterparts. It also increases the likelihood of certain tied publicans being 
able to respond to consumer demand for greater choice, by not being restricted to the sale 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Essentially this means that the tenant should not be worse off as a result of being in the tied agreement and 
so their projected profit should be equal to or greater than that projected under a free-of-tie scenario. HC Deb 
28th October 2014, col 338 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/smallbusiness/141028/pm/141028s01.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015   
378 Above, n.293 at GC 91  
379 Above, n.293 at GC 101  
380 HC Deb 18th November 2014, col 184 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141118/debtext/141118-0002.htm> 
accessed 11th June 2015 
381 Above, n.293 at GC 118  
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of pubco approved brands in their pubs, whilst also potentially improving smaller brewers’ 
access to tied local pubs, thereby reducing barriers to entry and market foreclosure.382  
Whilst the foregoing are undoubtedly positive developments for the industry, they are 
limited only to qualifying tied pubs, and as discussed above, there are many concerns over 
the provisions of Part 4 of the 2015 Act. Furthermore, the UK market has proven itself to 
be particularly difficult to regulate given the powerful and resourceful players involved as 
well as the complexity of the relationships between them, which have their roots in the 
historical tied house system. The Beer Orders and failed self-regulatory attempts are 
testament to this. Consequently reform of the regulation of the UK beer market is not an 
entirely straightforward matter. It therefore remains to be seen whether Part 4 of the 2015 
Act will increase market forces and the level of competition in the UK market, or whether 
it is effectively a backward step in its regulation given the significant potential for it to be 
overshadowed by unforeseen developments as have come to be synonymous with the Beer 
Orders of the late 1980s.  
7. Conclusion  
When the UK acceded to the EU in 1972, the benefits of exclusive purchasing agreements 
such as beer tying agreements were recognised through the offer of block exemption to 
these. The EU was keen to promote measures that enhanced distribution, and subsequently 
integration within the single market, while market integration was not of concern to the 
UK Government. The beer tie has therefore long been accepted as a legitimate business 
model in the EU, with this acceptance coming to influence the approach of the UK 
Government.  The UK courts however initially struggled with the enforcement of the EU 
competition law provisions although latterly the relationship between EU and national law 
has developed, including the harmonisation of the two legal regimes and so the provisions 
applicable to beer tying agreements.  
Notwithstanding the EU’s acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model and the 
Europeanisation of national law as well as the OFT’s decision in 2000 that the UK market 
was sufficiently competitive for the Beer Orders to be revoked, concerns over the level and 
impact of the concentration of public house ownership in the UK, and the extensive use of 
beer tying agreements persisted. These concerns resulted in a decade of on-going 
investigation and reporting on the UK market however no substantive reform of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 HC Deb 18th November 2014 col 191 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141118/debtext/141118-0002.htm> 
accessed 17th July 2015 
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regulation of the market was implemented during this time. The unforeseen consequences 
of the Beer Orders, discussed in Chapter 2, appeared to have had a chilling effect on 
further intervention in the market, with many of the reports produced shying away from 
suggesting similar market interventions in light of their potentially unforeseen 
consequences.  Over this period, the OFT frequently deferred to the EU’s on-going 
acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model in order to avoid intervening in 
the market and so resisted strong pressure from the BISC and CAMRA, amongst others, to 
further investigate the operation of the beer tie in the UK. This ultimately impacted on the 
Government’s position on the on-going concerns being raised, with it tending to follow the 
OFT’s lead with regard to proposed interventions. As a result in 2011 the Government 
mistakenly opted to perpetuate self-regulation as opposed to statutory regulation of the 
market even although it had clearly failed on prior attempts. 
Consequently the 2015 Act and the inclusion of the MRO option is the first attempt at 
substantive reform of regulation of the UK market since the Beer Orders. While the offer 
of the MRO option was contrary to the Government’s clear preference to preclude this 
from any regulatory reform and was brought about by unexpected amendments to the 
Government’s 2014 Bill, it is suggested that reform of some form should have occurred 
sooner. The terms of the reporting in relation to the UK market has not altered significantly 
in the last few years suggesting that the delay in doing so was unnecessary. There are 
however numerous issues regarding the provisions of 2015 Act and the implementation of 
the MRO option, which whilst stopping short of severing the beer tie entirely, significantly 
weakens its operation in the UK beer market.  The lessons learned from the Beer Orders is 
that such market interventions may worsen the problems they seek to address. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the beer tie is deeply integrated in the structure of the UK beer market and is 
a tradition that can be traced back almost to its inception. The Beer Orders and failed 
attempts at self-regulation have shown that the UK beer market is a difficult market to 
regulate given the powerful and resourceful players involved and the complexity of the 
relationships between them which have their roots in the archaic tied house system. 
Consequently whilst reporting on the market over the past decade has shown that the beer 
tie as currently operated in the UK requires to be restricted in order to address many of the 
anticompetitive issues surrounding its operation, this is not entirely straightforward. It 
remains to be seen whether or not the 2015 Act delivers any potential benefits or if it will 
be overshadowed by potentially unforeseen consequences as predicted. It is therefore not 
definitive whether the MRO option is the best option for reform.  
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In order to determine whether there is a more appropriate way to reform the regulation of 
the distribution of beer in the UK than that offered by the 2015 Act, consideration will now 
be had to the approach adopted towards the beer tie in other selected geographical markets. 
This will make it possible to ascertain whether any guidance can be gleaned on how best to 
reform the UK beer tie and in doing so, determine whether it is a legitimate business model 
in these jurisdictions, in the absence of the overriding goals and objectives that have 
informed the EU’s position, and subsequently impacted on the UK’s acceptance of the tie. 
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Chapter 5 - A Selective Comparison of Non-UK 
Brewing Markets 
The preceding chapter analysed how the UK Government has regulated the beer tie noting 
the influence exerted by the EU since the UK’s accession in 1973. In doing so the concerns 
expressed over the use of the beer tie following the OFT’s decision in 2000 to revoke the 
Beer Orders, up to the present day have been considered along with the Government’s 
response. This included the provisions of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015 (2015 Act) which introduces a Market Rent Only (MRO) option for tied tenants 
of pub owning businesses, which will potentially significantly weaken the operation of 
beer tying agreements in the UK. This chapter now considers by way of comparison with 
the US, Australian and Belgian beer markets whether any lessons may be learnt from the 
selected non-UK markets when making recommendations for the future reform of beer 
distribution in the UK. 
The chapter first notes the potential limitations of international comparisons. It emphasises 
that the intention of the chapter is not a simple exportation of another legal regime into the 
UK. Rather it is the consideration on a case study basis of the impact of the approach 
towards vertical integration within selected non-UK markets (Subsection 1). It then focuses 
on the Unites States’ (US) approach to the distribution of beer highlighting the impact on 
the market of outlawing vertical integration (Subsection 2). The chapter then considers the 
effect of the Australian approach to beer distribution noting that exclusive dealing is 
generally prohibited under the Australian antitrust provisions (Subsection 3). Finally the 
approach to the distribution of beer in Belgium, which is considered to have one of the 
most diversified beer markets in the world, will be considered (Subsection 4). 
1. Potential limitations on International Comparisons 
Before considering how the US, Australia and Belgium have dealt with the distribution of 
beer it is necessary to consider the limitations of such comparison. As Gourvish notes there 
are three limiting factors to the simple ‘theoretical exposition of the development of 
brewing production and retailing’.1 These are the impact of government regulations, 
especially the approach towards vertical integration, mergers and taxation; the behaviour of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 T.R. Gourvish, ‘Economics of brewing, theory and practice: concentration and technological change in the 
USA, UK and West Germany’ (1994) 32(1) Bus Econ Hist 253 at 253 
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firms themselves; and differing consumer preferences.2 These factors all influence the 
achievement of scale economies and high concentration.3 However, as already stated 
above, the intention of the chapter is not a simple exportation of another legal regime into 
the UK. Rather, it seeks to consider the impact of the approach towards vertical integration 
within other jurisdictions to reveal the effect of their policies in shaping the market 
structure and any resulting implications. For these reasons, the selected geographical 
markets will be used as case studies of the different approaches that can be adopted in 
dealing with the distribution of beer. Focus will be placed on the US as one of the largest 
and most established brewing industries to examine the impact of a long-term prohibition 
on the beer tie. Australia will also be considered as it is a Commonwealth country and a 
major beer producer that has more recently taken steps to outlaw the tie in order to address 
the networks of tied houses owned by some of the country’s most powerful brewers. 
Finally the Belgian beer market will be reviewed. By virtue of also being a Member State 
of the European Union (EU) it is subject to a very similar competition law regime to the 
UK, although it is considered to be the most diversified beer market in Europe.  
2. The US beer market  
The US beer market is one of the largest and most established in the world. The history of 
brewing in the US dates back to the early communities established by English and Dutch 
settlers in the 17th Century.4 Brewing was a local industry with local products being sold in 
local taverns, or brewed at home.5 By the 20th Century it was one of the leading 
manufacturing industries in America with the US coming to be one of the world’s largest 
beer markets in modern times.6 
2.1  A brief overview of the historical development of the US beer market 
and how the beer tie became an illegitimate business model  
The future form of the US industry was largely shaped by Prohibition in the 20th Century. 
This resulted in the introduction of the ‘3-tier system’ of producing, distributing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid at p253-254 
3 Ibid at p254 
4 M.H. Stack, ‘Concise History of America’s brewing Industry’ (The Economic History Association, 4th July 
2003) <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/a-concise-history-of-americas-brewing-industry/> accessed 3rd July 2015 
5 B Asher ‘Global beer: the road to monopoly’ at p4 (The American Antitrust Institute, September 2012) 
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Global Beer Road to Monopoly_0.pdf> accessed 2nd 
March 2015) 
6 Above, n.4. The US was only eclipsed by China as the world’s largest beer producer in 2003. See Deloitte, 
‘Profitable growth and value in the beer industry A view from Deloitte and SAP’ at p1 (Deloitte) 
<https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Venezuela/Local Assets/Documents/White 
Paper_Beer%281%29%282%29.pdf> accessed 2nd March 
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retailing alcohol. Following the repeal of Prohibition, brewery ownership of retail outlets 
was prohibited in the US.7 
2.1.1 Prohibition and the ‘3-tier’ system 
Prohibition was largely encouraged by the increasingly powerful temperance movement. In 
1919 this prompted the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution, which in conjunction with 
the National Prohibition Act of 1919, commonly known as the Volstead Act, outlawed the 
production and distribution of any beverages with more than half of one percent alcohol.8 
These measures naturally impacted on the brewing industry, and saw brewers divest 
themselves of the saloons they owned or controlled. These were the primary retail outlets 
for alcohol, with draft beer accounting for most beer sold at that time.9  
As Tamayo notes, in the early 20th Century beer had increased in popularity amongst 
Americans, prompting a corresponding increase in the number of breweries in operation 
with fierce competition prevailing in the beer market.10 Brewers were eager to secure 
guaranteed outlets for their products with this being offered by saloons, the precursor to 
modern day bars.11 American brewers, in-keeping with their UK counterparts had, amongst 
others, provided furnishings, paid licence fees or provided loans on the condition that 
saloons carry only their brands.12 However there were concerns that these tied house 
arrangements also encouraged increased alcohol consumption, as retailers were required to 
meet quotas causing them to encourage increased consumption by customers.13 The tied 
house system therefore soon came to be one of the principal drivers behind Prohibition 
with the 3-tier system being imposed to prevent this pre-Prohibition practice.14 As Tamayo 
notes the primary impetus for temperance was “a societal perception of rampant public 
drunkenness and its attendant ills...”15 Focus was placed squarely on saloons. In the 
absence of wholesalers, these were subject to significant influence from brewers.16  
Tamayo also highlights that brewers’ ignorance of saloonkeepers’ involvement in illicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Beer A Report on the supply of beer for retail sale in 
the United Kingdom (Cm651, 1989) at para 8, p312 
8 Above, n.4 at p2  
9 The remaining beer supplies were distributed directly to homes in returnable bottles. See above, n.7 at para 
15, p314 
10 A Tamayo, ‘What’s brewing in the old north state: an analysis of the beer distribution laws regulating 
North Carolina’s craft breweries’ (2010) 88 N.C.L. Rev. 2198 at 2207 
11 Ibid at p2207 
12 S.L. Martin, ‘Wine wars – consumers and mom-and-pop wineries v. big business wholesalers: A citizen 
United Example’ (2011) (21) Kan. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 1 at p4 
13 Ibid at p4 
14 Above, n.10 at p2207 
15 Ibid at p2207-2208 
16 Ibid at p2008 
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lines of business to boost their own profits resulted in the Prohibition movement gaining 
public support.17 Fourteen years of Prohibition resulted in some breweries surviving by 
producing low alcohol beer and soft drinks.18 The Prohibition regime however eventually 
ended in failure in 1933 following an increase in organised crime and general disregard for 
the law.19 
The 21st Amendment to the US Constitution repealed the Prohibition amendment and was 
only passed as it afforded each State considerable autonomy in the regulation of alcohol.20 
Section 2 of the Amendment provides that “[t]he transportation  or importation into any 
State, Territory or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited”.21  The Supreme 
Court has held that this provides individual States with a virtual monopoly in structuring 
the alcohol distribution system within their jurisdiction.22 As a result, numerous provisions 
have been introduced at the Federal and State level to control the production, distribution 
and sale of alcohol, including beer, with the intention being to avoid a repeat of the pre-
Prohibition problems discussed above.23 The National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) 
Brewers Code was adopted and in 1935 the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) 
came into effect.24 This includes amongst its aims, checking individuals entering the 
industry to ‘keep out undesirable elements,’ and the prevention of anticompetitive 
practices.25 Federal law did not demand that individual States had to implement the 3-tier 
system. However, Tamayo notes that the FAAA prompted this by prohibiting retailers 
from entering into tied house agreements with suppliers and wholesalers; by outlawing the 
practice of retailers acquiring supplies of alcohol exclusively from one source; and by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid at p2208 
18 Above, n.5 at p5  
19 Above, n.10 at p2209 
20 Above, n.7 at para 15, p315 
21 Amendment XXI ‘Repeal of Prohibition’ passed by Congress February 20th 1933 (National Constitution 
Center) < http://constitutioncenter.org/constitution/the-amendments/amendment-21-amendment-18-
repealed> accessed 2nd March 2015. See also above, n.10 at p2206 
22 Above, n.10 at p2206 
23 J.C. Cooper and J.D. Wright, ‘Alcohol, antitrust, and the 21st Amendment: An Empirical Examination of 
Post and Hold Laws’ (2012) 32 Int’l Rev.L & Econ. 379 at p379. Also above, n.7 at para 15, p315. 
24 The NIRA was passed in 1933 to permit the President to regulate industry to increase prices and stimulate 
economic recovery following deflation. To deal with issues of competition, monopoly and under 
employment, the National Recovery Agency (NRA) established by the NIRA increased the role of trade 
associations in the economy. (See A Mittelman, Brewing Battles a History of American Beer (United States, 
Algora Publishing, 2008) at p100.) The NRA made each industry write a code with their ultimate adoption 
being decided by the Federal Government (ibid at p102). Brewers had a pre-existing trade association which 
drafted their code (ibid at p103). The FAAA remains in force in part including Title 27, Chapter 8, 
Subchapter I s.205 on unfair competition and unlawful practices (‘United States Code’ (Office of the Law 
Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015) 
25 Above, n.7 at para 19, p316-317 
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prohibiting bribery and consignment sales.26 The FAAA prohibits a brewer or a wholesaler 
from requiring a retailer, by way of agreement or otherwise, to purchase those products to 
the exclusion, in whole or in part, of similar products sold by others.27 The Act also 
prohibits retailers from entering tied house agreements with suppliers or wholesalers.28 
This is achieved by provisions that prevent the brewer29 or wholesaler from inducing a 
retailer to purchase from him on a basis that would result in the exclusion in whole or in 
part of similar products.30 The unlawful inducements include ‘acquiring an interest in 
property used by the retailer in his business; guaranteeing a loan of the retailer; providing 
excess credit; or requiring quota sales.31 Consequently, Federal law does not specifically 
require a mandatory wholesaler tier in the distribution of alcohol as it only outlaws certain 
practices between brewers and retailers.32 Ronnenberg highlights that the intention was to 
prevent measures that had been labeled in various studies as pre-prohibition abuses.33 
Cooper and Wright subsequently note the existence of a “complex web of regulations” 
controlling the distribution and sale of alcohol in different States.34 However, almost every 
State instituted a form of the 3-tier system under which the beer tie was effectively 
outlawed as an illegitimate business model and the use of wholesalers became obligatory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Above, n.10 at p2206. See also The FAAA Title 27, Chapter 8, Subchapter I s.205 on unfair competition 
and unlawful practices. (‘United States Code’ (Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015) 
27 FAAA Title 27, Chapter 8, Subchapter I s.205 on unfair competition and unlawful practices. (‘United 
States Code’ (Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015). See also above, n.7 at para 20, p317. 
28 FAAA Title 27, Chapter 8, Subchapter I s.205(b) on unfair competition and unlawful practices. (‘United 
States Code’ (Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015) 
29 The FAAA applies to all producers of alcoholic beverages 
30 FAAA Title 27, Chapter 8, subchapter I s.205 on unfair competition and unlawful practices. (‘United 
States Code’ (Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015) See also H.W. Ronnenberg, ‘The American brewing industry since 1920’ in R.G. Wilson and  T.R. 
Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 
1998) at p199 
31 FAAA Title 27, Chapter 8, Subchapter I s.205 on unfair competition and unlawful practices. (‘United 
States Code’ (Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:27%20section:205%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid
:USC-prelim-title27-section205)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true> accessed 4th July 
2015) Section 205(b) lists 7 unlawful inducements  
32 Above, n.10 at p2206 
33 H.W. Ronnenberg, ‘The American brewing industry since 1920’ in R.G. Wilson and T.R. Gourvish, eds, 
The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 1998) at p199 
34 J.C. Cooper and J.D.Wright, ‘Alcohol, antitrust, and the 21st Amendment: An Empirical Examination of 
Post and Hold Laws’, (2012) 32 Int’l Rev.L & Econ. 379 at 379 
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By prohibiting economic relationships between producers, wholesalers and retailers, the 
system essentially requires brewers to sell to wholesalers who can only sell on to retailers 
or other wholesalers.35 Brewers in most States therefore can no longer wholesale their own 
beer and are precluded from owning or having an interest in businesses that retail beer 
although some States permit brewers to own distribution facilities.36 Some States require 
that beer be sold at the same price to all wholesalers, whilst others permit a degree of price 
competition.37 The manufacturers, distributors and retailers all require a separate licence 
from the State, and licensees in one tier cannot be licensed to operate in another tier.38 
Consequently the overriding effect has been that beer producers can no longer directly 
supply any retail outlets, placing distributors at the centre of the US system of distribution 
and preventing the re-emergence of the much-feared tied houses.39 Therefore, whilst 
burdensome, Robertson highlights that the scheme is justified on the basis that it avoids the 
“perceived social ill of brewers operating their own bars or saloons”, which was one of 
the main drivers behind Prohibition.40 However, under this structure where beer sales pass 
through distributors as ‘middle men’, Reeves makes it clear that “efficiency is not, to put it 
mildly, an achievable goal under such a regime.”41 
2.1.2 The shaping of the modern US market 
The US market changed dramatically following Prohibition and the introduction of the 3-
tier system. Today, following decades of consolidation it is no longer a fragmented and 
locally orientated business but is a classic duopoly.42 This process of consolidation began 
after Prohibition. Having been largely redundant for fourteen years, brewers faced new 
challenges beyond the 3-tier system. These included the soft drinks industry, which as 
noted by Mittelman, had grown during Prohibition and subsequently became a post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Above, n.10 at p2201 
36 Above, n.7 at para 23, p318.  
37 Ibid at para 31, p319.  Cooper and Wright note that some states have implemented ‘post and hold’ laws. 
These require alcohol distributors to share their future prices by ‘posting’ them in advance and ‘holding’ 
them, allowing rivals to reduce their prices in line with those disclosed. These have, however, been subject to 
numerous challenges on the basis of facilitating wholesaler collusion. See above, n.34 at 379. 
38 A.M. Reeves, ‘Protecting our barefoots: Policy problems in the international wine market’ (2010) 27 Ariz. 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 835 at 866-867. Some states created monopolies to handle alcohol sales, with wholesalers 
and distribution facilities being state owned; whilst others created agencies to issue licences to private 
companies to deal in the production, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages. See also C Robertson, The 
Little Book of Wine Law (Chicago, American Bar Association, 2008) at p116-117 
39 Under this system, distributors in the US depend on the brewers pricing their products so as to enable the 
distributor to earn a profitable margin. Above, n.5 at p45  
40 C Robertson, The Little Book of Wine Law (Chicago, American Bar Association, 2008) at p117. See also 
A.M. Reeves, ‘Protecting our barefoots: Policy problems in the international wine market’ (2010) 27 Ariz. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 835 at 867 
41 A.M. Reeves, ‘Protecting our barefoots: Policy problems in the international wine market’, (2010) 27 Ariz. 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 835 at 867 
42 Above, n.1 at p254. See also n.5, at p3 
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Prohibition source of competition for brewers. 43  Their use of modern bottling equipment 
encouraged brewers to develop new packaging options, with brewers beginning to produce 
canned beer by 1935.44 Old problems of wide scale advertising and marketing also 
persisted and posed problems for brewers used to doing business on a local basis, selling at 
the point of consumption.45 Mittelman notes that with repeal of Prohibition, familiar issues 
of competition between local, regional and national brewers resurrected themselves and the 
trend towards consolidation intensified.46 This was further encouraged by the fact that, in 
contrast to the UK’s preference for draft beer consumed in public houses, the US was 
witnessing a noticeable move away from draught to canned beer.47 Subsequently there was 
also a move away from on-licensed to home consumption of beer, with the economies of 
scale in canning being such that only the largest brewers could take advantage of these 
economies. As a result, national mass marketed brands became noticeable in the 1950-
1960s.48  
This consolidation continued during the 1970s and 1980s as small companies continued to 
close or were acquired by larger firms.49 These larger producers were also able to make use 
of TV and national advertising to appeal to the take home market. This assisted in 
increasing their market share.50 As Gourvish notes, the significant investment required to 
exploit economies of scale not only demanded this ‘effective marketing of brands sold in 
large volumes’ but naturally fueled the desire for horizontal and vertical integration.51 
However, the 3-tier system curtailed the latter, and so, further encouraged concentration 
amongst brewers with the continued exit of smaller and medium sized producers as the 
search for scale economies continued.52 This contrasted with the UK beer market. There 
the acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model appeared to permit the largest 
brewers to push their national brands whilst also protecting the smaller brewers by assuring 
them a limited but protected market for their products.53 Gourvish also notes that by 
comparison to the UK market, the US market was more receptive to strong brand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 A Mittelman, Brewing Battles a History of American Beer (United States, Algora Publishing, 2008) at 
p106  
44 Ibid at p106 
45 Ibid at p105-106 
46 Ibid at p107 
47 Ibid at p107 
48 Above, n.5 at p3  
49 Ibid at p3  
50 Ibid at p3 
51 Above, n.1 at p253 
52 Ibid at p254   
53 Ibid at p259-260. See also Chapter 2. 
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advertising and canned products.54 This further aided the growth of a small number of 
leading brands, with this concentration continuing for several years. 55  
2.2  The US beer market today  
Two of the most significant changes in the US beer market occurred in 2008 and 
concluded many years of consolidation. This also caused the US market to be transformed 
into a duopoly.56 First, London based SABMiller entered into a joint venture with Molson 
Coors to form MillerCoors. Secondly, in November of that year Anheuser Busch (AB), the 
largest brewer in America was acquired by Belgian based InBev to form AB InBev thereby 
creating the US beer market’s duopolistic market structure.57 In 2013 AB InBev accounted 
for 50.4% of the US beer market share by volume followed by MillerCoors with a 29.2% 
market share. The market is therefore highly concentrated with the dupolists enjoying a 
combined market share of 79.6% whilst the top four market participants jointly hold a 
90.2% market share.58 By contrast, in the UK beer market, the top two brewers enjoyed a 
combined market share of 51% of the UK beer market by volume.59 In-keeping with the 
globalisation of the brewing industry,60 these four major brewers are owned by foreign 
multinational corporations.61 Further, given the US’s longstanding outlawing of the beer 
tie, today the vast majority of beer sales are through the off-trade with on-trade sales only 
accounting for an 18.9% of the US beer market distribution by value in 2013.62 By 
contrast, supermarkets were the leading distribution channel accounting for 61.1% of the 
market’s total value. 63 Whilst there has been a shift in favour of off-trade sales in the UK 
in recent years, in the UK beer market in 2013 supermarkets accounted for 35.3% of the 
market’s value while the on-trade accounted for 42.8%.64 
2.2.1 Craft beer boom – relaxation in 3-tier distribution system 
Over a relatively short history, and aided by the 3-tier system, the American industry has 
therefore been transformed from a fragmented and locally orientated business pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Above, n.1 at p260 
55 Above, n.7 at para 28, p318-319  
56 Above, n.5 at p v  
57 Ibid at p3  
58 Heineken held a 6% share of the US beer market by volume in 2013 followed by Groupo Modelo S.A.B. 
de C.V. with 4.6%. Others accounted for 9.8%. See MarketLine, ‘MarketLine Industry Profile Beer in the 
United States’ (August 2014) at p12 
59 MarketLine, ‘MarketLine Industry Profile Beer in the United Kingdom’ (August 2014) at p12 
60 The increasing participation of international brewers in the UK market was also discussed in Chapter 2. 
61 These are AB Inbev, based in Belgium; British based SABMillerCoors; Modela, which is now Belgian 
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62 Above, n.58 at p13 
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Prohibition into one that is concentrated and national in character and more recently a 
duopoly.65 Now the US market is largely stagnant and mature overall and is essentially 
made up of three segments. These are craft beer, non-craft ‘traditional’ beer and import 
beer.66 One consequence of the 3-tier system and a duopolistic market structure has been a 
restriction on consumer choice with the duopolists’ products dominating the market. 
Recently however there have been positive movements towards greater diversity. This has 
been the result of the recent boom in the craft beer sector. Adams notes that in this sector 
products are sold locally or regionally and are differentiated by the raw materials used; not 
TV advertising as favoured by the largest brewers.67 The growth in this sector however has 
been facilitated by a relaxation in the long established prohibition of the beer tie. This has 
followed significant demand amongst American consumers for greater localism and choice 
in brewing products.68 Welch suggests that over the past twenty years the American palate 
has bored of the products produced by the largest brewers, such as Budweiser and Miller.69 
As a result, in 1993 ‘brewpubs’ became legal in virtually all States through amendments to 
state laws prompted by these changes in consumer preferences.70 By 2011 only a few 
States continued to outlaw them.71 
Welch highlights that ‘brewpubs’ differ from all other brewery categories as they produce 
their own product and also serve it on their own premises.72 This clearly contravenes the 3-
tier system under which they have generally been prohibited by State laws known as ‘tied 
house statutes’. As mentioned above these prohibit ownership of licenses in more than one 
tier of manufacturing, retailing or distributing alcohol73 and have their roots in the general 
‘distrust of domination of the industry by a few companies’.74 Brewpubs have been 
legalised not through the abolition of these statutes but by creating a narrow exception to 
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66 Ibid at p6  
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69 J.M. Welch, ‘The Inevitability of the brewpub: legal avenues for expanding distribution capabilities’ 
(1997) 16 Rev. Litig. 173 at 174 
70 Prior to 1984 brewpubs were illegal in virtually all states but by 1993 they were legal in all but eight states. 
(Stanford University Graduate School of Business ‘Note on the US Craft Brewing Industry’ (Stanford 
University Graduate School of Business, September 1994) <http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-
research/case-studies/note-us-craft-brewing-industry> accessed 3rd March 2015) 
71 By 2000 there were 1,400 small scale beer producers in operation in the US. See D Persyn, J.F.M. Swinnen 
and S Vanormelingen, ‘Belgian beers: where history meets globalization’ in J.F.M. Swinnen ed, The 
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72 Above, n.69 at p175 
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these rules.75 Strict requirements are imposed on ‘brewpubs’, including production limits 
and restrictions on where and to whom their products can be sold.76 Welch notes that 
owners of ‘brewpubs’ can be prohibited from having interests in other ‘brewpubs’.77 They 
are also often precluded from selling to grocery stores, bars and restaurants and even 
distributors, thereby preventing any off sales, much to the frustration of these smaller 
brewers. 78 
In 2011 craft beer only accounted for 5.7% of the total US beer market by volume and in 
April 2012 there were 2000 craft brewers in operation in the US.79 However, such is the 
popularity of craft beer that many of the traditional national brewers, who for so long have 
been shielded from competition from such craft brewers by virtue of the tied house 
statutes, have been forced to acquire some of this market via internal growth and 
acquisitions.80 This suggests that US consumers are no longer satisfied with the offer of 
only generic mass-produced beers of the largest brewers which since the introduction of 
the 3-tier system have come to dominate the market. Limited acceptance of the beer tie 
through strict exceptions to the tied house statutes, which for decades have deemed the 
beer tie an illegitimate business model in the US, has been central in increasing diversity. 
Such diversity has long been a feature of the UK beer market due to, amongst others, 
toleration of the beer tie. This is so even although this diversity is not necessarily reflected 
in the pubco dominated on-trade sector as discussed in Chapter 4. Acceptance of the beer 
tie as a legitimate business model has ultimately helped smaller brewers in the UK to 
survive by retaining their small but protected market shares in the face of challenge from 
the UK’s largest brewers. Whilst as discussed in Chapter 2 concerns have long been 
expressed over the national, and now international, brewers’ domination of the UK beer 
market, Welch correctly highlights that the concerns in the US over monopolisation within 
the brewing industry which prompted a very strict approach to tied houses, and is the 
antithesis of the UK market, have done little to prevent a similar domination of the US beer 
industry by the largest brewers.81 
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2.2.2 Brewer control of US wholesalers 
In contrast to the UK beer market however under the 3-tier system wholesalers have a 
central role in the US market. This differs from the UK where, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
an independent wholesale and distribution sector has failed to materialise with this being a 
source of concern in successive UK competition law investigations. As noted above, the 3-
tier system was implemented to ensure legal separation between brewers, distributors and 
retailers with wholesalers being of significant importance in achieving this. The intention 
was to limit the ability of one tier within the system to control another,82 as is evident in 
the UK beer market today through pubco ownership of public houses. There are no pubcos 
operating in the US market. In order to prevent any overlap between the tiers in the US 
market the role of the wholesaler has been further ensconced by the enactment of franchise 
protection laws in many States. These make it extremely difficult for suppliers to end their 
contractual relationship with wholesalers, as well as requiring brewers to grant wholesalers 
exclusive territories.83 As Cooper notes, such franchise laws often prohibit the termination 
of wholesalers contracts in the absence of “just cause” with extensive administrative 
processes to be satisfied before this requirement is deemed to have been met.84 As Tamayo 
and Cooper highlight the underlying intention was to create a more level playing field 
between the parties, as wholesalers were generally considered to be small and suppliers 
generally large.85 These franchise protection laws were also to protect the welfare of 
citizens by ensuring ‘orderly and fair’ distribution of alcohol within the State.86 However, 
despite these protections, distributors are generally considered to be in a vulnerable 
position within the US market. Their survival is directly linked to the existence of the 3-tier 
system and they are also susceptible to consolidation and cost savings by brewers and 
retailers.87 
2.2.3 Wholesaler consolidation  
Despite the highly protected position of wholesalers in the US market, the wholesale sector 
has consolidated with there now being many producers and few wholesalers operating in 
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the US beer market.88 These remaining wholesalers however continue to enjoy a protected 
position and also wield significant power under the 3-tier system.89 This increased 
consolidation within the wholesale sector has brought the US market more into line with 
the UK beer market, which as already mentioned above lacks a competitive wholesale 
sector. This has increased the difficulties faced by start-up brewers wishing to have their 
products distributed. These smaller brewers have significant difficulty persuading powerful 
wholesalers to carry their products as they are not as profitable as those produced by the 
largest brewers.90 Consequently, smaller brewers are often forced to find alternative means 
of getting their product to market, which are not always the most efficient.91  
Furthermore, once accepted by a distributor smaller producers can continue to face 
difficulties in having their products distributed. By using value-added distributors to handle 
the merchandising, sale and delivery of their products, brewers generally benefit from high 
returns and low capital requirements under the 3-tier system. This contrasts with 
distributors who often suffer lower returns and higher capital requirements as they have to 
fund distribution networks.92 Distributors are therefore incentivised to actively encourage 
the sale of those brands with the highest profit margins, which are usually those produced 
by the largest brewers.93 This has also caused further consolidation within the distribution 
sector in order to reduce costs and so offset margin pressure.94  
The remaining powerful wholesalers in the US beer market are also influential in State 
politics.95 Welch highlights that in some States, such as Texas, wholesalers opposed de-
regulation of the 3-tier system and ‘brewpub’ legislation. 96 This has been attributed to their 
fear of being bypassed should producers be able to sell directly to consumers.97 Tamayo 
therefore highlights that in the US market, craft brewers face tough opposition from 
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89 Above, n.12 at p6. See also above, n.5 at p46.  
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wholesalers whose well-resourced and powerful lobbyists have protected their economic 
interests under the 3-tier system by successfully opposing deregulation in some States.98 
2.2.4 Wholesaler exclusivity  
The number of distributors and wholesalers operating in the US market has therefore 
declined with many medium sized multi-brand wholesalers being bought out by larger 
wholesalers while smaller operators have left the market.99 Further, the majority of those 
remaining often exclusively handle certain brands and identify themselves with the major 
brewers.100 Distributors of Coors, AB and Miller products are estimated to account for 
60% of the number of distributors in the US market and for 89% of the volume of beer 
distributed.101 This situation contributes to the difficulties independent producers 
experience in getting their products to the market. Further parallels with the UK beer 
market where the largest brewers still largely control the distribution of beer were evident 
in the US market throughout the 1990s. AB introduced its “100 per cent share of mind” 
marketing philosophy, which actively encouraged distributors to carry only their products 
and caused other brewers’ products to be dropped by their distributors.102 This practice was 
not exclusive to AB with other brewers offering financial incentives in exchange for 
loyalty and exclusivity.103   
Despite these difficulties, more recently due to the increasing demand for craft beer there 
has been a shift in this long-established trend of wholesalers favouring larger brewers’ 
products. Distributors in the US have started to move towards multiple clients, including 
craft brewers.104 Some distributors have also emerged that handle only craft beer and craft 
brewers themselves have taken steps to establish their own distribution networks.105 
However, whilst these are undoubtedly positive market developments, in 2012 it was 
estimated that AB owned in excess of twelve distributors and has minority shareholdings 
in others.106 It also has contracts with approximately 500 distributors.107 The majority of 
these distributors handle AB products exclusively although there has been some relaxation 
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104 Above, n.5 at p10  
105 Above, n.10 at p2217. See also above, n.5 at p10. 
106 Above, n.5 at p9-10. It was estimated that approximately 2000 distributors were operating in the US in 
2010, although there are doubts over the accuracy of this data (ibid at p10).  
107 Ibid at p9  
 	  174	  
to allow them to handle other brewers’ products including craft brewers.108 There are also 
similar arrangements in place for the distribution of major brands Miller and Coors.109 In 
light of these on-going difficulties experienced by US craft brewers in getting their 
products to market there are some similarities with the position of small brewers in the UK 
who, as discussed in Chapter 4,110 have struggled to comply with the significant demands 
of pubcos in order to have their products distributed.  
2.2.5 Constitutional protection for the 3-tier system but some exceptions 
being created 
By virtue of its constitutional protection under the 21st Amendment discussed above, the 3-
tier system has generally been shielded from any great erosion. This has only recently 
begun to change with some minor exceptions being created to facilitate ‘brewpubs’ 
discussed above and more recently Washington’s Initiative 1183.111 In 2011 Washington 
State opted to end its monopoly on liquor sales (sales of beer, wine and spirits) by selling 
its alcohol distribution centres and liquor stores to private companies.112 The State now 
issues licences to private companies to carry out these activities.113 Initiative 1183 eroded 
the 3-tier system in Washington as retailers are now able to purchase directly from 
producers, have freedom to negotiate discounts and can store their inventories in their own 
warehouses.114 The Initiative was prompted as it would allow the competitive private sale 
of liquor under State regulation. This would free State officials from dealing with retail 
sales and allowing them to focus on the enforcement of the State’s liquor and public health 
laws.115 The Initiative’s sponsors noted, amongst others, that the regulations imposing the 
Government’s monopoly on both wholesale and retail liquor sales were outdated and 
inefficient and so costly to all parties.116 It was suggested that the privatisation of liquor 
sales in the State would increase revenues through the imposition of a fee on privately 
owned liquor retailers and wholesalers operating in the State. However notwithstanding the 
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Policy Centre, September 2011) <http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/notes/citizens-guide-
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touted benefits of the Initiative, concerns were also expressed that it may present an 
opportunity for large retailers, such as Costco, to dominate liquor sales and distribution. 
Costco Wholesale had reportedly allocated $22 million to push through the Initiative.117 
Nevertheless, other States including Virginia, Oregon and Pennsylvania are considering 
such measures, with more likely to follow suit in bringing about such privatisation due to 
increasing pressure on State Governments to cut costs and increase revenues.118  
2.3 ‘3-tier’ distribution is not a fix-all solution for the distribution of beer 
In light of the foregoing, it would appear that merely outlawing the beer tie as an 
illegitimate business model and imposing a mandatory separation between each tier in the 
chain of distribution does not produce a very competitive system for the distribution of 
beer, and as such does not provide a suitable model for the UK market to follow. There are 
however lessons to be learned from the experience of the US market following the 
outlawing of the tie which can inform the proposals made in the thesis for the reform of the 
UK market. As noted above, since the implementation of the 3-tier system of 
manufacturing, wholesaling and distributing liquor following Prohibition, the US beer 
market has experienced significant concentration, with a resulting impact on consumer 
choice in the market. The US beer market has changed from a largely local and fragmented 
market pre-Prohibition to a modern day duopoly under the 3-tier system with supermarkets 
now dominating the distribution channel for beer. The 3-tier system has therefore failed to 
shield the US market against the dangers of monopolisation by a few large brewers, which 
was considered to be the primary danger of vertical integration and was one of the main 
drivers behind the implementation of the 3-tier system. Consolidation is however a 
recognised feature of the global beer market and as discussed in Chapter 2, has also 
affected the UK beer market. Numerous factors have contributed to this including 
technological advances, declining consumption, and the desire for scale economies. 
However, the restriction on vertical integration by outlawing the beer tie as a legitimate 
business model after Prohibition has been shown to have been one of the initial catalysts 
for this concentration in the US market. Consequently it is necessary to be aware of this 
when proposing reforms to the UK beer market. 
Furthermore, whilst the craft beer sector of the US market has recently enjoyed a gain in 
market share, this has been facilitated almost entirely by a relaxation in the 3-tier system 
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through some acceptance of vertical integration. This is exemplified by the ‘brewpub’ 
exceptions now implemented in most States. As discussed in Chapter 2, smaller brewers 
operating in the UK beer market have long enjoyed the advantages of being able to sell 
their products from their premises, or those tied to them, thereby affording them a small 
but protected market share in face of competition from major brewers.119 Following the 
implementation of the ‘brewpub’ exceptions small brewers in the US are only just coming 
to benefit from this. This relaxation in the 3-tier system has therefore also brought about as 
increase in consumer choice in the US beer market by facilitating the sale of beers beyond 
those of the duopolists and other large brewers. By contrast, the UK beer market has long 
enjoyed the increased consumer choice offered by its established craft beer sector, even if 
this is not reflected in the pubco dominated on-trade.120 It is therefore necessary that any 
reforms of the UK market acknowledge this role of the tie in protecting the market position 
of small brewers. 
However, as discussed above, the UK beer market has long lacked an independent 
wholesale and distribution sector with this being a long-standing concern in successive 
investigations by the UK competition authorities. By contrast wholesalers have played a 
central role in the distribution of beer in the US market. In recognition of their importance 
they enjoy both Federal and State protection. Nevertheless, in light of the numerous issues 
surrounding their practices in the US market including their alignment with the duopolists, 
the imposition of a mandatory 3-tier system does not guarantee the creation and operation 
of an ‘independent’ wholesale and distribution sector. Additional measures would be 
required to ensure their independence beyond those in place under the US regulatory 
regime, such as a prohibition on wholesalers acting exclusively for a single brewer. 
Therefore, whilst as noted in Chapter 2 there are numerous problems associated with the 
operation of the beer tie in the UK, a mandatory 3-tier system poses different challenges 
some of which serve to highlight the benefits of vertical integration through some 
acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model.  Consequently, regard will now 
be had to the distribution of beer in Australia where the tie has more recently been 
outlawed but a mandatory 3-tier system of distribution has not been imposed.  
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3. The Australian beer market   
Similarly to the US, Australia is a major beer producer. It has also been forced to deal with 
brewers’ extensive use of beer tying agreements however in doing so has adopted a 
different approach from that in the US. As noted above, in the US social concerns 
influenced the Prohibition movement in the early twentieth century and prompted the beer 
tie to be regarded as an illegitimate business model in all circumstances, with some minor 
exceptions only recently being accepted. In Australia, brewers’ reliance on the beer tie has 
been affected by Australian competition law provisions that outlaw exclusive dealing 
where this is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition.  
3.1  A brief overview of the historical development of the Australian beer 
market and brewers’ reliance on the beer tie 
Similarly to the UK and the USA, Australia has a long history of brewing with it being one 
of the earliest manufacturing activities of the colonies.121 Today, Australians are amongst 
the largest per capita consumers of beer in the world. However during the 19th century, due 
to poor transportation and the perishable nature of beer, the brewing industry was dispersed 
with many small-scale brewers operating in towns as part of local hotels rather than as 
individual specialist brewers.122 By the end of the century a more modern industry focused 
on large-scale and capital-intensive production methods had evolved following advances in 
brewing methods suited to hot climates.123 The introduction of lager beer in 1880 also 
came to be popular with consumers.124 As this expansion continued, State laws were 
passed to regulate the sale of alcohol.125 Similarly to the UK this was based on a licensing 
system for those wishing to sell liquor. The principle outlets were hotels selling beer in 
bottled and draught form and brewers made it a priority to tie up these hotels and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 G Oliver, ed, The Oxford Companion to Beer (New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2012) at p70-71. 
See also D.T. Merrett, ‘Stability and change in the Australian brewing industry, 1920-1994’ in R.G. Wilson 
and T.R. Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, 
Routledge, 1998) at p230. For discussion on beer brewing in the colonies see D Hughes, ‘The brewing 
industry in early Australia’ in R.G. Wilson and T.R. Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International 
Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 1998) at p214-215. 
122 D.T. Merrett, ‘Stability and change in the Australian brewing industry, 1920-1994’ in R.G. Wilson and 
T.R. Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 
1998) at p230 and G Oliver, ed, The Oxford Companion to Beer (New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 
2012) at p71 
123 D.T. Merrett, ‘Stability and change in the Australian brewing industry, 1920-1994’ in R.G. Wilson and 
T.R. Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 
1998) at p230. See also G Oliver, ed, The Oxford Companion to Beer (New York, Oxford University Press 
Inc., 2012) at p71. 
124 G Oliver, ed, The Oxford Companion to Beer (New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2012) at p71 
125 D.T. Merrett, ‘Stability and change in the Australian brewing industry, 1920-1994’ in R.G. Wilson and 
T.R. Gourvish, eds, The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800 (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 
1998) at p231 
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distribution channels.126 Dunstan notes that brewers claimed it was necessary to control the 
hotels serving their products in order to ensure, amongst others that they were properly run 
and their beer was not watered down.127 However, as the temperance movement 
strengthened and the number of licences being issued slowed, the barriers to entry into the 
industry increased, with Merrett noting that by the 20th Century the tie was a form of 
forward integration widely utilised by brewers.128 By 1870 -1880 half of the hotels in 
Victoria and metropolitan New South Wales (NSW) were already tied to a brewer. 129 In 
line with their British peers, the Australian brewers sought to form close relationships with 
those outlets that agreed to exclusively serve their products.130 By the 1920s the vast 
majority of country brewers had been ousted by the city brewers who had replaced them 
with branch plants, with Merrett noting that the industry now represented its ‘modern 
form’.131 As a result, the industry fell into the clutches of a small number of large-scale 
capital-intensive brewers. However Oliver notes that given Australia’s largely dispersed 
population each of the major brewers were independent and were based in a capital city or 
significant town in each State and consumers were loyal to their local beer brands.132 
These brewers were able to deny competitors a market share by entering into tying 
agreements with large numbers of hotels that were limited to serving only their products.133  
Kirby notes that this tied house system strengthened during the Depression of the 1930s 
and World War II.134 Eventually in 1951, amidst concerns regarding corruption in pubs, the 
NSW Government appointed a Royal Commission to review brewery ownership of tied 
houses.135 The terms of reference for the Commission were, amongst others, to examine 
brewers’ financial interests in and control of hotels, and the adequacy of the liquor 
licensing laws in controlling licensing.136 It established that 69% of the hotels in the area 
were tied to the two major brewers.137 While the Committee failed to find any specific 
disadvantages associated with the operation of the tied house system, the report on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 In Australia, pre-1950, with the exception of clubs, only hotels were licensed to sell beer on draught. 
Above, n.125 at p231 and p238. See also K Dunstan, The Amber Nectar A celebration of beer and brewing in 
Australia (Victoria, Viking O’Neil, 1987) at p35  
127 K Dunstan, The Amber Nectar A celebration of beer and brewing in Australia (Victoria, Viking O’Neil, 
1987) at p148  
128 Above, n.125 at p232 
129 Ibid at p232 
130 Ibid at p232  
131 Ibid at p232  
132 Above, n.124 at p71-72 
133 Above, n.125 at p235  
134 D Kirkby et al, The Australian Pub (Sydney, UNSW Press, 2010) p100 
135 Ibid at p100  
136 Royal Commission on Liquor Laws in New South Wales, Final Report of Commission (New South Wales 
Government State Records, 25th March 1954) 
<http://investigator.records.nsw.gov.au/Entity.aspx?Path=%5CAgency%5C4925> accessed 5th March 2015 
137 Above, n.134 at p105 
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conduct of hotels was damming.138 It was not, however, considered to be in the public 
interest or financially practical to abolish the tied house system.139 Instead it was 
considered acceptable for brewers to own hotels provided they appointed managers and 
were not themselves directly involved in the running of those establishments.140 By the 
early 1970s the South Australian Brewing Company controlled more than 50% of hotels in 
the State of Victoria while brewers Tooths and Tooheys had in some manner tied 
approximately 70% of the hotels in NSW by the early 1950s.141 The tied house system in 
Australia therefore served as a substantial barrier to new entrants to the market and 
perpetuated the significant level of concentration within the industry.142 
More generally across the country however, given the significant market power enjoyed, 
and in the absence of any legislation constraining concentration or anti-competitive 
practices, Merrett notes that brewers came to their own implicit understandings regarding 
the level and the type of competition between them.143 Where two or more brewers 
operated in the same market, price competition was absent and brewers would engage in 
price wars with any brewer who did not respect these arrangements.144 Stubbs highlights 
that as early as 1901, brewers Tooths and Tooheys reached agreement not to ‘interfere’ 
with their respective tied houses.145 Instead, competition within the market was based on 
the acquisition of even more tied trade.146  
3.2 How the beer tie came to be outlawed in Australia 
Having enjoyed decades without any restrictive trade practices legislation, the tide 
eventually turned on the Australian brewers. In the 1960s and 1970s, their stranglehold on 
distribution channels weakened as many anti-competitive acts were prohibited.147 Included 
amongst these were demands by suppliers for exclusive dealing arrangements with 
distributors.148 The route to this was not however a direct one. Whilst Australia has had a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Ibid at p105 
139 Above, n.136 
140 Ibid 
141 Above, n.125 at p236. See also B.J. Stubbs, ‘The revival and decline of the independent breweries in New 
South Wales 1946-1961’ (1996) 36(1) Aust Econ Hist Rev 32 at p35 
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common law doctrine of restraint of trade, dating as far back as 1890,149 the first national 
Act seeking to control anti-competitive conduct was the Australian Industries Preservation 
Act 1906.150  This was modeled on the US Sherman Act 1890 and made it an offence to 
conclude a contract or combine ‘with intent to restrain trade or commerce to the detriment 
of the public...’.151 These measures did not go far enough in restraining the powerful 
Australian brewers. Restrictive trade practices continued largely unabated throughout the 
Australian industry for several decades.152 Although numerous legislative attempts to deal 
with the situation followed,153 the first of any great significance was the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 Cth (the TPA). The then Labour Government was under pressure from the public 
to tackle price increases as well as inflationary pressures.154 They sought to address all 
forms of anticompetitive behavior through penalties and injunctions under the TPA.155 This 
subsequently instituted a stricter approach to anticompetitive behavior in light of 
Australia’s flagging economic predicament. It was recognised that increased competition, 
not protectionism, would promote economic growth and efficiency as well as consumer 
protection.156  
3.2.1 Trade practices Act (TPA) 1974 
As in the UK, in Australia the general concerns regarding the extensive use of exclusive 
dealing arrangements, such as the beer tie, focus on their ability to aid the acquisition and 
exercise of market power and their potential to contribute to market foreclosure.157 Clough 
also notes that barriers to entry are an important consideration in Australia as markets are 
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<http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44529918.pdf> accessed 3rd July 2015  
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151 Section 4 Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 
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relatively small and concentrated.158 The UK and Australia have however adopted different 
approaches in addressing these concerns. As discussed in Chapter 4, the UK in line with 
the EU permits the beer tie to benefit from parallel exemption from the competition law 
provisions under Regulation 330/2010, failing which it has to meet the test set by Chapter I 
of the Competition Act 1998 in order for the agreement to be considered contrary to the 
UK competition law provisions.159 This is so even although the newly adopted 2015 Act 
restricts the operation of the tie by requiring pub owning businesses to offer their tied 
tenants a Market Rent Only (MRO) option in certain circumstances.160 In Australia, the 
TPA was a Federal Act and as such applied throughout Australia. The central antitrust 
provisions of the TPA were contained in s.45-s.47 and have been re-enacted as the current 
antitrust provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA 2010). Section 47 of 
the TPA outlawed the practice of exclusive dealing including the use of beer tying 
agreements. Under the TPA, now the CCA 2010, Australia has a dual adjudication system 
for assessing exclusive dealing arrangements.161 The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC)162 can authorise notified conduct or grant it immunity 
from the statutory provisions with these authorisation decisions being subject to appeal to 
the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal).163  
3.2.1.1 TPA – the antitrust provisions  
Section 45-s.47 of the TPA contained Australia’s antitrust provisions and were only 
concerned with the actions of corporations. While s.46 dealt with substantial market 
power, s.45 prohibited contracts, arrangements or understandings in restraint of trade or 
commerce. This was generally considered to deal with horizontal agreements between 
competitors. By contrast s.47 was focused on the issue of vertical agreements,164 and so 
was of significance to brewers who placed reliance on beer tying agreements.165 Section 47 
prohibited the practice of ‘exclusive dealing’ with s.47(1) declaring that ‘a corporation 
shall not, in trade or commerce engage in the practice of exclusive dealing.’ Section 47(2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 D Clough, ‘Law and economics of vertical restraints in Australia’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law 
Review 551 at 582 
159 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
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161 Above, n.158 at p552 
162 Until 1995 this was the Trade Practices Commission. For simplicity it will be referred to throughout the 
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then detailed a range of prohibited non-price restrictions imposed by suppliers in respect of 
the distribution or marketing of their goods or services by the person supplied.166 Whilst 
s.47 is drafted in an elaborate fashion, Hurly succinctly states that exclusive dealing “is 
essentially a supply of goods or services on the condition that the purchaser accept a 
restriction on its ability to deal.”167 Consequently s.47 was applicable to beer tie 
agreements under which the purchaser agrees to distribute the supplier’s goods to the 
exclusion of their competitors. Such agreements are also referred to in Australia as ‘solus’ 
contracts.168 Section 47 TPA was an incredibly long and complex section due to the 
numerous vertical non-price restraints it was intended to deal with.169 Section 47(2) stated 
that a corporation engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if it ‘(a) supplies, or offers to 
supply, goods or services; (b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular 
price; or (c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount allowance, rebate or 
credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply of goods or services by the corporation’; 
on the condition that the person ‘(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire 
goods or services of a particular kind or description, directly or indirectly from a 
competitor of the corporation or a related company’. Section 47(12) TPA however clarified 
that the prohibition on exclusive dealing under s.47 did not apply to restrictive dealings 
between related corporations. 
However, before the exclusive dealing in question was prohibited, similarly to the EU and 
UK competition law provisions, s.47 TPA required consideration of the effects of the 
conduct on competition.170 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Chapter I Prohibition of the 
Competition Act 1998 requires that the conduct in question affects trade within the UK or 
has as its object or effect the prevention restriction or distortion of competition within the 
UK.171 This appears to be a higher test than that imposed by s.47(10) TPA which simply 
stated that exclusive dealing was prohibited if the conduct had the ‘purpose, effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition’.172 The majority of enforcement action under 
the TPA provisions has focused on notification and authorisation applications before the 
ACCC and the Tribunal. Hurley and McEwin therefore note that there are very few judicial 
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decisions highlighting the approach of the courts in assessing the competitive impact of 
exclusive dealing arrangements.173 Hurley indicates that the ACCC and Tribunal have 
taken a negative view where the corporations involved have enjoyed market power, the 
market has had high barriers to entry or where there has been a network of one-brand 
restriction in the market.174 McEwin also highlights that ‘substantial’ means that the 
conduct in question must be ‘non-trivial’ in the context in which it occurs in the relevant 
market and through the use of ‘likely’ extends to taking into account the future impact of 
the conduct on competition.175 Nevertheless, this still appears to be a lesser test for 
outlawing exclusive dealing arrangements than its equivalent under Chapter I of the 
Competition Act 1998.  
3.2.1.2 Authorisation and notification under the TPA 
As mentioned above, the majority of the enforcement action under the TPA occurred under 
the notification and authorisation provisions. While the intention of the TPA was to 
prohibit anticompetitive conduct, s.88(8) TPA made provision for the authorisation of 
exclusive dealing conduct with the tests for granting this being contained in s.90 TPA. 
These provisions opened up the possibility for the ACCC to authorise most conduct 
coming within the TPA.176 Section 90(6) TPA contained the test for authorisation of 
exclusive dealing. This required that before granting any authorisation the ACCC had to be 
satisfied that the conduct to which the application related resulted or was likely to result in 
a benefit to the public, and would outweigh the detriment to the public constituted by any 
lessening of competition that would result.177 While ‘public benefit’ was not defined in the 
TPA, Smith highlights that this created flexibility and permitted the application of the TPA 
to changing circumstances.178 The TPA therefore relied on the term ‘public benefit’ as 
opposed to ‘public interest’ with Fels and Grimwade considering this appropriate in light 
of the ACCC’s need to engage in a weighing up process to determine whether or not to 
grant authorisation.179 They note the ACCC and Tribunal’s practice of applying a ‘future 
with-and-without test’ to determine the net public benefit through consideration of the 
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situation with and without the conduct in question.180 They also highlight that the basis for 
granting an authorisation was “the presumption that the conduct creates sufficient public 
benefit that it is desirable, on balance, even though it may also give rise to some anti-
competitive effects.”181  
Consequently, this authorisation process was not entirely dissimilar to the European 
Commission’s initially exclusive ability to grant exemptions under Article 101(3) Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to agreements infringing Article 101(1) 
discussed in Chapter 3.182 However, the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU are more 
focused on efficiency considerations than the public benefit condition of s.90 TPA. As 
Clough notes the small and concentrated nature of Australia’s markets have influenced 
what is taken into consideration in determining what is relevant to the public benefit.183 As 
such, he states that efficiency considerations have not been the primary concern for the 
ACCC although he suggests that there has been increasing recognition of efficiency as a 
public benefit.184 Hanks and Williams also highlight the lack of consideration the ACCC 
has given to efficiency considerations as creating public benefits.185 These observations are 
in line with Fels and Grimwade’s assertion that “[a]uthorisation reflects the belief that the 
public interest, with an emphasis on an efficient and productive economy, is the 
centerpiece of the TPA and that competition is not an end in itself.”186 
In recognition of the potential benefits of exclusive dealing however s.93 TPA also made 
special provision for the notification of exclusive dealing arrangements, thereby 
distinguishing them from all other conduct falling within the terms of the TPA.187 This 
opened up the possibility for the conduct in question to be granted a statutory interim 
exemption from the TPA. This exemption could be withdrawn by the ACCC issuing a 
notice confirming that the notified conduct had or was likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition within the meaning of s.47 TPA and did not produce a 
net public benefit.188   
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3.2.1.3 Dismantling of the tied house system - Re Tooth & Co Ltd; Re 
Tooheys Ltd 
In light of the foregoing, the introduction of the TPA in 1974 was a blow to the brewing 
industry however the dismantling of the tied house system in Australia did not occur until 
the late 1970s-1980s. This followed on from the Tribunal’s consideration of Australian 
brewers’ use of solus agreements. Similarly to the concerns highlighted by the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission in their 1989 Report on the UK beer market,189 the traditional 
concerns over their use have focused on their ability to raise barriers to entry at the supplier 
level by tying retail outlets thereby making it difficult for new suppliers to enter the 
market.190 Where outlets are limited in number due to restrictive licensing, there has been 
recognition of the ability of solus agreements to consolidate and increase the market power 
of the brewer imposing the restrictions on retailers.191 At the retail level the retailer is 
restricted to the products of the supplying brewer thereby limiting their choice of 
substitutes and affecting competition at this level. As Hurly highlights these factors can 
cause higher prices and a restriction on the choice of goods for consumers.192  
The foregoing anticompetitive effects of solus agreements were influential in the 
Tribunal’s judgment in Re Tooth & Co Ltd; Re Tooheys Ltd193 (Tooth) which represented a 
watershed moment in the treatment of beer tie agreements in Australia. The Tribunal 
reviewed the ACCC’s decision to refuse the grant of authorisation under s.88 TPA to 
brewers Tooth & Co. (Tooth) and Tooheys on account of the “anticompetitive detriment” 
resulting from their tying agreements.194 The conduct for which they sought authorisation 
related to their ownership of hotels and beer production in New South Wales (NSW). More 
specifically this concerned their conduct and future conduct in imposing ties for the supply 
of bulk (draught) beer in return for the grant of leases of hotels, loans, liquor licences for 
hotels, and the hire of beer dispensing equipment.195 The Tribunal stated that its function 
was to determine whether, as required under s.90(6) TPA that “it is satisfied in all the 
circumstances that…the proposed conduct…would result, or be likely to result, in a benefit 
to the public…which would outweigh the detriment to the public…”.196   
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In the course of its considerations, similarly to the UK competition authorities in their 
review of tying agreements at that time discussed in Chapter 2, the Tribunal highlighted 
the significant influence of licensing laws in NSW.197 It stated that regardless of the 
imposition of the tie, licensing determines the character of the distribution system by, 
amongst others, controlling the number and location of licensed premises.198 As such it 
was considered to be “the most important regulatory constraint upon the competitive 
functioning of the industry – with or without ties.”199 The effect of the licensing laws had 
generally been to restrict the number of licensed outlets in operation.200 The Tribunal noted 
that Tooth and Tooheys had the largest aggregations of licences in NSW.201 
The Tribunal also clarified the importance of market definition in the assessment of the 
solus agreements as barriers to entry.202 It accepted that the wider the market in question 
the less significant the ties were as barriers to entry and as a cause of long-term 
anticompetitive detriment.203 The Tribunal adopted a broad approach to market definition 
finding that the relevant product market was beer, including bulk and packaged beer204 in 
the ‘lesser NSW market’.205 However market definition was not the only consideration. It 
found that “the implication of the ties for both benefit and detriment needs to be considered 
by reference to the structure of the market in which they are embedded, the processes of 
competition with which they are associated, and the prospects for change.”206  
In considering the market structure, it was noted that whilst there was a high degree of 
vertical integration in the production and distribution of beer by the two brewers, the 
majority of the transactions involving the brewers and all retail outlets were conducted at 
arms’ length. Only an almost insignificant proportion of the NSW beer trade was handled 
by fully integrated brewer owned and managed hotels. In 1976 such outlets handled less 
than 1% of beer as a whole.207 By contrast, approximately 77% of the total beer trade was 
in the ‘free market’.208  However, here the Tribunal was concerned with the 23% of the 
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market in the middle ground, namely the “the partly integrated, partly independent area” 
which was the subject of the application.209 In considering the brewers’ tying arrangements 
within this category the Tribunal had regard to the competitive setting in which the ties 
operated. It established that at the wholesale level the NSW beer market was highly 
concentrated with the two brewers being the only companies brewing beer in NSW.210 
Between 1974 and1976 they had a market share in excess of 90% of the total market for 
both bulk and packaged beer in NSW.211  In the same period they accounted for 95% of the 
NSW trade in bulk beer.212 Their share in packaged beer was declining but still accounted 
for 86% in 1976. 213 However, Tooth was the more powerful of the two brewers accounting 
for almost double the quantity of beer supplied by Tooheys in 1976 and holding almost 
75% of the tied market in bulk beer.214 The remainder of the NSW trade was accounted for 
by five interstate brewers.215 At the retail level, the market was also concentrated with the 
two brewers’ ties and ownership links forming two significant hotel chains.216 The ACCC 
had established that as at 1977 Tooth and Tooheys together owned or tied in some way 
1,249 of the 1,980 hotels operating in NSW accounting for approximately 63% of these.217 
Brewers owned 37% of all hotels in NSW.  
The length of the tying agreements entered into by the brewers varied from a few years to 
in excess of fifty or one hundred years,218 with the lessee tie, where brewers lease their 
hotel to a tenant in return for guaranteed trade, being the most common form of tie.219 
However, in considering the ties in context, the Tribunal highlighted that they are “an 
instrument of vertical integration”.220 It noted that “there are really three kinds of vertical 
integration between brewing and distribution to be found in this industry: (a) integration 
by ownership plus managerial control; (b) integration by ownership plus contract (lease 
and related covenants); (c) integration by contract alone (long term covenants with 
privately owned hotels).”221 Whilst as noted above the majority of transactions between 
suppliers and distributors in the beer trade were conducted at arms’ length, there was a 
“highly integrated wedge of the market”, given the high level of vertical integration in the 
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two brewers’ production and distribution of beer.222 In the course of its consideration, the 
Tribunal had regard to the competitive behaviour of the brewers and established there was 
no obvious price competition between the two brewers in the bulk beer market and there 
was also little brand development or product differentiation.223 The tied sector was also 
considered to amount to a form of market sharing arrangement with the tie providing each 
brewer with a “guaranteed base”.224 
Under these arrangements the bulk beer sector was largely protected and within this so was 
the tied sector.225 The Tribunal therefore established that the agreements in question 
limited competition in a number of respects.226 Included amongst these was the finding that 
the ties prohibited the two brewers from accessing hotels already tied to the other brewer 
and there was no evidence of competition between them.227 They also impeded the market 
entry of interstate brewers by denying them access to an important segment of the 
market.228 The ties increased barriers to entry and so limited market entry by new brewers 
and hoteliers as they were restricted to acquiring an interest in a hotel with pre-determined 
stocking policies.229 Hoteliers’ bargaining power was also limited in their dealings with the 
tying brewer and they were unable to obtain supplies elsewhere when their supplying 
brewer was unable to meet their demands. Consumer choice was also affected by these 
arrangements as tied hotels were restricted in their ability to change the beers they served 
in line with public demand.230  
It was established that the ‘fundamental effect’ of the tie, that also gave rise to the 
foregoing anticompetitive effects, was its role in creating a ‘captive market’.231 The parties 
disputed the relevance of this as they claimed that only 23% of the NSW beer market was 
tied and so their agreements were of limited significance for market foreclosure and 
anticompetitive detriment.232 The Tribunal was however satisfied that the 23% tied when 
considered in the context of the foregoing structural and behavioural features of the market 
had a significant effect upon both foreclosure and anticompetitive detriment.233 The 
Tribunal failed to be persuaded by the arguments provided regarding the public benefit. It 
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found that neither applicant had established any benefit to the public resulting from their 
conduct or likely to result from it, however they were satisfied that the conduct considered 
had resulted and was likely to result in “very considerable anticompetitive detriment to the 
public.”234 It therefore upheld the ACCC’s decision to refuse the brewers exemption under 
the TPA.235  
The ACCC’s decision in Tooth that brewers’ exclusive dealing arrangements were 
prohibited under the terms of the TPA heralded the start of the dismantling of the tied 
house system in Australia and thereby marked the end of an era for brewers. Concerns 
similar to those seen in the UK beer market, discussed in Chapter 2, namely the market 
power of brewers, barriers to entry including the role of restrictive licensing, restricted 
consumer choice and absence of price competition were influential in the ACCC’s 
decision. Following the grant of a two-week interim authorisation after the publication of 
the Tribunal’s reasons, brewers’ exclusivity agreements relating to mortgages, loans and 
covenants ceased to have effect.236 This ended brewers’ interest in hotel ownership as they 
pursued other ‘avenues of capital development’.237 This prohibition on the use of the beer 
tie combined with changing consumer preferences in favour of bottled beer had far 
reaching implications for the structure of the Australian brewing market similar to those 
examined in the context of the American market.238 As Merrett notes in 1977-1978, the 
four largest brewers accounted for 78% of turnover with this increasing to 92% by 1987-
1988 thereby changing the market from one that was highly concentrated into a duopoly.239 
3.2.2 The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
In light of the foregoing, the TPA facilitated fundamental changes in Australia’s brewing 
industry. The TPA was however subject to numerous reviews and debates over the coming 
decades. The most extensive review of its competition law provisions was conducted by 
the Dawson Committee Review, which made several recommendations for the technical 
reform of the TPA and its administration by the ACCC.240 The Committee’s terms of 
reference required it to assess whether the competition law provisions promoted 
competitive trading which benefitted consumers in terms of service and price. The 
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Committee concluded that the competition law provisions had overall served Australians 
well.241 It was deemed to have achieved an appropriate balance between the prohibition of 
anticompetitive conduct and the promotion of competition.242 While the TPA was finally 
replaced in 2011 by the CCA 2010, the substantive amendments were applied to fair-
trading and consumer protection. The key competition provisions including s.47 TPA have 
been re-enacted in identical terms in the CCA 2010.243 Part VII of the CCA 2010 continues 
to make provision for authorisations, notifications and clearances in respect of restrictive 
trade practices including exclusive dealing.  
3.3 The impact of outlawing the beer tie in Australia  
The TPA, and now the CCA 2010, which generally outlaws exclusive dealing, together 
with the ACCC’S decision in Tooth, has had implications for the Australian beer market. 
The implications are not entirely dissimilar to those discussed above in relation to the 3-tier 
system in the US. As Dunstan highlights the beer tie in Australia was a ‘tradition that dated 
back to the birth of the industry’ and ensured the survival of many small brewers, whose 
tied hotels were their only outlets.244 Consequently, from a relatively established structure 
within which brewers supplied regional markets, partly on account of loyalty to local 
brands and partly due to high transportation costs, the Australian beer market like that in 
the US has evolved into a modern day duopoly. This duopoly largely divides the 
Australian beer market, with increasingly dominant retailers also becoming a feature of the 
market.245 In 2013, SAB Miller accounted for 43.3% of the Australian beer market by 
volume whilst Kirin Holdings accounted for 41.4%.246 By comparison, as discussed above 
the duopoly in the US market in 2013 was made up of ABInBev with a 50.4% market 
share and SABMiller accounting for 29.2% of the US market.247 Consequently, the 
Australian market is now more concentrated than the US beer market. 
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3.3.1 National brands and increased consolidation  
Prior to the ACCC’s decision in Tooth in 1979, which resulted in beer tie agreements in 
Australia ceasing to have effect, there was only limited competition on a national scale 
within the Australian beer market.248 Competition was generally concentrated within each 
State on account of both loyalty to local brands and the high transportation costs associated 
with shipping beer.249 The level of competition within individual states tended to vary from 
a monopoly to duopoly with only limited competition being presented by producers in 
neighbouring states.250 However the structure of the beer market changed significantly 
following the dismantling of the tied house system. As Merrett highlights, for the first time 
in decades, brewers had the ability to take market share from each other.251 They duly did 
so by taking advantage of the increased consumer preference for packaged beer by 
switching from draught to bottled beer and transporting their products interstate.252 As 
brewers were no longer focused on controlling distribution outlets, wide-scale marketing of 
their beer brands was used as a tool to both defend market share and to enter new 
markets.253 In the absence of vertical integration, as in the US market, focus was placed on 
non-price competition.254 The largest barrier to entry into the Australian brewing market 
was now the substantial expenditure required for marketing national brands.255 Merrett 
notes that the outlays required to do so were well beyond the financial means of any small 
or medium sized brewery.256 Consequently, further consolidation ensued and national 
brands were a reality within the Australian beer market.  
As already mentioned, this trend towards consolidation has been maintained with 
duopolists SAB Miller and Kirin Holdings today accounting for 84.7% of the beer market 
by volume.257 In line with the increasingly global nature of the beer industry, the two main 
brewers in Australia today are foreign owned. Fosters, renamed Carlton & United Brewers, 
is owned by SABMiller, the second largest brewer in the world which is headquartered in 
London. Lion Nathan is now fully owned by Kirin Holdings, a Japanese based brewer. The 
duopoly between these two brewers was formed in 2011 following SABMiller’s takeover 
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of Fosters. Despite the significant market power of the merged firm, the ACCC found that 
SABMiller’s acquisition of Fosters was not likely to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition for the supply of beer.258 The ACCC considered that the merged firm would 
face competition from Lion Nathan and competition presented by smaller producers such 
as Coopers, who in 2013 had a market share of 6.1% of volume, microbrewers and parallel 
import and control brands supplied by the main supermarkets which would act as a 
constraint on the merged firm.259 As a result, the Australian beer market is now 
significantly more concentrated than the UK beer market.  
3.4 The fringe players in the Australian beer market 
The Australian and US beer markets are therefore both categorised as duopolies, however 
as in the American market discussed above, the Australian craft beer sector has also 
enjoyed an increase in market share in recent years. The Sail and Anchor Pub brewery 
started in 1984 is considered to be the first successful craft brewer in Australia.260  
However, the three main beer producers in the Australian market are SABMiller, Lion 
Nathan and Coopers, all of which produce full strength beer and accounted for 90.8% of 
the Australian beer market by volume in 2013.261 Many small producers were casualties of 
the mass consolidation in the market following the outlawing of the beer tie. However 
recently, as in the US market discussed above, there has been a renewed desire amongst 
Australian consumers for greater choice than simply the duopolists’ products.262 This is 
being driven by enthusiastic craft brewers and increasingly sophisticated consumers.263  
Craft brewers have created a niche in which the large brewers struggle to compete due to 
the differing tastes and production techniques utilised.264 Although craft beer only accounts 
for approximately 2.5-3% of the Australian beer market by volume,265 Deloitte note that 
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the more than 150 microbreweries operating in the market are being added to with IBIS 
World predicting that the industry will grow by 5% over the next five years.266  
However, beer consumption in Australia is declining overall and is currently at a 65 year 
low with wine replacing beer as Australia’s preferred drink.267 The Australian craft beer 
sector is therefore bucking this trend as demand for ‘specialist’ beers is increasing at the 
expense of the large ‘generalist’ producers.268 This demand for craft beer has been noted 
by the largest brewers who are buying their way into the craft market in order to satisfy 
increased consumer demand for diversification.269 Amongst others, Lion Nathan owns the 
Malt Shovel Brewery that produces craft style beers and Carlton & United Breweries 
produce Matilda Bay brands.270 The ACCC has however raised some concerns over the 
largest brewers misleading consumers in the marketing of their ‘craft’ beers.271 Australia’s 
largest retailers Woolworths and Coles have also turned to producing their own craft 
brands referred to as private labels.272 Woolworths for example has a partnership with craft 
brewer Gage Roads Brewing Co. for the supply of its private label beers.273 Consequently 
the market is increasing in strength with larger companies investing greater time and 
resources in its development.274 
3.4.1 The old problem of the beer tie 
Whilst as noted above the Australian craft beer sector’s market share is increasing there are 
concerns that the continued use of beer tie agreements by the largest brewers is hindering 
its expansion. Similarly to the UK beer market discussed in Chapter 4, this use of beer tie 
agreements has caused craft brewers to struggle to access Australia’s draft beer sector, the 
equivalent to the UK’s on-trade.275 This is a lucrative market sector and approximately 
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95% of this draft beer is produced by the duopolists.276 These concerns have arisen despite 
the fact that in contrast to the UK position, exclusive dealing including beer tie agreements 
is generally prohibited by s.47 CCA 2010. However as discussed above this prohibition 
only applies where the exclusive dealing has ‘the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition’. Further, the possibility of notification and 
authorisation by the ACCC still exists for such agreements. The beer tie may therefore be 
legitimately used in Australia in certain circumstances.  
As in the UK beer market, due to restrictive licensing there are only a limited number of 
on-licensed outlets in the Australian market that brewers can supply. When combined with 
the global decline in beer sales, already discussed, which has also affected the Australian 
market, there is a competitive nature to the securing of beer ‘taps’ in on-licensed 
establishments such as public houses (pubs). Given that draft beer is more profitable than 
bottled beer and is subject to reduced level of excise tax, there is once again significant 
competition for market share in the draft beer market through the tying of taps in pubs.277 
There are subsequently significant similarities in the difficulties faced by Australian and 
UK craft brewers seeking to secure an outlet for their draft products. As is the case in the 
UK beer market discussed in Chapter 4, the diversity of the craft beer sector in Australia is 
not fully reflected in the beers served in pubs and other retail outlets.278  
As discussed in Chapter 4 small brewers in the UK have significant problems in accessing 
the tied estates of pubcos as amongst others, they are unable to match the substantial 
discounts on beer offered to pubcos by the largest brewers. Similarly, Australian craft 
brewers are often eliminated from the competition to secure beer taps in pubs as they are 
unable to match the generous incentives offered by the larger brewers who wield 
significant market power.279 The tying agreements favoured by Australian brewers today 
involve them paying a venue to supply their product on tap for a certain duration, usually a 
number of years. Contracts imposed by the larger brewers Lion Nathan and Carlton & 
United Breweries have been found to impose conditions on publicans, such as requiring the 
exclusive right to supply 80% or even 100% of the beer taps in the outlet in return for 
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significant volume rebates and the instillation and maintenance of those taps.280 These beer 
tie agreements therefore differ from those in the UK as they can recognise the current 
demand for increased consumer choice and therefore only require the right to exclusively 
supply a percentage of the beer taps in a particular retail outlet. By contrast, it is standard 
practice in the UK for complete exclusivity to be granted. This therefore marginally 
improves the prospects of Australian craft brewers supplying their draft products to retail 
outlets by comparison to their UK counterparts who can face foreclosure from tied houses 
on account of pubcos complete exclusivity in supplying them. Further, notwithstanding the 
foregoing issues faced by Australian craft brewers, it is suggested that in light of the 
experience on the US beer market discussed above, the position of these smaller brewers 
would be worsened by an absolute ban on vertical integration and exclusive dealing. This 
would prohibit all forms of vertical integration and beer tying agreements with on-trade 
establishments thereby presenting an even greater challenge to the continued growth and 
increasing market share of the craft beer sector. As was made apparent in the consideration 
of the UK beer market in Chapter 2, some acceptance of the beer tie has long enabled 
smaller brewers to retain their market share in a rapidly consolidating market. 
3.4.2 ACCC investigation into exclusive dealing in the beer market  
The struggle faced by Australian craft brewers in accessing pubs and other retail outlets 
has recently attracted the attention of the ACCC. As discussed above, the ACCC is charged 
with determining whether practices such as exclusive dealing are likely to substantially 
lessen competition in the market. Allan Fels, the former chairman of the ACCC highlights 
that given the growth in the craft beer sector these exclusive contracts relied on by the 
larger brewers raise significant issues under the CCA 2010.281 Fels states that “[t]he 
general approach is if exclusive dealing cuts competitors, especially if it forecloses 
markets and keeps competitors out, it is generally unlawful.” 282 He therefore suggests that 
as craft brewers attempt to gain access to pubs and other retail outlets, the exclusive 
dealing arrangements in the market require significant attention by the ACCC.283 The 
ACCC is subsequently reported to have instigated a confidential investigation into draft 
brewing in Australia. This includes an investigation into the practices of Lion and Carlton 
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& United Breweries which has been highlighted as one of the ACCC’s top priorities.284 
The urgency of the investigation has been prompted by suggestions that Lion Nathan and 
Carlton & United Breweries, the two duopolists on the market, have used their significant 
market power to force out competitors from the draft beer market.285 Therefore should the 
ACCC be satisfied that the exclusive dealing arrangements of the largest brewers caused a 
substantial lessening of competition, the implications may be similar to the ACCC’s 
historic decision in Tooth discussed above. 
3.5  The establishment of powerful retailers in the Australian beer market 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned competitive implications resulting from the tying of 
beer taps, the general prohibition on exclusive dealing under s.47 CCA 2010 has presented 
additional challenges as the primary means of distributing beer in Australia is now through 
the off-trade sector.286 While this change in the distribution of beer is not solely 
attributable to the competition law provisions of the CCA, with this being a global trend in 
beer distribution and with Australian consumers exhibiting an early preference for bottled 
beer, there was a significant shift from draft to bottled beer in the aftermath of the ACCC’s 
decision in Tooth discussed above.  
As in the UK market, today the off-trade sector is mainly made up of off-licenses and 
supermarkets, with the latter dominating. In 2011 Citigroup estimated supermarket chains 
Coles and Woolworths’ market share of liquor retail to be 58% and rising.287 These chains 
operate three different store formats. They operate ‘big box’ stores, with Woolworths and 
Coles stores accounting for 27% of retail liquor industry revenues; convenience stores; and 
specialty standalone stores.288 Coles and Woolworths therefore enjoy market power in the 
Australian off-trade. This has been the result of organic growth with acquisitions being 
historically significant to these companies.289 The influence of these chain stores however 
is also increased by their production of ‘private’ label beers that are essentially ‘home 
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brands’.290 This was exemplified by Woolworths’ acquisition of a 25% stake in craft 
brewer Gage Roads Brewing Co. which enabled it to secure volumes to supply its private 
label.291 It has been reported that Coles’ private label sales constitute 20% of their total 
sales with this continuing to strengthen. One of its private labels produced by brewer 
Independent Distillers, is outselling branded beer competitors.292 Bowley however 
highlights some of the implications of supermarket chains producing their own private 
labels.  These include the fact that chain stores are most likely to prioritise shelf space to 
the advantage of their own labels; they are able to replicate producer led innovation; and 
chain stores secure even greater bargaining power against producers.293 Bowley also notes 
that their continued success lies in the fact that price is the principle differentiator in chain 
store retailing.294 Chain stores are able to use their favourable trading terms and efficient 
supply chains to offer low cost options.295 Brewers have however expressed concerns that 
the increasing margin pressure from national retailers presents a challenge to the industry 
going forward as this limits their ability to invest in product development and new capital 
equipment.296 The imbalanced bargaining power between supermarkets and suppliers, 
which is partially attributable to the low switching costs for supermarkets, has also 
attracted the attention of the ACCC.297 Supermarket practices have been highlighted as 
including the placing of unreasonable demands on suppliers and threatening product 
removal, as well as favoring their home brand products to the detriment of suppliers.298 
Consequently politicians in Australia have called for legislation to bring about divestiture 
within the supermarket sector.299  
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3.6  Australian approach is not a solution to the challenges faced in the 
distribution of beer in the UK market 
In light of the foregoing it is clear that Australia has not gone as far as the US in outlawing 
the beer tie as an illegitimate business model in all circumstances. It has however adopted a 
stricter approach than the UK where, under the influence of the EU, the tie generally 
benefits from reciprocal exemption under Regulation 330/2010300 without the need for 
notification to the European Commission. Where such exemption is not available, the 
Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 must be breached before the conduct is 
prohibited.  As noted above, this imposes a higher test than that of s.47 CCA 2010 which 
generally prohibits all exclusive dealing such as the beer tie where it has the purpose effect 
or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.301 This is so even although the 
newly adopted 2015 Act restricts the operation of the beer tie in the UK by requiring large 
pub owning businesses to offer their tied tenants a MRO option in certain circumstances as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
As shown above this stricter approach by the Australian competition authorities has not 
had an entirely positive effect on the competitive situation in the Australian beer market 
suggesting that it is not a suitable model for the UK market to follow. After the 
introduction of s.47 TPA and the Tribunal’s decision in Tooth, the Australian brewing 
market has transformed from a relatively fragmented market into a national duopoly today. 
The two largest producers Lion Nathan and United & Carlton Brewers in 2013 enjoyed a 
combined market share of 85.7% which is even greater than that of the US duopolists 
discussed above. Consequently, the Australian approach to regulation of their beer market 
has caused, amongst others, increased concentration, a reduction in consumer choice and 
an increase in barriers to entry although it has not produced an equivalent to the pubco. 
Australian consumers have however recently begun to enjoy greater variety beyond the 
dupolists’ generic products as the country’s craft beer sector has gained market share 
amidst increased consumer demand for choice in the beer market. This growth has 
occurred under a legal regime that in contrast to the US market allows for some acceptance 
of vertical integration and reliance on the beer tie, again suggesting that the UK market 
should not be regulated in a way that prohibits this outright. Nevertheless, as in the UK 
beer market, the increased diversity resulting from these developments is not necessarily 
reflected in the range of products offered in Australia’s pubs and other on-trade outlets. 
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This is also due to the continuing use of beer tying agreements by the largest brewers with 
this practice reportedly undergoing investigation by the ACCC. However, in certain cases, 
the range of beers offered in tied establishments is not as restricted as it is in the UK due to 
the use of tap contracts that only require a certain proportion of the pub’s taps be tied to 
that brewer, although in some cases 100% exclusivity is demanded. Therefore, whilst there 
are undoubtedly consequences associated with the use of beer tie agreements by the largest 
brewers, in light of the implications of the outright prohibition on exclusive dealing in the 
US market which largely precluded the development of any brewing sector to rival the 
largest players, some acceptance of exclusive dealing is still preferable to outlawing this 
entirely.  
Nevertheless, a further implication of the Australian approach to exclusive dealing is that 
off-trade beer sales have long been greater than those through the on-trade. Whilst the 
switch to off-sales of beer is now a trend in the global beer market, similarly to the US 
market, this was expedited in Australia due to the general prohibition on exclusive dealing. 
Today powerful supermarket chains Woolworths and Coles are well established and now 
dominate off-trade sales in Australia. Although their success has been greatly influenced 
by their ability to offer consumers low cost options, as discussed above, their development 
of private labels and significant bargaining power in dealings with suppliers potentially has 
implications for the beer market going forward with their practices also attracting the 
attention of the ACCC. Therefore the potential for reforms to the UK’s regulation of the 
beer market to increase the role of supermarkets in the distribution of beer should be 
acknowledged when making recommendations for reform. 
In light of the foregoing, despite Australia’s stricter approach to the beer tie than that in the 
UK, the Australian market is more concentrated and similarities can be drawn between the 
competitive concerns in both over the use of beer tying agreements today. Therefore regard 
will be had to the arrangements for the distribution of beer in Belgium where the tie is 
permitted under a competition law regime that is largely similar to that in the UK, however 
the beer market is considered to be one of the most diversified in the World. 
4. The Belgian beer market   
Belgium, despite its small geographical size, is one of the world’s major beer producers 
and is home to a significant variety of beers. On a per capita basis this is higher than any 
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other country.302 It is also the birthplace of the world’s largest brewer Anheuser Busch 
InBev (AB InBev), whose roots can be traced back to the 14th Century. Today it operates 
alongside many Belgian brewers with a similarly impressive history which utilise 
traditional techniques but compete in the global marketplace.303  
4.1  A brief history of the Belgian beer market and the role of the tie 
Brewing is said to be “ingrained in the culture” in Belgium, having been introduced by the 
Romans.304 Several factors have however influenced the rich variety of Belgian beers 
produced today.305 Being embedded amongst France, Germany and the Netherlands, and 
having had Europe’s leading forces take charge of the country at various points in time, has 
influenced the flavours and techniques employed in brewing in Belgium.306 As a result 
these are considered to be probably the most varied in the world.307 Oliver highlights that 
many of these techniques continue to be used today, providing inspiration to brewers all 
over the World.308 Religious institutions, such as monasteries, have also engaged in the 
production of beer thereby adding to this diversity.309 By the early 20th Century, Belgium 
enjoyed the beer of over three thousand commercial breweries and in contrast to most other 
European countries, including the UK, these beers were enjoyed by all social classes due to 
the significant import duties on French wine.310 
This diversity endured and by World War I the market was still highly fragmented. Due to 
the relatively low start-up costs for brewers relative to the high transportation costs for 
beer, small local brewers dominated.311 These local beers had their own distinctive tastes, 
making market integration difficult.312 However Van Der Hallen notes that due to wartime 
restrictions the Belgian beer market began to consolidate and although consumption levels 
recovered in the post-war era, the number of breweries in operation did not.313 During 
World War I many Belgian breweries were stripped of their copper equipment and several 
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were destroyed.314 German occupation during the war is also thought to have introduced 
lager-type beers to the Belgian market. This was a more homogeneous product than locally 
brewed beers with their specific production techniques. Lager therefore made it possible 
for brewers to penetrate the markets of rival brewers.315 The introduction of lager 
combined with a reduction in transportation costs, due to improvements in the road 
network and the use of motorised vehicles, resulted in rapid consolidation of the Belgian 
beer market in the inter-war years and beyond.316  
4.1.1 Brewers’ reliance on beer tying agreements  
This consolidation posed a threat to small and medium sized brewers operating in the 
Belgian beer market. They were forced to defer to traditional means to defend their market 
share including placing increased reliance on the use of the beer tie. Similarly to brewers in 
the UK, discussed in Chapter 2, the tie had long been relied on by Belgian brewers due to 
the perishable nature of their traditional beers and the need for reliable outlets for their 
products.317 However, in the late 1920s the largest brewers sought to capitalise on this 
when it became apparent that the smallest brewers in the Belgian market lacked the 
resources to produce their own lager beers which were increasing in popularity. Van Der 
Hallen notes that they did so by offering these smaller brewers their brands at a discount.318  
Many brewers accepted this offer and sold the lager brands of the largest brewers alongside 
their own traditional beers.319 As customers increasingly opted for the lager on offer many 
small brewers eventually opted to exclusively sell the larger brewers’ brands from their 
retail outlets.320 Nevertheless, as medium sized brewers continued to lose market share 
they increasingly relied on beer tie agreements with pubs and offered outlets credit or other 
financial advantage in return for purchasing their products to the exclusion of their 
competitors’ products.321 However, for the same reasons that have influenced the 
widespread use of the tie in the UK discussed in Chapter 2, Van Der Hallen notes that the 
larger brewers also relied heavily upon the beer tie when consumption levels began to 
decline in the 1930s.322 Brewers were concerned that declining beer consumption would 
result in the under utilisation of production capacity. 
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Whilst this widespread use of the tie initially had the desired effect, in that all brewers 
managed to secure their market share to some degree or another, smaller brewers soon ran 
into difficulty as tying distribution channels in this way was costly.323 As their capital was 
tied up it could not be used to improve their products and ultimately they could not 
compete with the favourable enticements offered by the largest brewers.  Over the coming 
decades, this prompted the exit from the market of many smaller brewers.324 The market 
therefore consolidated further with the remaining brewers competing by taking over the 
distribution networks of their rivals with this increasing greatly after World War II.325 The 
ensuing mergers remained a feature of the market throughout the coming decades as did 
the use of the beer tie and loan tying agreements.326  
Consequently the UK and Belgian beer markets have placed similar reliance on the beer tie 
throughout their histories.  However, Van Der Hallen also distinguishes these two markets 
by acknowledging the role restrictive licensing played in shaping the UK market.327 There 
was no parallel to restrictive licensing in operation in Belgium at that time and so the use 
of tying agreements had different effects on the structure of the Belgian and UK 
markets.328 As licensing laws restricted the number of retail outlets available to brewers in 
the UK, the structure of the market was largely frozen unless a merger between brewers 
occurred. Van Der Hallen therefore suggests that the combination of restrictive licensing 
and the tied house system served to preserve some fragmentation within the UK market up 
until the 1950s.329 By contrast, the number of outlets in Belgium at that time was 
unconstrained by such licensing requirements and the Belgian Government adopted a more 
lax approach towards mergers than in the UK. The evolution of the Belgian market was 
therefore less constrained than in the UK with further consolidation resulting.330  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Ibid at p30 
324 Ibid at p30 
325 Ibid at p30 
326 Above, n.7 at para 12, p313 
327 Above, n.312 at p31 
328 Ibid at p31 
329 Ibid at p31. See also G Johnson and H Thomas, ‘The Industry Context of Strategy, Structure and 
performance: the UK Brewing Industry’ (1987) 8 Strategic Manage J, 343 at 344  
330 Belgian licensing policy is now a Federal matter. All retailers of alcoholic beverages require a licence to 
operate. E Österberg and T Karlsson, (eds), ‘Alcohol policies in EU Member States and Norway A 
Collection of country reports’ (Europa, 1998) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_projects/1998/promotion/fp_promotion_1998_a01_27_en.pdf>  accessed 3rd 
July 2015. Above, n.312 at p31. 
 	  203	  
4.1.2 Consolidation in the Belgian beer market and increased exports in 
the Belgian beer market  
Belgium became a founding member of the EU in 1957 and the beer tie remained as 
prevalent throughout the 1950s and 1960s in the absence of any restrictions on this practice 
or that of granting credit to outlets.331 As a result, by the 1960s following a series of take 
overs, the Belgian brewer Artois had establish itself as the largest in the country. Given 
Belgium’s long acceptance of the beer tie, by 1961 it was estimated that 81% of Belgium’s 
restaurant, hotel and café (horeca) sector, was tied in some way to a brewery.332 
Nevertheless, in keeping with the global trend of declining beer consumption, Belgian 
brewers were also forced to explore the possibility of international expansion.333 As this 
strategy was successful, by the 1970s decreased reliance was placed on tying regional 
distribution networks. Although the practice did not disappear, by relaxing this system 
there was a reduction in the costs incurred by brewers in operating their regional 
networks.334 As in the US and Australian beer markets discussed above, marketing became 
an increased source of expenditure for brewers at this time.335 Consequently, Houthoofd 
and Heene highlight the tied house system, strong brand recognition and reputation, as well 
as significant capital expenditure on, amongst others, advertising and promotion became 
significant barriers to entry to the largest sector of the beer market, namely the pils (lager) 
segment.336 This was not however the case in the non-pils segment of the Belgian market. 
There beers were still produced on a smaller scale with larger production costs. These 
traditional production techniques, whilst costly, introduced differentiation that offset the 
differentiation amongst the large pils producers brought about by extensive marketing of 
their brands and made these smaller brands desirable to consumers.337  
Nevertheless, as Belgian brewers looked to exploit the opportunities presented by 
international expansion, by 1990 approximately 10% of Belgian beer production was 
marked for export.338 This has increased to over half of the total beer produced in Belgium 
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332 Above, n.312 at p30-31 
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336 N Houthoofd and A Heene, ‘Strategic groups as subsets of strategic groups in the Belgian brewing 
industry’ (1997) 18(8) Strategic Manage J 653 at 655 
337 Ibid at p655 
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(The Brewers of Europe) <http://www.brewersofeurope.org/uploads/mycms-
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today, making it Europe’s second largest exporter of beer.339 In addition to developing this 
export market for Belgian beer, Belgian brewers were ahead of the trend in international 
consolidation and rapidly started to acquire their foreign counterparts. This foresight 
resulted in InBev, the world’s largest brewing company being a Belgian based brewer.340 
In 2008, InBev acquired America’s largest brewer Anheuser Bush (AB), to form AB 
InBev, reinforcing its position as the largest brewer in the world.341 However, in line with 
being home to the world’s largest brewer, despite the diversity of beers brewed in Belgium 
today the Belgian beer market is now highly concentrated. In 2013 AB InBev accounted 
for 53.9% of the Belgian beer market by volume, with the three largest Belgian brewers 
having a combined market share of 76.3% of the market by volume.342 Whilst highly 
concentrated, the top two producers had a combined market share of 71% thereby still 
comparing favourably to the duopoly in the US market discussed above where the top two 
brewers have a combined market share of 79.6% of the US beer market by volume in 
2013.343 Similarly, this is also favourable to the Australian duopolists’ market share of 
84.7% of the Australian beer market by volume in 2013.344 All three markets are however 
significantly concentrated by comparison to the UK beer market discussed in Chapter 4 
where the three largest producers had a combined market share of 71.6% of the UK beer 
market by volume in 2013.345 The Belgium beer market is however closer to the UK 
market’s level of concentration than the US and Australian markets. 
4.2  Legal acceptance of the beer tie  
Notwithstanding the foregoing developments in the Belgian beer market that have 
decreased Belgian brewers’ dependence on tying domestic distribution networks, similarly 
to the UK market discussed in Chapter 4, the beer tie is still an important business model 
used by Belgian brewers. This reliance was initially unaffected by Belgium’s membership 
of the EU in 1957. Whilst Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were applicable in certain Belgian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 In 2012 Belgium was the second largest exporter within the EU after the Netherlands. Berkhaut B et al, 
‘The contribution made by beer to the European Economy’ at p74 (Ernst & Young, 2013) 
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
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merge with Brazilian based AmBev to create the world’s largest brewer InBev in 2004. Above, n.304 at p4 
341 Above, n.304 at p4 
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competition law cases due to their direct effect and their supremacy over national law, 
Belgium lacked its own competition laws and policy. This was with the exception of an 
under utilised Act of the 1960s which dealt with the abuse of economic power.346   
4.2.1 The Competition Act 1991 
Belgium’s first substantive competition law provisions did not come into force until the 
introduction of the Competition Act 1991 (the 1991 Act).347  As with the UK’s 
Competition Act 1998 discussed in Chapter 4, this sought to implement a national 
competition law regime that was aligned with the EU competition law provisions.348 As 
this was based on EU competition law, the terms of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were 
clearly reflected in the provisions of the 1991 Act that detailed the prohibited conduct. 
Article 2 of the 1991 Act dealt with restrictive practices with the object or effect of 
preventing, restricting or materially distorting competition in the relevant Belgian market 
or a substantial part of it; and Article 3 attended to abuses of dominance in the relevant 
Belgian market or a substantial part of it. The main difference from the EU provisions was 
therefore the 1991 Act’s focus on the Belgian market and the lack of a requirement for an 
inter-state effect. The Belgian Supreme Court also made clear its intention to interpret and 
apply its provisions in line with EU law.349  However, in 2006 the 1991 Act was replaced 
by two Acts350 that were subsequently consolidated into a single Royal Decree. This was 
the Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition 2006 (the 2006 Act).351 
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351 Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition of September 15 2006, Moniteur Belge, 
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4.2.2 Act on the Protection of Economic Competition 2006 and its 
successors 
The main prohibitions contained in the Competition Act 1991 were reflected in Chapter II 
of the 2006 Act which dealt with anti-competitive practices. Similarly to the 1991 Act, 
Article 2(1) of the 2006 Act was the equivalent of Article 101 TFEU prohibition, while 
Article 3 reflected Article 102 TFEU.352 Article 5 of the 2006 Act also confirmed the 
benefit of the EU block exemption regulations to restrictive practices, with this extending 
to situations where there was no effect on inter-state trade and so only the Belgian market 
was affected.353 Consequently the 2006 Act was very similar in its terms to the UK’s 
Competition Act 1998, discussed in Chapter 4. While the 2006 Act failed to define 
‘vertical restraint’ or to provide examples of the conduct affected, as noted above Belgian 
competition law was to be interpreted in accordance with EU jurisprudence. The 
Competition Council and its auxiliary bodies had primary responsibility for the 
administrative enforcement of the Belgian competition law rules.354 However, Montangie 
states that it “malfunctioned from the outset”.355  
The Competition Council was therefore soon replaced. Two Acts of April 13, 2013 were 
implemented in place of the 2006 Act with new competition rules also being integrated 
into the new Code of Economic Law.356 The substantive competition law provisions are 
now detailed in Book IV of the Code of Economic Law (CEL).357 Whilst this introduced 
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353 Above, at n.351 
354 Y Montangie, ‘The Application of EU Competition Law by the Belgian Competition Authorities and 
Judges: Is Belgium Prepared for the “New Regime”?’ (2004) 1 (1) The Competition Law Review 41 at p44 
355 The problems included the fact the Competition Council was under-resourced to deal with its workload 
(ibid at p44-47). The Council was also ciriticised for its lack of economic analysis in competition cases (ibid 
at p49).  
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Competition Litigation Review 39 at 40.  
357 Also referred to as the Competition Act of 3 April 2013 (Belgian Official Gazette 26-4-2013). Unofficial 
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<http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/Book_IV_of_the_Code_of_Economic_Law-
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significant reforms to the Belgian Competition Authority, the substantive provisions 
regarding anti-competitive practices described above remain unchanged.358  
As was the case under Article 2 of the 2006 Act, Article IV.1 of the CEL is equivalent to 
Article 101(1) TFEU and is subsequently also very similar to the UK’s Chapter I 
prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. This states that ‘all agreements between 
undertakings, all decisions by associations of undertakings and all concerted practices, the 
aim or consequence of which is to prevent, restrict or distort significantly competition in 
the Belgian market concerned or in a substantial part of that market are prohibited’.359 It is 
therefore applicable to brewers’ exclusive dealing agreements. Agreements or decisions 
coming within this provision are automatically void under Article IV.1(2) CEL. However, 
reflecting the terms of Article 101(3) TFEU, discussed in Chapter 3, the possibility of 
exemption from the prohibition is offered under Article IV.1(3) CEL. This has been 
extended further than Article 101(3) TFEU by adding to the exemption criteria “any 
concerted practice…which enable small and medium sized undertakings to assert their 
competitive position in the market concerned or internationally”.360 Therefore, in keeping 
with the EU competition law provisions, Belgian competition law is more concerned with 
the interests of consumers, small and medium sized undertakings and efficiency gains 
when granting exemptions to prohibited anticompetitive practices than their Australian 
counterparts under the CCA 2010 discussed above.  
Similarly to the 2006 Act, whilst no definition of vertical restraint is provided in the CEL, 
as already mentioned Belgian law is to be interpreted in line with EU law. Therefore the 
types of restraint caught are largely identical to those under the EU competition law 
provisions discussed in Chapter 3. Further, Article IV.4 CEL confirms that the Belgian 
competition provisions are inapplicable to agreements benefitting from EU block 
exemption Regulations with this also extending to arrangements lacking any inter-state 
effect. In light of this, block exemption Regulation 330/2010 discussed in Chapter 3 is 
applicable to beer tie agreements that only have an effect on the Belgian market. The 
Belgian competition law regime is therefore very similar to the UK’s competition law 
regime discussed in Chapter 4 and reflects the EU position that the beer tie agreement 
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constitutes a legitimate business model. However, like their UK counterparts the extensive 
use of the beer tie by Belgium’s largest brewers has long attracted the attention of the 
European competition authorities as exemplified by the 1967 Brasserie de Haecht case, 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3.361  
4.3  European Competition Authorities scrutiny of Belgian brewers’ 
practices 
The beer tie has been and continues to be used widely in the Belgian and UK beer markets. 
However, as mentioned above, given the ability of such exclusive agreements to foreclose 
markets and aid the acquisition of market power, brewers’ reliance on such agreements has 
been subject to regular scrutiny by the European competition authorities.362 Therefore 
although EU membership initially had little practical impact on the practices of Belgian or 
UK brewers, this changed in 1999 with the adoption of the new Block Exemption 
Regulation 2790/99.363 As discussed in Chapter 3, this made exemption of such agreements 
conditional on compliance with a new market share requirement. Article 3 of Regulation 
2790/99 imposed a market share cap of 30% as a condition for exemption from the EU 
competition law provisions. Prior to this, in the absence of any market share threshold, 
Belgian brewers had largely enjoyed a free rein to tie as many outlets as they desired.  
4.3.1 AB InBev’s use of beer tie agreements 
The adoption of the market share approach under Regulation 2790/99 prompted Belgium’s 
largest brewer AB InBev, then called Interbrew, to notify the European Commission in 
June 2000 of its supply agreements with on-trade establishments in Belgium.364 At the time 
of notification, AB InBev held a market share of approximately 56% of the Belgian horeca 
sector whilst the second largest brewer Alken Maes had a market share of only 13%.365 AB 
InBev was therefore the only Belgian brewer at that time not to qualify for exemption 
under Regulation 2790/99 on account of its market share.366 The Commission noted that of 
the 52,000 horeca outlets operating in the Belgian market, 35,000 were pubs. Over 20,000 
of these sold AB InBev’s beers with 11,000-13,000 being subject to an exclusive supply 
agreement.367 Of those tied to AB InBev, over 7,000 were subject to loan tie agreements 
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362 See Chapter 3. 
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and over 3,000 were subject to lease or sublease tie agreements, all with a requirement to 
exclusively supply the brewer’s products.368 The loan tie agreements were subject to a 
maximum duration limit of 5 years.369 In accordance with Belgian law, the lease ties were 
generally concluded for a period of 9 years and were renewable for a further 9 years up to a 
maximum duration of 27 years.370 
In order to secure exemption for its agreements AB InBev proposed certain concessions. 
The Commission subsequently imposed further demands on the brewer before it accepted 
that their supply agreements did not restrict competition in an appreciable manner.371 The 
extent of the tie imposed under the notified agreements varied. AB InBev’s loan tie 
agreements were divided into two categories, both imposing different tying obligations. 
Firstly, contracts entered into after 1 March 2001 imposed a non-compete obligation in 
respect of draft beer only, thereby excluding bottled and canned beers and other drinks.372 
Those entered into from 1 June 2001 were terminable annually on 3 months’ notice.373 
Secondly, those loan agreements entered into after 1 July 2001 had this non-compete 
obligation replaced with a minimum-purchasing obligation requiring 75% of total beer 
turnover to be purchased from AB InBev.374 Under the concessions granted the outlets tied 
by loan agreement had their minimum-purchasing obligation limited to draught pills beer 
only, provided that the outlet purchased 50% or more of its total beer requirements from 
the brewer. This therefore limited the breadth and extent of the obligations imposed and 
allowed ABInBev’s competitors to supply those tied outlets with any beers, except draught 
pils.375 Concessions were also made to allow these contracts to be terminated at any time 
on 3 months notice.376 Outlets operated under lease from Interbrew were subject to a 
reduced non-compete obligation that was limited to all types of draught beer brewed by 
ABInBev under its own brand or under a license agreement.377 Under the concessions 
granted, the tie no longer extended to draught beer that was not brewed by AB InBev.378 
This subsequently opened up these outlets to competition from Trappist beers and others 
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not brewed by AB InBev.379 As Ratliff notes by agreeing to grant exemption to these 
agreements, the Commission appears to have take into consideration the commercial 
interests of the suppler by negotiating these concessions as opposed to prohibiting the 
agreements as incompatible with Article 101 TFEU.380 However, while these concessions 
imposed more stringent requirements on AB InBev than were required under the terms of 
Regulation 2790/99 then in force, as noted in Chapter 3 it ultimately permitted AB InBev 
with a market share of 53% of the Belgian horeca sector to impose reasonably restrictive 
obligations on over half of Belgium’s pubs.381  
4.3.2 Suspected cartel activity in the Belgian beer market  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, excessive reliance on exclusive supply contracts is not the 
only practice of Belgium’s largest brewers to attract the attention of the European 
competition authorities. In 2000, the European Commission investigated cartel activity in 
the Belgian brewing sector between Belgium’s two largest brewers, AB InBev, then known 
as Interbrew, and Alken Maes a subsidiary company of Groupe Danone.382 This was the 
first time the Commission had considered possible horizontal collusion between 
brewers.383 The alleged infringements included market sharing, price fixing and 
information exchange.384 In December 2001, the European Commission fined the two 
brewers, along with smaller brewers Haacht and Martens, for orchestrating two secret 
cartels on the Belgian beer market between 1993 and 1998.385 This decision was upheld on 
appeal.386  
The first cartel involved the two largest suppliers of beer to the Belgian market, Interbrew 
and Alken Maes and concerned an extensive range of anticompetitive practices in both on 
and off-trade premises from 1993 until the beginning of 1998.387 Following increased 
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threats from Danone to create difficulties for Interbrew on the French market, the brewers 
entered into a gentleman’s agreement giving effect to these practices and subsequent 
‘cooperation’ between the brewers.388 The Commission found this cartel, which covered all 
sectors of the market, to be a very serious infringement of Article 101 TFEU with this 
being reflected in the level of fine imposed which was intended to have a deterrent 
effect.389 The second cartel was concerned with private label beer. There had been 
consultation between the two largest brewers and brewers Haacht and Martens concerning 
this sector.390 The parties met and exchanged information regarding private label beer and 
Interbrew subsequently acknowledged that it was a party to an “agreement on price level 
and market sharing in the private label market (1997-1998).”391 The Commission found 
that their practices were aimed at both sharing customers and at fixing prices above the 
level that would have been achieved under conditions of free of competition.392 The 
brewers’ cartel activities amounted to a concerted practice and a serious breach of Article 
101 TFEU.393 The Commission did however take into consideration the shorter duration of 
the infringement, which lasted for 9 months,394 and the ‘effective economic capacity’ of 
the smaller brewers to cause significant damage to other operators in setting the level of 
the fines imposed.395 These were therefore not as significant as those for the first cartel 
however were intended to have a deterrent effect.396  
4.4  The Belgian beer market today  
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the practices of brewers in the Belgian beer market 
have not been entirely free of controversy, having attracted the attention of the European 
competition authorities for their widespread use of the beer tie as well as their concerted 
practices. However, notwithstanding this, and despite the market being significantly 
concentrated, as discussed above the Belgium brewing industry is still characterised by its 
great diversity. Persyn et al highlight that approximately 95% of Belgian brewers produce 
only 7% of Belgium’s total beer production.397 Included amongst the products of these 
smaller brewers is Trappist beers the brewing and marketing of which remains within the 
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control of the Trappist monks.398 The authenticity of their products has been preserved by 
the imposition of strict rules governing their production that do not lend themselves to 
mass production by international brewers.399 The Belgian beer market is therefore 
characterised by a small number of very large breweries co-existing alongside a plethora of 
small brewers.400 This ‘dual market structure’ is similar to that existing in the UK beer 
market discussed in Chapter 4, and is also increasingly the case in the US and Australian 
markets due to their growing craft beer sectors.401 The concentration now apparent in the 
Belgium beer market is therefore common to all of the beer markets considered here, and 
has been influenced by numerous factors beyond the acceptance or rejection of the beer tie 
as a legitimate business model.402 As already mentioned, in Belgium the introduction of 
lager beer during the German occupation has been influential. However other generic 
factors that have contributed to this concentration in all beer markets include technological 
progress which has in turn lead to increased economies of scale, the development of 
powerful and nationally marketed beer brands, and declining beer consumption.403 
4.4.1 Diversity distinguishes the Belgian beer market   
Therefore whilst Belgium’s ‘dual market structure’ does not distinguish it from the UK 
beer market, the sheer number of beer varieties it supports does serve to do so. As already 
mentioned, on a per capita basis this is greater than any other country.404 As discussed 
above, a relaxed approach towards the beer tie has contributed to the maintenance of this 
diversity by providing a means for many smaller brewers to retain their market share in a 
rapidly consolidating industry. However, Persyn et al also suggest that the preservation of 
Belgium’s unique variety of beers is due to attempts by the larger brewers to maintain a 
portfolio of beers covering the most important traditional varieties.405 These brewers are 
active in the production of many different types of beer and endeavor to protect the image 
of regional quality products.406 The specificity of the production processes involved in 
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400 Above, n.302 at p93. See also See E Wauters and S Van Passel, ‘The more beers the better? Exploring the 
link between vertical integration in the brewery sector and beer diversity in pubs’ (Beeronomics, the 
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producing some of these regional beers do not lend themselves to centralised production. It 
has therefore been suggested that the acquisition of some of these regional brands by a 
larger brewer has prevented them from disappearing from the Belgian beer market.407 
Belgium’s largest brewer AB InBev for example has an extensive portfolio of over two 
hundred brands and has a policy of retaining local beers in each country where it has a 
presence.408 It also has ‘global flagship’ brands that it promotes worldwide as ‘premium 
brands’ using the distribution networks for local brands to gain market share.409 However, 
the value in preserving this range of traditional Belgian beers is also influenced by the 
substantial and lucrative export market for them. As discussed above, Belgium is the 
second largest beer-exporting nation in Europe with international demand for Belgian 
beers continuing to increase.410 Consequently all of these factors, in addition to Belgium’s 
acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model, have contributed to Belgium’s 
significant diversity in terms of the beer varieties and producers operating in its beer 
market, at a time of declining global demand for beer.411  
4.4.2 Increasing off-trade sales  
In keeping with global trends in the beer industry already mentioned, the Belgium beer 
market is however declining.412 Whilst as discussed above, international demand for 
Belgian beers has long compensated for declining domestic consumption, another 
implication of this has been the recent shift away from on-trade beer sales through 
Belgium’s horeca sector of the market. Belgian brewers, like many of their European 
counterparts, have responded by increasing the support offered to the hospitality sector. 
However Belgian brewers have also placed significant effort in developing novel beers as 
consumers have favoured local premium brands over mainstream lagers due to a trend of 
pairing specialty beers with cooking.413 Whilst the on-trade sector remains strong, in 2009 
off-trade consumption was greater than on-trade beer sales for the first time in several 
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410 B Berkhaut et al, ‘The contribution made by beer to the European Economy’at p74 (Ernst & Young, 2013) 
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years with this trend continuing today.414 As discussed above, a similar trend is evident in 
the UK beer market, and has also long been evident in the US and Australian beer markets 
in light of their outlawing of the beer tie. In 2013, supermarkets accounted for 46.5% of the 
Belgian beer market distribution by value, with the on-trade accounting for 32.5% of the 
market.415 The largest off-trade channel in the Belgian beer market is therefore the 
supermarket. As is also evident in the UK and Australian beer markets, the Belgian 
supermarkets enjoy significant buyer power and so are able to negotiate preferred terms on 
price with brewers with the supermarkets’ low switching costs and their increasing 
production of private labels contributing to this buyer power.416  
As mentioned above, the Belgian on-trade sector is still strong and the chain of distribution 
in the Belgian beer market involves the on-trade sector being supplied by beer 
wholesalers.417 Whilst consolidation within the wholesale sector has caused a decrease in 
the number of such wholesalers in operation it is still considered to be reasonably large.418 
As already mentioned concerns over the distribution of beer in the UK have included the 
absence of an independent wholesale and distribution sector. Some Belgian wholesalers 
specialise in supplying the on-trade whilst brewers also distribute directly to the trade.419 
However in addition to tying outlets within the horeca sector, Belgian brewers have been 
known to acquire these beer merchants as the largest of these often own pubs.420  
Consequently despite having a competition law regime that is very similar to that in the 
UK and recognises the beer tie as a legitimate business model, the Belgium beer market 
has no equivalent to the UK’s pubcos in the supply chain of beer distribution. The closest 
to this would be those Belgian beer wholesalers who also own pubs, however, no 
competition law issues appear to have been raised regarding their practices. This a very 
different proposition from the UK’s pubcos, which were ultimately an unforeseen 
consequence of the Beer Orders of 1989 as discussed in Chapter 2.  
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4.5 Belgian approach to beer distribution preferable to that in the US and 
Australian markets  
In light of the foregoing it is evident that there are some similarities between the Belgian 
beer market and the UK market. Both share a ‘dual market structure’, which is also 
increasingly evident in the US and Australian markets. Whilst both are significantly 
concentrated, as is a trend in the global brewing market, the levels of concentration 
amongst the largest producers in Belgium and the UK are less than those in the US and 
Australian markets. The Belgian beer market is however distinguishable from the other 
beer markets considered here on account of its trademark diversity. This has been retained 
under a legal regime that is very similar to that in the UK under the Competition Act 1998 
discussed in Chapter 4. Modeled on the EU competition law provisions both recognise the 
beer tie as a legitimate business model for the distribution of beer. 
Whilst Belgium’s legal regime has contributed to the maintenance of its diversity, 
acceptance of the beer tie alone does not account for the extensive range of Belgian beer 
products and producers operating in the market today. As discussed above, Belgium’s 
geographical position in Europe and the historical influences on the range of brewing 
techniques utilised in the country have played a significant role in this. The largest Belgian 
brewers’ desire to maintain an extensive range of brands that utilise traditional brewing 
techniques, and the increasing international export market for Belgian beers have also been 
influential. As has the recent trend in favour of consuming local premium brands over 
mainstream lagers. 
However, notwithstanding the diversity in the Belgian beer market, the competitive 
implications arising from the extensive use of the beer tie by the country’s largest brewers 
have also attracted the attention of the European competition authorities as exemplified in 
Interbrew.  This serves as a reminder of the potential competitive implications arising from 
the widespread use of such vertical restraints which as discussed in Chapter 4 has long 
been a feature of the UK beer market. Consequently, whilst it is undoubtedly the case that 
acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model requires its use by the largest 
market participants to be closely monitored by the competition authorities given its 
potential to, amongst others aid market foreclosure, the Belgian beer market serves to 
highlight that recognising the tie as a legitimate business model is not in itself 
objectionable. In light of the foregoing consideration of the Belgian beer market, 
acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model is preferable to the approaches 
adopted in the USA and Australia. However, in light of the peculiarities of the UK market, 
 	  216	  
most notably the existence of the pubco, and in order to address the on-going concerns 
discussed in Chapter 4 over its use which ultimately prompted the adoption of the 2015 
Act, in the context of the UK while outlawing the tie as an illegitimate business model may 
not be desirable, the beer tie requires to be rebalanced. 
5. Conclusion 
The foregoing review of beer distribution in the selected geographic markets highlights 
that there are several factors influencing the current structure of these markets. This 
includes the approach adopted towards vertical integration and the acceptance of beer tying 
agreements. As discussed above there are limits to the weight that can be afforded to 
international comparisons, however consideration of these geographic markets suggests a 
broad trend between outlawing the tie and considerable consolidation following. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that consolidation has been a feature of all of the markets 
considered given the influence of, amongst others, declining global beer consumption and 
the need for brewers to maintain economies of scale to ensure economic production. 
Consideration of the US beer market has shown that outlawing the beer tie as a legitimate 
business model and imposing a mandatory separation between each tier in the distribution 
chain does not produce a very competitive system for the distribution of beer. Efficiency 
was not however the goal of the US authorities at the time of implementation of the 3-tier 
system, with public policy considerations being the driving force behind its adoption. 
Nevertheless, as has been shown above, this has facilitated the creation of a duopolistic 
market structure today. Further, some relaxation of the prohibition on vertical integration 
by brewers through very narrow exceptions to the 3-tier system has been necessary to 
facilitate the development of a craft beer sector to challenge the market power of the 
largest brewers. Consequently acceptance of some vertical integration in the market has 
been required in order to increase consumer choice beyond the duopolists’ products. The 3-
tier system has also been shown not to present a solution to the UK market’s lack of an 
independent wholesale and distribution sector. Despite distributors being placed at the 
centre of the 3-tier system and being afforded Federal and State protection, due to factors 
including their alignment with the dupolists, the 3-tier system has not established an 
entirely ‘independent’ wholesale and distribution sector. The foregoing review of the US 
beer market therefore suggests that merely outlawing the tie as an illegitimate business 
model and imposing a mandatory layer of distributors is not a model that is suitable to be 
followed in reforming the distribution of beer in the UK. 
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Australia however has not gone as far as the US in terms of deeming the tie an illegitimate 
business model in all circumstances. It has nevertheless adopted a stricter approach than 
the UK. While Australian markets are generally relatively small and concentrated, 
following the introduction of s.47 TPA and the Tribunal’s decision in Tooth, the market 
has evolved into a duopoly, with the two largest brewers having a combined market share 
exceeding that of the US duopolists. This has ultimately impacted on consumer choice with 
a recent resurgence in the craft beer sector being prompted by Australian consumers’ 
demands for greater choice beyond the duopolists’ products.  The resulting increase in the 
craft sector’s market share has been facilitated without amendment to the legal regime, as 
was necessary in the US, given Australia’s acceptance of the beer tie and vertical 
integration in certain circumstances. However, as in the UK beer market, this increased 
diversity is not reflected in the Australian on-trade due to the continued use of beer tying 
agreements by Australia’s largest brewers, with this reportedly prompting investigation by 
the ACCC. This serves to highlight the consequences of the use of the beer tie by the 
country’s largest brewers, however given the implications of an absolute prohibition on 
exclusive dealing as in the US market, including restricting the development of a brewing 
sector to challenge the largest players, the Australian market highlights that some 
acceptance of exclusive dealing is preferable to outlawing this entirely.  
A further implication of Australia’s stricter approach to exclusive dealing is that off-trade 
beer sales have long exceeded those through the on-trade. While this is an increasing 
global trend affecting all of the beer markets considered, this was expedited in Australia, as 
it was in the US, due to the general prohibition on exclusive dealing and the decision in 
Tooth. Although supermarkets undoubtedly offer low cost options for consumers, their 
development of private labels and significant bargaining power also have implications for 
the beer market going forward with their practices attracting the attention of the ACCC. 
This is therefore a potential implication of reform that should inform proposals for the UK 
market. 
Consequently, the Australian approach highlights that some acceptance of vertical 
integration is preferable to outlawing this entirely. However Australia’s stricter approach to 
the beer tie has generally resulted in significant concentration in the market and there are 
similarities in the on-going competitive issues raised in the UK and Australian beer 
markets today. The Australian approach therefore does not appear to present a suitable 
model to be followed in reforming the distribution of beer in the UK.  
 	  218	  
The advantages of accepting the beer tie as a legitimate business model are also supported 
by the foregoing review of the Belgian beer market. Whilst the Belgian beer market has 
undergone significant consolidation in line with the on-going global trend, this has not 
been as great as that in the US or Australian markets. Today the Belgian market similarly 
to the UK market has a ‘dual market structure’ under which it has retained its trademark 
diversity. This has developed under a legal regime, almost identical to the UK’s, which is 
modelled on the EU competition law provisions and so recognises the tie as a legitimate 
business model. Other factors beyond acceptance of the beer tie have however been 
acknowledged as contributing to this diversity, including the desire of the largest brewers 
to maintain broad portfolios of brands utilising traditional techniques and the extensive 
export market for Belgian beers.  
However, notwithstanding this diversity the competitive implications of the largest brewers 
placing reliance on the beer tie have also affected the Belgian market. This was illustrated 
by the European Commission’s involvement in Interbrew. This highlights the potential 
competitive implications associated with the widespread use of such vertical restraints 
which, as discussed in Chapter 4, is an on-going issue in the UK beer market. Therefore 
whilst is it clear that acceptance of the beer tie as a legitimate business model requires its 
use, especially by the largest market participants, to be closely monitored by the 
competition authorities due to the dangers of amongst others market foreclosure, 
consideration of the Belgian beer market highlights that accepting the tie as a legitimate 
beer model is not in itself objectionable from a competitive perspective.  
From the foregoing review of these selected geographical markets it is subsequently 
suggested that UK and Belgian approach of accepting the beer tie as a legitimate business 
model is preferable to those adopted in the USA and Australia. However, in light of the 
peculiarities of the UK beer market, particularly the existence of the pubco, and the 
numerous and on-going concerns surrounding their operation of the beer tie, it is suggested 
that while the beer tie should not be prohibited outright in the context of the UK market, it 
requires to be rebalanced. In light of this it is instructive in the next chapter to consider 
whether another market in the UK that shares some of the characteristics of the beer 
market and also relies heavily on tying agreements, namely the petroleum market, has also 
faced the same issues as the brewing industry. 
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Chapter 6 - A Comparison of Beer and Petroleum 
Distribution in the United Kingdom 
The preceding chapter considered, by way of comparison, the lessons that may be learned 
from selected non-UK markets when making recommendations for the future reform of the 
distribution of beer in the UK. It was suggested that in light of the experience in the US 
and Australian markets, following the outlawing of the beer tie as a legitimate business 
model, that rebalancing not outlawing the beer tie is the preferred option for the reform of 
the distribution of beer in the UK. This chapter now considers whether another market in 
the UK that shares several characteristics of the beer market and also relies heavily on 
tying agreements, namely the petroleum market, has also faced the same issues as the 
brewing industry in order to further guide proposed reforms of the distribution of beer in 
the UK. 
The chapter first notes the similarities in the distribution of beer and petrol highlighting 
their vertically integrated distribution systems, their reliance on vertical restraints and 
increasing buyer power in both markets (Subsection 1). It then focuses on the special 
handling of both of these sectors at the EU level noting the provisions of the various Block 
Exemption Regulations and touching on the decisional practice of the European Courts and 
Commission (Subsection 2). The chapter then highlights the numerous and on-going 
competition concerns that have affected both markets including early concerns over 
vertical integration and possible monopoly situations (Subsection 3). Regard is had to 
structural changes and the Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) declarations of competitiveness 
in the beer and petroleum markets (Subsection 4). The chapter then turns to consider the 
on-going challenges facing both sectors (Subsection 5). Continued discontentment over the 
operation of these markets is also considered noting the newly adopted Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (2015 Act) with regard to the beer market and the 
OFT Call for Information on the UK petrol and diesel sector in 2013 (Subsection 6). The 
chapter then highlights the continued lack of anticompetitive declarations in both sectors 
(Subsection 7). It then considers the distinguishing features in the supply of beer and petrol 
(Subsection 8). Finally the rise and influence of supermarkets in the distribution of beer is 
addressed (Subsection 9).  
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1. Similarities in the distribution of beer and petrol 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, there are many similarities between the distribution of 
beer and petrol. As noted by Goyder, both industries involve ‘liquid products which are 
consumed or utilised on a regular basis in small quantities by individual consumers and 
have to be provided from a large number of outlets across a wide geographical basis.’1 
They are also similar in that both are scale economy industries and as such brewers and 
refiners have long strived to utilise the full capacity of their facilities in an attempt to keep 
their costs at an acceptable level. Consequently, producers in both have sought control of 
guaranteed retail outlets for their products and have gone about this in similar fashions.2 As 
a result, and as discussed in Chapter 3, within both industries there is a natural tendency 
towards vertical integration with the widespread ownership of retail outlets and the use of 
exclusive purchasing agreements being employed in the distribution of beer and petrol in 
order to achieve this.3  
1.1 Vertically integrated distribution systems 
1.1.1 Retail distribution of beer 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a high level of vertical integration has been achieved in the 
retail distribution of beer through the practice of tying retail outlets, with very similar 
mechanisms also being employed in the retailing of petrol. As discussed earlier, initially 
breweries owned public houses and other retail outlets, and only permitted the sale of their 
product from these premises.4 They also influenced the ‘free-trade’ in independently 
owned public houses by securing exclusivity for their products in exchange for loans on 
favourable terms.5 Whilst these practices ultimately prompted the Beer Orders in 1989, 
marking the demise of the large tied estates of the national brewers, today the majority of 
public houses in the UK are still tied to the supply of beer from a small number of large 
international brewers. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, following the Beer Orders this 
supply is now largely facilitated by pub companies (pubcos).6 Whilst operating 
independently of the brewing industry, they have perpetuated the tied house system by 
owning significant estates of public houses supplied by a single brewer, most often one of 
the largest brewers with the strongest brands and the greatest discounts on wholesale beer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 3rd Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) at p203 
2 The Monopolies Commission, Petrol, A Report on the Supply of Petrol to Retailers in the United Kingdom 
(Cmnd 264,1965) at para 58, p20  
3 Chapter 3, p57 
4 See Chapter 2. 
5 This practice developed early on. See Chapter 2, p13 
6 Chapter 2, p40 
 	  221	  
prices. Consequently, economies of scale are maintained under the pubco’s tie. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, another aspect of the pre-Beer Orders market that is still evident 
today is that whilst some pubcos have their own distribution networks, many outsource 
distribution to the largest brewers which today are international organisations.7 As a result, 
there is still no strong independent wholesale sector in the distribution of beer in the UK as 
the largest brewers still dominate the market with their distribution systems and discounts.  
1.1.2 Ownership of public houses  
However, whilst as discussed in Chapter 4, pubcos have come to have significant tied 
estates, no pubco holds a dominant position under the UK or EU competition law 
provisions.8  Nevertheless, a high level of vertical integration still exists in the market 
today. The different models of ownership of public houses can be broken down into three 
broad categories, namely pubco owned outlets; brewer owned outlets; and independently 
owned or ‘freehold’ outlets.9 As discussed in Chapter 2, the tied sector comprising brewer 
owned and pubco owned outlets, can be further subdivided into ‘tenanted or leased’ outlets 
and ‘managed’ outlets. Under the ‘tenanted or leased’ model, the brewer owns the public 
house however a tenanted landlord runs the business independently and pays rent in return, 
with the business being tied to the brewer’s or pubco’s products.10 Under the managed 
model, the owning brewer or pubco employs a manager who is an employee of the 
company and runs the pubic houses on behalf of the owning pubco or brewery.11 No rent is 
payable under the managed model. The overall effect of these different models of 
ownership and management is to ensure a high degree of vertical integration in the 
distribution system and the maintenance of economies of scale, with close parallels being 
evident in the techniques employed in the retail distribution of petrol. 
1.1.3 Retail distribution of petrol 
Significant similarities are apparent in the retail distribution of beer and petrol on account 
of the high levels of vertical integration within these markets, and the means employed to 
achieve this. This is so, even although some structural changes within the petrol industry 
have reduced this from its peak levels during the 1960-1970s, when the industry was 
characterised by substantial vertically integrated supply chains dominated by the major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chapter 4, p118 
8 Chapter 4, p118 
9 Chapter 2, p31 
10 As discussed in Chapter 2, tenanted public houses are a remnant of the old brewery tied house system, with 
leased houses being a modern version.  
11 R Hucker, (ed) ‘Market Report 2013, Public Houses’ (Key Note, 2013) at p4 
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international oil companies.12 Consequently, as in the brewing industry there has been 
some supply chain fragmentation although in the petrol industry this has been influenced 
by cost savings and the desire to increase efficiency, not Government intervention as in the 
brewing industry.13 Despite this, oil majors such as BP, Esso and Shell, still operate as both 
refiners and wholesalers of petrol and also own their own forecourts.14 Therefore, as with 
the large international brewers in the brewing industry, the large international oil 
companies have retained an important role in the distribution of petrol. However, in 
contrast to the brewing industry where distribution is still largely dominated by the largest 
brewers, within the petrol industry, whilst in the 1970s-1980s the wholesalers who 
supplied petrol stations with fuel were primarily those with refining capacity, they also 
included independent wholesalers who lacked refining capacity.15 These independent 
wholesalers varied considerably in size and obtained fuel supplies from UK refiners under 
individual contractual terms.16 Today, the wholesale market is made up of a range of 
undertakings utilising different business models. The most predominant of these are UK 
refiners who sell directly to retailers; wholesalers who either import fuel from overseas or 
obtain it from UK refineries and sell it to retailers and other wholesalers; blenders who 
purchase fuel components and complete the production process themselves; and oil 
companies which are ultimately the wholesaler for their own product.17 Subsequently, this 
is more differentiated than the wholesale sector in brewing which is largely dominated by 
the largest brewers and pubcos. 
1.1.4 Ownership of petrol stations  
Similarly to the ownership of public houses, the ownership of petrol stations can be broken 
down into three broad categories. These are the traditional petrol retailing oil company-
owned sites; independent dealers that are not part of an oil company but are also 
considered to be a traditional petrol retailer; and the newer but increasingly significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Deloitte, ‘Study of the UK petroleum retail market A Final Report for DECC’ (December 2012) UK 
Government, 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69760/7322-study-of-the-uk-
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branded petrol stations that were generally owned by the supplying company or were independently held and 
branded by the supplying oil major (ibid at p17-18). This changed after the oil shock in 1970, when crude oil 
prices fell and stayed low until 2000. As these organisations looked for cost savings, in the 1980s they cut 
their own distribution channels and developed exchanges and partnerships with other oil companies (ibid at 
p18)  
13 Ibid at p6 
14 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Petrol a Report on the supply in the United 
Kingdom of petrol by wholesale (Cm 972, 1990) at para 3.24, p19  
15 Ibid at para 3.51, p30 
16 Ibid at para 3.45, p29  
17 Office of Fair Trading, UK petrol and diesel sector An OFT Call for Information (OFT 1475, 2013) at para 
3.31, p39-40 
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supermarket owned sites.18 As is the case in the ownership of public houses, no company 
has been found to hold a dominant position under the UK or EU competition law 
provisions. Nevertheless, as with public houses a significant level of vertical integration 
has been achieved through these different models of ownership and the management of 
these sites similarly to tied pubs. Oil company owned sites can be operated along the lines 
of a ‘managed’ public house, and as such operated by the oil company’s own retail 
subsidiary,19 or they may also be licensed or leased to another individual or group, 
similarly to a ‘tenanted or leased’ public house, tied to its products.20 However, recently 
the structure of the market has been altered by the significant growth in supermarket 
forecourts. In the late 1980s, there was an increase in supermarkets selling fuel in order to 
attract customers to their stores by making offers on fuel.21 Today, this model increasingly 
dominates the market due to the significant cost savings they offer consumers through low 
retail prices.22 Supermarkets’ share of the retail fuel market has been rising at such a 
consistently strong rate that they have significantly challenged the traditional petrol 
retailers, whose share of the market has been declining.23 However, despite this growth, the 
largest proportion of petrol stations in the UK are owned by independent dealers and so are 
held and operated by an individual or group which is not part of an oil company or a 
supermarket.24 Nevertheless, only a very small proportion of these independent sites are 
unbranded with most of them retailing fuel under the brand name and sign of the supplying 
oil company to which they are tied.25 Similarly to tied publicans, retailers enter into solus 
agreements that impose exclusive purchasing obligations on them, which are very similar 
to those imposed on tied public houses under beer tie agreements. Consequently, the 
market is still highly integrated and exhibits significant similarities to the distribution of 
beer.  
1.2 The solus tie – the beer tie’s equivalent   
As in the brewing industry, vertical restraints have been widely used to replicate the effects 
of vertical integration and so have played an important role in the retailing of petrol. The 
most common form of vertical restraint in the distribution of petrol, as is the case with 
beer, is the imposition of exclusive purchasing obligations on retailers with solus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Above, n.12 at p28 
19 Ibid at p28 
20 Ibid at p28 
21 Ibid at p18 
22 Ibid at p18. The major supermarkets include Tesco, Asda, Morrisons and Sainsbury’s.  
23 Ibid at p29 
24 Where a supermarket retails fuel under the brand of an oil company and not under their own brand name, 
they are regarded as independent dealer-owned sites (ibid at p28-29). 
25 Ibid at p28 
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agreements being the equivalent of the beer tie in the brewing industry. These agreements 
were introduced into the UK by the large international oil groups which used them abroad 
and effectively tie the petrol station in question to a single petrol wholesaler.26 Their use 
was justified on the basis of the significant capital investment in refineries that required 
“careful consideration…be given to economies in distribution methods, to ensure that a 
reasonable return would be obtained from such capital investment.”27 Consequently, 
similarly to the beer tie, solus agreements essentially require independent branded dealers 
agreeing to a branded wholesaler being the sole supplier of motor fuel to its site.28 The 
solus agreement is however only one type of supply agreement, with the characteristics of 
the contractual relationship between the wholesaler and retailer varying with the type of 
forecourt in question.29  Consequently, unbranded sites can source fuel from different fuel 
suppliers. Similarly, given that supermarkets often sell fuel under their own brand name, 
and not that of an oil company, they may have a contract with a single wholesaler for the 
supply of all of their sites, or they may have numerous supply agreements in place.30 Given 
their size and influence, their terms of supply are generally preferable to those offered to 
solus tied forecourts, due to the fact that as, is now the case with the pubco in the 
distribution of beer, supermarkets also enjoy increased buyer power.31 This development 
has however had implications for both industries.  
1.3 Increased buyer power in beer and petrol industries  
The changes that have occurred in both markets through the growth of the pubco in the 
retail distribution of beer, and the supermarket forecourt in the retail distribution of petrol, 
include the fact that both enjoy countervailing buyer power in relation to the major brewers 
and petrol wholesalers in their respective industries.32 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
countervailing buyer power now enjoyed by pubcos has brought about a reduction in the 
average net wholesale price of beer.33 Similarly, supermarket forecourts due to the volume 
of sales they account for, coupled with their ability to draw on a wide range of suppliers, 
have been able to negotiate lower wholesale petrol prices compared to other independent 
retailers.34 While, as discussed in Chapter 2, these reductions have not filtered through to 
the average retail price of beer in the pubco controlled on-trade, in the petrol industry these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Above, n.2 at para 58, p20 
27 Ibid at para 58, p20, quoting oil company Anglo-American  
28 Above, n.14 at para 3.59, p33  
29 Above, n.12 at p47  
30 Ibid at Table 6, p48 
31 Ibid at Table 6, p48 
32 Above, n.17 at para 5.4, p88-89 
33 Chapter 2 at p44 
34 Above, n.17 at para 5.4, p88-89 
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reductions have filtered down into lower pump prices at supermarket forecourts.35 
Nevertheless, a consequence of this countervailing buyer power in both sectors and its 
respective effect on retail prices has ultimately been the closure of public houses and 
forecourts. The failure of pubcos to pass on discounts in wholesale prices to their tied 
lessees has increased retail prices and undermined the viability of tied public houses which 
have continued to close.36 Similarly, as will be discussed more fully below, the low pump 
prices charged by supermarkets and the ensuing aggressive competition between oil 
company and supermarket owned sites has caused extreme squeezing of retail margins and 
ultimately accelerated the closure of independent forecourts. The overall effect in both 
sectors has been a continued decline in the number of public houses and petrol forecourts 
in operation.37 Nevertheless, due to the many similar, and largely unique, features shared 
by these markets, beyond the countervailing buyer power now common to both, they have 
been singled out by the EU competition authorities as deserving of special treatment under 
the EU competition law provisions. 
2. Special handling for both sectors at the EU level 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the many similarities between the retail distribution of beer and 
petrol have been deemed sufficient by the EU to merit the special treatment of exclusive 
purchasing agreements within these industries under the EU competition law provisions. 
This is a largely unique approach that contrasts with the American and Australian 
competition law regimes considered in Chapter 5, which do not make special provision for 
such agreements in the brewing industry, except in so far as they are outlawed. Whilst the 
EU’s position has been influenced by several factors including integration as a unique, but 
overarching, goal of the EU competition law regime, this special deference towards EU 
beer tie and service station or solus agreements38 has contrasted not only with the treatment 
of similar agreements in other jurisdictions, considered in Chapter 5, but also with the 
treatment of similar arrangements in other sectors of the economy.  
2.1 The EU block exemption regulations  
The EU’s largely unique approach to the beer tie and service station agreements has been 
influenced by several factors. As discussed in Chapter 3, the beer and petrol industries 
have long enjoyed special handling at the EU level on account of the significant capital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Above, n.12 at p10 
36 Chapter 4, p 127 
37 Above, n.12 at p2.  
38 The term ‘Solus agreement’ is used interchangeably in this chapter with the term ‘service station 
agreement’ as referred to in the context of the European Block Exemption regulations. 
 	  226	  
investment suppliers have had to make in the retail outlets for their products.39 This was 
most evident in the terms of Regulation 1984/83.40 Due to the large capital outlays 
involved in acquiring such an outlet, breweries and oil companies frequently bought and 
leased premises to resellers or almost always financed the acquisition of sites as well as 
offering loans on favourable terms. The EU placed reliance on such ‘peculiarities of the 
markets in question’41 in order to justify its approach. General concerns over the 
foreclosure effects of the widespread use of such agreements were overlooked due to the 
‘special commercial or financial advantage’ conferred on the resellers under the exclusive 
purchasing agreements in these sectors.42 As discussed in Chapter 3, the European 
Commission considered this made it significantly easier for resellers to establish, operate 
and maintain premises and were therefore credited with aiding integration, efficiency and 
low cost entry to both industries with consumers enjoying a fair share of the resulting 
benefits.43  
2.1.1 Position pre-Regulation 1984/83  
The first Block Exemption Regulation (BER) was not adopted until 1967.44 Prior to this, 
the assessment of the legality of service station agreements, like that for beer supply 
agreements, was in accordance with the decisional practice of the European Commission 
and Courts discussed in Chapter 3.45 Although there were no express rules in Regulation 
67/6746 regarding beer or service stations agreements, by including exclusive purchasing 
agreements they were implicitly included. Sector specific rules first appeared in Regulation 
1984/83. The provisions applicable to beer supply agreements were noted in Title II, 
discussed in Chapter 3, and those relevant to service station agreements were in Title III. 
There were significant similarities between them. 
2.1.2 Title III of Regulation 1984/83 - special provisions for service station 
agreements 
In light of the similar justifications provided for the exemption of beer and petrol supply 
agreements, it was unsurprising that the terms of Title III of Regulation 1984/83 reflected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Chapter 3, p66  
40 Commission Regulation (EEC) 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements ((1983) OJ L173/5) 
41 See Chapter 3, p66  
42 See Chapter 3, p67  
43 See Chapter 3, p67  
44 See Chapter 3, p60 
45 See Chapter 3, p57  
46	  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 67/67 of 22 March 1976 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements ((1967) OJ (spec ed) 10)	  
 	  227	  
those of Title II.47 The provisions of Article 10 regarding petrol station agreements were 
therefore very close to those of Article 6(1) regarding beer. It stated that an exemption 
would be granted to ‘agreements where only two undertakings are party and the reseller 
agrees with the supplier, in consideration for the according of special commercial or 
financial advantages, to purchase only from the supplier, or an undertaking connected or 
trusted by the supplier with the distribution of his goods, certain petroleum-based motor-
vehicle fuels or certain petroleum based motor vehicle and other fuels specified in the 
agreement for resale in a service station designated in the agreement’.48 Consequently, the 
exemption applied to agreements concerning motor vehicle fuels alone, such as diesel or 
petrol, or these and other fuels, such as paraffin.49 The Commission clarified that the goods 
in question had to be petroleum-based products and they had to be for use in motor 
powered land or water vehicles or aircraft, with “service station” being interpreted 
accordingly.50 However, the reference to ‘resale’ prevented the Regulation applying to 
services.51 Consequently, the provisions for petrol were very close to those for beer. 
2.1.2.1 The ‘white’ list for service station agreements  
Article 11 of Regulation 1984/83 however detailed a simpler, exhaustive ‘white’ list of 
obligations that the supplier could impose on the reseller in service station agreements by 
comparison to those for beer supply agreements.52 Article 13 also incorporated the terms of 
Article 2(1) and (3) of Title I regarding exclusive purchasing agreements in all sectors of 
the economy, into Title III.53  Following on from the provisions relating to beer supply 
agreements under Title II, Article 11(a) allowed the imposition on the reseller of the 
obligation not to sell motor vehicle fuel and other fuels supplied by other undertakings, in 
the designated service station. However, in contrast to the white list for beer, Article 11 
was not restricted to petroleum-based fuels or fuels of the same type as those sold under 
the agreement in the designated premises, suggesting that the possibilities for tying under 
this Title were not as narrow as those for beer.54 Article 11(b) also differed from the white 
list for beer by permitting a limited tie of lubricants or related petroleum-based products, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Chapter 3, p 67  
48 Article 10, Title III of Regulation 1984/83 
49 European Commission, Notice concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No 1983/83 and (EEC) No 
1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive 
distribution and exclusive purchasing agreements ((1984) OJ C 101/2) at para 58, p9 
50 Ibid at paras 58-59, p9. V Korah and W.A. Rothnie W.A, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition 
Rules Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 2nd Edition (London, Sweet and Maxwell ,1982) at para 8.23, p233    
51 V Korah and W. A. Rothnie, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules Regulations 1983/83 
and 1984/83 2nd Edition (London, Sweet and Maxwell,1982) at para 8.23, p233  
52 Chapter 3, p68 
53 Chapter 3, p65-66 
54 Above, n.51 at para 8.24, p234 
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such as brake fluids.55 The supplier could impose an obligation ‘not to use lubricants or 
related petroleum based-products supplied by other undertakings within the service station, 
where it had made available or financed a lubrication bay or motor vehicle lubrication 
equipment’. However the Commission clarified that this provision was concerned more 
with the use of these products, and so the provision of a service, rather than the reseller’s 
freedom to purchase the products from undertakings for resale in the service station.56 In 
keeping with the provisions of Title II, minor restrictions could be imposed in respect of 
advertising goods supplied by other undertakings.57 However, Article 11(d), which was 
unparalleled in Title II, permitted an obligation to have equipment owned or financed by 
the supplier, or a connected undertaking, serviced by the supplier. Korah and Rothnie note 
that this was a justifiable imposition on the reseller as such equipment would not be 
provided if the supplier could not ensure proper maintenance.58 Subsequently, by contrast 
to Title II, as the provisions regarding service station agreements did not limit exemption 
to specified products, and due to the smaller range of products supplied by oil companies, 
the wording of the petrol ‘white’ list was simpler than that for beer.59 
2.1.2.2 The ‘black’ list for service station agreements  
Similarly to Article 8 of Title II regarding beer supply agreements,60 Title III also adopted 
a ‘black’ list approach to restraints, the inclusion of which would deny an agreement the 
benefit of exemption. Article 12(1)(a) precluded the supplier from imposing exclusive 
purchasing obligations for goods other than motor vehicle and other fuels or for services. 
The exceptions to this were obligations under Article 11(b) not to sell lubricants or 
petroleum related products supplied by other undertakings in that service station; and the 
obligation to have equipment owned or financed by the supplier serviced by them, under 
Article 11(d). This effectively limited the exclusive purchasing obligation to the fuels, 
lubricating oil, and servicing equipment provided by the supplier and exempted under 
Articles 10 or 11.61  This was reinforced by Article 12(1)(b), which denied exemption 
where the reseller was prevented from obtaining goods or services from third parties where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Above, n.49 at para 61, p9 and above, n.51 at para 8.24, p235 
56 Above, n.49 at para 61, p9 
57 Article 11(c) Regulation 1984/83  
58 Above, n.51 at para 8.24, p236  
59 Ibid at para 8.25, p237-238 
60 Chapter 3, p69 
61 Above, n.51 at para 8.25, p237 
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neither an exclusive purchasing obligation nor a ban on dealing with competing products 
was allowed.62 
Concerns over foreclosure influenced the terms of Article 12 (1)(c), which limited the 
duration of service station agreements to ten years and denied exemption to those of a 
longer or indefinite duration. However, in keeping with the position regarding beer, this 
was twice as long a duration as permitted under Title I regarding exclusive purchasing 
agreements in all sectors of the economy. In line with Title II however, Article 12(1)(d) 
limited the obligations that could be imposed on successors in title. Nevertheless, concerns 
regarding exclusive purchasing obligations of long durations, resulting in time limits for 
such restraints in all other sectors, seemed to be disregarded under by the terms of Article 
12(2). As with tied public houses leased to the reseller, Article 12(2) stated that where the 
supplier lets or allows the reseller to occupy the service station, the exclusive purchasing 
obligation could be imposed on the reseller for the duration that they operate from the 
premises. However, in contrast to the provisions of Title II, there was no obligation to 
include an ‘English Clause’ in such circumstances.63 Unlike the provisions for beer, 
allowance was made in the Regulation for national authorities to impose a shorter duration 
limit on such agreements than that prescribed under Article 12.64 Further, even although 
the terms of Title III were prescriptive, petrol companies were noted to be ‘reasonably 
happy’ with its application in regard to the supply of petrol to garages.65   
2.1.3 The CJEU’s approach to parallel networks of service station 
agreements 
In addition to the foregoing similarities under Regulation 1984/83, parallels were also 
apparent in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) handling of beer supply 
agreements discussed in Chapter 3 and service station agreements as evidenced in its 
decision in Neste.66 There the CJEU also sought to limit the application of Article 101(1) 
TFEU to such agreements. Neste arose from a preliminary reference connected with an 
exclusive purchasing obligation for petrol and other products sold in Finnish service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid at para 8.25, p237 
63 See Chapter 3, p71 
64 National laws and measures imposing a shorter duration limit were not incompatible with the objectives of 
the Regulation which set an upper duration limit on service station agreements (Recital 19, Regulation 
1984/83) 
65 Above, n.51  at para 11.12, p295 
66 (Case C-214/99) Neste Markkinointi OY v. Yötuuli KY [2001] 4 CMLR 993  
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stations.67 The parties had entered into a ‘co-operation and marketing agreement’ in respect 
of the operation of a service station.68 Under its terms Yötuuli Ky undertook to exclusively 
sell Neste’s oil and other products. It was concluded for a period of ten years, after which it 
would continue for periods of five years, unless terminated by either party.69 Termination 
was effected through the provision of notice to the other party six months before the end of 
the term of the contract.70 However, once the agreement had run for a term of ten years or 
more the purchaser, Yötuuli Ky, could at any time terminate the agreement on the 
provision of one year’s notice.71 On providing such notice, Neste brought a claim for 
compensatory damages. Yöutuuli Ky claimed the exclusive purchasing obligation was 
contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU as the agreement was precluded from exemption under 
Regulation 1984/83 as it continued automatically and so was for an ‘indefinite duration’. 
They claimed it was therefore void under Article 101(2) TFEU.72 The national court 
subsequently sought a preliminary ruling. This was sought on the interpretation of Article 
101(1) TFEU, in light of the CJEU’s ruling in Delimitis,73 presupposing that Neste’s 
exclusive purchasing agreements, along with parallel networks of similar agreements, had 
significant market foreclosing effects.74 However, agreements terminable on one year’s 
notice, such as that concluded with Yötuuli Ky, constituted only a small proportion of 
Neste’s agreements with only 1.5% of service stations in Finland being tied to Neste in this 
way.75  
In its written observations submitted to the CJEU, the Commission appeared to adopt a 
firmer stance than that evident in its practices concerning beer supply agreements. It stated 
“the fact that the effects on competition of an individual contract or group of contracts are 
relatively insignificant does not mean that such a contract or group of contracts is not 
caught by Article [101(1) TFEU].”76 It subsequently stated that Neste’s network of 
agreements should not be sub-divided on the basis that these agreements made an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The central issue in the preliminary reference was whether the effects of certain agreements which could 
be freely terminated following a short notice period could be assessed separately from the supplier’s other 
fixed duration agreements. Ibid at para A1, p996-997 
68 Ibid at para A2, p997 
69 Ibid at para A2, p997 
70 Ibid at para A2, p997 
71 Ibid at para A2, p997 
72 Ibid at para A4, p997-998 
73 Chapter 3, p77 
74 Above, n.66 at para A16, p1002  
75 Ibid at para 29, p1016. See also A Crowe, ‘Case Comment: Petrol service station network – Exclusive 
purchasing Agreements’ (2001) 22(4) E.C.L.Rev N58 at N59  
76 Above, n.66 at para A12, p1000. This is a firmer stance than that exemplified by the Commission’s 
approach towards the beer supply agreements of small brewers in the EEC Beer Review. There it suggested 
that such agreements be subject only to national law. The Commission stated that this was so even where 
parallel agreements of other brewers existed. Chapter 3, p74-76  
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insignificant contribution to the cumulative effect of all Neste’s arrangements. To do so 
would be arbitrary and contrary to the CJEU’s approach in Delimitis.77 Such an approach 
was expressly rejected by the General Court in Langnese-Iglo78 and Scholler,79 the only 
case where the benefit of block-exemption has been withdrawn.80 The Commission 
therefore asserted that a bundle of similar agreements had to be considered as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU departed from this approach.  
Following Delimitis, the CJEU focused on whether Neste’s agreements combined with 
other agreements have a cumulative effect on competition and make access to the relevant 
market difficult;81 and examined whether the agreements in question contributed to the 
“cumulative effect produced by the totality of the agreements”.82 However, the CJEU 
agreed with Neste’s position that exclusive purchasing obligations for fuels differed in one 
significant respect from those for other products, including beer and ice-cream.83 Service 
stations sell only one brand of fuel.84 In light of this, the duration of the supply obligation 
of the reseller is more important to the supplier than the exclusivity clause and is the 
decisive factor in the market sealing-off effect.85 The CJEU stated that it had to be 
acknowledged that fixed-term contracts concluded for a set number of years were more 
likely to limit access to the market than those terminable on one year’s notice.86 The CJEU 
noted the onerous obligations in terms of investment, amongst other things, involved in 
adapting a service station to its brand.87 As such, the CJEU opined that a one-year notice 
period protected the economic and legal interests of the parties and provided suppliers, and 
their investment, with reasonable protection.88 This was also considered to have only a 
limited restrictive effect on competition on the market in motor fuel distribution. 89  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid at para A12, p1000.  
78 (T-7/93) Langnese-Iglo v. E.C. Commission [1995] ECR II-1533; [1995] 5 CMLR 602 
79 (T-9/93) Schöller Lebensmittel v. E.C. Commission [1995] ECR II-1611 and above, n. 66 at para A12, 
p1000 
80 Langnese/ Schöller concerned exclusive purchasing agreements for ice-cream concluded with retailers and 
resulted in the withdrawal of exemption for such agreements under Regulation 1984/83. The General Court 
stated that “[t]he Court considers…that a bundle of similar agreements must be considered as a whole and, 
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81 Above, n.66 at para 25-26, p1015-1016 
82 Ibid at para 27, p1016 
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In light of the foregoing circumstances of the case the CJEU considered that the contracts 
in question constituted a minor proportion of all of Neste’s exclusive purchasing 
agreements. As such, they had to be regarded as making no significant contribution to the 
cumulative effect for the purpose of Delimitis, and so, were outside the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU.90 The CJEU proceeded to justify this position as being compatible with 
Delimitis. It stated that although that judgment established the criteria for “assessing the 
extent to which a supplier’s “contracts”, without being more specific, contribute to the 
cumulative sealing-off effect, it did not exclude a selective assessment according to the 
various categories of contract that a particular supplier might have entered into”.91 Whilst 
this may be the case, Cumming correctly suggests that the CJEU’s judgment in Neste 
appears to undermine the certainty of the Delimitis network concept when considering the 
anticompetitive effect of individual agreements.92 Having determined that the agreement in 
question forms part of a network as required, the CJEU introduces the need for a selective 
assessment of the various categories of contract the supplier has entered into. Cumming 
considers that the decision means it “is simply no longer possible to predict the status of an 
individual agreement in relation to Article [101(1) TFEU] by applying the concept of the 
network.”93 It is however suggested here that this was not the case even under Delimitis. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the CJEU established two cumulative conditions when assessing the 
legality of an agreement. These required that the agreement in dispute not only forms part 
of a network of agreements but also makes a significant contribution to the cumulative 
effect of those agreements. Simply being part of a network of agreements was not 
sufficient to determine the status of an agreement under the Delimitis conditions and the 
CJEU in Neste did not deviate from this position. It simply muddied the waters. 
Nevertheless, the overall effect of the CJEU’s judgment in Neste would appear to be a 
reduction of the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU to exclusive purchasing obligations, with 
Cumming and Ratliff supporting this view.94 The CJEU, however, appears to have 
specifically limited its judgment to a restricted context, namely where the agreement is 
entered into by a motor fuels supplier; termination is possible on one year’s notice thereby 
ensuring adequate protection to both parties; and the agreements at issue, by reason of their 
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duration, represent a very small part of the totality of one supplier’s exclusive purchasing 
agreements, the majority being fixed term contracts entered into for more than one year.95  
2.1.4 Regulation 2790/99 – a more economics-based approach to service 
station agreements 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 3,96 calls for a generally more economics-based 
approach to the handling of vertical agreements, including those in the beer and petrol 
industries, resulted in the replacement of the sector specific rules of Regulation 1984/83 
with Regulation 2790/99.97 As noted in Chapter 3, this was applicable to all vertical 
restraints concerned with intermediate and final goods, as well as services, with the 
exclusion of only a few hardcore restraints.98 However, the new Regulation introduced a 
market share cap for the first time. Where the market share of the supplier did not exceed 
30%, and the vertical agreement did not contain any of the ‘black’ listed provisions they 
were generally considered to lead to an improvement in distribution or production and 
allowed consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.99 Consequently, following the 
implementation of Regulation 2790/99, as in the beer market, in the petrol market 
occasions arose when the market share cap was breached, causing the Commission to be 
notified of agreements that would have benefitted from exemption under Regulation 
1984/83. 
Similarly to Interbrew, which as discussed in Chapter 3 had to notify its tying agreements 
to the Commission following the adoption of Regulation 2790/99, Repsol, a major 
distributor of fuel and related products in Spain, notified it of its Spanish service station 
agreements that included non-compete obligations.100 The Commission invited 
observations from interested parties with several being received.101 Repsol had a market 
share of 35-50% of the relevant market.102 In its Notice published in 2004, the Commission 
highlighted its competition concerns and remedies. Amongst its concerns, the Commission 
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noted the non-compete clauses in Repsol’s agreements, the duration of which in some 
agreements was five years, while in its tenancy type agreements it ranged from 25-40 
years.103 The Commission also had concerns over the foreclosure effect of the non-
compete obligations and their weakening of inter-brand competition in the relevant 
market.104 It noted, amongst others, the difficulty experienced by competitors attempting to 
access the market or increase their market share due to the significant vertical integration 
of operators, and the cumulative effect of the parallel network of such agreements.105 The 
Commission considered that the notified agreements potentially contributed significantly 
to the foreclosure effect due to the extent of the non-compete obligations imposed; the 
substantial duration of these non-compete obligations; and the ‘weak and fragmented’ 
position of services station operators and final consumers by comparison to suppliers such 
as Repsol.106 Numerous commitments were offered by Repsol, including observing a five-
year duration limit on new agreements and an undertaking not to purchase service stations 
that were not tied to its network.107 Whilst the Commission considered these commitments 
provided a ‘practical response’ to the concerns raised, responses to the notice called their 
effectiveness into question.108 Repsol submitted amended commitment proposals which 
were revised several times, with the Commission ultimately accepting them as no longer 
presenting grounds for action under the EU competition law provisions.109 Consequently, 
as was the case when dealing with Interbrew’s notified agreements,110 the Commission was 
prepared to accept the single branding obligation despite Repsol’s very significant market 
share.  
Further, despite the new economics-based approach of Regulation 2790/99, the deference 
towards beer and service station agreements at the EU level was also maintained. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Article 5(a) of Regulation 2790/99 denied exemption to non-
compete obligations of indefinite duration or in excess of 5 years reflecting on-going 
concerns over the duration of such obligations and their foreclosure effects.111 However 
this was not applicable to beer and service station agreements under which the goods were 
sold from premises and land owned or leased by the supplier, with such agreements 
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continuing to qualify for exemption.112 The non-compete obligation simply could not 
exceed the period of occupation of the premises. 
The CJEU in Pedro IV Servicios113 gave a preliminary ruling on the eligibility of an 
exclusive purchasing agreement between a service station operator and a petrol supplier 
under Regulation 2790/99. The CJEU disagreed with the submissions from the 
Commission that Regulations 1984/83 and 2790/99 must be interpreted in the same way, 
even although they are drafted differently. The Court found that Regulation 2790/99 
clearly required that the supplier owned both the land and the premises from which the 
contractual goods were sold by the reseller.114 The CJEU stated that Article 5(a) had been 
drafted in clear and unequivocal terms.115 In contrast to the position under Regulation 
1984/83, for the purposes of applying Regulation 2790/99, a service station agreement 
lasting longer than five years could only benefit from exemption if the supplier is both the 
owner of the service station which he lets to the reseller and also owns the land on which it 
is built. If the supplier is not the owner, he must lease the land and the service station from 
third parties unconnected to the reseller.116 Regulation 2790/99 therefore tightened up on 
the position under Regulation 1984/83 however beer and service station agreements of 
longer durations than were permitted in other sectors of the economy continued to benefit 
from exemption. 
2.1.5 Regulation 330/2010 
As noted in Chapter 3, as the expiry of Regulation 2790/99 loomed, it was considered to 
have worked well with no drastic measures being proposed to the system it 
implemented.117 Under its successor Regulation 330/2010,118 the greatest change required 
that both the supplier and the buyer’s market share of the relevant market did not exceed 
30% in order to qualify for exemption.119 Similarly to the responses received from the 
brewing industry,120 this was not well received by the petrol industry.  BP highlighted their 
concerns over the practical difficulties this would cause without resulting in efficiency 
gains. They were concerned it would narrow the application of the Regulation and lead to 
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legal uncertainty.121 BP was also concerned that whilst larger suppliers are aware of their 
market shares, they often have no knowledge of the buyer’s downstream market and must 
rely on their share being below 30% to enforce the non-compete obligation.122 They 
subsequently stated that buyers have little incentive to assist in their diligence as an over-
statement of their market shares would render the obligation unenforceable.123  
Article 5(2) of Regulation 330/2010 however maintained the status quo for beer and 
service station agreements by exempting them from the 5-year time limit on non-compete 
obligations where the goods or services are sold by the buyer from premises and land 
owned by the supplier or leased by the supplier. Again, it requires simply that the duration 
of the non-compete obligation does not exceed the period of occupancy of the premises. 
Consequently, the deference of the past towards beer and service station agreements is still 
evident in the terms of the current BER. 
2.2 EU’s influence on UK competition authorities’ approach to both 
sectors 
This deference at the EU level has subsequently filtered through to the UK competition 
authorities’ approach to the beer and petrol industries. As discussed in Chapter 4, the UK 
competition law regime was largely harmonised with the EU competition provisions 
through the enactment of the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2000. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 reflects 
Article 101(1) TFEU and forbids agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which affect trade in the UK and have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition in the UK. Consequently, this is applicable to beer tie and solus 
agreements. However, s.60 of the 1998 Act requires consistency in the application of 
national and EU competition law with conformity also being ensured by s.10 of the 1998 
Act which provides for parallel exemptions, thereby importing all EU block exemptions 
into national law.124 Consequently, as will be shown, the UK competition authorities have 
often deferred to the EU’s acceptance of beer tie and solus agreements as legitimate 
business models when considering complaints regarding the practices within the retail 
distribution of beer and petrol in the UK. The complaints have been numerous and on-
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going in both industries, with continuing mistrust over their operation prompting many 
investigations into both sectors for several decades by the UK competition authorities. 
However, as will become evident from the following review of their findings, with the 
exception of the Beer Orders, the authorities seem to have been similarly unable to identify 
anticompetitive behaviour in either sector.  
3. Numerous and on-going competition concerns in both sectors 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, there have been numerous investigations into the 
practices employed in the retail distribution of beer, both before and after the radical 
structural shake-up brought about by the Beer Orders in 1989. Similarly, the retail 
distribution of petrol has also been subject to considerable attention by the UK competition 
authorities, with on-going mistrust over the operation of both of these markets prompting 
repeated recommendations that they be kept under review. Although, as will be shown the 
petrol industry has escaped any sweeping recommendations along the lines of the Beer 
Orders, several investigations have been conducted since the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission’s (MMC)125 first report in 1965 on the supply of petrol in the UK.126  Whilst 
the focus of these investigations in the beer industry remains the operation of the tie and its 
implications, albeit as now operated by pubcos not brewers; over the decades the focus 
within the petrol industry has shifted from concerns over high levels of vertical integration, 
to the increasing dominance of supermarkets in the retail sale of petrol. Despite the interest 
shown in the operation of both sectors however they have been repeatedly cleared of 
anticompetitive practices. Nevertheless, as already discussed in Chapter 2, in the earliest 
reports prior to the UK’s accession to the EU in 1973, given the EU and UK’s differing 
objectives at that time, these were more scathing than the most recent investigations 
focused on the practices of pubcos and supermarkets respectively.  
3.1 Early common concerns over vertical integration and monopoly 
situations  
3.1.1 Concerns over vertical integration in both sectors  
The MMC was one of the first bodies to consider the practices within the brewing and 
petrol industries, reviewing the former in 1969,127 and the latter in 1965.128 As discussed in 
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Chapter 2, its report on the brewing industry focused on the level of vertical integration, 
with this also being the focus when considering the supply of petrol to retailers in the 
UK.129 The high levels of vertical integration prompted similar concerns in relation to both, 
including the fear that these arrangements dampened price competition amongst public 
houses and petrol stations in their respective markets.130 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
MMC was far more critical of the tied house system, finding that it was detrimental to 
efficiency and to the interests of suppliers and consumers. It subsequently concluded that 
“…a state of affairs in which brewers did not own or control licensed outlets would be 
preferable to the tied house system”.131 However, it conceded that restrictive licensing of 
public houses reduced competition by limiting the establishment of new competitors, 
prompting recommendations that the licensing laws be amended to address the ‘defects’ of 
the tied house system.132  Further, when considering the issue of the solus system, although 
the MMC was less scathing than it was in respect of the beer tie, ultimately stating that it 
approved of it in principle, it considered that as the system operated in the UK at that time, 
it had “some disadvantageous features”.133 Whilst in its preliminary conclusions it 
accepted that the solus system had, amongst others, led to some reductions in suppliers’ 
costs and reduced retail prices, it concluded that the restrictive agreements between petrol 
suppliers and retailers was contrary to the public interest.134  The solus agreements used 
were considered too long; too wide; contained provisions relating to lubricants and non-
petroleum based products; enabled suppliers to exert too much influence over the retailers’ 
trade in those products to their own advantage; and granted the supplier rights of pre-
emption in the sale of the premises.135 It was therefore recommended that they be limited 
in duration to five years;136 and recommendations were made to address the other concerns 
noted. These included preventing suppliers’ committing retailers to sell specified quantities 
of lubricants, and precluded suppliers’ from accepting commission in relation to the sale of 
non-petroleum based products.137 It was also concluded that company ownership could 
operate against the public interest if limits were not imposed on this, and so it was 
recommended that the largest suppliers should not be allowed to acquire any further petrol 
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stations, or interests in them.138 Nevertheless, despite these recommendations, given the 
control exerted in both industries by the major brewers and oil companies concerns within 
both turned to the possible existence of a monopoly situation.  
3.1.2 Early concerns over monopoly in both sectors 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the brewing industry was reviewed by the Price Commission in 
1977 over concerns of vertical, as well as horizontal, integration as the price of beer 
continued to increase.139 Not long afterwards, in 1979 the MMC investigated the possible 
existence of a monopoly situation in the petrol industry.140 With regard to the brewing 
industry, its highly concentrated nature combined with high barriers to entry, were 
considered by the Price Commission to be the ‘classic conditions’ for a monopoly.141 The 
lack of price competition was highlighted, with the combined effects of high concentration 
and vertical integration enabling managed houses to lead prices upwards.142 The primary 
concern was therefore the closed nature of trade and the diminishing level of price 
competition due to the extensive use of the beer tie. Similarly, the MMC’s 1979 review of 
the possible existence of a monopoly in the supply of petrol considered price competition 
between retail outlets and company ownership of these.143 By contrast to the increasingly 
concentrated brewing industry, the MMC noted that since its report in 1965, the number of 
companies producing petrol had increased and the growth of smaller suppliers had also 
improved.144 However, whilst this had stimulated greater price competition as the new 
entrants adopted different pricing policies from the established majors,145 they also 
introduced temporary discounts and financial support, known as Selective Price Support 
(SPS), in order to address increasing petrol prices, with other refining wholesalers soon 
following suit.146 This support varied depending on the market conditions, targeting the 
areas of greatest competition and reflecting the uneven nature of price competition.147 
Whilst the aim had been to regain volumes this ultimately caused regional price variations. 
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The MMC subsequently found that this affected competition between retailers,148 and 
amounted to “discrimination in net wholesale prices in response to the severity of local 
retail price competition”.149 Further, similarly to the concerns over vertical integration in 
the brewing industry, the MMC noted that solus agreements were still widespread, and 
concluded that a monopoly situation existed in relation to the supply of petrol by wholesale 
in the UK.150 However, due to the reduction in seller concentration and the increase in the 
number of refining and non-refining competitors,151 the level of company ownership of 
retail outlets did not operate against the public interest.152 Nevertheless it was again 
recommended that the level of company ownership and seller concentration be kept under 
review.153 Concerns over the possible existence of a monopoly situation did not dissipate 
and shortly after its consideration of the brewing industry in 1989 the MMC duly revisited 
the petrol industry, although this failed to prompt any recommendations along the lines of 
the Beer Orders. 
3.2 MMC review of beer and petrol industries  
In the late 1980s, not long after the implementation of Regulation 1984/83, the MMC 
investigated the brewing and petrol industries. Whilst critical of the supply of petrol, its 
report was not as far reaching in its recommendations as it was in respect of the brewing 
industry.154 As discussed in Chapter 2, its concerns over the level of brewery ownership of 
retail outlets contributed to its finding that a complex monopoly existed in favour of 
brewers with tied estates, and restricted competition at all levels. This prompted it to 
recommend a cap of 2,000 on the number of licensed premises that any brewer could 
own.155 Similarly, its investigation in the petrol industry was necessitated by concerns over 
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151 Ibid at para 144-145, p54. As noted above, the 1965 Report recommended that controls be placed on 
company ownership of retail outlets as otherwise this would operate against the public interest. The MMC 
stated that this recommendation was based on concerns that such ownership could lead to “rigidity” in the 
retail trade and between suppliers. Since that report, the structure of the wholesale supply had changed due to 
new market entrants.  
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153 Ibid at para 149, p55-56 
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the degree of vertical control being exerted within it.156 The MMC noted that the retail 
petrol market was supplied by 69 wholesalers, with many of the fourteen major players on 
the market at that time also being involved in oil exploration and refining.157 Similarly to 
the six national brewers at that time, these wholesalers also owned a significant number of 
retail sites and also supplied independent retailers.158 However, as in 1965, the MMC did 
not find the principle of the solus tie to be objectionable and noted that, in contrast to the 
beer tie, there had been no suggestion that its use be abandoned.159 Nevertheless, in 
considering the competitive situation in the petrol distribution sector the MMC addressed 
issues that were also common to the brewing industry, such as the increasing company 
ownership of retail outlets, control of retail prices, and the possible existence of a 
monopoly situation. 
3.2.1 Ownership of outlets – a common problem  
As discussed in Chapter 2, brewery ownership of public houses was one of the principle 
drivers in the MMC’s finding that a complex monopoly situation existed in the UK market. 
However, in considering wholesaler ownership of petrol stations, it was noted that since 
1977 the proportion of sites owned by them had only increased slightly, as had the sales by 
volume through them.160 Whilst as discussed in Chapter 2 the MMC had estimated that 
75% of all public houses in Great Britain were owned by brewers, it was estimated that 
only 33.2% of petrol stations were owned by wholesalers.161 Nevertheless, the MMC 
received complaints that wholesalers’ control over both prices and the means of operation 
of sites dampened competition at the retail level and inhibited licensees from lowering 
prices or responding to local consumer needs.162 The MMC however attributed licensees’ 
difficulty in cutting prices to the higher wholesale price they paid for petrol by comparison 
to independent retailers, with this being justified by the significant investment wholesalers 
had to make in retail sites.163 Further, the control exerted was part of the wholesaler’s 
broader strategy to establish and promote their brand, thereby promoting not inhibiting 
competition.164 In contrast to the brewing industry, the MMC therefore concluded that 
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wholesaler ownership and the way in which they operated petrol stations did not have an 
adverse effect on competition.165  
3.2.2 Control of retail prices – a problem shared  
Similarly to brewers who exerted significant influence over retail prices through both their 
wholesale price and the prices charged at their managed houses, petrol wholesalers also 
exerted significant influence over the pump prices charged at their petrol stations.166 
However, whilst as discussed in Chapter 2 the MMC’s 1989 report concluded that amongst 
others the complex monopoly situation that existed in favour of brewers had caused the 
price of a pint of beer to rise too quickly in recent years, had allowed regional price 
variations, and the increased cost of lager was not justified by the cost of production, 
similar conclusions were not reached with regard to the distribution of petrol.167 At the 
outset of its report on the petrol industry, the MMC noted that numerous factors influenced 
the retail price of petrol.168 Whilst it was established that pump prices could vary from one 
site to another within local areas and across the country,169 the MMC considered that this 
was attributable to the differing range of services offered at different sites, although 
wholesalers were also highly influential through the wholesale prices they set and their use 
of SPS.170 Nevertheless, the MMC was satisfied that the extent to which these could be 
used to maintain higher prices was limited by competition from other wholesalers, 
independent sites and supermarkets.171 It therefore concluded that regional price 
differences were due to variations in the level of local competition.172 Further, in 
considering price differences in rural areas compared with central locations, these were not 
attributed to excessive profit margins but were due to the higher costs of supply and 
reduced competition at the wholesale and retail level.173 Consequently, the price increases 
in the supply of petrol were not as contentious as those in the supply of beer. 
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3.2.3 No equivalent of the Beer Orders for the petrol industry  
Following its consideration of similar issues in both industries, the MMC reached different 
conclusions in respect of them. As discussed in Chapter 2, the MMC concluded that a 
complex monopoly existed in favour of brewers with tied estates or loan ties with free 
houses and restricted competition at all levels.174 This prompted far reaching structural 
remedies in the form of the Beer Orders. However, with regard to the supply of petrol the 
MMC found that unlike the national brewers, the principal wholesalers competed 
effectively on price, facilities and services.175 In most areas consumers were thought to 
have a wide range of petrol prices and services to choose from and UK pump prices after 
tax were generally not unreasonable compared against European pump prices.176 The 
profits enjoyed by companies in their wholesale operations had been moderate177 and since 
its last report there had been a reduction in concentration with the combined market share 
of the five oil majors declining, with the entry of new wholesalers to the UK market being 
noted.178 The MMC highlighted the rise of supermarkets as a strong competitor and stated 
that annually significant numbers of independent solus contracts were replaced causing 
wholesalers to compete for these, thereby strengthening the position of independent 
retailers.179 In contrast to the brewing industry, all of these factors assisted in maintaining 
prices and services at a competitive level.180 Consequently, intervention along the lines of 
the Beer Orders was not necessary, however, as before the MMC highlighted that it would 
be nervous about a significant increase in wholesaler ownership of petrol stations or the 
volume of fuel sold through them.181 As a result, the market was once again monitored.182  
4. Structural changes and continued declarations of competitiveness in 
the UK beer and petroleum markets 
Both the UK beer and petrol markets therefore continued to be monitored and reviewed. 
However, following the structural changes in the beer market resulting from the MMC’s 
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recommendations, the focus turned to the practices of pubcos, in the place of national 
brewers; and due to their increasing market presence, supermarket forecourts instead of oil 
companies in the supply of petrol. Nevertheless, as will be shown, both would benefit from 
on-going declarations of competitiveness. This was the case when in 1998 the OFT 
reported on the retail distribution of petrol and shortly afterwards, in 2000, declared the 
retail distribution of beer sufficiently competitive for the Beer Orders to be revoked. 
Subsequently, the structural changes that had occurred in both markets were seen to have 
enhanced not inhibited competition.      
4.1 Pubcos and increasing retail prices but improved market entry at the 
retail level of the UK beer market  
As discussed in Chapter 2, when considering whether or not the Beer Orders were still 
required, the OFT highlighted the significant structural changes that had been brought 
about in the retail distribution of beer due to the substantial growth in pubco ownership of 
public houses. Pubcos now owned over one third of the UK’s public houses and were 
found to enjoy a degree of countervailing buyer power in relation to the national 
brewers.183  Whilst this power was found to have enabled pubcos to negotiate reductions in 
the average net wholesale price of beer, this had not filtered through to the retail price of 
beer in the on-trade, which was continuing to increase.184 The OFT did not however 
attribute this to a failure in retail competition. Rather, it considered that retail competition 
in the supply of beer was manifest in increased levels of capital expenditure on amenity 
and service provision.185 It also considered that consumers now had a greater choice of 
different price and amenity combinations due to the emergence of low-priced retail pub 
chains.186 However, as already discussed in Chapter 2, by contrast to the wholesale supply 
of petrol an independent wholesale and distribution sector had not materialised in the UK 
beer market. The majority of beer sold to the on-trade continued to be distributed by the 
national brewers, who could exert significant control through their distribution channels.187 
Nevertheless, the OFT considered that the distinction between pubs and other on-trade 
outlets had been clouded, with pubs increasingly competing with clubs, bars and to some 
extent restaurants.188 It was subsequently satisfied that overall the UK market was 
sufficiently different at all levels of the supply chain compared to before the Beer Orders 
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and recommended that they be revoked subject to the retention of certain provisions.189 
Nevertheless, there was some acknowledgement by the OFT that competition in the market 
could be improved and so it continued to be subject to review. As discussed in Chapter 4 
however the OFT attempted to resist further investigations into the concentration of public 
house ownership in the hands of pubcos on the basis that the beer tie did not infringe the 
EU competition provisions.190  
4.2 Increasing supermarket forecourts but decreasing pump prices and 
diversity of suppliers in the UK petroleum market  
However, shortly before it recommended the revocation of the Beer Orders, the OFT 
considered competition in the supply of petrol in the UK. Similarly to the rise of the pubco 
in the distribution of beer, it noted that since 1990 the market share held by supermarket 
forecourts had significantly increased from 5% to approximately 23%.191 Their growth had 
encouraged oil companies to diversify into alternative product lines, such as shopping 
facilities, and forced them to focus on their high volume sites,192 as supermarkets tended to 
operate very large forecourts, with substantial throughputs.193 This strategy enabled 
supermarkets to spread the high fixed costs of operating a forecourt and so allowed them to 
charge very competitive retail prices for fuel.194  Consequently, in contrast to pubcos which 
as discussed in Chapter 4 were driving up retail beer prices, supermarkets placed 
downward pressure on petrol prices. Since 1990, these had been cut by approximately one 
third, with a significant improvement also being made in the services offered at 
forecourts.195 However the corollary of this was a marked reduction in the number of small 
independent retailers due to the squeezing of industry profit margins.196 In the face of such 
significant competition from supermarkets, the retail networks of the two largest suppliers, 
Shell and Esso, had also declined significantly.197 The OFT therefore found that 
supermarket growth had “fundamentally changed the market place”, however it concluded 
that the market was competitive overall.198 It had failed to establish that UK petrol prices 
reflected either predatory or collusive behavior by any suppliers or retailers and concluded 
that provided competition between supermarkets and oil companies continued competition 
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was unlikely to suffer.199 Overall, the OFT established that the diversity of suppliers in the 
market would make collusive behaviour difficult at both the retail and wholesale level.200 
The market was therefore operating competitively and did not require any intervention at 
that time, despite the reduction in the number of independent retailers in operation.201 The 
OFT did not consider their decline to have significantly weakened competition, as the 
market was now increasingly supplied by supermarket and company owned sites.202 While 
independent dealers generally acted as agents for branded suppliers who constrained their 
scope to adjust prices, supermarkets set their own prices.203 Consequently, as independent 
retailers did not offer any benefits for competition beyond those offered by a company or 
supermarket owned site, their decline was not a concern from a competition perspective.204 
The OFT also stated that whilst there had been some entry and exit from the market the 
number of wholesalers in the UK had not fallen since 1990 and so market foreclosure due 
to vertical integration from refining to retailing was not a current problem.205 It was 
however concluded that the market would again require to be monitored to ensure that 
competition between the major players was not dampened in the event it became more 
concentrated.206 
5. On-going challenges  
5.1 Pricing issues in the distribution of beer 
Despite the OFT’s declarations of competitiveness, both markets have continued to be 
investigated by the UK competition authorities however both have continued to be cleared 
of any anti-competitive conduct. As discussed in Chapter 4, amidst claims by the Business 
Innovation and Skills Committee that the market conditions prior to the Beer Orders were 
still evident in the UK beer market, the pressure group the Campaign for Real Ale 
(CAMRA) asserted that the retail on-trade price of beer in 2008 was approximately 3.3-3.5 
times more than the price charged in the off-trade, with pubcos’ inflated retail prices 
generally being followed by the market.207 As pubcos were able to increase retail prices 
above market levels, CAMRA considered this to contribute to the closure of public houses 
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in the UK.208 The OFT however continued to decline to alter its position that ‘there was no 
significant competition problem in respect of the beer and pub market’.209 As discussed in 
Chapter 4 however, as part of the on-going scrutiny of the operation of the beer tie in the 
UK market, CAMRA submitted a super-complaint to the OFT on the basis that the UK pub 
industry and the beer tie in particular, are anti-competitive.210  As noted in Chapter 4, in 
dealing with such concerns over the operation of the tie, the OFT has frequently deferred to 
the fact that they, along with the Competition Commission and the European Commission, 
have reviewed this and that no new evidence had been presented to justify revisiting it. 
Further, as discussed in Chapter 4, on rejecting the super complaint the OFT highlighted 
the large number of competing public houses owned by different operators, and the fact 
that consumers benefit from competition and choice between these.211 The fragmented 
nature of the market was deemed not to facilitate coordinated behaviour and so prohibited 
pubcos from inflating prices above a competitive level. Again, higher retail prices were 
attributed to higher costs at the retail level as well as the amenities offered by public 
houses to their customers, not to a lack of effective competition between them.212 The OFT 
defaulted to the position that consumers benefit from ‘considerable competition and 
choice’ between public houses, finding no evidence of competition problems significantly 
impacting on consumers.213 A similar outcome was also reached when the OFT failed to 
establish any evidence of anticompetitive practices when addressing pricing issues in the 
distribution of petrol.  
5.2 Pricing issues in the distribution of petrol 
Whilst pricing concerns in the distribution of beer have focused on increasing retail prices, 
with regard to the distribution of petrol in the UK numerous investigations have been 
conducted into the price differential between mainland and rural pump prices, and between 
different regions and towns. The Highlands and Islands have been highlighted as an area of 
concern.214 The OFT has however established that the increased price differential between 
this area and urban UK is not necessarily a result of exploitative behaviour, it being noted 
that competition driven by supermarket forecourts is largely absent in the Highlands and 
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Islands, although some sites were found to have natural monopoly characteristics.215 The 
OFT failed to establish evidence of excessive profits and whilst retail margins were higher 
than those in the rest of the UK,216 higher retail prices were attributed to, amongst others, 
higher transportation costs for lower volumes of fuel and the reduced level of business over 
which fixed costs could be recovered.217 Consequently a higher retail margin was deemed 
necessary if smaller retailers were to remain in business.218 The use of ‘fuel’ cards was also 
highlighted as a potentially contributing factor to the higher prices in these areas as they 
permitted customers to buy fuel in these rural areas at a national average price.219 
Consequently, overall the OFT did not consider there to be any general problems of 
excessive profits or prices.220 Even in areas deemed worthy of further investigation, such 
as the Western Isles,221 the OFT again highlighted the absence of a supermarket and 
established that the total margin earned following deduction of transportation costs, was 
not much greater than that earned on the mainland prior to the entry of a supermarket.222 
The OFT therefore failed to establish an infringement of the UK competition provisions by 
local suppliers.223 This reliance on the absence of a supermarket as explanation for the 
widening price differential between urban and rural areas of the UK continued when the 
OFT revisited the issue in 2012.224  
6. Continued discontentment over the operation of both sectors 
Despite the OFT’s failure to establish any problems of excessive profits or pricing in rural 
areas, the general issue of pricing and the role of supermarkets in particular, has been a 
recurring one in the UK petroleum market. This was recently addressed in the OFT’s Call 
for Information in 2012225 in response to claims that, despite the on-going declarations of 
competiveness, the market was not working as well as it should be. This served to 
highlight the general competitive implications arising from supermarkets’ growing 
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participation in the distribution of fuel with some parallels being evident with the concerns 
discussed in Chapter 5 regarding the role of supermarkets in the distribution of beer in 
Australia. However, around about this time, similar discontentment over the operation of 
the beer tie prompted it to again be revisited by the UK Government, this time resulting in 
a statutory code for pubcos, although this was not a response to anticompetitive behaviour 
within the sector.  
6.1 The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
As discussed in Chapter 4, numerous reports have long urged the Government to take 
action in addressing the competitive implications associated with the operation of the beer 
tie. However, as already mentioned it has long deferred to the OFT’s finding that there is 
no evidence of competition problems having an adverse impact on consumers and it has 
also been reluctant to intervene in the negotiation of the terms of commercial contractual 
relationships.226 Following the OFT, the Government has also highlighted that the beer tie 
is accepted as a legitimate business model under EU law and the apparent absence of any 
competition issues that significantly affect consumers, as justification for their restraint in 
intervening.227 Nevertheless, in 2013 the Government was finally persuaded of the need for 
a statutory code of conduct to regulate the relationship between pubcos and their tied 
tenants.228 The Government did not intend to include a mandatory free-of-tie option in the 
Code given the potential implications of such an obligation, its aim being simply to ensure 
that tied tenants are treated fairly and are no worse off than their free-of-tie counterparts.229 
Consequently the Code was not intended to be a departure from the position that there are 
no competitive problems having an impact on consumers. However, in contrast to the 
petrol market, given MP intervention in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Bill 2014, which received Royal Assent in March 2015 and includes a Market Rent Only 
(MRO) option, as noted in Chapter 4, the UK beer market is now faced with its most 
significant intervention since the notorious Beer Orders of 1989, even although the UK 
Government has not departed from its position that the market is operating competitively.  
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6.2 Increasing focus on the role of supermarkets in the distribution of 
petrol  
Around about the time the Government revisited the issue of the beer tie, in 2012 a call for 
information was launched in response to claims, mainly by the Petrol Retailers 
Association,230 that the UK petrol sector was not working as well as it should, with the aim 
being to determine how best to rectify any competition issues.231 By contrast to the 
brewing industry where the concerns remained pubcos’ operation of the tie, the primary 
concern in the distribution of petrol was now the rise and influence exerted by 
supermarkets, with broad parallels being evident with their role in the distribution of beer 
in Australia, as discussed in Chapter 5.232 Included amongst the issues addressed by the 
OFT was that of local competition and the influence of supermarkets; independent retailers 
ability to compete fairly with supermarkets and oil company owned sites; and the issues of 
rocket and feather pricing,233 although it would ultimately conclude that competition is 
working “relatively effectively”.234 At the outset it was noted that the price of petrol is 
influenced by factors including taxation and crude oil prices, and in contrast to pubcos 
which have ultimately driven up the retail price of beer, petrol price increases over the past 
decade have not been significantly influenced by increased margins earned by refiners, 
wholesalers or retailers.235 Before tax and duty, the UK has amongst the cheapest petrol 
prices in Europe although after tax and duty these increase to amongst the highest.236 
Consequently, the OFT opted not to pursue these increasing prices at a national level.237 
The issue of varying pump prices between neighbouring towns and in rural areas was also 
acknowledged and subsequently dismissed by the OFT, although they did not rule out the 
possibility of taking action at a local level in the future should evidence be presented to 
merit this.238  
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231 Above, n.17 at para 1.2, p4 
232 Chapter 5, p196  
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6.2.1 Supermarkets and their influence on local competition 
The OFT addressed concerns over local competition and varying pump prices.239 Whilst 
acknowledging their existence, the OFT sought to rely on a number of possible 
explanations for differing prices including cost factors such as transportation of fuel, as 
well as local competition between wholesalers and retailers.240 As the OFT considered 
wholesale competition to be ‘reasonably effective’ it was deemed unlikely that variations 
in wholesale competition significantly impact on pump prices except in rural areas with 
fewer wholesale suppliers.241 Considering local competition, the most important factors 
were noted as the number of local competitors, and the number of supermarkets present.242 
With regard to higher prices in rural areas the OFT once more deferred to the reduced 
volumes sold by forecourts in these areas, increased costs of supply, and fewer 
supermarkets as an explanation for this.243 With regard to supermarkets, the OFT noted the 
increased market share now held by them with the big four supermarkets’ market share of 
road fuel sold in the UK having increased by 10% between 2004 and 2012, to 39%.244 This 
growth was however considered a positive development from the consumer’s perspective. 
Their countervailing buyer power enabled them to buy wholesale road fuels at lower prices 
than other retailers, and the large volumes sold enabled them, to operate on lower margins 
and to offer consumers lower prices than elsewhere.245 The OFT found that this pressurised 
independent retailers and oil companies to follow suit and reduce their prices, although 
many retailers have ultimately found it very difficult to do so.246 As a result, similarly to 
the number of public houses in operation in the UK, the number of forecourts has 
continued to decline.247 The OFT, however, similarly to its finding that consumers benefit 
from significant competition and choice between public houses, found that in areas of 
closures, retail competition was still strong.248  
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6.2.2 Independent retailers unable to compete fairly with supermarket and 
oil company-owned sites 
Whilst the rise of the supermarket forecourt has generally been perceived as a positive 
development from the consumer’s perspective due to their ability to lower retail prices, the 
OFT was also forced to consider independent dealers’ ability to compete fairly in the retail 
sector, given their submissions highlighting supermarket and oil company practices that 
made this difficult.249 The OFT noted the on-going decline in the number of independent 
retailers over the past 10 years, and considered some of the challenges facing them.250 
They found that independent retailers generally have to pay a higher wholesale price for 
fuel compared to supermarkets.251 The OFT did not, however, consider this to be surprising 
due to their limited bargaining power.252 They noted that supermarkets’ bargaining power 
enabled them to draw on a wide range of suppliers and as they were not limited to a 
particular branded wholesaler they were able to negotiate lower wholesale prices.253 Due to 
the significant levels of business supermarkets offer wholesalers they also generally 
enjoyed preferential supply terms, with this ultimately benefitting consumers through the 
lower retail prices charged.254 However, as already mentioned it was accepted that there 
may be some issues at the local level. Concerns over the operation of forecourts in certain 
rural areas had prompted initiatives such as the Rural Petrol Stations Grant Scheme, which 
was introduced in an attempt to assist rural petrol stations particularly vulnerable to 
closure.255 The OFT did not however consider there to be sufficient evidence of practices 
against independent dealers that would justify investigating the matter further.256 
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6.2.3 Supermarkets pricing below wholesale level and engaging in 
predatory practices 
Whilst concerns in the distribution of beer in the UK are still focused on increasing retail 
prices, the OFT considered and rejected concerns that supermarkets were charging fuel 
prices close to, or below, the wholesale level as they were able to cross-subsidise this with 
profits earned through their grocery business.257 The Chairman of the Petrol Retailers’ 
Association claimed that fuel discounts offered by supermarkets lead to higher grocery 
prices and caused the closure of small independent retailers faced with aggressive 
competition from supermarkets.258 They therefore argued that the OFT should have 
proposed similar action to that taken in Australia where supermarkets are no longer 
allowed to offer fuel discounts which are funded by other parts of their business, namely 
groceries and are limited to fuel saving offers that do not exceed 4 cents per litre.259 
Nevertheless, supermarkets submitted to the OFT that they operated as stand-alone 
businesses, and the OFT identified evidence to support this including that their lower 
prices were due to their increased bargaining power and larger volumes of fuel sold.260  
The OFT also dismissed claims by independent retailers that supermarket fuel promotions 
might ultimately amount to selling fuel below cost.261 Independent retailers claimed these 
promotions were only possible as grocery prices were inflated to subsidise lower fuel 
charges, to the disadvantage of those customers who only purchased groceries at the 
supermarkets in question.262 This was however dismissed on the basis that the groceries 
market is competitive and consumers have a significant choice of retailers to buy groceries 
from should prices be inflated.263 The OFT also dismissed the possibility that supermarkets 
were engaging in predatory behavior against independent dealers.264 It noted that rival 
supermarkets and oil companies offered lower prices than independent retailers and would 
remain in the market after an independent retailer exited.265 Subsequently they would 
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prevent supermarkets recouping losses resulting from their predatory strategy.266 Further, it 
was noted that there did not appear to be significant barriers to entry to the retail market. A 
number of new sites opened, and several closed sites had re-opened,267 although 
independent dealers claimed that supermarkets benefitted from favourable planning terms 
when opening new sites.268 Nevertheless, in light of the lack of examples of supermarkets 
causing the exit of independent dealers due to predatory behaviour, and the lack of 
evidence that consumers were suffering reduced choice and higher costs in areas where 
independent retailers had exited, the OFT considered that it lacked the necessary evidence 
to investigate this further.269  
6.2.4 Reduced competition in the wholesale sector - not a problem shared 
Similarly to concerns discussed in Chapter 4 over the lack of wholesale competition in the 
supply of beer, independent petrol retailers also complained that there was a lack of 
competition in the petrol wholesale sector, highlighting the decline in the number of 
branded wholesale options open to them.270 They claimed that their limited avenues of 
supply meant they had very limited room to negotiate their supply contracts with 
wholesalers.271 This was more so for independent retailers dealing in a single brand of fuel 
than supermarkets, which are unrestricted in their choice of supplier. Further, changes in 
the source of supply are very costly due to, amongst others, the cost of rebranding 
forecourts.272 Independent dealers also alleged that branded suppliers tended to make 
unattractive offers of supply as they wished to focus on expanding their own supply 
networks and tended to shun smaller sites with low throughputs.273 Nevertheless, the OFT 
relied on evidence that the wholesale market had benefitted from importers and blenders 
increasing their market share due to supermarkets purchasing unbranded fuel from a range 
of sources.274 Whilst they concluded that overall the UK wholesale sector is competitive, 
they did however acknowledge that there are areas of the country, such as Scotland, where 
wholesale competition is weaker, with only limited branded supply options available.275 
Concerns over anticompetitive behavior prompted an investigation into the supply of fuel 
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in the Western Isles of Scotland, with the OFT also undertaking to investigate complaints 
as they arise.276 
6.2.5 Competition still working effectively  
Despite the numerous concerns raised, most notably those of independent retailers facing 
aggressive competition from supermarket forecourts, the OFT again concluded that 
competition in the UK road fuel sector is working relatively effectively.277 None of the 
practices by retailers or wholesalers were found to amount to a breach of the Competition 
Act 1998278 and the OFT Chief Executive supported this finding by stating that while they 
“…recognise that there has been widespread mistrust in how this market is operating…our 
call for information has not identified any evidence of anticompetitive behavior in the fuel 
market at a national level, where competition appears to be strong.”279 However he did 
acknowledge that there may be some competition issues at a more local level and that 
action may be taken where evidence is provided.280   
While the OFT found that competition in the sector is working relatively well, there were 
claims that the OFT had ‘turned their back’ on one of the primary issues, namely fuel 
discounting.281 At a time when as mentioned above Australia’s largest supermarkets, Coles 
and Woolworths, had recently undertaken not to offer customers discounted petrol 
subsidised by their grocery business, the Petrol Retailers Association claimed it was 
‘imperative’ that the OFT re-open their investigation.282 The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission reached agreement with the two biggest supermarkets that they 
would stop offering discounts following its finding that this was resulting in a substantial 
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lessening of competition in the medium to long term.283 The Petrol Retailers Association 
subsequently claimed that this discredited the OFT’s response to the concerns raised 
regarding unfair competition in the UK fuel market.284 Similarly to the UK, where, as 
discussed above, forecourt closures are continuing due to aggressive pricing and 
discounting by supermarkets, the Australian competition authorities were concerned by the 
long term effects of supermarkets deep discounting on the structure of the retail fuel 
market.285 Essentially this was a lack of choice and higher prices, as competition is 
removed from the market.286 Subsequently, in light of the Petrol Retailers Association’s 
plans to continue to lobby the UK competition authorities to re-open their investigation, 
with the intention of achieving similar agreement with the UK’s big four supermarkets,287 
it is most likely that this sector, similarly to the brewing industry, will once again be under 
investigation. 
7. No anticompetitive declarations in either sector  
With the exception of the Beer Orders and now the 2015 Act, despite the numerous and 
on-going investigations and concerns over the retail distribution of beer and petrol in the 
UK, reflecting the general mistrust in the operation of these markets, the UK competition 
authorities have been unable to identify any anti-competitive conduct within either market.  
From the foregoing review of these, various reasons appear to have been provided in 
explanation of this. In the distribution of beer, the OFT has generally refused to attribute 
increasing retail prices to a failure in retail competition. As already mentioned, it has 
instead resorted to the position that retail competition is manifest in the increased level of 
amenity and service provision with consumers benefitting from greater choice of amenity 
and price combinations.288 Consequently, increased retail prices have been attributed to the 
‘package of features’ offered by public houses, not a lack of retail competition between 
them.289 In rejecting concerns that pubco ownership of public houses has enabled them to 
inflate prices above a competitive level and notwithstanding the continuing decline in 
public houses, as mentioned above, the OFT has highlighted the large number of pubs 
owned by different operators, and the fact that they consider consumers benefit from 
competition and choice between these. This fragmentation within the market has been 
deemed to prohibit coordinated behaviour. With regard to competition at the wholesale 
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level, whilst a diverse and independent wholesale sector has failed to materialise in the 
distribution of beer, with this still being dominated by the largest brewers, and being a 
source of concern in the numerous reports produced on the market, the OFT has generally 
deferred to the improved market entry at the retail level, which it considers to be 
increasingly differentiated.290  
The OFT also appears to have been similarly optimistic when addressing competition 
concerns in the distribution of petrol. As noted above, reliance has been placed on market 
entry and exit at the wholesale level and the general maintenance of diversity of suppliers 
at that level in ensuring foreclosure due to vertical integration from refining to retailing is 
not a problem. At the retail level, when considering the possibility of predatory practices 
by supermarkets, the OFT has generally been satisfied that so long as competition between 
oil companies and supermarkets continues, competition will not suffer, even if the number 
of independent dealer owned sites continues to decline. Further, in addressing increasing 
pump prices in rural areas, the OFT has repeatedly deferred to the reduced volumes sold by 
the forecourts in these areas, increased costs of supply, and the absence or reduced number 
of supermarkets, as an explanation for this. Levels of local competition have been used to 
explain retail price differences between neighbouring towns and regions. Although the 
authorities remain open to the possibility of anticompetitive practices at the local level, 
similarly to the distribution of beer, there has still been no acceptance of any 
anticompetitive practices at a national level, despite campaigning by pressure groups. 
Whilst these continuing declarations of competitiveness in the face of significant and on-
going discontent are just one of the many shared similarities in the distribution of beer and 
petrol, there are certain features that distinguish them from each other and require some 
consideration in order to determine whether any guidance can be gleaned from the 
distribution of petrol in reforming the distribution of beer in the UK.  
8. Distinguishing features in the supply of beer and petrol  
Despite the many similarities between the brewing and petrol industries, there are certain 
features distinguishing them from each other. Therefore, in order to determine what 
guidance can be gleaned from the retail distribution of petrol in reforming the distribution 
of beer in the UK, regard will be had to these here. In doing so, focus shall be placed on 
the heterogeneous nature of beer compared with petrol’s homogeneous qualities. In light of 
this it will be shown that issues connected to restrictions on consumer choice that have 
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been prevalent in relation to the operation of the beer tie, have not been of concern in the 
distribution of petrol. It will also be highlighted that beer, unlike petrol, has two main and 
directly competing avenues of distribution to the final consumer, as opposed to one in the 
distribution of petrol. This second avenue of distribution, namely the off-trade, is similar to 
the UK petrol distribution market as it is increasingly dominated by supermarkets.  
8.1 Heterogeneous v. homogenous  
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, beer is a heterogeneous product, whilst petrol is 
homogeneous.291 The production processes, raw materials and recipes used in the 
production of beer are differentiated, resulting in varying tastes and appearances.292 As a 
result, strong brand loyalty, regional preferences for locally brewed beer, and increased 
demand for craft beers due to their unique production techniques and flavours, are all 
factors affecting the industry and are not reflected in the distribution of petrol. 
Consequently, certain concerns raised regarding the distribution of beer, have not been 
reflected in the UK competition authorities investigations into the supply of petrol. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, restrictions on consumer choice have been an inevitable, but 
highly problematic, aspect of the widespread use of the beer tie. Whilst petrol was once 
considered to be a heterogeneous product, with major producers relying heavily on 
branding to differentiate their products, since the introduction in 1971 of legislation 
requiring petrol be sold by the ‘star’ octane grading, petrol, grade for grade has essentially 
been regarded as a homogenous product in the eyes of consumers.293 Consequently, even 
although, on account of the significant costs and logistical constraints involved, petrol 
stations can only sell one brand of fuel, this has not prompted concerns over restrictions on 
consumer choice. From the foregoing review it is apparent that this limitation has only 
proven problematic to branded retailers. As already noted, this is due to the fact they are 
reliant upon branded suppliers, and so are restricted when negotiating the terms of their 
supply contract, should they wish to avoid the expense of switching supplier. However, a 
further consequence of petrol being homogeneous as opposed to heterogeneous, again 
distinguishing it from beer, is that price and convenience are now the principal driving 
factors in the consumer’s choice of petrol forecourt.294 These factors have facilitated the 
growth in supermarkets’ market share as they are able to offer fuel at reduced prices whilst 
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also offering increased services, thereby attracting customers to their forecourts. By 
contrast, brand loyalty is still a feature of the beer market, and whilst low prices and 
services offered by public houses are influential in consumer choices, they are not the only 
factors informing their choice of public house. Nevertheless, beyond these differences in 
the nature of the products involved, and the factors influencing consumer choices in each 
market, the distribution of beer is also distinguishable from petrol on account of the fact 
that it has two main avenues of distribution to the final consumer. 
8.2 Two avenues of distribution– the on and off-trade for beer 
Unlike petrol, which is retailed to consumers through petrol forecourts, beer has two main, 
directly competing, avenues of distribution to the final consumer. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, in addition to the on-trade, which involves the distribution of beer for consumption in 
the premises in which it is sold, such as public houses; beer is also sold to the final 
consumer via off-trade outlets, namely those licensed to sell alcohol for consumption off of 
the premises.295 Today, the off-trade sector is comprised of multiple retailers, such as 
supermarkets or convenience stores; and specialised alcohol retailers, namely off-
licenses.296 This off-trade has no equivalent in the supply of petrol. However, similarly to 
the distribution of petrol, this distribution channel is increasingly dominated by the UK’s 
largest supermarkets, with this also being the case in the distribution of beer in the US, 
Australia and increasingly in Belgium, as discussed in Chapter 5. Whilst the on-trade, 
namely public houses, has traditionally dominated the supply of beer in the UK, the 
relatively recent downturn in economic conditions has prompted increased demand for 
comparatively cheaper off-trade beers.297 Given this demand for low alcohol prices, 
supermarkets have rapidly gained market share in the UK off-trade. Similarly to 
supermarket involvement in the distribution of petrol, one of the primary trends in the UK 
off-trade has been supermarkets’ offering beer at greatly reduced retail prices compared to 
other off-trade outlets.298 This has also been a trend in the other geographic markets 
considered in Chapter 5. Consequently, similarly to other national markets, as well as the 
UK petroleum market, supermarkets now also have a prominent role in the off-trade 
distribution of beer in the UK. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that supermarkets have 
managed to evade any conclusions that they are engaging in anticompetitive practices in 
the distribution of fuel in the UK, their increasingly prominent role is one of the primary 
observations gleaned from this review of it. Further, in light of the fact that the on and off 
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trade for beer in the UK are in direct competition, and given that proposals to rebalance the 
beer tie which is widely used in the on-trade will most likely result in increased beer sales 
via the off-trade, as has been the case in Australia, the increasingly significant role of 
supermarkets may merit further consideration. 
9. The rise and influence of supermarkets in the distribution of beer 
From the foregoing review of the distribution of petrol which, notwithstanding the 
differences identified, generally shares many similarities with the distribution of beer, it is 
evident that there has been a shift away from competition concerns focused on the level of 
vertical integration in distribution, to the increasingly dominant role of supermarkets and 
their associated implications. However, this increasing participation by supermarkets is 
also reflected not only in the UK off-trade for beer, but is an increasingly global trend as 
highlighted in the review of the US, Australian and Belgian beer markets considered in 
Chapter 5.  
9.1 Global trend – increased off-trade sales via supermarkets  
As discussed in Chapter 5, following the general outlawing of the beer tie in Australia as 
an illegitimate business model, the off-trade is now the primary means of distributing beer 
to the final consumer and is dominated by supermarket chains Coles and Woolworths. 
However, similarly to supermarket participation in the distribution of petrol in the UK, this 
increased role of supermarkets has attracted the attention of the competition authorities. 
Concerns over, amongst others, the imbalanced bargaining power between supermarkets 
and suppliers generally have caused the Australian competition authorities to consider this 
issue, with some politicians calling for legislation to instigate divestiture in the 
supermarket sector.299 However, this trend of increased off-trade beer sales though 
supermarkets is also evident in the US and Belgium, which as discussed in Chapter 5 
accepts the beer tie as a legitimate business model, similarly to the UK and also has one of 
the most diversified beer markets in the World. Today, the majority of Belgian beer sales 
are through the off-trade, with supermarkets accounting for the largest share of the 
market.300 Nevertheless, the Belgian on-trade sector is still considered to be strong and in 
contrast to the UK market has a reasonably large wholesale and distribution sector 
supplying it.301 Consequently, the increasing influence of supermarkets has had different 
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effects in the jurisdictions considered in Chapter 5, however the UK experience would 
appear to be more aligned with the Australian example.  
9.2 Supermarket domination of UK off-trade  
Supermarkets have been licensed to sell beer in the UK since the 1960s,302 and as 
mentioned above following the recent economic downturn, the off-trade sector in general 
has benefitted from significant growth in sales due to their comparatively cheaper alcohol 
prices over the on-trade. However, whilst enjoying steady growth, the market has also 
undergone significant structural changes over the past ten years, due to a substantial 
decline in one of the traditional distribution avenues, namely the off-license. As a result, 
many national operators have largely or completely disappeared from the high street.303  
This has coincided with the increasingly strong market position enjoyed by supermarkets. 
Their significant growth has been attributed to their low prices; the convenience of their 
‘express’ store formats, which are now widespread on the UK’s high streets; and the 
general convenience of purchasing groceries and alcohol from the same store, which have 
all attracted consumers away from traditional off-licenses.304 Consequently, in 2013 it was 
estimated that multiple grocers, namely supermarkets and convenience stores, now account 
for 75% of the UK market for take home alcohol by type of retailer by value.305 Only two 
of the largest national off-licences are still in operation, and given the considerable 
competition faced by independent off-license stores, it is expected that supermarkets will 
continue to increase their share of the market.306 Subsequently, similarly to the Australian 
experience of supermarket involvement in the distribution of beer considered in Chapter 5, 
as well as the Australian experience of their involvement in the distribution of petrol, given 
the continued expansion of UK supermarkets and the declining number of major players in 
the UK off-trade market, today competition within this market is less robust than it has 
been.307  
9.3 Low beer prices   
In light of the foregoing, similarly to their involvement in the distribution of petrol in the 
UK, supermarkets have used their increased purchasing power and economies of scale in 
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the distribution of beer to expand their market share at the expense of the traditional off-
license stores.308 A key element of this has been their ability to offer alcohol at very low 
retail prices with their increased buyer power being influential in the same way as it has 
been in the offer of cheap petrol to customers.309 By comparison to smaller chains and 
independent off-licenses, which generally have to go through a wholesale intermediary to 
obtain supplies, supermarkets tend to be supplied directly by producers.310 In a similar 
fashion to pubcos, which source supplies directly from brewers, breweries are the main 
suppliers of beer to the off-trade, enabling supermarkets to use their significant buyer 
power to negotiate their terms of supply. These breweries are mainly the larger brewers 
such as Heineken, Molson Coors and Carlsberg.311 Supermarkets have subsequently been 
able to offer substantially discounted deals on alcohol, often at below cost price, in an 
attempt to generate increased demand and increase their market share.312 These deep 
discounts have been significant enough for the Government to take measures to tackle this 
in an attempt to prevent excessive consumption.313 However, despite the UK off-trade 
being in direct competition with the on-trade, this does not appear to have encouraged 
pubcos to reduce retail on-trade beer prices, which as discussed above, are continuing to 
increase and are an on-going issue. Nevertheless, this practice of offering substantial 
discounts on groceries, including beer, has attracted the attention of the UK competition 
authorities.  
9.4 Competition concerns over supermarket involvement 
Similarly to supermarket participation in the distribution of petrol, their role in the grocery 
market has also prompted investigations by the UK competition authorities. The 
Competition Commission314 in its market investigation into the supply of groceries in 2000 
identified two complex monopoly situations.315 It considered that the supermarket practice 
of consistently selling some products below cost distorted competition and damaged 
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smaller grocery retailers and convenience stores.316 It was also concerned by the behavior 
of the five largest grocery retailers towards their suppliers, with the Supermarket Code of 
Practice being introduced to regulate this.317 The supply of groceries by retailers was 
subsequently reviewed again in 2006, and whilst overall the industry was deemed to be 
effective and delivered good outcomes for consumers, it was concluded that “not all is 
well”.318 In addition to their strong positions in local markets presenting a barrier to entry 
to competing grocery retailers, supermarkets’ relationships with suppliers, which includes 
brewers, was highlighted as a potential problem.319 However, in considering the 
competition issues in the supply chain, it was noted that the buyer power enjoyed by the 
largest grocery retailers may be offset by the market power of the suppliers of the most 
prominent brands, such as the largest brewers.320 Supermarket buyer power was ultimately 
deemed to be beneficial for consumers due to the fact that the lower prices resulting from 
this were ultimately passed on to them in lower retail prices.321 They did not consider 
supermarkets’ practice of selling below cost to amount to predatory behavior against other 
retailers and was not likely to result in an adverse effect on competition.322 They also went 
further and considered that temporary promotions on products, including fuel, to increase 
footfall and boost sales may represent effective competition between retailers and may 
benefit consumers by reducing the cost of their shopping.323 The Commission did however 
once again highlight its concerns over supermarkets’ relationships with suppliers stating 
that that should they pass on excessive risks or unexpected costs to suppliers, this would 
reduce the incentives for them to invest in new products and production processes, which 
would ultimately be to the detriment of consumers.324 This prompted some tightening of 
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the terms of Supermarket Code of Practice and the establishment of an Ombudsman to 
oversee the revised code.325  
10. Conclusion  
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that there are many similarities between the 
distribution of beer and petrol. Both are scale economies and as such producers within each 
have long strived to achieve vertical integration and have gone about this in similar 
fashions. This has primarily been through the ownership of retail outlets and the 
widespread use of exclusive purchasing agreements. In light of the shared peculiarities of 
these markets, the exclusive purchasing agreements within them have been singled out for 
special handling at the EU level, with this being a largely unique approach distinct from 
that adopted in the other jurisdictions considered in Chapter 5. Whilst this special handling 
has been influenced by several factors, and was most evident in the terms of Regulation 
1984/83, this is still evident today under the terms of Regulation 330/2010. This deference 
at the EU level towards beer tie and solus agreements has subsequently also filtered 
through to the UK competition authorities’ approach to complaints regarding the practices 
within the distribution beer and petrol industries.  
As has been shown, complaints concerning the operation of both of these sectors have been 
numerous and on-going over many decades, prompting several investigations by the UK 
competition authorities. The earliest of these focused on issues common to both sectors, 
namely the levels of vertical integration and the possible existence of a monopoly situation. 
However, whilst critical of both, these reports were generally less scathing with regard to 
the distribution of petrol. This was due to its relatively competitive wholesale sector, which 
was, and still is, lacking in the distribution of beer due its domination by the largest 
brewers; and new market entry at the wholesale and retail level. However, over the years 
the focus of these investigations has shifted in light of the structural changes that have 
occurred in both industries. Today the operation of the beer tie is still the primary concern 
in the distribution of beer, but with pubcos standing in the place of national brewers; and 
the increasing market presence of the supermarket forecourt and its associated implications 
has largely displaced concerns over oil company-owned sites. This increased role now 
played by supermarkets in the distribution of petrol, has been shown to bear some 
similarities to the increased role they also play in the retail distribution of beer and petrol in 
the other geographical markets considered in Chapter 5, and most notably Australia.  
Consequently, by contrast to pubcos which have been accused of inflating beer prices, in 
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the UK petroleum market the competition authorities have investigated supermarkets’ 
pricing practices, with allegations being made of predation and pricing below the 
wholesale level, with the ability of independent retailers to compete fairly with them also 
being called into question. However, as has been shown, in contrast to the Australian 
position, both sectors, with the exception of the Beer Orders, have been repeatedly cleared 
of any anticompetitive practices. 
Various reasons have been provided in explanation for the repeated failures to identify any 
anti-competitive practices within either sector. As noted above, in the distribution of beer, 
in addition to deferring to the EU’s acceptance of the tie as a legitimate business model, 
the OFT has pointed to the fact that consumers benefit from competition and choice 
between public houses, despite their continuing decline in number; that fragmentation 
within the market prohibits coordinated behavior; and that retail competition is manifest in 
increased capital expenditure on amenity and service provision not reduced prices. With 
regard to the distribution of petrol, when considering the possibility of predatory practices 
by supermarkets, the OFT has generally been satisfied that so long as competition between 
oil companies and supermarkets continues, competition will not suffer, even if the number 
of independent dealers continues to decline; and diversity of suppliers makes collusive 
behavior difficult at the wholesale and retail level. Further, in accounting for significant 
variations in pump prices, the OFT has sought to place reliance on cost factors, such as 
transportation, as well as levels of local competition between wholesalers and retailers. 
This is despite the fact it has been forced to undertake investigations into practices in local 
areas, mainly in rural Scotland, in respect of which it has acknowledged the possible 
existence of competition issues in the wholesale and retail supply of fuel. Further, given 
the general mistrust surrounding the operation of these markets as a whole, and due to the 
largely unrelenting campaigning by pressure groups in both sectors, both have been 
subjected to continued recommendations that they be kept under review. 
Nevertheless, whilst continuing declarations of competitiveness in the face of general 
mistrust over the operation of these markets is just one of the many similarities in the 
distribution of beer and petrol, there are certain features distinguishing them. These should 
be taken into consideration when determining whether any guidance can be provided by 
the distribution of petrol when proposing reforms to the UK beer market. As discussed 
above, petrol’s homogenous nature has meant that issues of restrictions on consumer 
choice, which have been prevalent in relation to the operation of the beer tie, have not been 
of such concern in the use of solus agreements. Further, beer has two main, and directly 
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competing avenues of distribution to the final consumer, as opposed to only one for petrol. 
Although public houses have traditionally been the principal avenue for the distribution of 
beer in the UK, increased demand for cheaper off-trade beer has seen supermarkets 
increasingly dominate this avenue of supply. Consequently, similarly to the distribution of 
beer in Australia, and also in the US and Belgium discussed in Chapter 5, given the 
demand for low alcohol prices supermarkets have rapidly gained market share in the UK 
off-trade by offering beer at greatly reduced retail prices compared with other off-trade 
outlets which have struggled to compete. The increasing market share enjoyed by 
supermarkets has significantly altered the structure of the UK off-trade, prompting the 
decline of the traditional off-license retailers and causing competition within it to be less 
robust than it has been.  
Notwithstanding the differences identified, it is however clear that the distribution of beer 
and petrol share many similarities, including the increasingly significant participation of 
supermarkets in the distribution of products within both sectors. This growing participation 
by supermarkets also appears to be an increasingly global trend. Subsequently, 
notwithstanding the fact that UK supermarkets have generally reduced prices for consumer 
and have managed to evade any findings that they are engaging in anticompetitive 
practices in the retail distribution of petrol, due to the largely unrelenting concerns 
surrounding their participation in this market, it is suggested that their rapidly continuing 
growth and its associated implications should be taken into consideration when reforming 
the regulation of the UK beer market. This is especially so as any proposals to reform the 
beer tie in the UK on-trade will most likely result in increased beer sales via the directly 
competing off-trade and so through supermarkets which, similarly to their Australian 
counterparts, have already attracted the attention of the UK competition authorities in the 
supply of groceries which includes beer. It is therefore useful in the next chapter to build 
on this, as well as the critical examination of the provisions of the newly adopted 2015 Act 
in Chapter 4, and the lessons learned from the consideration of selected geographical 
markets in Chapter 5, to make proposals for the reform of the regulation of beer 
distribution in the UK.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 
This Chapter details the conclusions of the thesis. It also draws on the comparative 
research conducted in the two preceding chapters in order to make recommendations for 
the future reform of the distribution of beer in the UK. In Chapter 5 a selective comparison 
of the UK beer market with other non-UK brewing markets was conducted in order to 
establish how they have dealt with the distribution of beer, and in the preceding chapter the 
UK beer market was compared with the UK petroleum market, as it shares several of its 
characteristics including being a scale economy industry with a natural tendency towards 
vertical integration, causing significant reliance to be placed on tying agreements. 
However, in order to make such recommendations for reform, in addition to relying on 
these comparative chapters the historical significance and role of the tie in the UK market, 
the lessons learned from previous Government interventions, namely the Beer Orders, and 
their resulting implications for the market, and the Government reforms detailed in the 
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (2015 Act) will also be considered 
and drawn on.  
The Chapter first details the conclusions of the thesis (Subsection 1). It then focuses on the 
peculiarities of the UK beer market that potentially complicate the process of reforming the 
distribution of beer in the UK (Subsection 2). The Chapter then considers why the tie 
should not be outlawed in the UK as an illegitimate business model (Subsection 3). It then 
details recommendations to rebalance the beer tie in the UK (Subsection 4). Finally 
concluding observations are noted on the recommendations made in this Chapter 
(Subsection 4). 
1. Conclusions 
The main objective of the thesis was to examine the competitiveness of the methods by 
which beer has been distributed in the UK, focusing on the beer tying agreement, with the 
primary objective of setting out recommendations that better address the on-going anti-
competitive concerns associated with the operation of the beer tie today and ensure a 
socially acceptable level of workable competition. In order to achieve this objective, 
Chapter 2 addressed the historical development of the UK beer market and sought to 
establish why the beer tie has been such an integral part of its development up to and 
including the 21st Century. In the course of this review it became apparent that there are 
many links binding the brewing industry and the public house market, with the beer tie 
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being a fundamental part of the UK’s brewing business. It also became apparent that 
reliance on the beer tie has been a source of concern, from as early as 1817, with these 
anticompetitive concerns persisting through the ages, culminating in the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission’s (MMC) 1989 Report and the resulting Beer Orders. These were 
shown not to be the most appropriate response to the complex monopoly then existing 
amongst the Big Six national brewers at that time.1 The MMC were deemed to have failed 
in their aim of increasing competition in the UK market with the Beer Orders also being 
identified as an important indicator of the unintended consequences that can arise from 
interfering in the use of the beer tie. The research established that their most significant 
consequence was the emergence of the pub company (pubco) with these replacing the 
national brewers in their ownership of significant tied estates of public houses (pubs) 
thereby preserving the use of the beer tie today.  
Chapter 3 of the thesis subsequently addressed the position at the European Union (EU) 
level given its strong competition law regime geared towards opening up markets to 
competition, in order to identify how the EU competition law rules have been applied to 
the brewing industry which relies significantly on beer tying agreements, having the 
opposite effect. The research demonstrated that initially such agreements were treated in a 
defensible manner by the European Commission, with this being influenced by the goals of 
EU competition law, most notably integration. However it was established that a gradual 
tolerance has been shown towards these resulting in such vertical agreements benefitting 
from the offer of exemption under the prevailing block exemption Regulation (BER) or by 
virtue of the application of Article 101(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Such has been the level of tolerance that the Commission’s practices have 
been shown to demonstrate what Everreste describes as a ‘special deference’ towards 
these.2 In light of the potentially anticompetitive effects of such vertical restraints, 
successive BERs have sought to limit their scope and duration, but this has been caveated 
to the extent that the time limits imposed are inapplicable to beer supply agreements where 
the goods or services are sold by the buyer from premises and land owned by the supplier 
or leased by them from third parties. This was shown to be supplemented by the decisional 
practice of the European Commission and to have been maintained under the provisions of 
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the current BER 330/2010.3 This review therefore established that the EU regards the beer 
tie to be a legitimate business model.  
The thesis subsequently examined in Chapter 4 how the UK Government has regulated the 
beer tie, noting any influence exerted by the EU’s tolerance of such arrangements. It was 
demonstrated that while the UK courts initially grappled with the enforcement of the EU 
competition law provisions, the relationship between the two regimes has developed, 
including the harmonisation of the legal provisions applicable to beer tying agreements. 
Nevertheless, the research established that over the course of the decade following the 
Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) 2000 decision that the UK market was sufficiently 
competitive for the Beer Orders to be revoked, concerns over the extensive use of beer 
tying agreements persisted. Over this period it was shown that there was reluctance by the 
OFT and subsequently the UK Government to intervene in the market, the unforeseen 
consequences of the Beer Orders being identified as having a chilling effect on such further 
intervention. The OFT was also shown to frequently defer to the EU’s on-going acceptance 
of the beer tie as a legitimate business model in order to avoid intervening in the market. 
The first substantive attempt to reform the industry since the Beer Orders was shown to 
have occurred earlier this year when the 2015 Act received Royal Assent. This introduced 
a statutory Pubs Code incorporating a Market Rent Only (MRO) option as well as an 
adjudicator to oversee it. However a critical analysis of these provisions highlighted certain 
issues with the 2015 Act. It was therefore established that it had to be determined whether 
the MRO option detailed in the 2015 Act represents the best option for reform of the UK 
market.  
As such, in Chapter 5, comparative research was conducted in order to consider how other 
geographical markets, namely the United States (US), Australia and Belgium have dealt 
with beer distribution. This made it possible to determine whether some guidance could be 
gleaned from these markets on how best to reform the UK beer tie. An examination of the 
US and Australian markets revealed a broad trend between outlawing the beer tie and 
considerable consolidation following, while the Belgian beer market, which tolerated the 
beer tie as a legitimate business model under a legal regime very similar to that in the UK, 
was shown to be preferable. It is therefore concluded that while the operation of the beer 
tie in the UK should not be prohibited outright, in the context of the UK market it required 
to be rebalanced.  
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The thesis subsequently examined in Chapter 6 whether another market, namely the 
petroleum market in the UK, has had the same or similar issues as the distribution of beer 
in the UK. This comparative research revealed many similarities between the distribution 
of beer and petrol including numerous and on-going anticompetitive concerns over the 
operation of both of these sectors over the past several decades. However the research 
demonstrated that the focus of these investigations had shifted within the petrol industry 
from concerns over the use of exclusive purchasing agreements to the increasing market 
presence of supermarkets and their low cost pricing strategies. It was also highlighted in 
the course of the comparison that supermarkets have an increasing role in the distribution 
of beer via the off-trade channel, with this development prompting the conclusion that 
supermarkets’ rapidly continuing growth, and its associated implications, should be taken 
into consideration when making recommendations for the reform of the regulation of the 
UK beer market. 
As noted above, however, in the final year of the research, the 2015 Act became law and 
makes substantive changes to the operation of the beer tie in the UK. Although the thesis 
supports the reforms introduced by the 2015 Act as they have gone some way to meet the 
concerns identified in the thesis, it was submitted in Chapter 4 that these reforms have not 
gone far enough and there are some risks associated with the provisions of the 2015 Act 
that could be minimised. The remainder of this Chapter therefore considers the factors that 
are deemed to be influential, in light of the foregoing conclusions, when making 
recommendations for the reform of the beer tie in the UK, and, subsequently, details the 
recommendations proposed by the thesis.4 
2. The Peculiarities of the UK beer market  
As noted above, from the review of the historical development of the UK beer market in 
Chapter 2 it is apparent that the beer tie has long been an integral feature of the market 
with significant dependence being placed on the beer tie in order to ensure the efficient 
distribution of beer in the UK. Consequently, vertical integration between production and 
retailing has been a feature of the market almost since its inception with the beer tie being 
interwoven into the market structure, and, subsequently, helping to shape it. This reliance 
on vertical integration is not however unique to the UK beer market. As noted above, the 
UK petroleum market is also a scale economy industry and as such producers within that 
market have also strived to achieve vertical integration in a similar fashion, namely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For clarity, in the remainder of the Chapter, the reforms introduced by the 2015 Act shall be referred to as 
the ‘Government’s Reforms’. The recommendations made in the thesis to strengthen the provisions of the 
2015 Act will be referred to as ‘Recommendations’. 
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ownership of retail outlets and the use of exclusive purchasing agreements. Further, from 
the consideration of the US, Australian and Belgian beer markets in Chapter 5, the use of 
beer tying agreements and ownership of retail outlets has been of significance in the 
development and operation of these markets. However, with the exception of the Belgian 
market, significant measures have subsequently been taken in these other beer markets to 
either outlaw or limit the use of beer tying agreements due to concerns associated with 
their use by brewers.  
Notwithstanding this, the UK market has more recently come to be distinguished from its 
counterparts due to the presence of the pubco. Today, due to the Beer Orders and the 
subsequent emergence of pubcos, the UK market is differentiated from the Belgian beer 
market, as well as the beer markets in all other EU Member States.5 Despite the different 
approaches to the distribution of beer adopted in the US and Australia, these markets have 
also not faced any issues with pubcos, as they are not known to exist in these markets. This 
is due to the fact, as noted above, the emergence of the pubco was an unforeseen 
consequence of the Government’s first significant intervention in the UK beer market, 
namely the Beer Orders, in an attempt to address the on-going anticompetitive implications 
associated with the operation of the beer tie at that time. Consequently, the UK market is 
now distinguishable from its counterparts on account of the presence of pubcos, the 
emergence of which highlighted the market’s resourcefulness and resilience when the 
operation of the beer tie is threatened. As discussed in Chapter 4, this serves as a reminder 
of the difficulties that will be faced in making any proposals to reform the distribution of 
beer in the UK that threaten the operation of the beer tie given the powerful players 
involved in the market and the complexity of the relationships between them, which have 
their roots in the historical tied house system.  
However despite these difficulties and the potential for further such unintended 
consequences on intervening in the operation of the beer tie, consideration in Chapter 4 of 
the ongoing anticompetitive implications associated with its operation in the UK highlight 
that the beer tie requires to be restricted in order to address these many issues.  
3. The tie should not be outlawed as an illegitimate business model  
While it is recommended here that the beer tie requires to be restricted in some manner in 
order to address the many on-going concerns surrounding its operation in the UK market, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In Inntrepreneur and Spring, the European Commission noted the presence of pubcos as one of the factors 
distinguishing the UK market from that in other Member States. (Commission Decision of 29 June 2000 in 
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as noted in Chapter 4, successive enquiries have highlighted the abolition of the tie as a 
simple option for reform, but have refused to recommend this due to the potential 
implications, with the unforeseen consequences associated with the Beer Orders being 
highlighted. Further, as noted above, in Chapter 5 in the context of the US and Australian 
beer markets, it has been concluded that outlawing the beer tie as a legitimate business 
model is not the most appropriate option for reform and as such is not recommended here. 
Although consolidation has been a global trend in the international beer market due to, 
amongst others, technological advances, declining consumption, and the desire for scale 
economies, it was apparent from reviewing the development of these markets that there is a 
broad trend between outlawing the beer tie and ensuing rapid consolidation. Today the US 
and Australian markets are characterised as duopolies.6 However, in addition to increasing 
concentration in these markets outlawing the beer tie also prompted brewers in both 
jurisdictions to focus on non-price competition such as advertising costs, thereby raising 
barriers to market entry. Prohibiting the tie subsequently denied smaller brewers the 
protected market shares they enjoyed from being able to serve their own products in their 
own retail outlets, causing them to be forced from the market during periods of 
consolidation as the national brewers came to dominate. By contrast, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the UK market through its toleration of the beer tie has long afforded smaller 
brewers some protection in retaining their market share. This has potentially contributed to 
the fact that the UK beer market, with the exception of Germany, is now home to the most 
brewers in the EU.7  
As noted above, consideration of the Belgian beer market in Chapter 5 further supports this 
proposition that generally recognising the beer tie as a legitimate business model is not in 
itself objectionable. While concentrated, today both the Belgian and UK markets are less 
concentrated than their Australian and US counterparts.8 Although other factors have 
undoubtedly been influential beyond the beer tie, including the largest brewers’ desire to 
maintain a portfolio of brands, Belgium has, under a legal regime not significantly 
dissimilar to the UK’s, managed to retain its trademark diversity which has been lacking in 
the US and Australia and is only recently returning. As discussed in Chapter 5, smaller 
brewers have only recently regained some market share in the US with this growth being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chapter 5, p166 and p190 
7 The growth in the number of micro and craft brewers in the UK has been influenced by many factors, not 
just the toleration of the beer tie. For example, in 2013 the alcohol duty escalator for beer was scrapped, 
thereby boosting the industry. B Berkhaut et al, ‘The contribution made by beer to the European Economy’, 
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assisted by limited exceptions to the 3-tier system and so the prohibition on the beer tie, in 
order to allow brewpubs to operate.9 Similarly, in Australia there has only recently been a 
resurgence in the craft beer sector. This has not, however, required any amendments to the 
competition law regime given that vertical integration is permitted in certain 
circumstances.10 Nevertheless, these smaller brewers are faced with similar issues to their 
counterparts operating in the UK market, despite Australia’s stricter approach towards 
exclusive dealing, including foreclosure from many on-trade outlets. Consequently, a 
general prohibition on exclusive dealing as in Australia does not address the 
anticompetitive concerns facing the UK market.  
It is therefore a primary and general Recommendation of the thesis that the UK, in-keeping 
with the approach of the EU noted above,11 should continue to recognise the beer tie as a 
legitimate business model. However, it is suggested in light of the peculiarities of the UK 
beer market discussed above, namely the existence of the pubco, and the numerous and on-
going anticompetitive concerns surrounding their operation of the beer tie, that while the 
beer tie should not be prohibited outright, in the context of the UK market it requires to be 
rebalanced. 
4. Proposals to ‘rebalance’ the beer tie in the UK 
As noted above and discussed in Chapter 4, despite years of refraining to intervene in the 
market, the UK Government has recently responded to the on-going concerns regarding the 
UK beer market that have followed the Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) 2000 decision to 
revoke the Beer Orders.12 In doing so, it noted the considerable history of beer tie 
agreements in the UK. It also highlighted their significance in promoting the growth of 
small and medium sized brewers, pointing to the buoyant craft beer industry in support of 
its proposition that the existing industry structure is beneficial to brewers.13 The final 
reforms, namely the statutory code incorporating a MRO option and an adjudicator to 
enforce it, are now detailed in Part 4 of the 2015 Act.14  
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10 Chapter 5, 192-195 
11 See also Chapter 3.  
12 See Chapter 2 
13 Chapter 4, p139 
14 Chapter 4, p143 
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The 2015 Act has ‘two fundamental purposes’ namely to encourage the growth of small 
companies and to ensure the UK is regarded as a ‘trusted and fair place’ to do business.15 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Government at the time of its decision to implement the 
statutory code and adjudicator therefore clarified that it was not intervening on the basis of 
competition law considerations, deferring to the OFT’s position that there were no 
significant competitive concerns over the operation of the UK market.16 The 2015 Act 
subsequently reiterates that the Pubs Code implemented by it is to be consistent with the 
Government’s two main aims of ensuring fair and lawful dealing by pub owning 
businesses in relation to their tied pub tenants; and the principle that tenants should be no 
worse off than they would be if they were not subject to a product or service tie.17 In light 
of this, it is recommended in the thesis that the Government’s Reforms should be improved 
upon from the perspective of addressing the numerous and on-going and anti-competitive 
concerns over the operation of the market.  As discussed in Chapter 4, there are several 
issues associated with the Government’s Reforms. However as they represent an attempt to 
rebalance, as opposed to outlawing the beer tie as a legitimate business model, the 
provisions in the Act themselves will form the basis for the proposals in the thesis to 
reform the distribution of beer in the UK. As such the thesis’ proposals are based on the 
implementation of the statutory code of practice. In Chapter 4 criticism was levied at a 
statutory code as a basis for the regulation of the market given the past failings by the 
industry to adhere to such a code.18 It is acknowledged that whilst the observation is 
correct this is, however, the first statutory code to be implemented. Further, in light of the 
ingenuity expected from the market in responding to the Government’s Reforms and the 
Recommendations, given its reaction to the Beer Orders in the early 1990s, it is beneficial 
to have the flexibility that comes with regulation based in secondary legislation in order to 
deal with any unintended consequences. 
4.1 A uniform system of regulation 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the primary concerns expressed over the Government’s 
Reforms was their limited application to pub owning businesses with 500 or more tied 
pubs.19 By including a threshold based on quantity, it has the potential to create a two-tier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 HC Deb 16th July 2014, col 906 
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14071659000001> accessed 7th June 2015  
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17 Chapter 4, p143-144 
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system of regulation for pubcos falling above and below this threshold.20 Such an approach 
is reminiscent of the provisions of the Tied Estate Order discussed in Chapter 2, which 
imposed a threshold of ‘more than 2,000 licensed premises’ as the basis for its application, 
thereby restricting it to the six largest brewers at that time.21 This Order had many 
unintended consequences, including facilitating the development of the pubco. Therefore, 
the first Recommendation is that this threshold is removed thus reducing the risk of an 
unexpected market response. 
The danger of a threshold approach lies in the fact there is a large sector of the market 
which is unaffected by the Government’s Reforms, thereby giving powerful and 
resourceful market participants the necessary impetus to restructure their affairs in order to 
come within the unregulated sector. This causes unintended consequences. It also creates 
loopholes. As discussed in Chapter 4, by focusing solely on the tied pubs of pub owning 
businesses, the managed pubs and pubcos, as well as those owning fewer than 500 tied 
pubs, are out with the scope of the Government’s Reforms.22 The Recommendation to 
include these other categories reduces the risk of brewers and pubcos taking measures to 
restructure their affairs, such as the sale of some of their pubs or the conversion of a small 
number of them to the managed model, in order to avoid the application of the 
Government’s Reforms.23 By removing the threshold, such measures will be rendered 
redundant as the 2015 Act will be applicable regardless of how many pubs are operated or 
the manner in which they are operated.  
One of the primary motivations behind the threshold approach of the Government’s 
Reforms was however the removal of small regional and family brewers from their 
scope.24 As noted above, the existing regulatory regime has permitted the growth of a large 
number of brewers, primarily small and microbrewers, with the operation of the beer tie 
long being considered central to their success. The importance of this model and the need 
to maintain this growth is fully accepted. However, there is an equal need to ensure that the 
Government’s Reforms and the Recommendations do not have unintended consequences. 
It is submitted that uniform application of these to all pubs is the most appropriate solution 
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21 Chapter 4, p145 
22 Chapter 4, p148 
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24 Chapter 4, p146 
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to reduce this significant risk.25 As already noted, the Government’s Reforms and the 
Recommendations do not seek to outlaw the use of the beer tie which would have a 
detrimental effect on smaller brewers. The Recommendations are intended to enhance their 
opportunities under the Government’s Reforms to gain market share through increased 
access to retail outlets for their products and via enhanced distribution arrangements. Such 
arrangements have long been a source of concern for smaller brewers in the UK and in the 
other geographical markets selected for comparative analysis in Chapter 5. Further, as 
noted in Chapter 4, the operation of the beer tie by smaller and family owned brewers has 
not been entirely without concern which further supports the Recommendation for a 
uniform system of application applicable to all market participants.26 
4.2 Preservation of stocking obligations  
As noted above, retaining and promoting the success of the UK’s variety of brewers is an 
important consideration in making Recommendations. Section 68(5) of the 2015 Act 
subsequently removes stocking obligations in respect of beer and cider from the scope of 
Part 4 of the Act.27 This approach is welcomed and would have been a Recommendation of 
the thesis had this not been met by the Government’s Reforms, due to their deemed 
importance discussed in Chapter 4, in protecting the market position of brewing pubcos 
and small and regional brewers.28 Such obligations have the advantage of affording 
brewers the protection of requiring that their products be sold from their own premises but 
allows the tenant the protection of sourcing these on the open market from any supplier 
they wish, thereby reducing the possibility that they are forced to pay anticompetitive 
prices for those brands. The brewer has to compete for the tenant’s business and so offer 
the best price for their products.29 The stocking obligation also precludes the tenant from 
being prohibited from selling on the premises competing suppliers’ beer or cider, thereby 
introducing increased consumer choice and flexibility for the tenant to respond to changing 
consumer preferences. However, as noted in Chapter 4, it will be essential that the brewer 
does not circumvent this by ensuring that they are the only source from which their brands 
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can be bought.30 Such potential implications are however unavoidable and as such require 
to be managed effectively by the adjudicator.  
4.3 The Market Rent Only (MRO) option 
Section 43 of the 2015 Act details the most controversial of the Government’s Reforms to 
the beer tie, namely the MRO option. The MRO option essentially frees the tenant or 
licensee of any ties to their landlord and obligates them to pay only the market rent for the 
property.31 The second Recommendation is to make the MRO option available to all 
prospective or existing pub tenants and licensees in order to rebalance the beer tie in the 
UK. This is however a significant market intervention which greatly weakens the operation 
of the beer tie. Therefore, in recognition of the importance of preserving the operation of 
this business model in the UK market, the Recommendation is that the MRO option whilst 
available to all tenants and licensees must only be available under very limited and clearly 
defined circumstances, which will be set out below.  
The MRO option however potentially addresses many of the on-going anticompetitive 
concerns over the operation of the beer tie discussed in Chapter 4 and essentially allows 
the market to decide whether or not the tied or free-of-tie model is best rather than 
imposing a mandatory free-of-tie business model on the market.32 While concerns have 
been expressed that the MRO option will cause investment in pubs to cease, should a 
tenant or licensee be in a relationship with a Landlord under which they benefit from such 
investment or other benefits, it is submitted that it is highly unlikely that they would accept 
the MRO offer, and so change their contractual arrangements with the landlord, thereby 
reducing the potential for this to occur. As noted in Chapter 4, the MRO option also offers 
the potential benefit of opening up retail outlets to competing brewers’ products thereby 
reducing barriers to entry for small and new brewers seeking a distribution channel for 
their products. This subsequently reduces the risk of market foreclosure, as well as 
increasing consumer choice should MRO tenants and licensees choose to stock a wide 
range of brands.33 MRO tenants and licensees can also source these brands on the open 
market, rather than from their landlord at inflated wholesale prices, which should result in 
lower retail prices for consumers.34 
As stated above, this second Recommendation is subject to conditions. 
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32 Chapter 4, p139 
33 Chapter 4, p139-140  
34 Chapter 4, p120 
 	  278	  
4.3.1 Circumstances under which MRO option is to be offered  
Section 43 of the Government’s Reforms details numerous circumstances under which the 
MRO option is to be offered. As noted in Chapter 4, many of these circumstances are 
subjective and so lacking in certainty thereby potentially extending the application of these 
provisions, and causing uncertainty, which greatly undermines the operation of the beer 
tie.35 By contrast, the second Recommendation is that this option be available only on two 
clearly defined occasions.  
Firstly, at the time the tenancy or licence agreement is entered into between the parties. 
The Government opted not to make the MRO option available to prospective tenants, 
instead placing reliance on the flawed parallel rent assessment under the provisions of the 
2015 Act.36 However, offering the MRO option at the outset increases transparency by 
allowing the prospective tenant access to the necessary information to make an informed 
decision as to which business model to pursue, thereby reducing the possibility of them 
entering into a disadvantageous contract.37 This ultimately increases the prospect of an 
effective and efficient business relationship between the parties which is in the interests of 
the market and ultimately the consumer.  
The second occasion on which it is proposed that the MRO option should be offered is ‘on 
the later of the rent assessment or assessment of money payable by the tenant in lieu of 
rent, or after a period of four years from the commencement date of the tenancy or licence 
under which the pub is occupied’. This Recommendation is intended to remove the 
subjectivity and so the uncertainty associated with the Government’s Reforms, thereby 
reducing the potential scope of the MRO option and its weakening effect on the operation 
of the beer tie. It ensures that existing tenants or licensees are provided with a clear 
opportunity to decide whether or not to persist with their contractual arrangements with 
their landlord. Postponing the offer until after a period of at least four years also balances 
the level of intervention the MRO option represents for the market, with the tenant or 
licensee’s freedom to determine whether they wish to pursue the MRO option.  
While this Recommendation potentially denies existing tenants and licensees an immediate 
solution by delaying the offer of the MRO option by a period of at least four years, the 
third Recommendation is to phase the implementation of the MRO option and so reduce 
the impact of this intervention in the market. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Beer Orders 
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sent shock waves through the industry by requiring that their terms be met with by a set 
compliance date and may have contributed to the unforeseen consequences they had.38 It is 
therefore necessary to avoid repeating this with the Government’s Reforms and the 
Recommendations. As already mentioned one of the greatest challenges to the 
Government’s Reforms and the Recommendations will be the resourcefulness of the 
market in attempting to evade their application.  By limiting the offer of the MRO option 
to two clearly defined occasions and phasing its implementation under the third 
Recommendation should reduce one such risk, namely pubcos converting their tied estates 
to managed estates in order to avoid being subject to the Government’s Reforms.39 This 
risk is already minimised by the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 2, pubcos are essentially 
property owning companies. As such they are unlikely to restructure their entire estates, 
thereby foregoing the rental income generated, in order to evade the MRO option which 
need only be offered under the limited circumstances outlined by the second 
Recommendation. It is also even more unlikely where the pubco is also a brewer given 
their dependence on their tied estates.40 Nevertheless this is a risk that should be 
acknowledged and addressed.  
Limiting and phasing the MRO option under the Recommendations should also reduce 
other concerns associated with its implementation. This includes the potential for pubco 
estates to suddenly become entirely free-of-tie, which would deny them the benefit of 
economies of scale. Such a change would limit the pubco’s ability to negotiate discounts 
from brewers as is central to their business model, and was a concern discussed in Chapter 
4.41 The possibility that pubco tenants may opt to pursue the MRO option may however 
have the beneficial effect of encouraging pubcos to pass on some of these discounts to their 
tenants, through lower wholesale beer prices, in order to reduce the likelihood of their 
tenants accepting the MRO option.42 Further, phasing the offer of the MRO option under 
the Recommendations should also reduce the risk that the market will be flooded with free-
of-tie pubs in a manner reminiscent of the market effects of the Beer Orders.43  
The Recommendations address another concern associated with the MRO offer discussed 
in Chapter 4, namely the potential for international brewers to dominate the market by 
offering discounts to MRO tenants in return for exclusivity, thereby causing market 
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foreclosure.44 While the Recommendations will cause there to be a greater number of 
MRO pubs than under the existing regulatory regime, by limiting and phasing its offer, 
only a proportion of pubs in the UK should be MRO pubs under the Recommendations. 
Further some of these will be subject to stocking obligations and so complete exclusivity 
could not be offered to the international brewers. Consequently these brewers should not 
be able to achieve the scale necessary to dominate the UK market simply on the basis of 
the Recommendations, as they were under the Beer Orders.45 Further, should tenants and 
lessees who are free of stocking obligations choose to be supplied by these international 
brewers, the decision to do so will be influenced by, amongst others, consumer demand for 
their products.  As the majority of pubco estates in the UK are already supplied by these 
international brewers as they offer pubcos the greatest discounts,46 the MRO option should 
therefore introduce the chance for tenants and licensees to decide whether there is 
sufficient demand to replace these with other brewers’ products, thereby having the 
opposite effect.  
The MRO option subject to the Recommendations subsequently presents the opportunity to 
increase the level of competition in the UK market without being as extreme and as 
interventionist as the Beer Orders, thereby reducing the likelihood of unforeseen 
consequences. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of an independent 
wholesale and distribution sector in the UK market has been a source of concern since the 
MMC’s 1989 Report.  
4.4 Impact on the wholesale and distribution sector  
As discussed in Chapter 6, despite sharing many of the characteristics of the petrol 
industry, the UK competition authorities have tended to be less scathing with regard to the 
UK petroleum market, by comparison to the UK beer market, on account of its relatively 
competitive wholesale sector. By contrast, the UK beer market has long lacked such an 
independent wholesale and distribution sector. Following the Beer Orders, wholesaling and 
distribution is still dominated by the largest brewers with pubco operating practices being 
considered to encourage this.47 However, as the Recommendations remove the ‘500 tied 
pubs’ threshold requirement for the offer of the MRO option and extends it to all tenants 
and licensees, albeit under narrow clearly defined circumstances, and on a phased basis, 
there will inevitably be a greater number of free-of-tie pubs in the longer term requiring to 
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be supplied with beer than under the existing regulatory regime. As noted above, 
depending on, amongst others, consumer demand, these pubs may opt to serve the products 
of local and regional brewers. Consequently, the MRO option could increase the likelihood 
of an independent wholesale and distribution sector emerging to distribute these beers to 
MRO outlets thereby reducing the international brewers “stranglehold on the distribution 
of beer”.48 This could potentially avoid the need for more interventionist measures to 
achieve this goal, such as mandating divestiture within the distribution sector in order to 
ease the largest brewers’ grip on the UK market. The MRO option subject to the 
Recommendations therefore has the potential to facilitate small brewers’ access to 
distribution arrangements for their products which is an on-going issue facing such brewers 
not only in the UK but in the other geographical markets discussed in Chapter 5.   
4.5 Meeting the challenge presented by supermarkets 
Supermarkets however, also have a prominent role in the distribution of beer in the UK off 
trade market and this could potentially increase under the Government’s Reforms and the 
Recommendations.49 As discussed in Chapter 5, the role of supermarkets in the distribution 
of beer in the US and Australian beer markets increased following intervention in the 
operation of the beer tie in the on-trade.50 This is due to the fact beer has two directly 
competing avenues of distribution to the final consumer through the on and off-trade 
markets.51 Any proposals to reform the beer tie in the UK on-trade will therefore most 
likely result in increased beer sales via the off-trade and so through supermarkets. As noted 
above and discussed in Chapter 6, supermarkets now also have a prominent role in the 
distribution of petrol in the UK, with their participation in the market being the focus of 
recent competition enquiries, not suppliers’ reliance on exclusive purchasing agreements. 
However, in contrast to pubcos which have been accused of inflating beer prices, the UK 
competition authorities have investigated supermarkets’ pricing practices under allegations 
that they are engaging in predation and pricing below competitive levels, in the petroleum 
market. Similar concerns have also been raised in the UK grocery market, although this has 
not been accepted by the competition authorities.52 As discussed in Chapter 5, their 
practices have also attracted the attention of the Australian competition authorities.53 
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Nevertheless, increasing beer prices in the on-trade due to pubcos’ failure to pass on 
wholesale discounts to lessees have subsequently caused pub closures as consumers have 
turned to lower off-trade sales, primarily those of supermarkets given their low cost pricing 
strategies.54 However the Recommendation for the uniform application of the MRO option 
and its offer to all tenants and lessees, in conjunction with the acceptance of stocking 
requirements, increases the likelihood of suppliers’ having to price their beer more 
competitively, which should subsequently filter through to lower retail prices in the on-
trade. These Recommendations should therefore potentially reduce retail prices and so also 
reduce the challenge and competitive implications for the UK beer market resulting from 
supermarkets’ increasing participation.  
4.6 Concluding observations 
The beer tie has long been an integral feature of the market with significant dependence 
being placed on this in order to ensure the efficient distribution of beer in the UK. While it 
is not proposed in the thesis that the beer tie be outlawed as an illegitimate business model, 
it is recommended that it be rebalanced by building on the Government’s Reforms. Given 
the unforeseen consequences of past market interventions, namely the Beer Orders, the 
Recommendations seek to mitigate the risk of these arising. It is proposed that this be 
achieved by removing the threshold of ‘500 tied pubs’ for the application of the 
Government’s Reforms thereby implementing a uniform system of regulation, that the 
offer of the MRO option be restricted to two clearly defined events in order to remove any 
subjectivity and to limit the uncertainty associated with its offer, and that the 
implementation of the proposals be phased in order to avoid sending shock waves through 
the industry, as the Beer Orders did in the 1990s and thereby potentially contributed to 
their dramatic impact on the market. However, while it is hoped that these 
Recommendations will safeguard against such unintended consequences, given the 
powerful players involved in the market and the complexity of the relationships between 
them, which have their roots in the historical tied house system, making recommendations 
is a complicated matter and no perfect solution exists.  
As stated at the outset,55 the intention of the thesis is not to make recommendations to 
achieve a state of perfect competition. Rather, it undertakes to make informed 
recommendations that address better the competition issues in the market today. It remains 
to be seen whether the MRO option as refined by the Recommendations presents the 
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optimal solution for reform of the beer tie, however it is hoped that given the safeguards 
outlined above, it should strike the right balance between addressing the on-going anti-
competitive concerns associated with the operation of the beer tie and the need to preserve 
it as a legitimate business model in the UK beer market thereby ensuring a socially 
acceptable level of workable competition. 
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